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The submarine is used as a case study to examine British attitudes to 
developing naval technology. Study of the Royal Navy's submarine policy 
suggests that the Admiralty was less conservative and more able than is 
often supposed. 
The British were thoroughly conversant with all significant developments 
in underwater warfare from 1853. There was an early, if abstract, 
appreciation of the potential of submarine boats, but a distinction must be 
drawn between adequate technical assessments of early submarines and 
inadequate appreciation of the strategic consequence of developments in 
submarine warfare. 
Development of British policy was greatly influenced by restrictive 
agreements concerning the type of vessels to be built by the Vickers arms 
firm, by the character and personal beliefs of successive Inspecting Captains 
of Submarines, and by the Royal Navy's decision to resume partial 
responsibility for coast defence from the Army. 
British experience is put into context by a study of the submarine 
policies of other powers. The importance of the coastal submarine to 
Imperial defence is discussed, the patrol submarine's influence on the 
British policy of blockade is assessed, and the failure to anticipate 
unrestricted submarine warfare examined. In the final chapter, the 
performance of RN boats in the Great War is set against pre- and 
post-war submarine policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Between 1914 and 1918, U-boats sank 11,148,027 tons of British and 
allied shipping and nearly won the war for the Central Powers [1]. This 
bald statistic is a measure of the terrible impact of a new weapon of 
destruction. Quite simply, the submarine was and remains the single most 
dramatic innovation in naval history. 
It upset the existing balance of naval power in a way that the 
Dreadnought, the ironclad - even the naval gun itself - had never done. 
It was more mobile than the mine, more insidious than the simple fish 
torpedo. It brought a new dimension to naval warfare, striking a heavy 
blow at British naval supremacy; and though no power hoping to gain 
command of the sea could do it with submarines alone, it offered 
predominantly military nations the means with which to hazard maritime 
lines of communication and supply without building a ruinously expensive 
surface fleet. By exposing merchant shipping to the continual danger of an 
unseen attack, the submarine made the new war at sea as terrible as the 
war to come on land. 
It may seem perverse, then, for this study to concentrate on British 
submarine policy. French inventiveness forced the Royal Navy to build its 
own boats. American business sense provided the Admiralty with the means 
to do so, and it was German ruthlessness that made the new weapon so 
formidable. Great Britain, whose flag flew over of 75% of the world's 
merchant shipping as well as the battle squadrons of the most powerful 
navy ever seen, had more reason to fear the submarine than any of her 
rivals, and was nearly ruined because she failed to appreciate the true 
magnitude of the threat it posed. But the roots of Britain's failure lie in 
the naval history of the preceding 60 years. 
1 [1] Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, 1904-1919 (Oxford 1961-70), V, 110 
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This study has two main aims: to explore the ways in which a complex 
organisation such as the Royal Navy adapted to new technology in an era 
of change, and to explain why that organisation was so poorly prepared for 
the submarine war of 1914-1918 that it was nearly humbled by the 
"weapon of the weaker power". 
In structure, the thesis can be divided into two fairly distinct sections. 
The first, which consists of the long opening chapter and the first part of 
chapter two, looks at nineteenth century submarine policy in some detail 
and puts the history of British submarine warfare in the years 1900-1918 
in context for the first time. 
Underwater craft are used as a tool with which to explore naval 
attitudes to technological change because the submarine can be introduced 
as a control in an assessment of the degree to which the Royal Navy was 
open to innovation. The major inventions of the nineteenth century - 
steam, ironcladding, shell guns, rifling and breech-loading - combined to 
enhance the efficiency of the battleships on which British naval power 
depended. To a lesser extent the same could be said of the torpedo, which 
the RN expected to use in the melee of a fleet action. For this reason the 
Navy was more or less bound to adopt these inventions, sooner or later, 
whatever the level of conservatism and apathy in the service. 
The Victorian submarine, on the other hand, was almost entirely useless 
to a naval power such as Great Britain. There was no pressing need for 
the nineteenth century Royal Navy to possess submarine boats. For this 
reason, British submarine policy can tell us much about the Navy's real 
attitude to technological change: whether RN decisions were based on 
technical or strategic assessments, and more particularly the degree to which 
moral revulsion and blind conservatism afflicted the naval hierarchy. 
The Royal Navy's response to developing submarine technology in the 
years 1853-1900 has never been properly examined before, but the wealth 
of new evidence uncovered suggests that the Admiralty did not - as all 
earlier histories have argued - close its mind to the submarine. Nor did 
the RN sneer at the immorality of a weapon of sneak attack and base its 
policy upon an irrational distaste for underwater warfare, as popular works 
commonly suppose. 
The Navy's conservative strategy was developed from a realistic policy 
opposed to innovation for its own sake. The Admiralty was generally well 
informed of developments in underwater warfare and made accurate 
technical assessments of most of the submarines built in this period, though 
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it never understood the strategic potential of underwater warfare. But the 
inability of its intelligence organisation to evaluate the progress made by the 
French navy in the 1890s, combined with a failure to appreciate the 
significance of the work being done by the American civilians John Holland 
and Simon Lake, left the RN vulnerable and forced it to place hurried 
orders for Holland type submarines in December 1900. 
The second portion of the thesis deals with British submarine policy in 
the period 1901-1918, and though no less detailed it is somewhat more 
concise, the bare bones of the story being better known. Chapter three 
examines the construction history of the submarine and discusses the 
important part played by the Vickers arms firm in the development of 
British boats. The Admiralty's motives for granting Vickers an effective 
monopoly over construction are outlined, and in the second part of the 
chapter the degree to which the monopoly influenced the design of 
submarines built for the Royal Navy is assessed. Chapter four looks at 
British submarine personnel and the role played by successive Inspecting 
Captains of Submarines. By discussing the compromises forced upon the 
Admiralty as it attempted to recruit and train submarine crews, it offers a 
new perspective on the RN's puzzling belief that enemy submarines could 
not operate off the east coast of England or in the Atlantic by suggesting 
that serious under-estimation of crew endurance was directly responsible for 
neglect of the underwater defences of British ports and contributed to the 
lack of urgency shown in the development of anti-submarine warfare. 
The early history of British ASW is dealt with in chapter 7, and the 
major theme of British failure to evaluate the true potential of submarine 
warfare is discussed in more detail in the fifth chapter, which examines RN 
attempts to assess a developing weapon by examining its performance in 
manoeuvres and in service with rival navies. In chapter six the submarine is 
placed in the context of contemporary British naval strategy, and its impact 
on both defensive and offensive operations is described. General naval 
ignorance of the type's potential, caused in part by the decision to make 
the submarine branch a closed service, delayed the incorporation of the 
submarine into the Navy's offensive strategy, while Admiral Fisher's 
unrealistic decision to resume full responsibility for coast defence from the 
army at short notice had the unwelcome effect of pigeon-holing underwater 
craft as defensive craft long after they were technically capable of operating 
offensively. The tardiness with which the RN recognised the role submarines 
could play in re-establishing a close blockade, and the failure to anticipate 
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German unrestricted submarine warfare, were both due in part to the 
tendency to identify the submarine as a defensive weapon. 
The performance of RN submarines in the Great War only emphasised 
the existing strengths and weaknesses of British policy. Individual submarines 
performed extraordinary feats made possible by the excellence of pre-war 
training and the soundness of pre-war design. But in struggling to 
incorporate submarines into a coherent overall strategy, the Admiralty 
doomed itself to devoting resources to useless projects: the steam-powered 
fleet submarine, whose strategic value obsessed the surface fleet and 
obscured the tactical problems of using underwater craft in close 
co-operation with capital ships; the submarine monitor; and, eventually, the 
aircraft-carrying submarine. The inadequacy of British anti-submarine 
tactics was ruthlessly exposed. Only by looking in detail at submarine policy 
in the seventy years from 1853 to 1918 can we understand why the Royal 
Navy was taken largely by surprise by the submarine's performance in the 
Great War and fully explain why the British empire came so close to 
defeat by starvation. 
Three earlier studies - Dr Alan Cowpe's Underwater weapons and the 
Royal Navy, 1869-1918, Dr David Henry's British submarine development 
and policy, 1919-1939, and Dr Michael Wignall's Scientists and the 
Admiralty: conflict and collaboration in anti-submarine warfare, 
1914-1921 - have helped to shape the present thesis. Thanks to these 
works I have felt able to exclude much that would otherwise have had to 
be written on the history of the torpedo, on the anti-submarine branch's 
activities during World War 1, and on those classes of submarine, 
subsequent to the K-boats, whose development was begun before 1918 but 
which really belong to the post-war period. 
The whole work has been read and criticised by my supervisor, Dr 
Geoffrey Till of Kings College, London, and by Commander Richard 
Compton-Hall of the RN Submarine Museum at Gosport. It has benefited 
greatly from the savaging it received. Mr Clive Trebilcock of Pembroke 
College, Cambridge, the historian of Messrs Vickers, has read and criticised 
chapters two and three. He also has the dubious distinction of being the 
first to suggest the study of British submarine policy to me. Nick Lambert 
of Worcester College, Oxford, very kindly supplied me with a copy of his 
analysis of the performance of British torpedoes in World War I. Finally, 
Richard Furlong and Andrew Wilton performed the arcane task of 
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computerising statistics and graphs. Remaining errors of fact, interpretation 
and typing are all my own work. 
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Abbreviations used in the text and footnotes 
ABSP Arthur Marder, The anatomy of British sea power: a history of 
British naval policy in the pre-Dreadnought era, 1880-1905 (London 
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of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols, London 
1952-59) 
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FP Fisher papers in Churchill College Archives Centre 
Halpern Paul Halpern (ed), The Keyes papers: selections from the private 
and official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Baron Keyes of 
Zeebrugge (3 vols, London 1972-81) 
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HSF Imperial German High Sea Fleet 
ICS Inspecting Captain of Submarines 
IGF Inspector General of Fortifications 
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy 
KP Keyes papers in the Department of Manuscripts, British Library 
M-branch Mobilisation branch of the Royal Navy, concerned with 
manning 
MM Mariner's Mirror 
NID Naval Intelligence Department 
NM Roger Keyes, The naval memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger 
Keyes (2 voll, London 1934-35) 
NYPL New York Public Library 
PRO Public Records Office, Kew 
RA Rear Admiral 
RMA Reichs Marine Amt, the German Navy Office 
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RN Royal Navy 
RUSI Jo. Royal United Services Institution Journal 
SM Submarine 
SRLB Surveyor's recommendation letter book, Admiralty papers, 
TB Torpedo boat 
TBD Torpedo boat destroyer 
TH Technical history of World War I in the Naval Library, 
Defence 
TrINA Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects 
USN United States Navy 
USNI Proc. Proceedings of the United States Naval Institution 
WO War Office papers in the Public Records Ofice, Kew 




/ Submarine specifications -depend on whether a boat is submerged or at 
the surface. The slash denotes surface/submerged specifications. Thus 
"displacement 198/220 tonnes" indicates a surface displacement of 198 




All emphases in quotes from primary and secondary sources are from the 
original. 
1.1 SURVEY OF SUBMARINE DEVELOPMENT 1800-1900 
Genesis 
BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1853-1898 
An incident at Valparaiso, 1866 
Valparaiso lies at the foot of hills that tumble towards the Pacific at about 
latitude 33° South. It is the second city of Chile and in the last century 
had a population of about 80,000, most of them supported by the seaborne 
trade around the Horn. Even in the 1860s the city was a cosmopolitan 
place, full of Italians and Britons, though German was the foreign language 
most commonly heard; the ships of a dozen nations swung at anchor in the 
bay. But the broad sweep of the coast offers no natural protection to 
shipping. The deep water harbour can be frighteningly rough, and has 
claimed vessels displacing more than 3,000 tons. 
In 1866 Valparaiso was a city under siege. Two years earlier a Spanish 
naval squadron had siezed two guano-rich islands off the Peruvian coast; 
Chile was drawn into the subsequent hostilities as an ally of Peru, and 
Valparaiso was blockaded by six ships commanded by Admiral Mendez 
Nunez. Seeing that conventional naval power would not defeat the 
Spaniards, the Chileans searched desperately for novel weapons. Early in 
1866, a group of patriots planned a torpedo attack on the Spanish squadron 
in the bay, and at the same time - possibly in connection with this 
scheme - two submarines were laid down in factories by the harbour wall. 
A German named Karl Flach supervised the construction of the larger boat; 
she was built rapidly and launched towards the end of April, a few weeks 
after Mendez Nunez had bombarded the city, causing $15,000,000 of 
damage to trade and merchandise and creating a profound sensation in 
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Europe. After her preliminary trials, the craft was submerged for 
experiment on the morning of 3 May with eleven people on board. So 
confident was the builder the submarine would be a success that he took 
his only son with him. 
The boat had an anticipated underwater endurance of eight hours. 
When 4 May dawned and Flach's submarine had not reappeared, the 
alarmed Chileans turned for help to the British frigate Leander, flying the 
broad pendant of Captain Michael de Courcy, Commodore of a flying 
squadron detached from Rear Admiral Denman's Pacific command. The 
situation was already hopeless, for de Courcy reported that when 
"application was made to me for the aid of divers and diving apparatus... 
the spot where the torpedo had gone down was clearly indicated by air 
bubbles rising to the surface, which continued to rise during that day, 
gradually getting weaker towards evening, and which by Saturday morning 
had all ceased. " [1) The inventor, his son, and nine crew were drowned. 
Flach's submarine was a 45 foot long hand-cranked boat, armed with a 
short breech-loading 42-pounder gun and a 2.5 inch cannon carried in a 
waterproof cupola. She was designed to creep up to the blockaders 
unseen and bombard them with the 42-pdr, which could be fired while 
she was submerged. Despite the provision of primitive hydroplanes to 
control her movement underwater, however, the boat had the fault of many 
early designs, lacking longitudinal stability when submerged. It seems 
probable that she took on an uncontrollable forward inclination and, going 
down in 150 feet of water in the deepest part of the harbour, her sides 
must have collapsed under the increasing pressure. 
Flach's craft was a fairly typical example of the nineteenth-century 
submarine. Built and crewed by enthusiastic amateurs, she was conceived to 
fulfil a specific tactical function, but lacked the most basic qualities of an 
efficient warship. Her motive power was inadequate and her weaponry 
dubiously useful. Insufficient attention had been paid to hull strength and to 
the difficulty of navigating submerged, blind and with zero buoyancy. 
(1J De Courcy letter of proceedings no. 18,22 May 1866, Adm I/5970. For the 
background to this story, see William Columbus Davis, The last Conquistadores: Spanish 
intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863-1866 (Atlanta 1950), especially pp. 285-6,300-06, 
and Roderigo Fuenzalida Bade, La armada de Chile desde la liberation de Chiloe (1826) 
hasta el fin de la guerra Espana (1866) (np, Chile 1978) pp. 638-9. Bade names a 
German engineer, Benen, as the designer of the submarine. Flach's crew is said to have 
comprised five Germans, two Frenchmen, two Chileans and an un-named Englishman. 
The latter thus became the first Briton to die in a true submarine. 
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As an experiment the submarine was a failure; as a weapon of war she 
was useless, since the blockade of Valparaiso had been lifted before the 
boat was even launched - and by a bitter irony hostilities were suspended 
within a week of her loss. But this incident at Valparaiso shows British 
submarine policy at work. Commodore de Courcy, and the Navy, looked on 
as the inventor experimented. They took careful notes, but neither 
encouraged Flach nor showed enthusiasm for his design. The help they 
offered was too little, and came too late. 
When it became clear that rescue was impossible, the Chileans asked de 
Courcy to raise the wreck. As his divers struggled, fruitlessly, to attach 
hawsers and chains to the boat, the Commodore cannot have known that 
his attempts at salvage were as close as the Royal Navy was to get to 
acquiring a submarine in the nineteenth century. 
Inspiration, utilisation, limitations: a survey of submarine development in the 
nineteenth century 
The first significant name in the history of submarine warfare is that of 
David Bushnell. The Yale graduate and his American Turtle were the 
inspiration, direct or indirect, for every subsequent attempt to construct a 
submarine, and although Bushnell himself drew on a vigorous tradition of 
submarine experimentation, it was his example that fired both his 
contemporaries and his successors. "An effort of genius", George 
Washington called it, while John Holland (a man with a better claim than 
most to be remembered as 'the father of the submarine') believed the 
Turtle to be "a remarkably complete vessel, by far the most perfect and 
effective submarine boat built before 1881. " [2] 
Bushnell was born in 1740 in Connecticut. At the age of 31 he went to 
Yale to read divinity, but instead immersed himself in the study of 
underwater warfare, his principle preoccupation being what would today be 
called mining. It was a common fallacy of the day that an explosion would 
[2) Alex Roland, Underwater warfare in the age of sail (Bloomington, Indiana 1976) pp. 
67,70-4; Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine warfare: monsters and midgets (Poole 
1985) p. 93; John Holland, 'Submarine navigation' in Cassier's Magazine, marine number 
1897 p. 541 
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dissipate itself under water and do no damage to solid objects. Bushnell 
realised that, on the contrary, water pressure could be harnessed to 
determine the extent and direction of an explosion with devastating effect. 
He began his experiments by detonating 21b gunpowder charges in the 
coastal waters off New England, and - spurred on by the outbreak of the 
War of Independence - quickly designed a much larger mine. In 1775 he 
and his brother built the Turtle to carry this charge into battle. 
Bushnell was not the first man to construct a submarine boat, but he 
was the first to arm one, and the Turtle was the first underwater craft to 
go into action against an enemy. The submarine herself was a tiny 
one-man vessel whose exact description does not survive. In shape she 
resembled two turtle-shells joined together - hence the name - and she 
was armed with a 1501b clockwork mine secured via a lanyard to a 
detachable auger. The inventor intended her operator to paddle the little 
boat out to the anchorage of a British man-of-war, submerge, and drive 
the auger into the hull of the intended victim. The mine would then be 
released and the Turtle could withdraw to a safe distance while the 
clockwork fuse wound down. 
The heroic attempt by Sergeant Ezra Lee to attach Bushnell's mine to 
the stern of the British 74 HMS Eagle is perhaps the best-known story in 
the annals of submarine warfare. Lee set out from the New York shore on 
the evening of 6 September 1776 and later claimed he had propelled the 
Turtle several miles down the harbour to the spot where Lord Howe's 
flagship lay off Staten Island, only to find that he could not make his 
auger bite into the warship's hull. It hardly matters that recent research [3) 
has shown Lee was probably nowhere near the Eagle on that or any other 
night, that he may well have been overcome by carbon monoxide 
poisoning, concocting his story in order to save face, and that American 
pride in Bushnell's inventiveness has ever since been allowed to obscure the 
facts. The extravagent tributes of Washington and Holland prove that Ezra 
Lee's exploits had inspired them. David Bushnell's example was more 
important than his achievement. 
Twenty years after the Turtle set out to challenge the Royal Navy, 
another American designed a submarine for use against Great Britain. 
I, [3) Compton Hall, op. cit. pp. 88-94 
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Finding himself in France during the Napoleonic Wars, the civil engineer 
and portrait painter Robert Fulton presented a set of plans to the Directory 
of the French Republic in December 1797. Fulton proposed to build a 
submarine capable of attacking the men-of-war enforcing Britain's 
blockade of the French coast. Hoping to reap the rich rewards of prize 
money, he offered to finance the boat's construction himself. 
The inventor's suggestion failed to arouse the Directory's interest, but 
his luck changed in 1799 when Pierre Forfait became Minister of Marine. 
Forfait was a naval architect and had himself designed a submarine as early 
as 1783; he was to champion Fulton's cause for the next two years. With 
Forfait's support, the American laid down a boat called Nautilus which he 
demonstrated at Paris and Brest in 1800 and 1801. The copper-skinned 
submarine was hand-cranked, but the inventor provided her with a 
collapsible sail for surface propulsion. She was armed with a 
mine-and-auger arrangement and incorporated many of Bushnell's 
innovations, but was 21 ft long and carried a crew of four. Fulton was able 
to dive her to depths of 25-30ft and after some practice found he could 
retain rough control over her while submerged with the help of a pair of 
hydroplanes right aft - the first to be fitted to a submarine. In his more 
candid moments, though, the American would confess that his boat was 
"extremely difficult to manage. " [4) 
At one point the inventor received a government grant of 10,000 francs 
to refit his boat and take her out to attack the British, but the blockaders 
were (it has been claimed) forewarned by an excellent intelligence system 
[51 and the Nautilus was too slow and too unwieldy to close a target 
successfully. When Forfait was replaced by the more conventional Admiral 
Decres in October 1801, the French government lost interest in the 
invention [6]. 
[4] Wallace Hutcheon, Robert Fulton and naval warfare (George Washington University 
PhD thesis 1975) p. 67, quoting Fulton to Volney et al, 12 March 1810 
[5] Cf. warning letters to Captain Samuel Linzee of L'Oiseau (14 September 1800, Adm 
2/140 and Linzee's reply of 21 September 1800, Adm 1/2067) and Admiral Lord Keith 
(19 June 1803, in Christopher Lloyd, ed, The Keith papers 111, London 1955 pp. 21-2). 
The warning issued to Linzee was made after a report on Fulton's submarine dated 9 
September 1800 was received from General Gordon; see precis of miscellaneous secret 
papers, Adm 1/4362. The efficacy of these letters must be in doubt; Nautilus was at sea 
between Le Havre and La Hogue from 12-15 September. See also 'Admiral Lord Keith', 
21 June 1803, digest cut 59-8, Adm 121103; Hutcheon op. cit. pp. 60,62,82-3 
16) Roland op. cit. pp. 89-94; Hutcheon op. cit. p. 84 
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The British were more concerned by Fulton's activities than they cared 
to admit, and in 1803 the inventor was offered a substantial financial 
inducement which brought him to London in April 1804. Interviewed by the 
Prime Minister, Pitt, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Melville, 
the American signed a contract which guaranteed him a salary of £200 a 
month in exchange for the exclusive rights to his inventions for fourteen 
years [7]. But the Admiralty had rather less faith in Fulton's submarine 
than had Britain's politicians; the agreement was never fully implemented, 
and Fulton returned to the United States in 1806 to devote his energies to 
the construction of the steam ships for which he is best remembered. 
Submarine warfare progressed no further for a number of years. 
The inspiration provided by Bushnell and Fulton was important because 
it was cherished by a small group of engineers and inventors who had little 
else to encourage them. The story of Bushnell's Turtle seemed to prove 
that a submarine - even a tiny, man-powered boat - could attack a 
warship and be foiled only by bad luck; it inspired designers grappling with 
inadequate technology. Robert Fulton, on the other hand, was one of the 
most celebrated engineers produced by an age rich in engineering talent. 
His reputation and his acknowledged genius lent credence to the somewhat 
extravagent claims made for his submarine. Fulton's experience encouraged 
other projectors (a contemporary term for inventors) in the belief that 
governments could be persuaded to finance the construction of submarine 
boats, and his example encouraged his numerous successors. Since the first 
Nautilus was launched in 1800, at least seven boats have borne the name, 
from Jules Verne's fantastic creation to the world's first nuclear-powered 
submarine [8]. 
The British naval archives contain details of more than 300 submarine 
inventions submitted to the Admiralty between 1800 and 1900. The 
would-be pioneers who submitted such schemes had a variety of motives. 
Many sought naval approval and Admiralty money. A few cranks were 
[7J Articles of agreement between Fulton and the British government, 20 July 1804, Adm 
1/5121/22. See also Hutcheon op. cit. pp. 84-88,90, and E. Taylor Parks, 'Robert Fulton 
and submarine warfare'. Military Affairs 21 (1962) pp. 177-82. 
[8] On Fulton's influence, see also Roland, op. cit. pp. 120-33. So great was the 
American's fame that in February 1880 a man named Stevenson wrote to the Admiralty 
claiming to be Fulton's grand-nephew and requested remuneration for his great-uncle's 
inventions. The application was refused. 'Mr J. Stevenson', 25 February and 7 April 1880, 
digest cut 59-8. Adm 12/1060. 
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certain their inspiration was worth a considerable sum, and figures of 
£10-£15,000 were not uncommonly demanded for a look at some plans; in 
1892 a Mr G. Buckley asked £200,000 for the rights to his submarine boat, 
suggesting that a pension of £500 a week be thrown in for good measure 
[9]. Thirty-seven years earlier, in 1855, the Surveyor of the Navy had 
rejected the plans of Cumberland Hill on the grounds that "the object of 
Mr Hill appears to be to get Employment in the Government Service. " [10] 
Imagination played an equal part. Man's desire to swim like a fish is as 
old as his wish to fly like a bird, and the sheer attraction of submarine 
navigation must be grasped before the effort put into the construction and 
development of underwater craft becomes intelligible. Indeed most competent 
inventors were not primarily motivated by commercial considerations. A 
significant number - the American Simon Lake prominent among them - 
envisaged the submarine as a tool for exploration. Lake, who turned an 
obsession into a successful business in the years before the First World 
War, designed submarines for salvage work, underwater mining and diving 
operations. His ideas were anticipated by Lodner D. Phillips, a Chicago 
shoemaker who built two successful craft on the Great Lakes early in the 
1850s. Phillips suggested that his submarines would be useful for 
pearl-fishing and wrecking - that is, recovering valuables from sunken 
ships [11]. Without private funding, though, such inventors often turned to 
governments for financial support. The progressive modification of the 
Phillips and Lake submarines, which were fitted out with guns and 
torpedoes to make them suitable for military use, indicates a realistic 
appraisal of what was needed to interest the admiralties of the world. 
A third group of projectors constructed submarines to perform very 
specific tasks. The press of war caused several boats to be built in 
desperate attempts to counter the overwhelming naval superiority of an 
enemy; the submarines designed by Bushnell, Flach and a Confederate 
[91 'Plans of a submarine torpedo boat' 29 November 1892, digest cut Ila, Adm 1211241 
[10] Surveyor's recommendation letter book [S. R. L. B. ) 24 October 1855, Adm 92/18 fol. 2; 
see also 'Submarine boat invented by Signor CA Regis', 18 August 1865, digest cut 
59-8, Adm 12/765 
[11] Description of 'Phillips' sub-marine boat', dated 3 January 1859, submitted to Sir 
Baldwin Wake Walker, the Surveyor of the Navy; Wake Walker papers WWL 1, National 
Maritime Museum. 
The most accessible account of Lake's theories is Submarine: the autobiography of 
Simon Lake (New York 1938). Readers should note that while the book is broadly 
accurate in outline, it is unreliable in detail. 
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syndicate led by the New Orleans broker Horace Hunley and an inventor 
named James McClintock, are typical examples. Such projects achieved 
unusual prominence for two reasons: . 
they were frequently backed by 
governments which tended, in wartime, to be less than usually critical of 
submarine devices, more tolerant of failure (in the short term at least), and 
more generous with funding; and they often saw action of a sort, thus 
coming to the notice of contemporaries and historians. Even the 
not-infrequent fatalities associated with such boats were significant from 
this point of view. 
Wartime submarines were most commonly intended for 
blockade-busting. The colonialists, during the War of Secession, the 
French, during the Napoleonic Wars, and the Confederate states, during the 
American Civil War, were all blockaded by a powerful naval enemy. 
Innovation was suddenly at a premium, and Bushnell, Fulton and the 
McClintock syndicate all took advantage of this fact to secure official 
backing for their submarine projects. 
The last notable use envisaged for underwater craft in the Victorian age 
was the infiltration of harbours and destruction of underwater obstructions. 
A submarine-cum-diving-bell built by the British naval architect John 
Scott Russell during the Crimean War was intended to breach the barrier at 
Cronstadt, which was holding up the Allied fleets in the Baltic. During the 
American Civil War a French inventor named Brutus de Villeroi produced a 
submarine with which the Federal navy hoped to attack the rebel base at 
Norfolk and destroy the formidable CSS Virginia while she was fitting out 
[12]. 
For all this activity, few significant advances were made in the first 
eight decades of the nineteenth century. Most inventors worked alone, and 
there was little continuity of effort. Such men generally lacked the 
necessary intellectual, technological and financial resources to build successful 
boats, and submarines intended for service in war were invariably 
abandoned when peace was restored. 
It is important to make a distinction here between inspiration - which 
was freely available to the aspiring designer - and information, which was 
I 
(12] James Baxter III, The introduction of the ironclad warship (Cambridge, Mass 1933) 
p. 286; Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, 
series I vol. 7 (Washington 1902) pp. 488,523-4 
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not. Many problems confronted the would-be submariner, and it was 
difficult to stomach continual frustration and disappointment forever. John 
Holland, the Irish-American inventor of the Royal Navy's first submarines, 
devoted nearly 40 years of his life to an obsession; few were prepared to 
make such a sacrifice. In the absence of official encouragement, moreover, 
an inventor's chances depended as much upon his persistance and financial 
resources as they did upon the merits of his creation. 
The most obvious difficulty lay in finding a propulsion system capable 
of driving a submarine beneath the sea. Early inventors, including Bushnell 
and Fulton, favoured hand-cranking mechanisms and relied upon the 
muscle power of their crew. This imposed severe limitations: Fulton's best 
speed was some 2.5 knots, about the same as that obtained by the 
Confederate submarine HL Hurley sixty years later 113). Other designers 
resorted to specially-designed oars which could (in theory) be feathered 
while submerged, but the 16-oared boat built at Philadelphia by Villeroi in 
1861 -2 proved so inefficient that she was converted to screw propulsion by 
the Federals during the American Civil War [14). 
More promising were various proposals to make use of stored power. In 
the years 1858-9 a French naval captain, Simeon Bourgois, designed Le 
Plongeur, a 420-tonne craft, with the help of the constructor Charles- 
Brun. They filled her to capacity with 23 huge cylinders of compressed air 
which drove an 80hp engine, but the British naval attache predicted she 
would not be successful, and 'he was right [15]. Though the first submarine 
to be built and systematically developed by a major shipbuilding power, the 
boat was grossly inefficient and capable of a maximum four knots 
submerged. A few years later James McClintock calculated that an engine 
fuelled by the 'ammoniacal gas' he had seen powering street-cars in New 
Orleans could propel a submarine along at five knots. The gas could not,, 
however, be safely generated on board, and a commission of British naval 
officers stated that its storage would require "the greatest attainable 
[13] Secretary of the Admiralty to Lord Keith, 19 June 1803, in Lloyd op. cit. III, 21-2 
(London 1955); statement by James McClintock, 30 March 1872, FO 5/1372 
[14] Louis Bolander, 'The Alligator - first Federal submarine of the Civil War', USNI 
Proc. 64 (June 1938) pp. 845-54 
[15] FO precis of Captain Hore's naval attache's report no. 27, dated 23 May 1862, 
Palmerston papers ND/D/24/2, Broadlands Mss. (Department of Manuscripts, Southampton 
University Library); Henri Le Masson, Les sous-marin Francais, des origenes (1800) a 
nos fours (Brest 1980) pp. 19-27 
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accuracy of workmanship... to prevent loss from leakage at joints, glands 
&c., and so to guard against the air in the boat becoming vitiated. " [16] 
Steam was harnessed to drive semi-submersible Confederate David 
torpedo-boats as early as 1862, but the furnaces needed oxygen which was, 
of course, in short supply once a true submarine had ventured under water. 
In the 1870s, however, the Lamm fireless engine was developed to power 
San Francisco street-cars and adapted for use on the London Underground 
Railway. It utilised latent heat and the Liverpool curate George Garrett 
fitted one in his 1879 submarine Resurgam, built at Birkenhead. 
Superheated water (which flashed into steam when released into the boiler) 
drove the little boat along at two or three knots. Similar engines were used 
to propel the four submarines designed by Garrett and built by a Swedish 
arms-maker, Thorsten Nordenfelt, in the 1880s; the partners claimed a 
submerged speed of five knots for their fourth and last boat [17]. The 
Lamm engine did, however, have serious disadvantages. It took fully three 
days to heat the reservoir, and no Nordenfelt submarine had an underwater 
radius of action of more than 20 miles. Prolonged or repeated travel 
submerged was therefore impossible. More significantly, the temperature 
inside a Garrett/Nordenfelt boat rose to over 1000 farenheit when the 
water was superheated. The effect this had on crew efficiency is easily 
imagined. 
Electricity was the answer. The Frenchman Oliver Riou was the first to 
suggest it, in 1861; two years later the Confederate engineer Alstitt 
designed the first dual-propulsion submarine, envisaging a boat powered by 
steam on the surface and electricity when submerged. McClintock expended 
considerable effort in attempts to perfect an electric motor for his second 
submarine in the same year, but abandoned the idea as impractical and 
converted the boat for hand cranking [18]. 
Workable electric submarines were not really feasible until the invention 
of the storage battery, conceived in 1837 but not commercially available 
[161 Captain Nicholson and Mr Ellis, RN, 'Report on a submarine boat invented by Mr 
McClintock of Mobile', 19 October 1872, Adm 1/6236 box II; see also The Engineer, 25 
August 1871 p. 131 
[17] William Scanlan Murphy, Father of the submarine: the life of the Reverend George 
Garrett Pasha, (London 1987) p. 234; Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine boats: the 
beginnings of underwater warfare (London 1983) pp. 48-53,64-71 
[18] Compton-Hall op. cit. pp. 72-3; statement by James McClintock, October 1872, Adm 
1/6236 box II 
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until the 1870s. (The lead acetate battery used in the first British Holland 
craft was developed in 1880. ) [19] Even then there were still significant 
problems to be overcome. The early cells were heavy, inefficient, and 
worryingly prone to leak poisonous fumes. The first modern 
electrically-powered submarine, built with government help by a Spanish 
naval lieutenant, Isaac Peral, in 1888, was not a conspicuous success, and 
the enquiries of the British naval attache revealed "the general opinion 
seems to be that the boat is a complete failure... Lieutenant Peral went 
down three times, but was never able to move more than a few yards. " 
[20] It was the French who finally produced an efficient electric 
submarine. Gymnote was launched in 1888 and powered by a 564-cell 
accumulator battery which was perfected only after years of frustrating trial 
and error [211. 
Then there was the problem of armament. Here too little useful 
progress was made before 1880, although a profusion of redundant systems 
clamoured for a projector's attention. Bushnell, Fulton, and the Polish 
inventor Stefan Drzewiecki favoured mines which could be planted under 
enemy warships as they lay at anchor, but which would have been useless 
against a vessel in motion. Drzewiecki, who built two quite advanced 
submarines in Russia (the first in 1877 and the second two years later) 
intended his boats to dive beneath a ship and release floating* charges which 
would bob upwards and be trapped underneath the target's hull. All his 
experiments with this system failed [22]. Other submarine mining vessels 
were constructed by the British shipbuilder John Scott Russell (in the 1850s) 
and the American Oliver Halstead (in the 1860s); both designed submarines 
which carried divers and explosives to breach underwater obstructions. 
Holland installed pneumatic 'dynamite guns' in several of his early boats, 
planning to bombard his victims from an awash position or close to short 
range and discharge a projectile into the target's side from underwater. 
[19] John Maber, 'The history of the electric battery', pamphlet P1001, Naval Library, 
Ministry of Defence. 
[20] Captain William May, 'Spain - fleet, dockyards &c. ', NID no. 346, April 1893, Adm 
231/22 
[21] Le Masson op. cit. pp. 44,48,50 
[22] Captain Ernest Rice, 'Report, with tracing, of a submarine boat', 27 November 1880, 
Adm 116551; Consul-General Stanley, despatch no. 3 Political, 29 January 1879, FO 
65/1054 
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Phillips and Flach fitted submarine guns to their craft. 
Other designers had their own ideas. Fulton and McClintock 
experimented with buoyant towed torpedoes. McClintock's original idea was 
to dive his submarine under the target, thus drawing an infernal machine 
onto the enemy's hull, but in practice he found it difficult to keep the 
device clear of its parent. Instead his syndicate converted Hunley to carry a 
spar torpedo. A 901b gunpowder charge was secured to a 22ft yellow-pine 
pole projecting from the submarine's bow; it was to be detonated by the 
boat's commanding officer after he had rammed his target. The spar (which 
was also fitted to Le Plongeur and was successfully used by Russian torpedo 
boats in the war of 1877) had at least the virtues of simplicity and 
certainty; it was, however, at least as dangerous to friend- as it was to foe, 
and the Hunley did not survive her famous encounter with the Federal 
sloop-of-war Housatonic on 17 February 1864 - the first (and for fifty 
years the only) occasion on which a submarine sank an enemy warship 
[23]. 
The pioneer submariners had to wait for the invention of the fish 
torpedo -a device that could strike at a distance and reduce a projector's 
dependence on the suicidal courage of his crew - to acquire a weapon of 
significant potential. For unless they could plausibly hope to do more 
damage to an enemy than to themselves, submarines would never (wrote 
Captain Domville, naval attache to France in the late 1880s) "be sufficiently 
a bugbear" [24]. 
The problem was, in fact, a little more complicated than it first 
appeared, and Robert Whitehead's celebrated torpedo - in service by 1869 
- was not fitted to a submarine until 1885. This may seem odd, given the 
enthusiasm with which the weapon was adopted by many navies in the 
1870s, but there were good reasons for the delay. Most obviously, those 
who could afford to purchase the inventor's expensive secret had no 
intention of fitting the Whitehead to submarine boats. The Royal Navy, 
which led the world in torpedo development during the 1870s, envisaged its 
use on board ocean-going warships, perhaps as a sort of long-range ram 
[23] On the details of the Hunley's armament, see Milton Perry, Infernal machines: the 
story of Confederate submarine and mine warfare (Baton Rouge 1965) pp. 98-99 and 
Eustace Williams, Tice Confederate submarine Hunley documents (np Van Nuys, California 
1958, typescript in the New York Public Library) 
[24] Captain William Domville, 'France: guns and torpedoes 1889', NID no. 211, December 
1889, Adm 231/16 
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in the confused melees that were expected to characterise a war at sea. 
Britain's 3,000-ton Mersey class torpedo cruisers were the logical products 
of this policy. Other nations preferred small, manouevrable torpedo boats 
that could press home an attack at short range, but depended for their 
safety on speeds far beyond any contemporary submarine [25]. 
The 'secret' of the Whitehead torpedo - the balance chamber that 
enabled the weapon to travel at any set depth - was well guarded. Little 
or no information was made available to outsiders, and during the 1860s 
and the 1870s submarine inventors were kept in profound ignorance of the 
Whitehead's capabilities. Having paid £15,000 for the privilege of obtaining 
the inventor's plans, the Royal Navy was not about to reveal them to the 
world. The majority of its officers knew nothing of the torpedo's workings; 
neophytes were sworn to silence before being initiated into the secret, and 
only a handful of men fully understood a Whitehead 'fish' [26). 
The torpedo was in any case a controversial weapon. The fate of the 
HL Hunley (destroyed by the explosion of her own torpedo) encouraged 
the widespread belief that all torpedo-armed submarines were seriously at 
risk every time they went into action. In 1885 the research station HMS 
Vernon remarked of the Norden felt I that "it remains to be shown how far 
this boat and those like her will stand the effect of a submarine explosion 
at a comparatively short distance. " [27) Eleven years later, the officer 
commanding the French boat Gustave Zede suggested to Lord Charles 
Beresford that "when it fired its own torpedo the concussion could smash 
the boat. " [28] Not until the French conducted careful trials in the 1890s 
was it acknowledged that a submarine was only endangered if closer than 
[25] Alan Cowpe, Underwater weapons and the Royal Navy, 1869-1918 (London 
University Ph. D. 1980) pp. 26-8,69,71,114-27,172-81. Proponents of underwater 
craft often pointed out that Whitehead's torpedo was in effect a miniature automatic 
submarine boat; and indeed the German Navy considered in 1874 a proposal that the 
British inventor should design them a submarine. RE Stotherd, 'Report on the German 
torpedo establishments at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven &c. ' 25 November 1874, GT Phipps 
Homby papers PHI 109/3, National Maritime Museum. Similarly, the inventor Louis 
Brennan, designer of a short-range wire-guided torpedo for coast defence, suggested that 
he should build a submarine for the Royal Navy; Wilson memo 'Submarine boats'. 15 
January 1901, Adm 117515. 
[26] Coape op. cit. pp. 18,35 
[27] HMS Vernon annual report 1885 p. 63, Adm 189/5 
[28] The memoirs of Lord Charles Beresford (London 1914) 1,362 
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about 75 yards to a torpedo explosion [29]. 
Most importantly of all, the underwater discharge of Whitehead 
torpedoes was not technically feasible until the early 1880s. The technique 
of projecting torpedoes from submerged tubes was not perfected until the 
end of the decade [30], and the impetus for this development stemmed not 
from concern for the possibilities of torpedo-armed submarines but from a 
decision to place a ship's Whiteheads where they were least vulnerable to 
enemy gunfire. 
It was, in short, impractical to arm any submarine with a torpedo tube 
before the middle 1880s, and for this reason Thorsten Nordenfelt at first 
planned to equip the Nordenfelt I with two Lay wire-guided torpedoes, 
which were mounted on deck. The Swedish arms tycoon also patented an 
electric torpedo of his own invention in 1883 before fitting his boat with a 
Whitehead tube in 1885. The Whitehead could only be discharged when the 
submarine was at the surface, the crew being required to climb out on 
deck to trigger the torpedo [31]. 
For a surface vessel, the problem of submerged discharge was one of 
protecting a 'fish' against the rush of displaced water caused by the ship's 
forward motion. For a submarine, the chief difficulty lay in compensating 
for the sudden loss of weight when a torpedo was fired. There is, in fact, 
no evidence that the Norden felt I ever discharged her Whitehead, and it 
was some time before early submariners felt happy about the idea of 
suddenly lightening one end of their delicately-trimmed craft by firing the 
weapon. In the early 1900s the Royal Navy got around the problem by 
arranging for a couple of heftily-built stokers to run for'ard carrying a 
heavy box at the moment a Whitehead was discharged. The less innovative 
French preferred to fit the experimental submarine Gymnote with two 
externally-mounted torpedoes, supplied without tubes and fixed by pylons 
to the pressure hull, where they were difficult to maintain and vulnerable 
[29] Theodore Ropp, The development of a modern navy: France 1871-1904 (Harvard 
University Ph. D. 1937) p. 545; Le Masson op. cit. pp. 50-1. 
For American experiments (c. 1894) see Frank T Cable, The birth and development of 
the American submarine (New York 1924) pp. 100-01. For British experiments (1907), see 
section 7.2 
[30) Cowpe op. cit. pp. 71 -82; Ruddock Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford 1973) 
pp. 153-56. Experiments with submerged discharge were conducted by the Royal Navy's 
Torpedo Committee from 1870, but the tube was for years fixed and stationary. 
[31) CW Sleeman, 'The Lay and other locomotive torpedoes', RUSI Jo. XXVII (1883) 
pp. 63,67-8; BNA 1887 p. 406; Murphy op. cit. pp. 93-4 
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to damage. Later French boats were fitted with a combination of tubes and 
external Drzewiecki 'drop collars', which permitted the torpedoes to be 
crudely angled [321. 
But many projectors never got the chance to worry about weaponry. 
Keeping a submerged boat on an even keel proved an almost intractable 
problem. Submarines dive by taking in enough water to destroy their 
positive buoyancy, and (broadly speaking) they will then happily plunge to 
the bottom unless trimmed so that they become neutrally buoyant. For 
years it seemed almost impossible to maintain the longitudinal stability of so 
finely-balanced a craft. The Nordenfelt submarines, for example, were 
decidely tricky to handle when submerged because the water in their 
partially-full boiler tanks. swilled about, upsetting trim. Nordenfelt, Lake 
and the Portuguese naval lieutenant Don Fontes Pereira de Mello (with 
Fontes, 1892) were among the designers who steadfastly refused to dive a 
submarine at an angle, as Holland recommended. Instead, their boats were 
stopped and carefully trimmed down until just awash, then clawed under by 
vertical propellers mounted on deck, for fear that the submarine might take 
on an uncontrollable forward inclination and dive to her destruction [331. 
The solution to this problem eluded even the determined French. The 
trials of Le Plongeur were abandoned in the 1860s when it was realised 
that she was excessively unstable. At 140 feet in length, she was by far the 
largest submarine built in the nineteenth century. It took an hour to trim 
the boat for diving, and even then she showed a disturbing tendency to 
veer uncontrollably between the surface and the sea-bed [34]. Hydroplanes, 
which act as horizontal rudders to control a submarine's pitch, were fitted 
to many boats from the Nautilus onwards, but were rarely placed abaft the 
propeller where they were most effective. The Gustave Zede underwent six 
years of trials (1893-99) before her hydroplanes were satisfactorily 
arranged, and the problem was by no means solved by the time she was 
formally commissioned. In May 1899 the British Admiralty learned from a 
reliable source that she was "a failure, that her ever coming back from 
[321 Le Masson op. cit. pp. 48,51,59; Bacon report 'Drzewiecki discharge gear for 
submarine boats' 2 July 1901, Adm 1/7522 
[33] Thorsten Nordenfelt, 'On submarine boats', RUSI Jo. )OOC (February 1886) 
pp. 159-60; 'A new submarine boat', Scientific American 66 p. 137,27 February 1892 
134] Captain Hore, naval attache's report no. 11,19 February 1864, Adm 1/5901 
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Marseilles, after her recent trip, was problematical, ... [and]... that she has 
never dived for more than eleven minutes, and that only once. That was 
during the trip back from Marseilles, and they thought they would go lower 
and lower and never come back again... the Captain is not at all happy... " 
[35] 
The underwater endurance of early submarines was limited by more 
than simple reluctance to plumb the ocean depths. The physiology of 
oxygen consumption in enclosed spaces was not well understood in the 
nineteenth century, but prudence (and a not-unnatural fear of suffocation) 
encouraged most pioneer submariners to err on the side of caution when 
estimating the supply of air available to them. Many inventors, including 
Fulton, installed cylinders of compressed air, and without it submerged 
endurance tended to be measured in minutes rather than hours. Holland's 
Fenian Ram had air "for at least half an hour" under water [36), an early 
submarine designed in 1863 by the Russian photographer IF Alexandrofsky 
was credited with the ability to dive for 45 minutes [37], and the hour's 
grace claimed for a submarine built at Chicago early in the 1890s by the 
American George Baker was described by the British naval attache as 
"considerable" [38]. 
Such estimates were needlessly pessimistic. The tiny Hunley - 40ft 
long, 42 inches in the beam and crewed by eight hard-working 
hand-crankers - established an endurance record in the winter of 1863-4. 
Twenty five minutes after she had submerged the air was so foul that a 
candle would not burn, but the crew stayed down for more than two and a 
half hours [39]. Numerous disasters and near-disasters have since confirmed 
the surprising endurance of humans trapped in a submarine; the artificers 
who cut a hole in K13, a British boat stranded for 35 hours on the bottom 
of the Gairloch in January 1917, were almost overwhelmed by the Stygian 
[35] Jeffreys to Egerton 27 May 1899, Adm 1/7422. (Jeffreys was DNO and Egerton the 
Captain of HMS Vernon. ) 
[36] Archibald to Thornton 20 December 1880, FO 5/1746 fols. 186-9. (Archibald was 
Consul-General in New York, and Thornton the British Ambassador to Washington) 
[37] Arthur Wellesley, military attache's report no. 9,22 January 1873, Adm 1/6281; DW 
Mitchell, A history of Russian and Soviet seapower (London 1974) p. 181 
[38] Captain Gerald Langley, 'United States: Navy dockyards, materiel &c. ', July 1893, 
Adm 231/22 
[39] Personal account by WA Alexander in the New Orleans Daily Picayune, 29 June 
1902, copy in RN Submarine Museum archives A1985/63 
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blackness of the air which escaped from her - but with it came 47 
survivors [40]. 
Not until 1901 did Captain Reginald Bacon, the Royal Navy's first 
Inspecting Captain of Submarines, lock himself and two full crews in one of 
the submarines then building for the Navy at Barrow to measure their 
oxygen consumption. "Although we know better now, " wrote Bacon in his 
memoirs, "it was then by no means certain that human bodies in close 
confinement did not give off poisonous exhalations. " In the event, he and 
his men suffered less from the effects of vitiated air than they did from 
the efforts of "an elderly representative of the Holland company who had 
brought along a flute wherewith to while away the time", and who played 
on through the long watches of the night. "At the best of times the flute 
is not an inspiring instrument, " recalled Bacon, "but the dirges to which we 
were treated that night, in the bowels of the submarine, I believe caused us 
all, ever after, to look on the flute with a large measure of personal 
enmity. " [41] 
The last great technical problem was that of submarine navigation. 
There were no charts detailing underwater currents. The thick iron pressure 
hulls and electric motors of a submarine combined to distort compass 
bearings, while the chances of makings accurate observations at the surface 
were restricted by the longitudinal instability of most early boats; periscopes 
were useless if a submarine could not be controlled at a specified depth. It 
was, therefore, difficult to attain the pin-point accuracy necessary for a 
succesful attack. 
Contemporary appreciations made much of this point. Sir Astley Cooper 
Key, Senior Naval Lord from 1879 to 1885, thought "very little of any 
vessel intended to be navigated under water as it is not possible to see any 
distance, " [42] and as late as 1902 a Major Marrow sent the Admiralty 
details of an invention to secure "immunity from submarine attack... inky 
[40) Don Everitt, The K boats: a dramatic first report on the Navy's most calamitous 
submarines (London 1962) p. 76 
[41) Reginald Bacon, From 1900 onward (London 1940) pp. 56-7. Further experiments 
were conducted by the RN as late as 1905, when Professor Haldane and 15 men shut 
themselves inside AS for 24 hours and emerged unscathed. Talbot diary 20 + 21 
September 1905, Imperial War Museum 81/42/2 
[42) Bound volume of reports on the 'Supposed Fenian submarine torpedo boat in the 
course of construction at New York', fol. 25: Key minute to Archibald despatch Secret 
no. 70,7 January 1881, Adm 1/6551 
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fluids to be discharged to becloud and discolour the water surrounding the 
vessel to prevent a submarine from finding its whereabouts. " [43] 
Alexandrofsky's boat was accounted "a failure inasmuch as it was found 
almost impossible to see a vessel at a distance of more than two yards, " 
and the DNO, Lord Hood, drew the Board's attention to the problem with 
the remark: "The difficulty of seeing a vessel at a very moderate distance 
from an underwater boat, is one of the great difficulties, as it must be 
necessary to be frequently coming to the surface to ascertain one's 
position. " [44] Several boats - notably those of the Holland type - were 
in fact designed to 'porpoise', showing themselves briefly at the surface to 
get their bearings and diving again before guns could be trained on them. 
The system worked, but the element of surprise was often lost, giving an 
enemy the chance to manouevre out of harm's way. 
The failure to evolve an efficient motor, a useable periscope, an 
effective weapon and reliable hydroplanes had obvious and important 
consequences. It meant that early, hand-cranked submarines were very 
restricted in their choice of targets. Stationary vessels and fixed defences 
were the most probable victims. In 1873 Lord Hood observed that "a 
submarine boat might probably be of considerable value for destroying 
torpedo defences, but not so efficient nearly as a means of attack against 
vessels especially when in motion. " [45] 
Similarly, primitive submarines had a tiny radius of action - usually a 
few miles at best. The perspiring oarsmen who rowed John Scott Russell's 
submarine could manage no more than four miles without relief. Robert 
Fulton's Nautilus was rendered impotent when the British vessels it had set 
out to attack raised anchor and moved further out to sea, and the 
Confederate privateer submarine HL Hunley spent months waiting for a 
Yankee blockader to come within range; she could travel no more than 
twelve miles in a night [46]. 
[43] 'Immunity from attack from submarine vessels' 9 January 1902, digest cut Ila, Adm 
12/1377 
[44] Wellesley report no. 9,22 January, and Hood minute 8 March 1873, Adm 1/6281 
[45] Ibid 
[46] Scott Russell 'Memorandum for consideration' 28 January 1856, Palmerston papers 
GU/RU/1149 enc. 1; Roland op. cit. pp. 100-01,103; Alexander's account 29 June 1902, 
RN Submarine Museum archives A1985/63 
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It can hardly be emphasised too strongly that, when applied to boats 
constructed during the nineteenth century, the term 'submarine' is quite 
misleading. Without an efficient periscope, any torpedo-armed submarine 
would have to attack while awash or at the surface, and complete 
submergence was, therefore, generally contemplated only when evasive 
action was required. Diving was an essentially defensive manoeuvre. An 
1893 Intelligence Department report observed that "the idea of attacking 
under water actually is not believed to be practicable. " [47] 
At this transitional stage in her development, the submarine was really 
no more than a torpedo boat which relied for protection on her invisibility 
rather than her speed. "It would appear that no recent design aims at the 
production of a real sub-marine, or actual sunken vessel, but that all 
projectors now desire to construct a craft which shall be only partially 
submerged, " noted Captain Cyprian Bridge in 1889 [48]. The American 
Holland submarines purchased by Britain in 1900 were subject to the same 
criticism: "The United States appear to have acquired a successful vessel, " 
reported the NID in May 1900, "but she can hardly be called a 
'submarine', being more of a 'submersible' type as it is apparently intended 
to navigate her awash until she gets under fire, but even then, she will 
have to come to the surface from time to time, so as to rectify her 
course. " [49] 
Most submarine builders therefore devoted themselves to designing boats 
with as low a silhouette as possible. (It was the inventor's boast that no 
more than 18" of Norden f elt I was visible when the submarine was 
steaming on the surface [50]. ) It was this imperative, not some technical 
difficulty, that persuaded the early submariners not to fit their boats with 
decks and conning towers, the absence of which kept hatches only a few 
inches out of the water. This in turn severely restricted the commanding 
officer's field of vision and left the danger of swamping ever-present; 
steaming with the hatches closed, on the other hand, both officers and men 
[47] Langley report 'United States: Navy dockyards, materiel &c. ', July 1893, Adm 231/22 
[48] Bridge minute 17 April 1889, Adm 1/6998 
[49] Intelligence Department report 'Submarine boats', NID no. 577, May 1900 p. 5, Adm 
231/31 
[50] Statement cited in despatch from Horace Rumbold (HM Ambassador, Stockholm) I 
May 1882, FO 188/144 
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were denied fresh air and kept cooped up below while the vessel was at 
sea - usually in conditions so cramped and unpleasant that crew endurance 
was minimal. 
That was why the Royal Navy had little use for the sort of submarines 
being built in the nineteenth century. It was a highly mobile, 
offensively-minded service. If submarines were taken seriously at all, it was 
as weapons of desperation and defence. Their low freeboard rendered them 
useless in the steep coastal waters of the British Isles, and they had neither 
the speed nor the weapons to attack warships on the move. They dived 
slowly, reluctantly, and for seconds rather than minutes, minutes rather than 
hours. On the rare occasions that a submarine lived up to her fine title, 
she was a menace to nothing but herself. 
Wilhelm Bauer and the Prince Consort 
Real British interest in submarine boats can be dated to the Crimean War. 
Only one communication on the subject [51] had reached the Admiralty in 
the first 16 years of Victoria's reign, but from 1853 a steady stream of 
inventions and reports were digested in the bulky volumes that record every 
letter and submission received by the Secretary of the Admiralty. The 
amount of business transacted by the Admiralty was huge, even in the 
relatively quiet years of the mid-Victorian era, and the proportion of that 
business which concerned submarines was, of course, tiny. But the Royal 
Navy soon became familiar with underwater weapons. As early as 1859 the 
Surveyor rejected Lodner Phillips' submission with the weary observation, "it 
does not appear that there is any great novelty in the plan or any 
advantage in it over the numerous propositions in regard to the construction 
of boats for similar purposes. " [52j 
[51] 'Bassett's submarine gun boat' 9 August 1849, digest cut 59-8, Adm 12/509. During 
the research for this chapter, the Admiralty digests were searched for the period 
1793-1900, and the Surveyor's Department records for the years 1812-1860. Three 
projects were submitted between 1800 and 1809, four between 1810 and 1819, tvm from 
1820 to 1829, and none between 1830 and 1849. Aside from its dealings with Robert 
Fulton, the Admiralty did become involved in one other submarine project early in the 
nineteenth century: the RN's relationship with the submarine-builder Tom Johnson is 
described in Appendix 2. 
[52] S. R. L. B. 2 June 1859, Adm 92/20 fol. 591 
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Graph la shows the number of 
submissions concerning 
submarines received by the 
Admiralty between 1853 and 
1900. Data has been drawn from 
the Admiralty digests, cuts Ila 
(boats) and 59-8 (projects for 
annoying the enemy), and from 
the Surveyor's department 
records for the period 
1853-1860. The latter series 
was discontinued in its old form 
in 1860. 
The digest entries record all 
submissions sent to the Secretary 
of the Admiralty, and the 
Surveyor's papers all submissions 
sent to his office. If the 
Surveyor found a submission of 
some merit or significance he 
would submit a brief report on 
it to the Board of Admiralty; 
thus some of the Surveyor's 
records are duplicated in the 
secretariat papers. (I have 
counted duplicated submissions 
only once for the purpose of 
preparing these figures. ) The 
less meritous of the Surveyor's 
submarine submissions were 
never seen by the Secretary of 
the Admiralty. In 1860 the 
Surveyor was elevated to the 
Board of Admiralty with the 
title of Controller, and thereafter 
all submissions were channelled 
through the Secretary - and, 
hence, into the digests. 
The total number of 
submissions recorded between the 
inception of the Admiralty digest 
in 1793 [1) and the British 
adoption of the submarine in 
1900 was 328 [2]. Of these, 318 
were received between the years 
1853 and 1900, an average of 
6.8 per year. This statistic 
should be enough to dismiss the 
popular notion that the 
Admiralty remained in happy 
ignorance of the submarine until 
very late in the nineteenth 
century. It is, indeed, apparent 
that the Royal Navy was 
perfectly well - informed about 
developments in submarine 
warfare during the Victorian era. 
The use to which it put this 
knowledge is, of course, another 
matter. 
Discussion of a simple 
average is, nevertheless, 
misleading, and the number of 
submissions received varied 
significantly from year to year. 
Notable peaks are recorded in 
the years 1878,1885, and 
1893-4, and from 1893 to the 
end of the century the number 
of submissions exceeds the 
average in every year. Graph Ib 
shows these peaks more clearly 
by illustrating the difference 
between each year's total and 
the number of submissions 
received during the previous 
year. Thus the increase in the 
number of submissions received 
in 1877 was 7, in 1878 it was 9 
and in 1885 - the largest 
increase recorded - it was 14. 
The probable significance of 
these peaks is debatable, but at 
least two appear to represent 
increased interest in submarine 
designs generated by 
popularly-reported trials of 
experimental vessels. The great 
increase recorded in 1885 was 
almost certainly the result of 
Nordenfelt's experiments with his 
first boat. The greater number 
of submissions made in the 
1890s probably reflects the 
increased pace of development 
in France (note the peak in 
1893-4, which coincides with 
the launching and early trials of 
the Gustave Zede) and the 
growing certainty that the 
development of a truly efficient 
submarine was just around the 
corner. Graph lc, a cumulation 
of the 318 submissions received 
between 1853 and 1900, could 
legitimately be said to reflect in 
visual form the pace of 
nineteenth century submarine 
development. 
Notts 
[1] The scheme was worked out 
in the years 1808-1812, but the 
system was applied 
retrospectively to the 
correspondence from 1793 to 
1808. 
(2) For the record, the earliest 
submission (dated 14 September 
1800) was a letter to Captain 
Samuel Linzee of L'Oiseau, 
warning him to be on his guard 
for Fulton's submarine. Digest 
cut 59-8, Adm 12/87; Linzee 
to Admiralty 21 September 1800, 
Adm 1/2067. 
Total No. of Submarines 
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The first notable invention submitted to the Surveyor's Department was 
the 'hyponaut apparatus' devised by a Bavarian projector, Wilhelm Bauer, 
in 1853. But Bauer was evasive when questioned by the naval constructors 
Isaac Watts and Thomas Lloyd and refused to give details of the allegedly 
revolutionary engine that was to power his submarine. Predictably enough, 
the Admiralty was unimpressed by the invention [53]. On 26 August 1854, 
however, the Surveyor's Department took the unusual step of re-examining 
Bauer's scheme, asking no less a figure than Professor Michael Faraday to 
come to the Admiralty to interview him [54]. 
The Admiralty had several reasons for taking an interest in Wilhelm 
Bauer. Firstly, he was one of the few submarine inventors to have built a 
workable submarine and to have persuaded other governments to take him 
seriously. In January 1850, while an artillery corporal in the army of the 
Duke of Holstein, Bauer submitted the plans for a submarine boat to the 
Duchy's Ministry of Marine. He suggested that such a vessel might break 
the blockade instituted by Danish naval forces during the 
Schleswig-Holstein revolt, and persuaded the Ministry to allocate him 30 
Prussian talers from the naval budget. With this money he built a large, 
clockwork-driven working model which was successfully demonstrated to an 
assemblage of notables. In due course a commission was charged with the 
construction of a full-sized boat. 
The submarine was built at Kiel with the help of voluntary contributions 
from members of the army and local civilians. Named Der Brandtaucher, 
she displaced 30 tons and was manned by a crew of three -a captain 
and two crewmen who turned large treadwheels connected to a screw, 
driving the craft along at a maximum speed of three knots. Unfortunately 
for Bauer, a shortage of funds had forced him to weaken the boat's 
structure. On her first diving trial (1 February 1851) she shipped enough 
water through leaky glands to become unmanageable, and Bauer and his 
companions were lucky to escape alive from the stricken submarine. Der 
Brandtaucher was unsalvageable, and the inventor eventually left Germany 
for Austria and then Britain. By the time he reached London, Wilhelm 
[53) Surveyor to Bauer 30 July and 5 August 1853, Adm 91/15; 'Bauer's hyponaut 
apparatus'. S. R. L. B. 16 August 1854, Adm 92/17 fol. 82. Brief details of Bauer's submarine 
may be found in his patent application (25 May 1853), copy in RN Submarine Museum 
archives A1853/1 
(54] Surveyor to Bauer 24 August 1854, Adm 91/16; S. R. L. B. 22 August 1854, Adm 92/17 
fol. 82 
1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR 
--m 
Bauer had demonstrated his model submarine to Ludwig I of Bavaria, to 
his successor, Maximillian 11, and to the young Austro-Hungarian emperor 
Franz Joseph [55]. 
The second and far more compelling reason for Admiralty interest in 
Bauer was the patronage the Bavarian secured from Prince Albert. Arriving 
in Britain late in the summer of 1852 he demonstrated his model submarine 
to the Royal family at Osborne [56], and Albert was sufficiently impressed 
to provide Bauer with the funds to construct another model when the first 
was lost. The Prince Consort had a lifelong interest in science and 
technology, took an interest in a wide variety of naval inventions, and was 
sufficiently unconventional to become a prominent proponent of Captain 
Cowper Coles' controversial turret ship a decade later [57). The Bavarian's 
proposals gripped his imagination, and he became convinced that "it is 'a 
priori' impossible that so important and new a fact as submarine navigation 
should be useless in the hands of men of genius. " [58) By acquiring so 
powerful a supporter, Bauer ensured he would be treated with respect. 
Indeed the Admiralty's first contact with the inventor was, made at the 
instigation of the Prince Consort, who wrote to Sir James Graham, the 
First Lord, to request a prompt investigation [59]. 
The RN's willingness to reinvestigate Bauer's proposals in 1854 may also 
be attributable to the fact that the German projector's plans took on a 
much more concrete form be tween July 1853 and August 1854. At Prince 
Albert's suggestion, he was introduced to the noted naval architect John 
Scott Russell late in 1853 [60). Russell owned a shipyard at Millwall on the 
Isle of Dogs, and had made the Prince Consort's acquaintance two years 
earlier as secretary to the committee that had organised the Great 
Exhibition. By 1853 he was already engaged in building Brunel's singularly 
[55] Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat: the evolution and technical history of German 
submarines (London 1975) pp. 10-12 
[56] The Times court circular 6 August 1852 p. 5 col. c 
[57] Stanley Sandler, The evolution of the modern capital ship (Newark, Delaware 1979) 
p. 184; George Emmerson, John Scott Russell: a great Victorian engineer and naval 
architect (London 1977) p. 84 
[58] Albert to Palmerston 9 January 1856, Palmerston papers RC/H/59 
[59] Albert to Graham 25 June 1853, microfilm 43, Graham papers, Cambridge University 
Library 
[60] Rossler op. cit. p. 12 
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ambitious Great Eastern - by far the largest ship yet laid down anywhere 
in the world - and as the inventor of the double bottom, pioneer of the 
wave-line system of shaping vessels, and co-founder of the Institute of 
Naval Architects, the Englishman was well qualified to help Bauer construct 
a new submarine [61]. 
Bauer moved down to Greenwich, and by August 1854 had fleshed out 
a new set of plans. Russell's contribution was to help the poorly-educated, 
intuitive Bavarian to present his ideas in a form acceptable to the 
Surveyor's Department, but no submarine was laid down in the Millwall 
yard prior to the submission of 26 August. Bauer and Russell may well 
have hoped to persuade the Admiralty to back the project before incurring 
major expense. 
If so, they were unsuccessful. Bauer's lack of English (he spoke through 
an interpreter) and mistrustful nature combined to make him an 
unsatisfactory witness, and two days after the meeting he was "acquainted 
that his explanations have not been sufficiently distinct. " Shortly thereafter 
Bauer became convinced that his co-workers were poaching his ideas. He 
had proved equally suspicious of French collaborators during a brief trip to 
Paris in 1853, but by now the Crimean War was under way and the 
inventor took himself and his plans to Russia. There, with the patronage of 
Grand Duke Constantine, the Minister of Marine, he built a large 
submarine, Le Diable Marin, which was intended to attack the Allied Fleet 
in the Baltic. This boat was quite successful and conducted numerous trials 
in the waters off Cronstadt [62]. 
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from Bauer's experiences in 
Britain. The German inventor enjoyed some unique advantages which 
persuaded the Admiralty to take him seriously. No other projector could 
boast a powerful patron and a track record of government-sponsored 
submarine construction; none had the help of a respected naval architect 
and the resources of a major shipyard to back them up. From this point 
of view, it is unsurprising that those who followed in Bauer's footsteps did 
not enjoy even his limited success. 
[61] Robert Rhodes James, Albert, Prince Consort (London 1983) p. 185; Emmerson op. cit. 
pp. 85-6 
[62] 'Bauer's hyponaut apparatus' 28 August 1854, digest cut 59-8, Adm 12/589; 
Hans-Georg Bethge, Der Brandtaucher: ein tauchboot - von der idee sur wirklichkeit 
(Rostock 1968) p. 36 
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It is, moreover, evident that when the Bavarian first arrived in Britain, 
the Royal Navy had no intention of building a boat to his specifications. 
The country was at peace, and the brief report submitted by the Surveyor's 
committee made it clear that Faraday and his associates were more 
interested in the inventor's 84hp "Gas-Steam-High-Pressure-Engine, in 
which Rocket Composition is to be used as the source of heat and gas" 
than they were in his submarine [63]. This preoccupation was fairly typical 
of the Navy's attitude to submarines in the Victorian era, and the 
Admiralty more than once showed considerably more interest in some 
feature of a submarine project than it showed in the submarine itself. In 
1878, for example, the Navy requested details of the submarine developed 
by the well-known Liverpool shipbuilder Josiah Jones. The Admiralty was 
particularly intrigued by the boat's electric light, their Lordships being eager 
to ascertain whether it could really be made to work underwater [64]. This 
attitude suggests that - while there were so many technical problems to be 
overcome - the nineteenth century naval authorities were not much 
concerned with the submarine for its own sake. 
John Scott Russell and Lord Palmerston 
Bauer's departure for Russia passed unnoticed in the scramble to prepare a 
British fleet for operations in the Baltic. The Royal Navy had entered the 
Crimean War quite unprepared to meet the special problems that were to 
confront it; its line-of-battle fleet was unsuited to operations in the 
[63] 'Bauer's hyponaut apparatus and gas engine: report upon'. S. R. L. B. 28 August 1854, 
Adm 92/17 fo1.83 
[64] 'Submarine boat and electric light' 9 and 22 January, 2 February, 2 March 1878, 
digest cut 59-8, Adm 12/1023. Like many submarine projectors, Jones was a notable 
innovator in other fields. He had come to the Admiralty's attention in 1859 as the 
inventor of a system of inclined armour; cf James Baxter III, The introduction of the 
ironclad warship (Cambridge, Mass. 1933) pp. 162-3. Similar examples are legion: Fulton 
did significant work as a canal designer and proponent of the steam engine; Holland 
puzzled over the problems of mechanical flight; Bauer invented a 'camel' for use in 
salvage operations, and George Garrett the pneumataphore, a self-contained diving dress. 
James McClintock devised a machine for the manufacture of minie balls, while Simeon 
Bourgois was an early proponent of the screw propeller and a leading jeune ecole theorist. 
The first British submariners were no less original. Murray Sueter contributed to the 
development of the tank and claimed to have originated the concept of the torpedo 
bomber; Hugh Williamson was a major figure in the early development of the aircraft 
carrier. 
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restricted waters of the Gulf of Finland, and a host of unusual vessels had 
to be designed to meet these new conditions. Suddenly innovation was at a 
premium. Gunboats, mortar vessels, armoured rafts and floating batteries 
were built in numbers [65]. 
Meanwhile, the Russian 'fleet in being' at the great naval base of 
Cronstadt controlled the approaches to St Petersburg and prevented the 
Allied fleet from gaining command of the strategically vital waters of the 
eastern Gulf. Cronstadt itself was protected by a great barrier, several miles 
long, stretched across the shallows outside the harbour. The Royal Navy 
had to break through this barrier before it could attack the Russian fleet. 
John Scott Russell revived the idea of building a submarine early in 
1855. A new design was sketched with the help of the well-known civil 
engineer Sir Charles Fox, one of the principals of Fox *& Henderson, the 
firm that had built the Crystal Palace. Together the two men drew up the 
plans of a large mobile diving bell to be crewed by divers and used to 
destroy the barrier at Cronstadt. Whether or not Russell had been 
examining Bauer's plans behind the Bavarian's back, the new invention bore 
little relation to Der Brandtaucher or Le Diable Marin. Bauer designed 
screw driven, completely enclosed boats. Russell's new craft, according to 
one officer who examined it, "was merely a large diving bell, like an 
inverted boat... It went down to the bottom with men under it; they were 
to walk along the bottom and propel the boat by pressing against against 
thwarts fixed to the under side. " Crew members in diving dress were to 
leave the vessel and attach explosives to the target [66]. Russell and Sir 
Charles Fox seem to have drawn more consciously on the inspiration of a 
French designer, Dr Payerne, who built the submarine L'Hydrostat in 1846 
and later converted her into a diving bell. In her new guise Payerne's boat 
was successfully employed in the construction of a breakwater for Cherbourg 
harbour [67]. 
[65] Baxter op. cit. pp. 69-91; Andrew Lambert. Battleships in transition: the creation of 
the steam battlefleet 1815-1860 (London 1984) pp. 41 -52 
[66] Key at the Royal United Services Institution, 5 February 1886, RUSI Jo. )O(X (1886) 
p. 164; Andrew Lambert, Great Britain, the Baltic and the Russian war 1854-1856 
(London University Ph. D. 1983) p. 280, citing Palmerston to Wood 17 December 1855, 
Halifax papers A4/63 fol. 54, Borthwick Institute, York. Lambert has expanded on 
British naval policy in the Baltic in a recent book, The Crimean War (MUP 1990) 
[67] See F Forest and H Noalhat, Les bateaux sous-marins (Paris 1900) vol. 1 pp. 28-37. 
The Fox/Russell boat deserves the title 'submarine' insofar as it. was both mobile and 
independent of any surface ship. 
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Whatever her deficiencies, Fox's and Russell's un-named vessel was the 
creation of two famous engineers, and with the war in the Baltic at a 
stalemate her inventors had little trouble in persuading Viscount Palmerston 
to sponsor the project. Like Winston Churchill in later years, the Victorian 
Prime Minister had a strong interest in novel military devices, and was 
excited by the possibilities of submarine warfare. The nineteenth century 
historian Herbert Paul observed that "there was no public man who could 
plausibly pretend to be more warlike than Lord Palmerston". [68], and 
according to Andrew Lambert, "Palmerston's enthusiasm for new weapons 
knew no bounds; he pressed every scheme that was sent to him onto the 
Admiralty and the Ordnance. " [69] Disraeli noted in November 1855 that 
"Palmerston is for blowing up Cronstadt having got a discoverer who builds 
submarine ships worked by submarine crews, & who are practising on the 
Thames with, they say, complete success. " [70]. 
The Prime Minister was unable to interest the Admiralty in Russell's 
experiments, but he told the inventors to press on and leave the problem 
of finance to him. This high-handed attitude drew an irritable response 
from the First Lord, Sir Charles Wood, who hastened to explain the 
Admiralty's position: "I do not quite understand from your note of 
yesterday what you have done as to Sir Charles Fox's proposed boat, " he 
wrote in March 1855. 
"I understood before he was building... [her]... at his own risk to be 
bought or not as it turned out. If that is all you mean I have not a 
word to say. If you mean that you have authorised him to build his 
boat at the risk of the Govt., it is quite a different matter. 
"He has never brought any of the plans or information which... 
[I]... asked for when I saw him. We know enough of him to know 
that he is not a man to be depended on and we cannot be answerable 
for an expedition upon which we have not had the opportunity of 
forming an opinion. " [71] 
(68] Quoted in Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and naval strategy: ideology, interest and sea 
power during the Pax Britannica (Boston 1986) p. 57 
1691 Lambert op. cit. p. 279 
(70] Disraeli to Lord Derby 20 November 1855, quoted in Emmerson op. cit. p. 86. The 
trials referred to were, in fact, conducted at Poole. (See below. ) 
[71] Wood to Palmerston 26 March 1855, Halifax papers Add. Mss. 49562 fols. 27-8 
r 1.2 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR 
0 
With the support of Palmerston and Prince Albert (who had kept up his 
interest in submarine warfare), the Fox/Russell submarine was nevertheless 
ordered on 22 March 1855 and launched on 5 October [72]. She carried a 
crew of 12, most of whom were employed in sculling the boat along at her 
maximum surface speed of two knots. Russell hoped that his oarsmen would 
also be able to row the submarine while submerged but this dangerous 
technique was never tried, the boat's captain, Chief Diver McDuff (who 
had been strictly enjoined by Russell "to train his men gradually, and on 
no account drown any of them"), reporting that "there must be several 
descents before the men will have sufficient confidence to propel her under 
water; although they are willing, still they are timid. " McDuff's caution was.. 
entirely justified. Although the submarine killed no-one, there were some 
exceedingly narrow escapes [73]. 
Anxious for secrecy, the designers sent the boat to the seclusion of 
Poole Harbour and persuaded a reluctant Admiralty to appoint a committee 
to examine their invention. The three officers selected were Captains 
Bartholomew Sulivan, Astley Cooper Key and James Hope. The first was a 
brilliant hydrographer, whose surveys of the Baltic and the approaches to 
Cronstadt had made him thoroughly familiar with the waters in which the 
submarine would have to operate. Of the latter two, Key (whose name had 
been suggested by John Scott Russell) was a noted technical officer and 
future Senior Naval Lord. Hope, another talented scientist, presided over 
the HMS Captain court martial and became an Admiral of the Fleet [74]. 
The initial investigation was not very thorough; the commissioners 
remained in London and contented themselves with examining the inventors, 
the captains of the submarine and her tender, and some Thames divers 
who testified to the difficulty of seeing any distance under water. Key, 
Sulivan and Hope then reported that although the boat might be useful in 
other circumstances, the murky waters off Cronstadt would preclude her 
successful employment there [75]. 
[72] McDuff's 'Journal of the submarine ship 1855', Palmerston papers GC/RU/1149 
[73) Scott Russell to Palmerston 28 January 1856 and his enclosed 'Memorandum for 
consideration', ibid. 
[74] Wood to Palmerston 17 December 1855, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 44-5; HN Sulivan, The 
life and letters of Sir Bartholomew James Sulivan... (London 1896) pp. 372-3 
[75) Albert to Palmerston 9 January 1856, Palmerston papers RC/H159; Wood to Albert 31 
January 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 67-9 
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The matter might, perhaps, have ended there, but a copy of the 
committee's report was sent by Wood to the Prince Consort. Outraged that 
the three naval officers had not seen Scott Russell's craft in action, Albert 
wrote to Palmerston insisting that the invention should not be forgotten. 
Wood's response was to reconvene the committee, and late in January 1856 
he sent its members to Dorset to examine the submarine. 
Both Hope and Sulivan were optimistic that the boat would be a 
success in the clearer waters of the south coast, but they were severely 
disappointed by the trial that took place at Poole on 25 January 1856. 
While the Admiralty committee watched from Scott Russell's tender, McDuff 
and his crew completed a preliminary dive. Then they submerged again, 
and a buoyed air hose advancing slowly across the harbour marked their 
progress through the icy sea. After 20 minutes, the prow of the submarine 
suddenly shot out of the water, blew like a whale and went down again. 
Moments later the boat reappeared briefly before slipping back in a swirl 
of water. Soon those at the surface heard the sounds of a hammer being 
struck against the iron sides of the submarine. This was the agreed distress 
signal, and the craft was hurriedly brought to the surface by a safety line 
which Russell had thoughtfully attached to her beforehand. The crew were 
pulled out, gasping but alive, to explain that they had become stuck in a 
patch of Poole mud. McDuff had attempted to surface, but one of the two 
weights that had to be released snagged on some obstruction. The other 
end of the submarine rose unchecked to the surface and most of the air 
escaped. The Chief Diver's presence of mind saved his crew, for he 
gathered the men by one of the tanks of compressed air used to keep the 
sea out of the boat, and fed them oxygen while they waited to be 
rescued. 
This concluded Britain's first official submarine trial. Not surprisingly, 
the Admiralty officers left Poole in what Russell termed "a state of 
considerable alarm and disappointment. " They retrieved their earlier report, 
which they now considered too favourable, and submitted a second, more 
damning indictment of the submarine [76]. The boat was brought back to 
[76] Scott Russell to Palmerston 28 January 1856, Palmerston papers GC/RU/1149; Wood 
to Albert 31 January 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 67-9. There are two slightly distorted 
versions of events by members of the Admiralty committee; see Key's account in RUSI 
Jo. XXX (1886) pp. 164-5; Sulivan op. cit. pp. 373-4 
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London and left to rust [77]. 
On 31 January 1856, Sir Charles Wood sent the Prince Consort a 
summary of the committee's revised judgement. The officers had 
concentrated on three points, he wrote -- the boat's qualities as a diving 
bell, her means of locomotion, and the difficulty of seeing any distance 
through the water. As a diving bell, they felt that Russell's craft had little 
to recommend her, and she was considered inferior to the Cherbourg bell 
and to the latest American designs. Nor was she fast enough to be useful 
in action. Finally, there still seemed to be very little chance of the 
submarine being used in waters clear enough for the crew to see where 
they were going [78]. 
Palmerston made one last attempt to involve the Royal Navy in what 
had been little more than a personal project of his by forwarding the bill 
to Sir Charles Wood. The First Lord was not amused. "I really do not 
know what has been gained by Mr Russell's experiment which was not 
known before, and actually in use before, " he rejoined. "If we had 
undertaken the experiment we should have looked after it and paid for it. 
We knew nothing of its being going on, and never till I received your note 
yesterday that we were to pay for it. I have spent my last farthing of this 
year's votes and made no provision in the next. It would come I suppose 
under experiments, for we can make no use of the machine and I have no 
such vote as would cover a hundredth part of the expense. " [791 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of early 
British submarine construction. The first concerns naval and civilian attitudes 
to the new weapon. By 1856, the Admiralty had established a policy it 
would maintain for the next 40 years. The Royal Navy refused to sponsor 
Russell's project, believing (correctly) that the submarine would be a failure. 
In so doing it resisted strong pressure from the highest authorities in the 
land. The boat owed her existence to the private enthusiasm of Prince 
Albert and Lord Palmerston, both of whom were keen innovators and firm 
1771 Delaney to Walker 10 January 1859, Wake Walker papers WWLI, National Maritime 
Museum 
178) Wood to Albert 31 January 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 67-9 
(79) Wood to Palmerston 19 March 1856, ibid fols. 84-6. The cost of the submarine was 
about £10,000; 'Journal of the submarine ship 1855' (entry for 22 March), Palmerston 
papers GC/RU/1149 
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believers in the Victorian 'new technology'. Furthermore, Russell's craft was 
intended for a specific (and offensive) operation, the destruction of the 
barrier at Cronstadt, and would never have been completed had the country 
been at peace. 
When Sir Charles Wood bowed to the wishes of the Prime Minister and 
the Prince Consort, he did so with good grace and ensured that the 
Fox/Russell boat was given a trial by highly qualified naval officers, just as 
the Surveyor had gone out of his way to secure the services of Michael 
Faraday in August 1854. For all their lack of initial enthusiasm, the officers 
appointed to examine the submarine made a sound assessment of her 
mechanical demerits. This pattern - considerable reluctance to become 
involved, reasoned resistance to the idea of submarine construction, civilian 
rather than naval enthusiasm for such projects, and the technical rather 
than tactical criticism of those that were investigated - was evident time 
and again during the next four decades. 
The marked enthusiasm of civilian projectors for dramatic but 
impractical gadgets has been described by Lee Kennett [80]. Analysis of 
both the records of the Crimean War and the 44,000-odd inventions sent 
to the Munitions Inventions Department during the World War I suggests 
that front-line troops devoted their ingenuity to the development of 
defensive and protective equipment, while the inventions submitted by 
non-combatants were "overwhelmingly offensive", based on 
up-to-the-minute technology (electric death-rays in the 1850s, tanks and 
aircraft 65 years later) and intended to "destroy the enemy in some massive 
and spectacular way. " The submarine projects of the Crimean War fit 
Kennett's model rather well. 
Equally significant is the fact that the Royal Navy believed as early as 
1855-56 that the development of an efficient submarine was inevitable. 
"There is no doubt in the world of the possibility of a submarine boat, as 
far as the existence of people inside her goes, or of the power of 
depressing or raising, " Wood assured Lord Palmerston. "The questions are 
[80] Lee Kennett, 'Military inventions and popular involvement, 1914-1918', in War and 
Society 3 (1985) pp. 69-73. According to Guy Hartcup, only 30 of the 100,000 inventions 
sent to the Board of Invention Research during World War I "were likely to be of any 
use". The Munitions Inventions Department received 47,949, of which 226 were useful. 
The equivalent French body developed 781 of 44,976 inventions. Hartcup, The war of 
invention: scientific developments 1914-1918 (London 1988) p. 189 
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the means of propulsion and seeing and steering. " [81] Less than a year 
later, the First Lord could envisage a solution to two of his three 
problems: "Locomotive power seems to me to have undergone a very 
insufficient trial, " he informed the Prince Consort, "but I do not entertain 
any serious doubt of this being accomplished. There can be no more 
difficulty about a compass in an iron vessel under water than above water. 
The real obstacle to the use of these machines for offensive purposes is the 
difficulty of seeing under water in a horizontal direction. " For this reason 
(and with peculiar forsight), the First Lord concluded his letter: "I am 
afraid that as far as the Naval operations of England are concerned they 
are more likely to be used against us than for us. " [82] 
Hope, Sulivan and Wood were not the only Admiralty officials with 
faith in the long-term future of the submarine. In May 1880 William 
Arthur, the first Captain of the torpedo school HMS Vernon and a member 
of the 1870 committee appointed to examine Whitehead's torpedo, declared 
that the construction of a successful submarine was certainly possible, and 
observed that "the capabilities of such a vessel would be great. " [83] 
Arthur's colleague AK Wilson did not doubt that he was right, for "a very 
well thought-out design for a submarine boat was brought to my attention 
while commander of the Vernon about 1879, which only required only one 
small addition which any Torpedo Officer could have supplied to make it 
efficient. " [84] These were not the sentiments of naval officers whose 
minds were closed to the possibilities of innovation. 
1.3: INNOVATION IN THE VICTORIAN NAVY 
Although the predominant image of the nineteenth century Royal Navy is 
still that of a service stagnating in the reactionary backwaters of 
ultra-conservatism, modern research has suggested that this view is 
[81] Wood to Palmerston 10 May 1855, Add. Mss. 49562 fol. 85 
[82] Wood to Albert 12 February 1856, Add. Mss. 49565 fols. 72-3 
[83] Arthur naval attache's report no. 26,19 May 1880, FO 115/673 
[84] Wilson memo 'Submarine boats' 15 January 1901, Adm 1/7515. It seems probable 
that the author is referring here to George Garrett's submarine. 
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inadequate. The Senior Service had its good and its bad points, it is true, 
but it is increasingly clear that its administration was broadly competent and 
its seamen never less than professional. 
The Napoleonic Wars were, naturally enough, followed by a period of 
retrenchment, but Britain could not afford to rest upon her naval laurels 
much beyond the mid-1820s. The Pax Britannica was not an era of 
universal peace; the nation's resources were stretched by anti-slavery 
patrols off the coasts of Africa and China, by the host of minor wars 
fought in the name of policing an empire, and by the demands of 
maintaining almost a dozen naval stations overseas. Serious challenges to the 
supremacy of the Royal Navy had to be met from both France and Russia, 
and it was natural that Britain, the first industrial nation, should exploit her 
industrial supremacy to retain a lead over these naval rivals. As the century 
progressed it was the near-impossibility of matching the pace of 
technological change, not the difficulty of keeping faith with Nelsonic 
tradition, that most taxed British naval officers. NAM Rodger points out 
that "if the Victorian era had really been one of peace, they might have 
had the leisure to reflect on how to wage a future war, and not just on 
how to operate future equipment. If they had really been reactionaries, they 
might have held onto some of the hard-won wisdom of former 
generations. As it was, they were knowledgeable and enthusiastic proponents 
of technical change and material development who had lost sight of the 
objects for which the Navy existed: highly trained, and wholly uneducated. " 
[85] 
It is not difficult to evidence the statement that the Royal Navy was 
open to innovation for much of the nineteenth century. Far from being 
nostalgically wedded to the days of sail, the service was a comparatively 
early proponent of steam. The Admiralty authorised the construction of a 
highly experimental steamship in 1792. By 1800 there were engines at work 
in the Royal dockyards; by 1816 the First Lord, Melville, was urging the 
acquisition of steam tugs. Britain's first engined warship, the 
paddle-steamer Monkey, was purchased in 1821. By 1830 the RN was 
probably ahead of its nearest rivals, the French and United States navies, 
[85] NAM Rodger, 'British naval thought and naval policy 1820-1890: Strategic thought in 
an era of technological change', in Craig Symmonds, ed, New aspects of naval history: 
selected papers presented at the 4th naval history symposium, United States Naval 
Academy, 25-26 October 1976 (Annapolis 1981) p. 149 
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in its employment of steamships [86]. 
The French replied with other innovations, notably the shell-gun 
pioneered by Henri-Joseph Paixhans. Britain tested a similar weapon in 
1829 and adopted it in a limited way over the next decade; French interest 
was less concerted [87]. Other significant advances in ordnance followed 
later in the century. Rifling substantially increased the accuracy of naval 
guns and made long-range fire practicable for the first time. The Royal 
Navy tested early Armstrong rifles in 1858; in 1863 it accepted the 
disastrous 110-pounder breach-loader, which was simply too ambitious a 
product for its time. 
The adoption of the Armstrong rifle demonstrated the naval appetite for 
innovation; its failure did much to dent this enthusiasm. The RN did not 
return to the breach-loader until 1881, and in the intervening period the 
quality of its gunnery fell behind that of its continental rivals. Gun calibre, 
however, increased rapidly in this period - from the 8-inch short-bore 
muzzle-loaders of HMS Warrior to the 12.5-inch muzzle loaders fitted in 
HMS Dreadnought (1875) and the Benbow's 16.25-inch breach-loaders ten 
years' later [88]. 
More caution was shown in the development of the steam engine. The 
pioneer paddle-steamers were powered by large and inefficient 
single-expansion engines that were continually liable to breakdown and 
(mounted as they were above the waterline) catastrophically vulnerable to 
damage in any engagement. In addition, the sheer quantity of coal which 
the early steam engines consumed made trans-oceanic voyages, impossible, 
and sail was necessarily retained as the principle motive power of the Royal 
Navy [89]. 
Not until Victoria's reign was underway did it become practical to 
provide sail line-of-battleships with auxiliary steam power. The 
development of the screw propeller made it possible to site engines in 
[86) Ibid pp. 146-7; Baxter op. cit. pp. 10-11; Christopher Bartlett, Great Britain and sea 
power 1815-1853 (Oxford 1963) pp. 197-200 
[87) Baxter pp. 17-26,69 
[88] Ibid pp. 125,131,154,197; Sandler, The evolution of the modern capital ship 
pp. 99-100,109; Marder, ABSP p. 5 
[89) Andrew Lambert, Battleships in transition: the creation of the steam battleflee: 
1815-1860 (London 1984) pp. 18-19; Bartlett op. cit. pp. 211-12; GA Osborn, 'Paddlewheel 
fighting ships of the Royal Navy', Mariners' Mirror 68 (1982) pp. 429-33 
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protected positions below the waterline, and the screw hoist helped to 
guarantee reasonable performance under sail - impossible when a ship was 
fitted with bulky paddle-wheels. Once this problem was solved, the British 
became the first to fit their ships-of-the-line with screw propulsion [90]. 
Critics have nevertheless accused the Royal Navy of being over-cautious 
and reluctant to adopt steam as a motive power, and it is therefore 
essential to note that the eventual perfection of steam propulsion was by no 
means certain in the first two decades of the Pax Britannica. "Above all, " 
writes Christopher Bartlett, 
"it was reasonable to doubt in the twenties whether the steamer would 
ever be able to fulfil the traditional requirements of the British capital 
ship - maximum fire power, maximum sea-worthiness, maximum 
solidity and maximum stowage capacity to enable it not only to fight, 
but to maintain a blockade in all weathers or voyage to any port of 
the globe. The only tactical and strategic advantage of the steamer at 
this time was its independence of wind and tide; on every other 
respect it was a less effective warship... The ultra-cautious 
introduction of steamers ... [in the 1840s]... could thus be justified - 
in no small measure - on the grounds of expediency, economy and 
technical ignorance, but only as long as no other power took the 
lead. " [91] 
The evolution of the wooden steam battleship has been traced by 
Lambert, who concludes that the Admiralty did an excellent, and suitably 
careful, job in producing vessels superior to those of its naval rivals in the 
1840s and 1850s [92]. The Crimean War, it is true, exposed numerous 
deficiencies in naval organisation and naval personnel, but they were the 
defects of a service that had become too highly adapted to its peacetime 
role and which retained on its Navy List too many officers who had not 
commanded a ship for twenty years or more [93]. The Royal Navy's 
[90] Bartlett op. cit. p. 326 
[91] Ibid p. 206 . 
[92] Lambert op. cit. 
[93] Rodger op. cit. pp. 142-4,147-8 
(jis, 
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performance in the later stages of the war was relatively impressive; 
innovation was strongly encouraged when it came to the host of small craft 
needed for the war in the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland, though 
battleships were still produced with one eye on their long-term usefulness 
in the struggle against France [94]. 
Under Napoleon III, France was anxious to enhance both her naval 
prestige and her say in foreign affairs. The French navy of the Second 
Empire was efficient and innovative, and its new construction was in the 
hands of a man of genius, the naval architect Dupuy de Lome. His wooden 
steam battleship Le Napoleon (1850) and the ironclad Gloire (1859) forced 
Great Britain into a naval race she had hoped to avoid - but the Royal 
Navy was not slow to surpass the standards which de Lome had set. The 
British Warrior (1860) was a great advance on Gloire, whose armour 
concealed a wooden frame. Warrior, the world's first iron warship, was by 
common consent superior to everything that had gone before her [95]. 
Under the progressive leadership of two particularly conscientious projectors 
- Edward Reed, the Chief Constructor, and the Controller, Admiral Sir 
Spencer Robinson - the RN was able to maintain the lead the Warrior 
gave it throughout the 1860s. Sail, not steam, was now the auxiliary power 
of British warships. "If the Admiralty was certain of anything during the 
period of profound technical change that characterised the decade of the 
1860s, it was that the sailing war ship was a doomed anachronism, " 
concludes Stanley Sandler. "It cannot be said that the retention of masts 
and sails throughout the 1860s constituted a conspiracy of obstruction on 
the part of the Admiralty... It is the hindsight of a century that gives us 
perhaps a clearer view of the technical imperatives demanding the eventual 
total abolition of sails. " Lance Buhl comes to a similar conclusion in his 
study of innovation in the post Civil War American navy [96]. 
The 1870s and early 1880s were a comparatively dispiriting period in 
British naval history. The so-called 'Dark Ages of the Admiralty' were an 
era of public disinterest, political interference and strict economy. Naval 
[94] Baxter op. cit. pp. 70-3; Lambert op. cit. p. 43 
[95] Baxter op. cit. pp. 97-100,109-11,122-4,158-60 
[96] Sandler op. cit. p. 78.84-5; Lance Buhl, 'Mariners and machines: resistance to 
technological change in the American navy, 1865-1869', Journal of American History 
(1974) pp. 703-27 
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conservatism might have been expected to flourish in this climate. Nathaniel 
Barnaby, the new Chief Constructor, was not a man of outstanding ability, 
and he was certain ironclad battleships and merchantmen were the only 
ship types required by a naval power. Sir Astley Cooper Key, who held the 
post of Senior Naval Lord from 1879 until 1885, was another who 
unconsciously espoused conservative values by devoting himself to routine 
administration to the exclusion of strategic planning. He did, however, 
substantially improve the materiel efficiency of the British fleet [97]. 
The Royal Navy's Dark Age weaknesses were exacerbated by the virtual 
absence of any naval threat. The French challenge all but vanished in the 
aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War; the US Navy was in an 
exceptionally moribund state; the German fleet was tiny and the Russians 
bedevilled by an unfavourable geographic position. . But even the Dark Ages 
had their bright spots. The leaders of another age were beginning to make 
their mark; Jackie Fisher was one brilliant iconoclast who gained preferment 
in this supposedly reactionary period. Alexander Milne, who served as 
Senior Naval Lord between 1866 and 1868 and again from 1872 to 1876, 
was one of the most able men ever to hold the post, and Sidney Dacres, 
who headed the Board of Admiralty in the intervening period, was also 
entirely competent; he was also one of the few officers who advocated the 
total abolition of masts and yards. During the Dark Ages the torpedo was 
adopted and developed with an enthusiasm that overcame budgetary 
restrictions and resulted in the creation of the pioneering torpedo boat 
Polyphemus. Milne himself was responsible for the creation of rudimentary 
but not unrealistic war plans in the middle 1870s. 
The slow decline in naval efficiency and enthusiasm inevitable in an era 
of monetary restriction and political restraint was ended by a series of 
violent invasion scares in the 1880s. The 'Truth about the Navy' panic of 
1884, which was initiated by Fisher, HO Arnold-Forster, and the crusading 
journalist WT Stead, renewed public interest in maritime affairs and 
encouraged significant increases in the naval estimates, which were bolstered 
by the French invasion scare of 1888. The result was the Naval Defence 
Act of 1889, which laid down the policy of a two-power standard. Under 
I 
[97] NAM Rodger, 'The dark ages of the Admiralty 1869-1885', Mariners' Mirror 61 
(1975) pp. 331-44; 62 (1976) pp. 33-46,121-28; Ruddock Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone 
(Oxford 1973) p. 179 
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the guidance of William White, a naval architect of conspicuous ability, the 
RN began to build homogenous classes of first-rate warships in the late 
1880s and 1890s. Royal Sovereigns and Duncans ruled the seas of the late 
Victorian era, and the renewed challenge of France and Russia, newly 
allied, was vigorously met. The torpedo boat, which many believed would 
threaten the supremacy of the battlefleet, was decisively countered by the 
British innovation of the destroyer - planned by the Admiralty but created, 
it must be admitted, by private industry [98]. 
This brief gloss is not the history of a stagnant service. Nor did the 
Royal Navy compare unfavourably with its major rivals. Despite the 
experience of the Napoleonic Wars and despite Paixhans' experiments in the 
1820s, the French took four decades to adopt the shell gun [99]. Like the 
British, they displayed a suspicion of expensive iron warships in the 1840s, 
questioning the degree of protection offered and emphasising the dangers of 
splintering [100). In the 1850s too many French warships were laid down 
without the step-by-step trials and experiments favoured by the UK, and 
the efficiency of the Frech navy suffered in consequence. France's steam 
warships were less advanced than their British rivals, and most were 
converted sail-of-the-line; even new construction continued to be 
wooden-hulled until the late 1860s, while the British turned definitely to 
iron hulls early in the decade. Royal Navy battleships of the period were 
superior in size, armament and in performance under sail 1101]. 
The American navy failed to develop the lead in steam propulsion 
Fulton had given it after the War of 1812; Lance Buhl points out that "it 
did little more than conduct a distant flirtation with the weapon for nearly 
thirty years thereafter. " [102) Steam remained auxiliary to sail in the 
United States, as elsewhere, until the 'outbreak of the American Civil War. 
And despite the impetus provided by this conflict, the United States did not 
capitalize on the dazzling innovations made during the early 1860s. The 
[981 Mackay op. cit. pp. 178- 9; Marder, ABSP pp. 65-70 
[991 Bartlett op. cit. pp. 216-17 
[100] Baxter op. cit. pp. 63-4 
(101] Lambert pp. 97-101, Sandler op. cit. pp. 44-46 
It is interesting to note parallels with French submarine construction policy of the early 
20th century, which was similarly biased towards the theoretical. See section 5.3. 
[102) Buhl op. cit. p. 704 
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submarine and the machine-gun were just two of the weapons developed 
during the war that remained unexploited for another half-century [103]. 
Having very briefly summarised almost a century of naval technical 
history, we are perhaps better placed to assess the British response to 
technological change. This response was not consistent and depended upon a 
variety of factors, some of them external to the Royal Navy and some of 
them internal. Obviously, both the political climate of the UK and the 
activities of foreign rivals were key variables. The stringent economies 
imposed by both Liberal and Tory governments during the 'Dark Ages' 
encouraged the retention of sails long after steam engines were technically 
efficient; coal was expensive [104]. Political expediency severely limited the 
funds available for experimentation and certainly precluded expenditure on 
weapons as esoteric as the submarine [105]. A desire to economise 
resources both financial and human underpinned Britain's 'wait and see' 
construction policy. 
As the leading maritime nation, Britain had little incentive to innovate. 
As things stood she was supreme at sea; why should she introduce weapons 
or ships that might drastically alter the balance of power? This was the 
reason for British (and indeed French) unwillingness to adopt the 
potentially-devastating shell gun, for if the weapon lived up to its potential 
the navies of the world would have to armour their fleets at phenomenal 
expense and drain their treasuries merely to maintain a position which they 
already held. The introduction of any radical innovation potentially gave 
Britain's rivals the chance to start the naval 'race' again on even terms 
[106], and St Vincent's unequivocal response to the news that his Prime 
Minister had lured Fulton across the Channel to have him build underwater 
[103] On US development of the machine-gun, see David Armstrong, Bullets and 
bureaucrats: the machine gun and the United States army 1861-1916 (Westport, 
Connecticut 1982) 
[104] Sandler op. cit. pp. 17,85-7 
1105) The influence of economy on British naval policy has been widely stressed: cf. 
Semmel op. cit. pp. 79-83; Rodger, 'British naval thought and naval policy' p. 145; Sandler 
op. cit. pp. 38-9,79-80; Paul M Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval mastery 
(London 1983) esp. pp. 177-79,193-4; Baxter op. cit. p. 173; Lambert op. cit. p. 60 
[106) Bartlett op. cit. p. 204,216-17 
This argument was, of course, commonly advanced when the RN introduced the 
Dreadnought design early in the 20th century. In this case, however, other navies were 
already planning very similar ships, and two decades of a naval arms race had increased 
public interest in naval affairs and made the governments of the day more willing to 
sanction the expenditure involved. 
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weapons for the Royal Navy was often quoted when this point was made. 
"Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed, " the Admiral is reported to 
have said, "to encourage a mode of war which they who command the sea 
did not want and which, if successful, would deprive them of it. " [107] 
In 1858 the Surveyor put St Vincent's policy in writing: "As I have 
frequently stated, " he wrote, 
"it is not in the interest of Great Britain possessing as she does so 
large a navy to adopt any- important change in the construction of 
ships of war which might have the effect of rendering necessary the 
introduction of a new class of very costly vessels until such a course is 
forced upon her by the adoption by Foreign Powers of formidable 
ships of a novel character requiring similar ships to cope with them... 
it then become a matter not only of expediency but of absolute 
necessity. " [108] 
The significance of this statement for nineteenth century British submarine 
policy is obvious. 
The successful implementation of a strategy of 'wait and see' made it 
important that a careful watch be kept on foreign rivals, and Sir Baldwin 
Walker and his successors backed up the policy with an extensive 
programme of research and experimentation; no reasonable suggestion was 
rejected out of hand. A fine example of the open-mindedness (though 
some might say empty-headedness) of the Surveyor's Department may be 
found in the Admiralty's 1840 investigation of rubberised armour, a 
compound of rubber and cork which a Royal Marines lieutenant had 
suggested might be used to coat iron warships in the hope that it would 
deflect incoming shot and shell. Trials at Woolwich showed that the 
compound was useless; what is significant is that the Admiralty ordered 
experiments rather than condemning this unlikely-sounding invention out of 
hand [109]. 
[107] St Vincent, supposedly in an interview with Fulton during October 1805. It is 
entirely possible the quotation is apocryphal; we have only Fulton's word for it. What 
matters, however, is that St Vincent's adage was widely circulated in the 19th century and 
was widely accepted as genuine. See Alex Roland, Submarine warfare in the age of sail 
(Bloomington, Indiana 1976) pp. 112-13 
[1081 Walker submission of 22 June 1858, quoted in Baxter op. cit. p. 117 
[109) Baxter op. cit. p. 36 
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The Surveyor's Department's had an excellent record in such cases. The 
potential of iron armour was investigated with great thoroughness, the 
negative conclusions reached in the 1840s being drawn from six years' work 
and eight major series of experiments. In the 1850s similar trials were 
conducted to compare rolled iron, cast iron and steel before the navy 
decided on rolled iron plating for armour, and at the end of the decade 
puddled steel was also tried and rejected. Inclined (tumblehome) armour 
experiments were carried out in 1860 and the idea rejected for a variety of 
technical reasons which showed that under Walker and Isaac Watts, Britain's 
naval constructors were fully capable of conducting fair trials and drawing 
reasoned conclusions from the results [110]. 
There is no reason to suppose that the mid-nineteenth century 
Surveyor's and Controller's departments displayed significant bias in assessing 
new inventions, despite the pressures to which they were subjected. In the 
1860s, for example, Reed and Robinson gave a fair trial to the 
controversial armoured turret warship promoted by the British inventor 
Captain Cowper Cowles [1111 and the Swedish-American engineer John 
Ericsson [112]. The pros and cons of the armoured gun turret have been 
set out by Stanley Sandler, and it is plain that the controversy that swirled 
around the weapon had as much to do with party politics as it did with 
practical policy. From the Royal Navy's point of view, the principal defects 
of the turret were its weight, which lowered freeboard and therefore 
adversely affected seaworthiness, and a limited utility when fitted to an 
ocean-going warship; foc'sle, poop, masts and sails all cut down the arc of 
fire. In addition, the number of guns that could be carried in turrets was 
limited, and neither the weight of shot in a turret battleship's broadside nor 
its rate of fire bore comparison to the ferocity of an 'old fashioned' steam 
ironclad's short-range hail of shot and shell. These failings rendered the 
turret ship of doubtful value, and condemned it to remain so until rifling 
made accurate long-range fire possible and until masts and sails were 
largely done away with. The Navy's rejection of Coles's initial approaches 
was therefore sound. It was, moreover, tacitly supported by Britain's foreign 
[110] Ibid pp. 36-9,118,154,162-3,201-07 
[111] Ibid pp. 181-92 
[112] Ibid pp. 250-67 
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rivals; none built seagoing turret ships in this period [113]. 
The inventor and his powerful supporters were quick to condemn 
Admiralty 'conservatism', and the administration of the day was regularly 
berated in Parliament and in the press. There was undoubtedly resistance to 
technological change in the Royal Navy. An active list peppered with 
officers who had not been to sea for twenty years was unlikely to throw up 
many deviants from naval orthodoxy; employment was too scarce for many 
to risk going out on a professional limb. But the Victorian Navy had the 
nineteenth century's faith in progress, and this meant orthodoxy was never 
synonymous with reaction. Officers were cautious rather than incompetent, 
and indeed the Admiralty's own turret-ship, Reed's coastal ironclad 
Devastation, was a far more effective warship than Coles's disastrous 
Captain [114]. Conservatism was rooted in institutions and owed its 
existence as much to administrative problems as it did to the prejudice of 
individual officers [115]. 
The administration of the Navy was always open to criticism. The 
members of the Board of Admiralty were political appointees, and naval 
affairs were often caught up in inter-party disputes. The pressure of public 
opinion forced the Navy into several ill-considered political decisions. 
Equally significantly, the propensity of incoming governments to install their 
own Naval Lords meant that the average tenure of a Board of Admiralty 
between 1834 and 1871 was little more than three years [116]. Nor were 
the duties of the naval lords properly defined. Between 1832, when Sir 
James Graham reformed the administration, and 1869, when Hugh Childers 
became First Lord of the Admiralty, each member of the Board had two 
potentially incompatible functions. No distinction was made between the 
individual responsibility of the Naval Lords for the administration of their 
departments and their collective duty to oversee the administration of the 
Navy. This system made it impossible to assign responsibility for decisions 
to individual members of the Board, and in the absence of a staff and of 
London-based middle-ranking naval officers, the senior officers at the 
[113] Sandler op. cit. pp. 51,179-80,194-5 
11141 Ibid pp. 183-4,192-4,230-5 
[115] Rodger op. cit. pp. 142,145,147 
[116] Sandler pp. 41-3 
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Admiralty spent much of their time performing routine clerical duties. "By 
1868, " writes Rodger, "the Naval Lords had become mere administrators. 
The Board mechanism now existed only as an engine for dissipating 
responsibility. " [117] 
In December 1868, Gladstone made Hugh Childers First Lord of the 
Admiralty and instructed him to reduce the naval estimates and reorganise 
the administration. Many of the new First Lord's policies had merit; in 
particular, by introducing compulsory retirement for aged or permanently 
unemployed officers, Childers thinned out the Navy List and helped to 
produce a comparatively young and able generation of senior officers in the 
1890s. But the First Lord did not understand the Navy and his decisions 
were based on political and economic preconceptions. His reform of the 
Board of Admiralty enhanced his own position, ` reduced collective discussion 
and responsibility still further, increased the amount of paperwork to be 
dealt with, and inhibited the development of strategic policy. Although some 
of Childers' more damaging reforms were rescinded by his successor, 
George Goschen, the influence of Gladstone's appointee continued to be felt 
well into the next century [118]. Not until the 1880s did the Admiralty 
regain some of the energy it had displayed in the 1860s. 
It is in this context that we must view British submarine policy in the 
mid-Victorian period. This short sketch cannot, of course, do real justice 
to modern research on the nineteenth century Royal Navy. It omits much 
of importance, and necessarily glosses over many of the failings of the 
Senior Service - which was very far from perfect. But it does, I think, 
suggest that the institution was never unthinkingly reactionary [119], that it 
was relatively open to innovation, and that it was unlikely to reject the 
submarine as a moral outrage or a wild and hopeless fantasy. 
British submarine policy 1856-1885 
Underwater warfare evolved rapidly in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Mines and locomotive torpedoes were familiar weapons to a new 
[117] Rodger, 'Dark ages' in Mariners' Mirror 61 pp. 332-4 
[118] Ibid pp. 336-8,342-3 and Mariners' Mirror 62 pp. 122-3 
[119] As Christopher Bartlett points out, "an intelligent conservative mind could speedily 
reinforce, and perhaps conceal, its prejudice with reasonable arguments against 
steam-power. Yet... a certain horse-sense was not lacking. " Bartlett op. cit. p. 205 
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generation of naval officers; Fisher and Tirpitz were among those who 
made their names in the torpedo services of their respective countries. In 
France a new school of naval thought, the jeune ecole, drew attention to 
the offensive possibilities of submarine weapons; in Russia, service in the 
torpedo branch meant prestige, accelerated promotion and better pay, and 
the officer corps was reported to be "enchanted with the torpedo boat" 
[120]. The British learned to be wary of Russian mines in the Crimean 
War, and the Federal Navy was taught the same lesson during the 
American Civil War. The Confederate Torpedo Bureau had more success 
than all the other rebel naval forces put together, sinking 29 enemy ships 
and damaging 14 more with mines and spar torpedoes [121). 
The Civil War legitimised submarine warfare and emphasised its 
importance, and there was an appreciable upsurge of interest in the subject 
from the mid-1860s. In 1866 the Italians used mines to protect ports : 
against Teggethoff's Austro-Hungarian fleet, and during the 
Franco-Prussian war minefields were sown to defend the German littoral 
against a materially superior French fleet. Russian torpedo boats scored 
striking successes with both spar and locomotive torpedos during the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8. The Royal Navy adopted the Whitehead 
torpedo in 1870, and experimented fitfully with mines throughout the 1870s 
and 1880s. 
The torpedo boat became the bogey-weapon of the mid-Victorian era. 
The first crude, spar-armed examples appeared when small but powerful 
steam engines were developed in the 1860s, and second class TBs were 
carried by many of the early ironclads. Improvements in the 1870s and 
particularly the 1880s led to the construction of larger, independent boats, 
lightly armed and armoured and dependent on high speed and raw courage 
to deliver their attacks - preferably by night. 
Torpedo boats were popular with most navies in the late nineteenth 
century. The newly-unified German navy was among the first to develop 
the type, constructing semi-submersible spar torpedo boats in the early 
1870s and - under the leadership of Tirpitz, who held the commission of 
Inspektion des Torpedowesens -a number of more conventional boats later 
[120] Captain Beaumont report, quoted HMS Vernon annual report 1882, Adm 189/2 
pp. 129-34; Captain Henry Kane report 'Russian manouevres in the Baltic' 3 September 
1884, FIC no. 50, Adm 231/5 
(1211 Perry op. cit., appendix A 
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in the decade [122]. The invention of the fish torpedo made the TB more 
attractive, for until the development of ship-mounted machine guns and 
quick-firing artillery in the 1880s it proved difficult for ironclads to ward 
off torpedo flotillas that did not have to close to ram. The British Torpedo 
Committee of 1876 reported that neither gunfire nor torpedo nets, 
guardboats nor extra lookouts could prevent a determined torpedo attack 
[123], a state of affairs that eventually encouraged other naval powers such 
as France - which had belatedly began TB construction in the mid-1870s 
- to develop the weapon in the 1880s. 
In the June 1884 manouevres, French torpedo flotillas launched the first 
full-scale attack on a fleet under weigh, closing to within 1,000 yards of 
their targets before being seen despite the disadvantage of a bright moonlit 
night, and coming under fire for less than a minute before discharging their 
torpedoes at a range of 400 yards [124]. This striking success encouraged 
members of the jeune ecole, a group of naval strategists who pointed out 
that France could not afford to maintain armed forces capable of opposing 
Germany on land and Britain at sea. The new school now suggested that 
French naval estimates could be reduced by abandoning the construction of 
capital ships and diverting resources into the production of fast cruisers and 
flotillas of cheap torpedo craft. 
A sufficient number of cruisers could (it was suggested) bring the British 
Empire to its knees by disrupting a seaborne trade thought, in 1899, to be 
worth £710,000,000 per annum, while torpedo flotillas harrassed British 
commerce in the Channel and coast defence ships protected the rump of 
the French battlefleet. So long as the' Marine Francaise had a fleet in 
being, argued the jeune ecole, the Royal Navy would have to institute a 
blockade of the enemy coast and would be unable to concentrate its 
resources on commerce protection [125]. 
[122] Charles Chesney report no. 56, 'Submerged iron torpedo boats of Germany' 14 
October 1871, Adm 1/6241; Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organisation, conflict, innovation: a 
study of German naval strategic planning 1888-1940 (Lund 1973) pp. 58-9; Mackay 
op. cit. pp. 129-30 
[123] Cowpe op. cit, p. 19 
[124] Ibid pp. 119-20 
[125) Geoffrey Till et al. Maritime strategy and the nuclear age (London 1982) pp. 34-8; 
Bryan Ranft, The naval defence of British seaborne trade, 1860-1905 (Oxford University 
D. Phil 1967) pp. 23-7 
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The strategy was an attractive one for obvious reasons. France, it 
suggested, could strike at the heart of her old enemy's prosperity without 
attempting to wrest command of the sea from the RN in a decisive battle 
which most admitted would have to be fought on British terms. She could, 
moreover, do so cheaply (dozens of torpedo boats could be built for the 
price of an armourclad) and in the knowledge that a wholly 
disproportionate effort would be required to track down and despatch each 
raiding cruiser. 
Sadly for the hopes of the jeune ecole, however, naval developments of 
the late 1880s and 1890s did much to discredit the torpedo boat. Later 
manoeuvres were inconclusive or downright discouraging; in 1887 the French 
flotillas failed to locate an enemy battle squadron - which had taken the 
simple precaution of dousing its lights by night - though they themselves 
were visible for miles, betrayed by the showers of sparks emitted by their 
over-heated engines. TB crews soon became exhausted; the efficiency of 
the flotillas declined swiftly after several days at sea in poor weather, and 
those torpedoes that were discharged sometimes acquired deflections of up 
to 15° from the engine vibrations that shook the little boats [126]. In 
1889,1892 and 1893 the defences mobiles of the Mediterranean Fleet could 
not prevent 'Italian' squadrons from ravaging the French coast more or less 
at will [127). 
British experiences with the TB were hardly more positive. In 1894 a 
flotilla attack on the battle squadron was adjudged unsuccessful despite being 
pressed to within 300 yards, and other torpedo boats attacked friendly 
warships. In 1895 Captain AK Wilson succeeded in blockading 'enemy' TBs 
in their harbour with a flotilla of newly developed torpedo boat destroyers, 
and British torpedo craft had no more success in the manoeuvres of 1896 
[128]. 
The French nevertheless pressed ahead with TB construction. By 1893 a 
dozen torpedo boat stations were strung along the coast from Dunkirk to 
Brest, with more under construction in the Mediterranean, and 80 first class 
TBs were stationed in the Channel [129]. But useful as the new large 
[126] Cowpe op. cit. pp. 123-4 
[127] Ibid pp. 125-6 
[128] Ibid pp. 151 -3 
[129] Marder, ABSP pp. 164-8 
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torpedo boats were admitted to be in coastal waters or the sheltered Med., 
they remained largely useless on the Royal Navy's high seas stamping 
grounds [130]. According to Alan Cowpe, the historian of the British 
torpedo service, 
"attempts to make the torpedo boat a seagoing threat to the 
battleship were discredited by the very manoeuvres designed to 
prove... [the]... thesis, while in its very reduced role as a 
harbour and coast defence vessel, the capabilities claimed by its 
advocates were never demonstrated in practice. The torpedo boat 
was repeatedly in difficulties merely steaming on the high seas, 
which dramtically reduced its claimed speed. By night, when it 
was reputed to be at its deadliest, the torpedo boat was often 
unable even to find the enemy. " [131] 
Although the Royal Navy continued to respect the Whitehead torpedo as 
a potent 'single blow' weapon possessing considerable moral effect and the 
ability to limit an enemy commander's freedom of action, it was, by the 
middle 1890s, coming to terms with the torpedo boat menace. Quick-firing 
guns, the TBD and the development of high-speed evasive tactics 
combined to make life in a surface TB dangerous and unprofitable, and a 
NID report on the 1895 manoeuvres quoted one naval officer who was of 
the opinion "that all the present types of torpedo boat are obsolete, and 
that probably no more will ever be built. " [132]. Despite its advantages of 
high speed and low silhouette, therefore, the surface TB was - in the eyes 
of the RN at least - something of a spent force by 1900. The stage was 
set for the arrival of a different sort of torpedo boat. 
* 
The naval authorities showed no special concern for the submarine between 
1856 and 1885. They could have done so. There were always a multitude 
[130] Ranft op. cit. pp. 272-3.283 
11311 Cowpe op. cit. p. 126 
[132] lbid p. 152 
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of projects in progress at home and abroad, and a good dozen significant 
attempts to build workable boats were made in this period. The Royal 
Navy's interest in the subject was at best sporadic, and this suggests two 
things: that the Admiralty had an established conception of how a useful 
submarine would perform and what it should do, against which it measured 
the inventions which came to its notice, and that in the absence of such a 
machine the RN gathered information about imperfect vessels not because 
they constituted a threat, but because it wanted to learn something of the 
activities of its naval rivals. If this model is correct, we would expect the 
Admiralty to be more interested in underwater warfare generally than it was 
in submarines in particular, and anticipate that the Royal Navy would find 
indifferent national projects more compelling than useful but privately-built 
submarines. 
The Admiralty's clandestine dealings with the Confederate submariner 
James McClintock support this interpretation of mid-Victorian submarine 
policy. Like Wilhelm Bauer, McClintock was a self-motivated and persistent 
inventor who had acquired considerable practical experience of underwater 
warfare. When the American Civil War broke out, he was the part-owner 
of a machine shop in New Orleans. With the financial backing of a 
wealthy lawyer and broker, Horace Hunley, McClintock and his partner 
Baxter Watson designed and constructed a small submarine at the 
Government Navy Yard. This boat, the Pioneer, was launched in February 
1862 and underwent trials on Lake Pontchartrain. The inventors intended 
her to operate as a privateer, applying for and receiving a Letter of 
Marque. In April 1862, however, Federal forces captured the city and the 
submarine was scuttled to keep her out of enemy hands [133]. The Pioneer 
syndicate escaped to Mobile and within a few months had built a second 
boat, which sank in a storm while under tow off Fort Morgan late in the 
year. McClintock then designed a third submarine, named her for his 
principal backer, and sent her to the blockaded port of Charleston, where 
as we have seen she sank the Federal warship Housatonic on 17 February 
1864 and was herself lost during the attack [134]. 
1133) 'CSS Pioneer', Royal Navy Submarine Museum archives A1872/23 
1134) Perry op. cit. pp. 90-108. Hunley hobbyists have never agreed on the identity of the 
submarine's designer; most assume from the craft's name that Horace Hunley himself was 
responsible, but McClintock's technical backround makes him a much more likely candidate 
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The exploits of the Confederate submarine service were the stuff of 
legend, and Frederick Cridland, the British consul at Mobile, was one of 
many fascinated by the story of the Hurley. He succeeded in tracing 
McClintock to a dredger busy clearing the muddy waters of Mobile Bay, 
and in March 1872 obtained an interview with the Confederate inventor and 
forwarded a description of his submarine to the British authorities [135]. 
The Admiralty's response was cagey, and the consul was asked to 
"obtain all the information ... 
[you]... can on the subject, and if possible 
the opinion of American Naval Officers" [136]. In the face of the 
inventor's refusal to allow a Yankee access to his plans, however, it was 
decided to send the Flag Captain of the North American station to Mobile 
with his chief engineer so that a full report could be made [137]. At this 
stage McClintock, who had contrived without actually lying to give the 
impression he had a submarine lying in the bay, was forced to admit that 
the boat existed only on paper, and alternative arrangements were made for 
him to 'visit the Royal Alfred at Halifax. 
On 18 October 1872 the inventor arrived on board the flagship of Vice 
Admiral EG Fanshawe, and in the course of a two-hour conversation Flag 
Captain Nicholson and the chief engineer, Josiah Ellis, were "strongly 
impressed with the great intelligence of Mr McClintock, and with his 
knowledge of all points, chemical and mechanical, connected with submarine 
vessels. " [138] The persuasive Confederate even convinced them that, if 
only he had had better resources, "these submarine boats would have 
attained a terrible celebrity and materially have affected the course of the 
, var. " 
Nicholson and Ellis concluded that "Mr McClintock's boat is capable of 
performing all that he promises of her, and we consider his invention of 
.4 for the honour. According to McClintock's partner, Baxter Watson, McClintock designed the boat, Watson built it and Hunley and his associates paid for it. Letter from Baxter 
Watson 11 to Eustace Williams cited in Williams, The Confederate submarine Hunley 
documents, (np Van Nuys, Calif. 1958, typescript in the New York Public Library). But 
see also the contrary arguments advanced by Ruth Duncan, The captain and submarine 
HL Hunley (privately published, Memphis 1965; copy in the NYPL). Given the importance 
of McClintock's dealings with the RN, it seems worth noting that I tend to accept he was 
the Hunley's designer. 
[135] Cridland to Foreign Office 5 April 1872, FO 511372 
[136] Cridland to Foreign Office 17 July 1872, ibid 
(137J 'Submarine boat invented by Mr McClintock... ' 9 August 1872, digest cut 59-8, 
Adm 12/897 
[138] Fanshawe to Goschen 21 October 1872, Adm 1/6236 box 11 
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the greatest possible value. " [139] Admiral Fanshawe endorsed their report, 
and believing that submarine boats had an important future he suggested 
that "it would be very desirable to bring Mr McClintock to England and 
afford him with all the necessary means to construct, or superintend the 
construction of, a boat of good capacity according to his plans, at the 
public expense - which would not be great in comparison with the 
object. " [140] 
In December 1872 McClintock was invited to visit Britain and lay his 
plans before the Admiralty [1411. After a certain amount of hesitation, he 
refused the offer on the grounds that he could not afford to bring himself 
and his family to London because the trip to Halifax had cost more than 
$600. "If I should sacrifice my present means of support, " he wrote, "and 
not make any definite arrangement with the Admiralty I should find myself 
in England in a very uncomfortable predicament. " [142] British interest 
waned. The Royal Navy did attempt to persuade the Foreign Office to 
meet the inventor's past and potential expenses "from the secret service 
money" [143], but was simply not prepared to fund McClintock's trip itself. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this unusually well--documented 
episode? The investigating officers were impressed by McClintock's expertise 
in underwater warfare generally, and drew attention to it in their report: 
"He produced two documents to shew the extent of the torpedo work he 
had done for the Government of the Confederate States, " they noted, "we 
venture to submit that the vast experience he must have acquired in this 
work would be of great value to any government interested in perfecting a 
system of torpedo defence. " [144] For its part, the Admiralty took the 
[139) Nicholson and Ellis 'Report on a submarine boat invented by Mr McClintock of 
Mobile, US of America' 19 October 1872. ibid 
[140) Fanshawe to Goschen, 21 October 1872, ibid 
[141) Cridland to Foreign Office 3 January 1873, FO 5/1441 
[142] McClintock to Cridland, letter dated 7 January 1873 but probably written late 
December 1872, ibid. When the Admiralty queried his seemingly excessive expenditure, it 
learned that "on Mr McClintock's return homeward he was seized with typhoid pneumonia 
at Bangor, Maine, and had to remain there confined to his bed for over six weeks. It 
appears that through a mistake a large quantity of morphine was administered to him in 
place of quinine. His recovery was not expected... " Cridland to Foreign Office 3 January 
1873, FO 5/1441 
[143) 'Inability of Mr McClintock to visit England... ' 8 February 1873, digest cut 59-8. 
Adm 12/920 
[144) 'Report on a submarine boat invented by Mr McClintock... ' 19 October 1872, Adm 
1/6236 box U. Similarly, Alexandrofsky's submarine was considered firmly in the context of 
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inventor seriously because of this experience and because he had designed 
what they understood to be a successful submarine. The fact that the Flag 
Captain of the North American station had been detailed to leave his ship 
and travel several thousand miles to Mobile strongly suggests that the 
British authorities were suitably impressed by the wartime achievements of 
the Confederate submarines. 
McClintock did not disillusion them. He carefully avoided mention of 
the Hunley's inadequate armament and grisly safety record - she had 
drowned almost 30 crew members during trials - glossing over her 
destruction during the attack on the Housatonic as "a totally unnecessary 
part of the performance. " [145] Significantly, too, the Admiralty was 
anxious to learn as much as it could about the submarine at the least 
possible cost. In 1872 the Royal Navy was subject to severe financial 
constraints, jibbed at the cost of bringing McClintock and his family to 
Britain, and met only a part of his expenses (he received $250). Despite 
the enthusiasm of its representatives on the spot, it is unlikely in the 
extreme that the Admiralty ever had any intention of paying the inventor 
to build a submarine. 
Most projectors received less consideration from the British naval 
authorities than had McClintock. Those without practical experience of 
submarine warfare continued to be treated with scepticism, and though the 
Admiralty sometimes expressed tentative interest in schemes that seemed 
likely to reach fruition, it was always on the understanding that the costs of 
construction and the risks of trials were to be borne by the inventor [146]. 
Despite this caution, occasional disputes arose. In 1879 the Reverend 
George Garrett built a small steam-powered submarine, Resurgam, at his 
own expense and offered to put the boat through her paces before a 
committee of naval officers. His proposal was accepted, but while the 
submarine was being towed from Birkenhead to Portsmouth, the Manchester 
curate lost her in a storm. The boat had cost Garrett £1,400 to build, but 
when he asked the Navy to refund his costs the Admiralty replied by 
4 Russian expertise in underwater warfare. See William Houston Stewart minute 9 March and 
Admiralty to Foreign Office 15 March 1873, Adm 1/6281 
[145] McClintock statement 30 March 1872, FO 5/1372 
[146] Cf. 'Letter from Mr William Steel' 5 August 1812, digest cut 59-8, Adm 12/155; 
'Mr Maguay' 19 February and 18 March 1878, digest cut 59-8, Adm 12/1023; 'Submarine 
torpedo launch submitted by Mr F. Windham' 4 May 1885, digest cut 11 a, Adm 12/1138 
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denying responsibility, and a correspondence took place "relative to trials by 
Admiralty officers and alleged encouragement to Mr Garrett to build the 
boat. " The authorities steadfastly refused to compensate the inventor, and in 
December 1880 rejected the further suggestion that he should build another 
submarine in exchange for £10,000 on the successful completion of trials 
[147]. 
The Admiralty ignored other would-be submariners completely. "You 
will be tired enough of projectors before you have done with them, " Sir 
Charles Wood had warned Palmerston in 1855 [148], and the Royal Navy 
showed little patience with the majority of civilian inventors. It refused to 
send officers to Slough to inspect the 'patent submarine ship' built by Mr 
Henry Middleton [149], and turned down a request that naval officers be 
sent to Annapolis to witness the trials of Professor Josiah Tuck's promising 
Peacemaker [150]. 
Further evidence that the Admiralty was not especially interested in 
submarine projects that did not have the backing of one of its naval rivals 
can be found in an examination of the early career of John Philip 
Holland. Born in 1841 in County Clare, Holland emigrated to the United 
States at the age of 32. He took with him the rough plans for a submarine 
boat drawn up during the years he had spent instructing children in 
mathematics and mechanics at schools run by an Irish teaching order, the 
Christian Brothers [151]. Soon after his arrival in America, Holland began 
to cast about for backers. The inventor's most likely source of funds was 
one of the then-active Fenian societies, and in 1876 his brother Michael 
introduced him to just such a group of people: Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa 
and the leaders of the Fenian Brotherhood. These men were impressed by 
the possibility of striking a blow at Britain's maritime supremacy, and 
[147) 'Submarine invention - Revd GW Garrett' 8 April 1878, digest cut 59-8. Adm 
12/1023; 'Revd. GW Garrett's submarine torpedo boat' - precis dated 8 April 1878 in 
digest of 1880, cut 59-8, Adm 1211060. See also William Scanlan Murphy, Father of the 
submarine: the life of the Reverend George Garrett Pasha (London 1987). Although of a 
fairly advanced design, Garrett's little boat had no ballast tanks and no weapons system. 
Prolonged dives and effective attacks were therefore out of the question. 
[148) Wood to Palmerston 26 March 1855, Add. Mss. 49562 fols. 27-8 
[149) 'Mr Henry Middleton's patent submarine ship' 12 November 1888, digest cut Ila, 
Adm 12/1186 
[150) 'Professor Tuck's submarine boat' 12 January 1887, digest cut ]la, Adm 12/1170 
[151) Donal Blake, 'John Philip Holland: his connection with the Christian Brothers', 
privately published paper in RN Submarine Museum archives A1985/49 
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Rossa's Skirmishing Fund agreed to finance the submarine project. 
Holland set to work, building a working model and then a tiny 
steam-driven submersible 'canoe', l4ft. 6in, long and crewed by a man in 
a diving suit. She worked sufficiently well for a much larger boat to be 
laid down. This craft, the Fenian Ram, was built in New York City by 
Delamater's Iron Works at a cost of $20,000. She displaced 19 tons, had a 
crew of three, and was powered by a1 Shp Brayton petrol engine. The 
boat was armed with a pneumatic 'dynamite gun', and upon her completion 
in 1881 made some well-publicised cruises around New York harbour. 
Eventually, in 1883, Holland's backers grew impatient at the slow progress 
of trials and took possession of the submarine. They were, however, unable 
to operate her successfully, and in October 1883 the British Vice Consul 
found the Ram tied up and neglected at Sewer. Dock, in a disreputable part 
of the harbour. 
The British consulate had begun to take an interest in the Ram in 
March 1880, while she was still under construction at Delamater's yard. 
Both the British naval attache, Captain William Arthur, and Consul General 
Archibald visited the shipyard while the submarine was building, and 
although initially sceptical of rumours that the Fenians were behind the 
project, they quickly obtained evidence that this was indeed the case [152]. 
Private detectives were employed to keep track of the submarine, and 
Archibald himself took the trouble of establishing a relationship with 
Cornelius Delamater [153]. The contractors allowed Captain Arthur to copy 
Holland's plans [154], and (perhaps by citing the Alabama claims) British 
officials persuaded the US customs authorities to keep a watch on the 
submarine: "The American government will do anything to carry out the 
wishes of Her Majesty's Government with regard to this and any other such 
plans, " noted Vice Consul Drummond [155]. British and American officials 
[152] Arthur naval attache's reports no. 12,5 March 1880, and no. 26,19 May 1880, FO 
115/673 fols. 18-19,55-6; Thornton to Foreign Office 24 May 1880, FO 5/1745 fol. 266 
[153] Archibald to Thornton 20 December 1880, FO 5/1746 fols. 186-9; Pierrepoint 
Edwards (Vice Consul, New York) reports political no. 35,14 July 1881, FO 5/1778 
fols. 315-19; political no. 39,20 July 1881, ibid fols. 343-5; political no. 41,25 July 1881, 
ibid fols. 367-72 
[154] Arthur naval attache's report no. 90,2 August 1881, FO 115/673 foLs. 209-I0 
[155] Drummond (Vice Consul, New York) telegram 3 September 1881, FO 5/1780 fol. 13; 
see also Foreign Office to Drummond 12 September 1881, ibid fol. 32; Admiralty summary 
of Drummond report secret no. 223,1 August 1881, in bound volume of reports titled 
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watched the Fenian Ram for two years, until she was "rusted so she is 
hardly good for anything... [and] there was some talk of her being sold for 
old iron. " [156]. 
Britain's diplomats took the Fenian Ram far more seriously than did the 
Admiralty. The Foreign Office sustained a major intelligence operation 
directed against the several Fenian societies from the 1860s to the mid 
1880s, when the Nationalist clamour began to diminish. It was forcibly- 
convinced by a variety of terrorist outrages that the Irishmen represented an 
appreciable threat. To the Foreign Office the submarine was important 
because it was a Fenian project, and the New York consulate displayed 
little interest in her until Holland's links with the Skirmishing Fund were 
made clear. 
The Admiralty approached the problem in a different way. It was 
prepared to take Holland seriously because of his links with the Fenians - 
indeed the DNO, Hopkins, minuted that "we should have the authority to 
take possession of this vessel whenever she gets under our jurisdiction" 
[157] - but the RN was more interested in the submarine's technical 
shortcomings than in her political significance. From this point of view, the 
Fenian Ram was not much of a threat. Although (unusually) she performed 
satisfactorily under water, the submarine was terribly slow, and her weapons 
system was never perfected. Holland thought of her as no more than an 
experiment; he intended to build bigger, better boats at a later date. While 
the Foreign Office was spending heavily on private detectives, therefore, the 
Director of Naval Construction judged that "there seems no reason to 
anticipate that this boat can ever be a real danger to British ships... [and] 
we should not recommend the spending of any money in order to obtain 
information. " [158] 
4 'Supposed Fenian submarine torpedo boat in the course of construction at New York' 
fol. 77, Adm 1/6551; Edwards reports political no. 47,2 August 1881, ibid fols. 118-119, 
and political no. 49,5 August 1881. ibid fols. 151-3; Foreign Office to Admiralty 3 
August 1881, ibid fol. 106; Drummond report secret no. 229,8 August 1881, ibid fo1.164; 
Edwards report political no. 53,1 September 1881, and enclosures, ibid fols. 169-71; 
Sackville-West to Foreign Office 20 October 1883, Adm 1/6693 
[156] Booker report 26 October 1883, Adm 1/6693. The effort which British officials put 
into monitoring Holland's activities may be contrasted with the total indifference alleged by 
the Admiralty critic Stanley Bonnett in The price of Admiralty: an indictiment of the 
Royal Navy 1805-1966 (London 1968) pp. 151-3. 
[1571 Hopkins minute 9 August 1881, 'Suppposed Fenian submarine... ' fol. 89, Adm 1/6551 
[1581 Barnaby minute 12 June 1880, ibid fol. 7 
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Between 1860 and the turn of the century most naval powers of any 
consequence built at least one experimental submarine. Several of these 
boats have been mentioned above - the French Le Plongeur (1859-67), 
Russia's Alexandrofsky and Drzewiecki submarines (c. 1863 and 1879), the 
Hurley and Halstead's Intelligent Whale, both constructed in America 
during the 1860s, and the Spanish Peral (c. 1886). In addition, Italy 
launched a submarine in 1890 and Portugal's Fontes was completed in 1892. 
There were unconfirmed but persistent rumours that Germany had built two 
boats of the Nordenfelt type and tried them in the naval manoeuvres of 
1890. 
Even setting aside the materiel inadequacies which bedevilled all these 
submarines, the Royal Navy still had three good reasons, and one bad one, 
for doubting that any would be a real threat. Firstly, diverse as they were 
in conception and design, not one of the boats had the unqualified support 
of the naval authorities. Proponents and opponents of submarine 
construction came and went, and the type was never developed with the 
consistency needed for long-term success. In addition, many of the 
submarine's most fervent supporters were junior officers whose views were 
as easily ignored by their own navies as they were by the British 
Admiralty. Secondly, it was obvious that the capabilities of the boats 
produced in this period were grossly exaggerated in propaganda issued by 
the inventors and by the patriotic enthusaism of the mass media. No trial 
could be conducted, it seemed, without it being accounted "a complete 
success". The Royal Navy never took such press coverage particularly 
seriously, but its very extravagence set the usually mundane deficiencies of 
the submarines themselves in perspective. Thirdly, the factions that actually 
promoted underwater warfare did so for reasons that did not necessarily 
include actual belief in the short-term future of the submarine. 
Carl Axel Gemzell has pointed out that naval innovation can result 
from organisational conflict within a naval hierarchy, and that groups 
struggling for power and influence often back some new invention. In doing 
so, they create a rallying point and create an association of interest that 
helps to give the group an identity [159]. The histories of many early 
submarine projects fit this model. In France the submarine was the child of 
1 
[159) Carl Axel Gemzell, Organisation, conflict, innovation: a study of German naval 
strategic planning 1888-1940 (Lund 1973) pp. 129-37 
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the jeune ecole, where one of the new school's figureheads was the same 
Simeon Bourgois who 20 years before had persuaded the French navy to 
build Le Plongeur. In 1888 the United States Navy appropriated $150,000 
for the construction of a boat, but President Cleveland lost an election and 
"with the change in administration, interest in submarine development 
languished. " [160] The Italian submarine Del lino was twice in commission, 
in 1896 and 1901-02, but she was laid up during the intervening period of 
naval disapproval [161]. In Britain the type was to be associated with the 
Fisher administration, and one Inspecting Captain of Submarines was 
warned, "you are closely connected with, a great man if you like, but one 
whose influence and interference are deeply resented, and who is regarded 
with great suspicion by the Service in general. " [162] 
One factor remains to be considered: British arrogance. The Royal Navy 
had considerably less faith in the ability of its naval rivals to produce 
submarines than it had in its own capacity to do so. 
As we have seen, many foreign submarine projects were the work of 
comparatively junior naval officers who received little moral or material 
support from their naval authorities. For a time the people of Spain were 
sanguine about the prospects of Lieutenant Peral's submarine "which, 
according to the Spanish papers, is destined to raise Spain at once to the 
rank of a first-rate naval power. " [163] From Cadiz the British 
Vice-Consul reported that "the vessel has awakened very considerable 
interest in Naval and Scientific circles in Spain", but he was shrewd enough 
to wonder "how much of this is owing to the intrinsic merits of the 
invention, and how much to. its being a national production. " [164] Sure 
enough, Spainish enthusiasm for the submarine and its inventor (who was 
[160) Frank Cable, The birth and development of the American submarine (New York 
1924) pp. 331 -2 
[1611 Report 'Relative to the Italian submarine boat Delfino' 21 July 1902, Adm 1/7618; 
Vice-Consul Towey, 'Report on submersible torpedo boats of the Italian navy' 8 October 
1901, Adm 1/7554; Captain Douglas Gamble, 'Italy: fleet, dockyards &c. 1900', NID 
no. 586, September 1900 p. 8, Adm 231/32 
[162) Keyes to Hall nd (December 1913), Keyes papers 4/22, Department of manuscripts, 
British Library 
1163) Captain Cecil Domville, 'Spain: fleet, dockyards &c. 1889'. NID no. 71,24 April 
1889, Adm 231/15/207 
[164] Henry Macpherson to Foreign Office 29 December 1888, FO 7211850 
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ennobled) drained away when the boat failed to live up to the extravagent 
expectations of the public [165). Peral and his Portuguese contemporary 
Fontes were too junior to persuade their naval authorities to do more than 
construct a single prototype; Peral "wished the Government to build a 
larger boat, and on their refusal to do so, he retired. " [166] 
In his study of innovation in the United States Navy, Vincent Davis 
observes that the successful innovator is usually a man in the broad middle 
ranks of the service, and seldom the inventor of the innovation he is 
promoting. This would suggest that Peral and Fontes (like Lt. John Parker, 
the American proponent of the machine gun) lacked the experience to 
understand and utilise the unwritten rules and administrative subtleties of 
their respective services in support of their proposals. They antangonised 
their superiors with their brash certainty that they were right and all others 
were wrong, and failed to assess the likely impact which the success of 
their proposals would have on established practice [167]. Of course, the 
civilian inventors who plagued the British Admiralty had even less chance 
of securing a sympathetic hearing for these same reasons. 
Greed and corruption had their own insidious effect on the naval 
policies of many nations. The Admiralty was sceptical when it learned in 
1880 that the Russian Minister for Coast Defence had contracted for 50 of 
Stefan Drzewiecki's little two-man submarines because it suspected there 
was an ulterior motive for the order. The Russian arms industry worked on 
a commission basis, agents being paid a percentage of the total price 
charged for the vessels ordered through them. Not suprisingly, costs were 
kept as high as the market . would bear, and there were considerable 
fortunes to be made by those who could obtain large orders for any sort of 
warship. "The fact of this order being given, " wrote the British naval 
attache, "points more to the anxiety to make money on the part of some 
official entrusted with the power of contracting for manufacture and 
material, than to any conviction on his part of the actual success or value 
of the invention. " He was sure that "little will be done by the Russians in 
[1651 CH Hilton, 'Isaac Peral and his submarine', USNI Proc. 82 (1956) pp. 1194-1202 
[166] Captain William May, 'Spain: fleet, dockyards &c. 1893', NID no. 346, April 1893, 
Adm 231/22 
[167] Vincent Davis, The problem of innovation: patterns in navy cases (Denver 1967) 
pp. 43-4,51-3 
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actual warfare with an invention so intricate and so dangerous to the 
principal actors" [168]. 
The attache was quite right. The Drzewiecki submarines were under 
powered, under armed and dangerous under water. Most of them ended 
their inglorious careers as floating supports for pontoons and oil jetties, and 
the torpedo school HMS Vernon, which kept an eye on the submarine 
construction of Britain's naval rivals, reported that "it has been observed by 
the Russians themselves that no-one, except in a state of drunkenness, 
would go into this boat. " [1691 
So much, then, for national projects. The Royal Navy did take an 
interest in the underwater activities of its naval rivals, but then officers 
were sent to report on battleships and submarines and improvements in 
pigeon lofts with equal despatch; it was enough that a potential enemy 
considered the subject worthy of attention. The primitive boats that came 
to the Admiralty's attention were reported on in spite of their deficiencies 
and not because the Royal Navy expected much from them. 
By now it should be possible to draw a few conclusions about British 
submarine policy in the mid-Victorian period. It was, firstly, rather more 
coherent than the varied reports of the Admiralty's far-flung 
representatives might suggest. Although individual responses to the submarine 
varied from the enthusiastic interest of Captain Nicholson to the dry 
scepticism of Nathaniel Barnaby, the conservative Chief Constructor, there 
was no significant change in the tenor of Board minutes on the subject in 
the period 1856-1885, and the Admiralty never seriously contemplated the 
construction of a submarine boat in these years. Furthermore, investigation 
and assessment of the submarine problem was inadequate rather than 
altogether non-existent. The technological limitations of a boat were of far 
greater interest to the sceptical British than her intended tactical or 
strategic role, and the Admiralty's technical assessments were accurate and 
noticeably harder-headed than those of most civilian enthusiasts for 
submarine warfare. 
The Royal Navy kept a watch on the doings of its maritime rivals, but 
[168) Captain Ernest Rice, naval attache's report no. 11,27 July 1880, Adm 1/6551; Jacob 
Kipp, 'The Russian Navy and private enterprise: a peculiar MIC' pp. 89-90, in Benjamin 
Cooling (ed), War, business and world military-industrial complexes (Port Washington, 
New York 1981) 
11691 HMS Vernon annual report 1885 p. 61, Adm 189/5 
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was not interested in their submarine projects per se. It was dismissive of 
the inventions that were submitted to it, and steadily refused to purchase 
either completed vessels or plans. Nor did it devote energy to the 
development of anti-submarine weapons. This was sensible enough, in that 
there was little point in erecting a fanciful body of theory on so slim a 
materiel base. But by making the comfortable assumption that the weapon 
was imperfect and likely to remain so for the forseeable future, the 
Admiralty ignored the fact that a workable submarine might force a 
reassessment of British naval strategy. 
This was a failure of some consequence. The problem was certainly not 
lack of information - the Admiralty was conspicuously well-informed 
[170]. It was, rather, primarily administrative. The RN suffered from 
organisational inadequacy, a sort of intellectual arrogance, and a peculiar 
strategic short-sightedness. 
The Victorian Navy was rarely able to process systematically the 
diversity of information which it received. No Admiralty department existed 
to determine strategy and tactics. There was no naval staff, no intelligence 
department existed before 1882, and the torpedo school HMS Vernon was 
over-worked and understaffed [see section 7.1). The Naval Lords had little 
time to devote to such minor issues as the submarine, and the only 
Admiralty officer with his own staff was the Surveyor (known as the 
Controller after 1860). For this reason, the mid-nineteenth century Royal 
Navy was better at assessing technology than tactics. 
The Controller's department was not without its faults. The Navy's 'wait 
and see' policy was a safe one only if it was possible to produce a 
workable submarine design quickly, but the department had no experience 
of such work and no contingency plans existed. The men of the 
Controller's staff were fully confident that with the accumulated expertise of 
British naval architecture behind them, they could out-design and 
out-build any other navy: "There would be but little difficulty in designing 
a submarine boat in every way superior to the one under consideration, " 
wrote Captain Arthur of the Fenian Ram [1711, and Sir William White, 
[170] For example, the RN on more than one occasion secured copies of supposedly secret Russian submarine plans. Cf. Wellesley report 22 January 1873, Adm 1/6281; G Stanley 
(Consul-General, Odessa) report no. 3 political 29 January 1879, FO 6511054 
[171) Captain William Arthur, naval attache's report no. 90 2 August 1881, FO 115/673 
fols. 209-10 
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one of the greatest of all Directors of Naval Construction, asserted that 
"there was no difficulty in undertaking here the design or construction of 
submarines had it been considered desirable to do so... but it was decided 
to await developments elsewhere before making a start. " [172] In 
retrospect it is apparent that neither White nor Arthur fully appreciated the 
special problems of designing a submarine from scratch. The Controller's 
department did not, in fact, have the necessary expertise to produce a 
successful submarine boat at short notice. When the Royal Navy decided to 
build its own craft in 1900, it had to adopt the tried and tested designs of 
John Holland. 
Had Holland's plans not been available, Britain would have found 
herself at a severe disadvantage. She was then ten or fifteen years behind 
her French and American rivals, and it would not have been easy to catch 
up. The RN could doubtless have produced a design of sorts, but - 
inevitably - would have entered the Great War with a far less efficient 
submarine than it actually possessed in 1914 [173]. This deficiency would 
have seriously impaired Britain's ability to blockade the German fleet and 
jeopardised her anti-submarine capability. The turn of the century was a 
good time for the Navy to order a foreign submarine; it was also its last 
real chance to do so. 
Finally - and perhaps most importantly - the Admiralty failed to 
think through the strategic assumptions that it did make. The Royal Navy 
discarded the torpedo boat because it had no place in a fleet action. In 
doing so, it fell into the trap of assuming that a weapon it thought useless 
would pose no threat in the hands of an enemy. Britain was as blind to 
the danger of the submarine. It was evident that no nineteenth century boat 
was fit for service on the high seas; low speed, low freeboard and low 
endurance all suggested that the type was best suited for coastal and 
harbour defence, and as such it was of little interest to the Royal Navy. 
Nathanial Barnaby dismissed the submarine because it was useless as an 
(1721 Sir William White, cited in Murray Sueter, Submarine boats, mines and torpedoes 
(Portsmouth 1907) pp. 137-8 
[1731 The Austro-Hungarian Navy also believed its own naval architects could produce a 
workable submarine design unaided, but the plans drawn up by the Naval Technical 
Committee in 1904 were inadequate and the KuK Kriegsmarine was forced to order its 
first boats from Lake and Krupp. Erwin Sieche. 'Austro-Hungarian submarines', Warship 
V p. 16 
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offensive weapon [174]. Ten years later the Senior Naval Lord, Sir Astley 
Cooper Key, implicitly rejected it for the same reason by stressing that 
British torpedo vessels should "be capable of accompanying the squadron to 
any distance in any weather... having sufficient speed to overtake an 
ironclad. " [175] But in dismissing the submarine as a weapon unfit for 
service with a seagoing fleet, the Royal Navy neglected its more limited 
potential as a scourge of the blockade. In the long run this was to prove a 
costly mistake. 
The Nordenfelt submarines 
Once it had been determined that the submarine was a weapon best suited 
to local defence, it fell naturally into the province of the British army. In 
the nineteenth century it was the Royal Engineers who were charged with 
the responsibility for most of Britain's coast defences; the regiment operated 
searchlights, boom defences and the minefields ('aquatics') at British and 
Imperial defended ports, and had a maritime arm in the little boats used to 
lay and maintain its electrically-fired observation mines. The Engineers 
therefore kept an eye on promising seaborne coast-defence weapons. 
Towards the end of the century the regiment expended a considerable 
amount of time and money developing the wire-guided, shore-launched 
torpedo invented by Louis Brennan, a weapon the Royal Navy had rejected. 
But a dozen years earlier the Engineers had recommended the purchase of 
an altogether more dramatic innovation: the Nordenfelt submarine. 
The British delegation sent to Sweden in September 1885 to witness the 
trials of this peculiar vessel comprised three Royal Engineers and only one 
naval officer, Captain Thomas Jackson. The senior army representative was 
Lieutenant General Sir Andrew Clarke, the Inspector General of 
Fortifications, a man best remembered for his governorship of the Straits 
Settlement in the 1870s. He was assisted by Major General Hardinge 
Steward, a leading mining expert, and by Colonel George Clarke, who as 
Lord Sydenham of Combe later served as Secretary to the Committee of 
I 
[174] Barnaby minute 12 March 1873, Adm 1/6281 
[175] Cited in Philip Colomb, Memoirs of Sir Astley Cooper Key (London 1898) p. 447 
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Imperial Defence. 
Nordenfelt's first submarine was a 60-ton, 64 foot steam-powered 
craft with a crew of 3, allegedly capable of making 9 knots on the surface 
and 4 submerged. On the first day of her trials the boat was exercised on 
the surface, dipping underwater occasionally but not proceeding submerged 
for any length of time. On the second, she steamed ten miles out to sea 
and returned, and on the third at last commenced her diving trials. The 
party embarked on Nordenfelt's yacht saw the boat submerge for periods of 
up to four and a half minutes. At best she steamed 300 yards underwater 
[176]. 
A distinguished array of notables had been gathered to witness the 
submarine's trials. Naval officers from Britain, the major European powers, 
Brazil, Japan, Turkey and Mexico were present, as were the Prince and 
Princess of Wales, the Empress of Russia and the King and Queen of 
Denmark. Never before had such a glittering assembly shown an interest in 
submarine boats. Yet the Norden felt I was not an especially impressive 
craft. Many of the submarine's faults, in particular her longitudinal 
instability when submerged, were hidden from those who had travelled to 
Sweden. She fired no torpedo, took 20 minutes to dive, displayed little in 
the way of endurance, and moved about at low speed. Her most attractive 
feature was a long, low silhouette which, it was agreed, would make her a 
difficult target for even a quick-firing gun, and she seemed to have more 
potential as an awash-boat than as a true submarine. 
Two more Nordenfelt submarines, built in British yards at Chertsey and 
Barrow, were purchased by the Turks in 1886 - reportedly on the 
initiative of the Sultan, rather than the navy. They too rarely ventured 
under water, and the British naval attache noted the Ottomans had little 
faith in the boats and "the general opinion of naval officers is much 
opposed to them. " [177] A fourth Nordenfelt, built in the yards of the 
Naval Construction Company at Barrow, had an even shorter career. She 
caused a minor sensation by appearing at the naval review held at Spithead 
to mark Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee, then sailed for Russia, becoming 
a constructive total loss on the coast of Jutland during her passage. The 
I 
(176] The Times 9 October 1885 p. 13 col. a 
(177] Kane report 'Turkish fleet and dockyards 18861, Adm 231/10 
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Tsarist government refused Nordenfelt's claims for compensation and denied 
it had ever intended to purchase the boat [178]. 
Thorsten Nordenfelt was a businessman, not an inventor. His submarines 
were designed by George Garrett, and the machine gun that bore the 
Swede's name was the invention of a compatriot, Heldge Palmcrantz. 
Nordenfelt's contribution to both projects was money and a shrewd 
marketing expertise. He built a reputation and an extensive network of 
contacts on the success of his machine gun, and it was his name that 
attracted royalty and a host of naval attaches to watch the trials of 
Nordenfelt I. A Nordenfelt invention commanded more respect from the 
world's press and naval authorities than did that of an unknown. 
Suitably impressed by the fairly modest trials they had witnessed in 
Sweden, Steward forwarded a favourable report on the Norden felt I to the 
War Office. He observed that "almost all the officers were very much 
impressed by it, " and was "perfectly certain that foreign war vessels would 
not lay off a port... if they knew there was a submarine vessel there which 
could come out without being seen. I certainly think that £10,000 would be 
very well spent in providing a vessel of this class. " [179] But Sir Andrew 
Clarke outdid even Steward in his enthusiasm, suggesting in April 1885 - 
five months before he inspected the submarine for himself - that £20,000 
be appropriated for the purchase of one or two Nordenfelt boats. Nothing 
came of this request, but to put Clarke's remarkable suggestion in context, 
it may be observed that the sum in question was equal to the whole 
estimate for submarine mines, stores and associated buildings for the 
defence of British merchantile ports in 1885 [180]. 
The widespread publicity which attended-the Landskrona trials brought 
the submarine to sudden prominence. The British observer Sir George Clarke 
understood their true significance when he noted that 
"these first public trials of a submarine boat will... undoubtedly 
produce results far beyond a mere criticism of the existing craft. Many 
[178] Murphy op. cit. pp. 152-84; The Times 24 September 1888 p. 9 col. f 
[179] Steward at the RUSI 5 February 1886, RUSI Jo. )COC (1886) pp. 168-9; 
'Nordenfelt's submarine boat' 1 October 1885, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1138 
[180] RH Vetch (ed), The life of Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Clarke (London 1905) 
p. 248; Clarke memo 'Defence of the maritime ports of the United Kingdom' 31 December 
1884, War Office papers WO 33143, Public Records Office 
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shrewd heads have been set thinking, and the great possibilities of this 
form of attack have been brought home with a force which no mere 
description, however graphic, could have excited. It is one thing to 
read of vaguely described exploits in the American war, or indefinite 
rumours of Russian experiments. It is quite another matter to be 
brought face to face with a boat which disappears before one's eyes to 
reappear in an unexpected position... It may be taken as certain that 
the perfection of this most dangerous weapon of attack is only a 
matter of time and brains. " [181] 
Nordenfelt's energetic promotion of the submarine thus had its effect. 
Although the Admiralty continued to display little enthusiasm for the 
weapon, semi-official service opinion (as expressed at the RUSI) was 
guardedly favourable in the mid-1880s, and the civilian press was often 
positively enthusiastic. Samuel Long, who chaired the Torpedo Discharge 
Committee and captained HMS Vernon, suggested in 1886 that a committee 
be formed to assess the recent development of the submarine boat [182], 
and the appearance of the Nordenfelt IV at the Jubilee review off 
Spithead caused the level-headed specialist journal The Engineer to remark 
that "in the Nordenfelt we have all the elements of a system of attack and 
defence which will certainly put blockades to an end... We may - we 
hope we shall - have quite a little fleet of Nordenfelts when Christmas 
comes around again. " [183] 
For all its scepticism, the Royal Navy sent representatives to report on 
both the Nordenfelt IV and a privately-built British submarine, the 
Nautilus, in 1886. At least three senior officers attended the latter's trials 
at Tilbury on 20 December 1886, and two of them - Charles Beresford, 
the Junior Naval Lord, and Sir William White, the Director of Naval 
Construction - were on board when the electrically-powered boat made a 
practice dive and instantly became stuck in the glutenous mud at the 
bottom of the deep-water dock. The captain, who had a heart condition, 
collapsed, and for an anxious quarter of an hour the two Admiralty officials 
[181) Anon. report in The Times 9 October 1885 p. 13 col. a. For authorship, see Lord 
Sydenham, 'The "weapon of the weak"', Naval Review 1933 p. 48 
[182) 'Submarine boat Nautilus' 10 December 1886, digest cut lla, Adm 12/1154 
[183) The Engineer 23 December 1887 p. 519 
1.5 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1885-1898 
were able to consider the merits and demerits of submarine warfare while a 
series of increasingly desperate measures were adopted in an effort to free 
the vessel. Eventually one of the two (for both claimed the credit) 
suggested that passengers and crew should rush in a body from one side of 
the submarine to the other. The boat began to roll, and this induced the 
mud to release its grip; the Nautilus came to the surface and its relieved 
occupants dragged the submarine's engineer out of their way and scrambled 
ashore [184]. It was probably no coincidence that both White and Beresford 
subsequently displayed dislike of the submarine [185]. 
Despite this setback, the Royal Navy went ahead with an assessment of 
the Nordenfelt IV, and rumours that the Russian government was planning 
to acquire the submarine may well have influenced this decision. HR 
Champness, a second class Naval Constructor from Portsmouth, was sent to 
Barrow to report on the boat's construction [186], and when the submarine 
arrived at Spithead in May 1887 her trials were witnessed by Captain 
Arthur Wilson, the Assistant Director of Torpedoes. Also present were 
Hardinge Steward and General Nicholson, Clarke's successor as IGF; 
Captains Long of the Vernon and Domville of the Excellent; and the naval 
CinC at Portsmouth, Admiral Willes. Wilson at least was not impressed by 
the Norden fell IV, submitting a report which suggested that "the vessel 
would prove of little value in time of war. " [187] 
In the week before Christmas another party travelled to Southampton 
Water to witness further trials. It included half a dozen naval attaches and 
naval men (one of them, Lieutenant WH Jaques of the USN, a future 
chairman of the Holland company) and William White, the DNC. By a 
peculiar chance, White's trip to see the Norden felt IV came exactly one 
year after his unfortunate experience at Tilbury [188], but he was no more 
[184] The Nautilus was an electrically-powered submarine designed and built by Messrs 
Campbell and Ash. See The Times 21 December 1886 p. 11 col. f; Frederick Manning, The 
life of Sir William White (London 1923) pp. 222-3; Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B.: the 
life of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford (London 1968) p. 140. The third officer referred 
to was Captain Eardley-Wilmot of the DNO's office; see Sydney Eardley-Wilmot, The 
British navy, past and present (London 1904) pp. 56-8 
[185] Reginald Bacon, From 1900 onward (London 1940) p. 53; White at the RUSI, RUSI 
Jo XLVIII (1904) p. 308 
[186] 'Submarine boat: Mr Nordenfelt's plans' 15 November 1886, digest cut Ila, Adm 
1211154 
[187] 'No. ZV trials' 16 + 30 May 1887, digest cut Ila, Mm 12/1170; Murphy op. cit. 
pp. 161-2 
[188] The Times 21 December 1887 p. 6 col. 1 
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impressed by the Nordenfelt boat than he had been by the Nautilus. 
Professional appraisal of two significant projects therefore confirmed the 
Admiralty's 1886 decision - reached, it must be said, in advance - to 
reject Captain Long's proposal on the grounds that "the development of 
submarine boats has not reached a stage to render it necessary. " [189] 
French submarine development 
After abandoning Le Plongeur, France lost interest in submarine 
development for almost 20 years. From the early 1880s, however, work was 
recommenced by a number of designers working in a private capacity. A 
Lyons engineer named Claude Goubet completed the plans for the first of 
two submarines in 1885, and early in the same year the 
highly-distinguished naval architect Dupuy de Lome began to work on a 
more ambitious scheme. This timing suggests that the revival of French 
government interest was fuelled in part by the publicity given to Nordenfelt 
and the Swedish trials. 
De Lome was, however, a notable innovator in his own right. He had 
designed Le Napoleon, the ground-breaking steam battleship, and Gloire, 
the first modern ironclad ship of the line; in the late 1860s he had 
interested himself in the design and construction of airships. But the great 
man made scant headway with the problems of submarine navigation before 
dying early in 1885, having done little to flesh out his novel (if 
impracticable) conception of a troop-transporting submarine which might 
expedite an invasion of Britain [190]. His ideas were taken up by a 
protege, the naval architect Gustave Zede, who made a submission to the 
Minister of Marine in March 1885. It was coldly received, but Zede's luck 
changed in January 1886 when a jeune ecole administration led by Admiral 
Theophile Aube took control of France's naval affairs [191]. 
Aube, a noted theorist, encouraged the development of all manner of 
[189] 'Submarine boat Nautilus' 10 December 1886, digest cut lla, Adm 12/1154 
[190] Le Masson op. cit. pp. 41-2 
[191] Ibid pp. 42-3 
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torpedo craft, and within a month of taking office had in principle agreed 
to finance a French submarine programme. Zede's project was approved in 
March 1887, and a small electric-powered submarine, the Gymnote, was 
launched eighteen months later. She was unarmed, spent most of her long 
career as a trial vessel for the French navy, and was not formally 
commissioned until 1908. Enough was learned, however, for a second 
submarine to be laid down in 1893 and named Gustave Zede after the 
pioneer designer, who was mortally wounded in 1891 while experimenting 
with torpedoes propelled by an explosive powder. At 261/270 tonnes, the 
Zede was considerably larger than her predecessor, which displaced no more 
than 30/31 tonnes, and after fitting out she embarked on a lengthy and 
frustrating series of trials. 
The French did not, therefore, possess a militarily useful submarine 
until the Zede was formally commissioned in 1898, and her immediate 
successors were only slightly more formidable. By the end of the century 
the Marine Francaise had built an electrically-powered improved Zede, the 
Morse, and a longer-range, dual-propulsion submarine named Narval. The 
former was laid down in 1897, the latter a year later. 
Morse was designed to incorporate the lessons of the Gustave Zede's 
lengthy trials. Realising that the Zede had been, perhaps, too ambitious an 
experiment, the French made Morse rather smaller (she displaced 143/149 
tons), gave her a small conning tower, and equipped her with a single 
internal tube. But like her predecessor, the new submarine was 
electrically-powered and had to return to port at regular intervals to 
charge her batteries at a shore station. The Narval, on the other hand, 
was the winner of a competition organised by the then Minister of Marine, 
Lockroy, to find a boat capable of steaming 100 miles on the surface and 
10 submerged. She was a double-hulled submersible capable of 10/5 knots 
and armed with four torpedoes in drop collars. 
The Narval's most remarkable feature was a 42% reserve of positive 
buoyancy, which made her far more seaworthy than her predecessors. "All 
French submarine boats before Narval are driven entirely by electricity 
stored in "accumulators... ", noted a British intelligence report. "The limited 
speed renders attacks on other than ships at rest the exception while their 
small radius of action makes it almost impossible for any of these boats, 
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except the Narval, to go in search of an enemy. " [192] 
The technical problems of submarine navigation occupied the attention 
of the French navy, and it was slow to develop strategical and tactical 
doctrines for its underwater craft. Submarines were initially expected to 
protect the battlefleet by patrolling harbours and the coast. They were not 
intended for - nor were they capable of - commerce raiding, but beyond 
this little was decided. The Gustave Zede's armament (which would, of 
course, partly determine the submarine's usefulness) was still under debate 
in 1889; in that year the Minister of Marine was reportedly asked to 
choose between a torpedo-armed boat and a submarine ram, the latter 
being Zede's preferred choice [193]. 
Indecision was rooted in the naval factionalism rife in the Third 
Republic between the Franca-Prussian war and the early 1900s. The 
French submarine service was very much the child of Admiral Aube and 
the jeune ecole theorists; when the French navy began to evaluate the 
Gymnote in November 1888, Gustave Zede wrote to Aube to assure him 
that "I have not forgotten that it was you who asked me to draw up the 
plan of the submarine which has just been tried at Toulon, and you also 
who... ordered it to be constructed. " [194] Frequent changes of 
administration and disputes between the leading naval schools significantly 
slowed French submarine development: there were 32 Ministers of Marine 
between 1871 and 1905, many of them personally opposed to submarine 
boats. "The delay of about ten years in completing the Gustave Zede is 
due... partly to changes of opinion of the numerous Ministers of Marine on 
her possible value, " wrote the British naval attache in January 1899. This 
made the Admiralty sceptical of the Zede's true worth: "Of course, for 
political reasons she was bound to succeed, " asserted the DNO, "and they 
said she did so, but she is not worth much. " [195] The French spent little 
on submarine construction after Aube had been forced out of office in 
1192] Admiralty report 'Submarine boats', NID no. 577, May 1900 p. 51, Adm 231/31 
[193] Captain Domville report 'France: Guns and torpedoes 1889', NID no. 211, December 
1889 pp. 13-14, Adm 231/16 
[194] Zede to Aube 21 November 1888, quoted in 'Papers on naval subjects 1903' vol. 1, 
April 1903 pp. 70-1, Adm 231137 
[195) Captain Jackson, naval attache's report no. 14,22 January 1899, Adm 1/7422; 
Jeffries to Egerton 27 May 1899, ibid. (Jeffries was DNO, Egerton the Captain of HMS 
Vernon. ) 
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1889; between 1893 and 1899 total expenditure on constuction amounted to 
no more than £154,000 [196]. 
The jeune ecole and the torpedo boat were out of favour for much of 
the 1890s, and the fuss made about the new weapon was regarded with 
deep scepticism by most Frenchmen. "The most curious thing about the 
appearance of the submarine was not the considerable sensation which it 
created, but the fact that comparatively little real notice was taken of it, " 
writes Theodore Ropp. "The New School had a good deal of trouble to 
drum up the enthusiasm that they did, and the submarine was then 
regarded as just another form of torpedo boat which was being taken up 
by these gentry, just as they had taken up successively every naval fad for 
the last 15 years... The vigour with which the New School hailed it was 
enough to bring it into some discredit. " [197] 
The Royal Navy had little chance of making an accurate assessment of 
French submarines through the swirling uncertainties of continual policy 
changes and the smokescreen thrown up by over-enthusiastic press 
coverage. The problem was exacerbated by the strict secrecy observed by 
the French navy, which persisted up to about 1906 [198]. Between 1886 
and 1900 the British relied largely upon guesswork and negative evidence: 
few submarines were being built, they reasoned, so those that existed must 
be failures [199]. 
Only the private manufacturer Claude Goubet was happy to supply the 
Admiralty with information. In 1895 he invited the Royal Navy to send an 
officer to see a two-man submarine in which the Brazilian government had 
taken an interest. The Admiralty despatched the naval attache, Captain 
Lewis Wintz, to Paris and also instructed Captain Henry Tudor to attend 
the boat's trials - hoping no doubt to glean some insights into the work 
being undertaken by its principle naval rival. The strong British interest in 
this small and largely discredited type underlines the RN's determination to 
[196] Reports on the French naval estimates in BNA 1893-1900 (see Appendix 3. ) See 
also John Walser, France's search for a battleflee:: French naval policy 1898-1914 
(University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) PhD 1976) pp. 166-7 
[197] Ropp op. cit. pp. 540-1 
[198] 'Reports on foreign naval affairs: France - fleet, dockyards &c. 1906', NID no. 804, 
September 1906 p. 11, Adm 231/46 
[199] Cf. 'France - fleet, dockyards and coast defences of the South of France', NID 
no. 70,16 March 1889 p. 10, Adm 231/15 
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find out anything it could about French submarine development, but the 
Admiralty did not have much to learn from M. Goubet. The inventor had 
been rebuffed by the French navy in the 1880s and (as Wintz's successor, 
Captain Henry Jackson, reported) "for some years they have practically 
ignored him. " [200] 
The Royal Navy was forced to rely on very inadequate information in 
assessing French submarine policy, and this - together with the discredit 
brought on the subject by the jeune ecole and the numerous technological 
shortcomings of even the best French boats - accounts for the Admiralty's 
unwillingness to take its rival's submarines seriously before 1898. Only the 
publicity generated by the apparently successful trials of 1898-1901 forced 
a reconsideration of this position. 
[200] 'Le Goubet' 12 + 13 June 1895, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1282; 'Capabilities of Le 
Goubet' nd (1896). digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1295; Jackson report 2 April 1898, quoted in 
HMS Vernon annual report 1899 pp. 115-16, Adm 189/19. 
The submarine was eventually rejected by the Brazilian navy, and in 1899 Goubet 
oresented her to France. 
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Turnaround 
BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1898-1901 
Acquiring the desire 
Before 1898, the Admiralty positively opposed the adoption of submarine 
boats. In 1899 John Holland himself, interviewed after a promotional visit 
to Europe, said that the British were still hostile to the idea of building 
submaripes, and in April 1900 the First Lord stated in the Commons that 
the type "would seem, so far as the immediate future is concerned, to be 
essentially a weapon for maritime Powers on the defensive... It seems 
certain that the reply to this weapon must be looked for in other directions 
than in building submarine boats ourselves. " [1] Yet by December the 
Royal Navy had hurriedly and covertly ordered no fewer than six 
submarines. What caused this remarkable turnaround in naval policy? 
The simple answer is fear: fear of the growing potential of undersea 
warfare, fear that the most modern boats were no longer simply harbour 
defence vessels but could menace warships in the Channel and threaten 
squadrons maintaining a close blockade. If Britain went to war, the Navy 
would probably encounter submarines in action. It needed a better 
understanding of what they could do, how they would attack and how they 
could be defeated, than mere written reports could provide. The RN needed 
its own submarine boats. 
* 
I 
(1) Holland quoted in Marder, ABSP p. 360; Goschen statement 6 April 1900, Hansard 4 
Ser. LXXXI col. 1402 
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French perseverance was paying off at last: submarines turned in 
enthusiastically acclaimed performances in the manoeuvres of 1898 and 
1901. In January 1898 the Gustave Zede succeeded in torpedoing the 
battleship Magenta in an open roadstead while the latter was at anchor. 
Although the trial was very carefully organised and the battleship made no 
attempt to avoid the Zede's attack, the result was unexpected and came as 
a shock to the majority of naval officers - many of whom had doubted 
that a submarine could even discharge a torpedo whilst submerged without 
fatally upsetting her trim. 
The manoeuvres of 1898 prompted the British ambassador in Paris to 
warn Whitehall that "belief in the success of the invention is very likely to 
encourage Frenchmen to regard their naval inferiority to England as by no 
means so great as it is considered to be in the latter country" [2], and a 
report by the naval attache, Captain Henry Jackson, concluded, "these 
submersible vessels have now reached a practical stage in modern warfare 
and will have to be reckoned with, and met, in future European war. One 
of the most important results of the trials has been to demonstrate that a 
vessel of this type... is capable of crossing and recrossing the English 
Channel from Cherbourg to Portland unaided... This fact is carefully hid 
from the public by the authorities, though considered the greatest triumph 
of this new vessel. " [3] 
However contrived, however dubiously reported the French manoeuvres 
were, they showcased the underwater craft as something it had never been 
before -a vessel seemingly capable of carrying out an effective attack on 
a capital ship. This development was quite unwelcome, and in May 1900 
Goschen - who had returned to the Admiralty as First Lord - scribbled 
against a batch of reports: "I have read the whole of the papers most 
carefully, they are not pleasant reading for clearly great strides are being 
made in the submarine boat. " [4] 
Progress in France and the United States triggered an alarm-bell 
somewhere in the collective subconscious of the Admiralty. The RN had 
long promised itself that no foreign rival would be allowed to gain an 
[2) Sir Edmund Monson to FO 28 January 1899. Adm 1/7422 
[3) Jackson report 22 January 1899, ibid; see also Jackson report 'Alteration in Vulcan's 
courses' nd (1900). quoted in HMS Vernon annual report 1900, Adm 89/20 p. 24 
[4) Goschen minute nd (May 1900), Adm 1/7462 
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undisputed lead in the construction of any warship type, for as Admiral 
Fisher observed, "we cannot afford any foreign power to possess any type 
of war vessel superior to our own. " [5] Having acknowledged the 
existence of a threat, the Royal Navy needed more precise information than 
could be had from attache's reports of foreign progress - and, 
furthermore, popular interest in the underwater exploits of the French led 
to the topic of submarine warfare being raised in Parliament on several 
occasions in 1900-01. Frequent criticism of Admiralty inactivity goaded the 
naval authorities, and parliamentary answers to the effect that underwater 
warfare was the preserve of weaker powers masked a geniune growing 
concern. 
The authors of early British submarine policy have often been criticised 
for their unthinking conservatism, but there is no evidence that collective 
prejudice held back the adoption of the submarine. On the contrary, the 
Royal Navy exhibited reasonable skill in its handling of the problem at the 
turn of the century. To have gone into submarine construction earlier - 
say with a Nordenfelt boat in the mid-1880s - would have been to 
undertake an eternity of experiment and fine-tuning that was always going 
to be as irritating as it was costly. Both the United States and France took 
15 years to develop practical submarines, and without a wholly 
disproportionate effort the RN would have required a similar time to 
produce even a modest harbour defence boat. 
A closer examination of the evidence suggests that a sensible policy has 
been misrepresented. Once the stratagem of discouragement had outlived its 
usefulness, the Admiralty dropped it and moved on. It did so without 
debating the morality of submarine warfare, without denouncing the 
submarine as underhand, and without allowing blind prejudice to influence 
its actions. In a revealing memorandum, the Permanent Secretary conceded 
that "it is so evident that we are individually interested in vetoing anything 
which might tend to reduce our present naval superiority that I fear it 
would only excite ridicule if we were now to attempt to put down 
submarines as 'underhand'" [6), and even AK Wilson - supposed author of 
the immortal opinion that submarines were "underhand, unfair and damned 
I 
15) Fisher to Selborne 19 December 1900, Fisher papers FP56, Churchill College 
Cambridge 
j6] MacGregor minute 19 February 1901, Adm 1/7515 
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un-English" [7] - belied his reputation as an arch-conservative in a 1901 
paper that explicitly predicted the 'piratical' use of submarines in an illegal 
guerre de course [8]. Despite the protests of a minority of naval officers, 
the Admiralty's determination to possess and develop submarine boats was 
not in doubt again until 1919 - and then because the weapon had proved 
itself an all-too-potent threat. 
Yet the Royal Navy's decision to build submarines should not be 
misinterpreted. The weapon was distrusted, and the UK was, as 
Arnold-Forster pointed out, "more vulnerable to the attack of submarines 
than any other nation" [9], since its tremendous naval power depended on 
the possession of an expensive surface fleet that could not, as yet, defend 
itself against cheap but efficient underwater craft. "We can delay ... 
[the 
submarine's]... introduction no longer, " conceded the Controller, "but we 
should still avoid doing anything to assist its improvement in order that our 
means of trapping and destroying it may develop at a greater rate than the 
submarine boats themselves. " J10] His colleagues concurred. "I think it a 
wise policy not to use the inventive power of this country to develop and 
advance submarine warfare, " wrote the Parliamentary Secretary, HO 
Arnold-Forster. "I am averse to doing more than is at present 
contemplated - in getting these boats we will be keeping pace with 
foreigners and able to acquire the necessary knowledge of their powers and 
[imitations. " [11] The Senior Naval Lord, too, believed that the purchase 
[7] Cf. Edwyn Grey, A damned un-English weapon (London 1971) pp. 12-14; Reginald 
Bacon, Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone I, 218; WS Chalmers, Max Horton and the 
Western Approaches (London 1954) p4n. There is no contemporary evidence that Wilson 
ever uttered these words, though he did - in a paper of January 1901 - advocate 
treating captured submariners as pirates [Wilson paper 'Submarine boats', 15 January 1901, 
Adm 1/75151. However, the context makes it clear that the proposal was intended to act 
as a deterrent, and it is by no means sure the author found submarines abhorrent himself. 
Admiral Bradford, his biographer, does not refer to the subject in his Life of Admiral 
of the Fleet Arthur Knyvet Wilson (London 1923). It is instructive to compare this hoary 
old naval chestnut with the equally common, equally unfounded tales of ammunition 
heaved overboard to avoid the grime of quarterly firing practice. See NAM Rodger, 
'British naval thought and naval policy 1820-1890: Strategic thought in an era of 
technological change' in Craig Symmonds, ed, New aspects of naval history: Selected 
papers presented at the 4th Naval History Symposium, US Naval Academy, 25-26 
October 1976 (Annapolis 1981) pp. 141-2,150n 
[8] Wilson memo 15 January 1901, Adm 1/7515 
[9] Arnold-Forster memo 13 March 1901, ibid. Arnold-Forster was, of course, referring 
to the vulnerability of the surface fleet and not to a submarine threat to British trade. 
[10] Wilson memo 15 January 1901, Adm 1/7515 
[11) Arnold-Forster memo 28 January 1901, ibid 
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of a few submarines was enough for the moment. "In doing this, " he 
wrote, "I think that we have not only adopted the best course that was 
open to us, but also done all that we can prudently do... While we are 
bound to follow up the development of the submarine boats and thus have 
at our disposal whatever advantages they may possess, it is not desirable to 
plunge too heavily as it must first be in the dark, nor until experience 
points us in the direction in which we should work. " [12] 
The Royal Navy did find roles for its submarines, but it is important to 
stress that the first craft were not acquired to fulfil any strategical function. 
The Admiralty considered them to be purely experimental [13], intended 
only for the purpose of instructing the surface fleet in the appearance and 
capabilities of boats. There was no immediate intention of integrating the 
type into the British fleet; Walter Kerr worried that the submarine had "a 
very limited sphere of usefulness", and sounded more than a little vague in 
agreeing to their employment "for any purpose to which they can be 
adapted. " The case for purchasing craft for trial appeared to him so weak 
that when requesting extra funds from the Treasury he suggested, "it is 
desirable to word the letter to give the impression that the sphere of 
usefulness of these vessels may be very wide if found to be a success. " [14] 
The wisdom of the Admiralty's decision to investigate underwater 
warfare at first hand was, however, almost immediately confirmed by the 
continued successes of French submarines. During the French manoeuvres of 
July 1901 the Gustave Zede was towed at a speed of 8 knots from Toulon 
to the Corsican port of Ajaccio, where she successfully torpedoed the 
battleship Charles Martel while the Minister of Marine, who was on board, 
was eating his dinner. Towards the end of the manoeuvre period the 
exploit was repeated when the pre-Dreadnought Bouvet was struck by a 
dummy torpedo as she approached her anchorage [15]. The Gustave Zede 
112) Kerr memo 20 January 1901, ibid 
[13] Bacon to May 13 May 1901, Adm 117462; see also AN Harrison, Development of 
HM Submarines from Holland No. 1 (1900) to Porpoise (1930), BR 3043 (1979) chapter 
3.2. Copy in the library of the National Maritime Museum. Harrison, who was DNC 
from 1961 to 1966, points out that the first Holland submarine was commissioned without 
having fired a torpedo. This adds weight to the hypothesis that the Admiralty intended its 
submarines to operate purely as trial horses for the development of A/S tactics. 
[14] Kerr minute 26 October 1900, Adm 117515 
[15) 'Synopsis of the first portion of French manoeuvres in the Mediterranean' 25 July 
1901, Adm 1/7507; Theodore Ropp, The development of a modern navy: France Piý 
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thereby became the first submarine to torpedo a moving ship [16]. Reaction 
to her feats remained mixed; The Times wrote of "an event of singular 
and, one might even add, of grave suggestiveness... of a character, indeed, 
which may render these manoeuvres historic" [17], but the British naval 
attache, Douglas Gamble, penned a report detailing the Zede's many 
defects, remarking that the submarine was "dangerous to live in, her radius 
of action is very limited, she is too complicated, a bad manoeuvrer on 
account of her length, and she could not be used at any distance from 
port" [18] -a notion one would have thought had been largely disproved 
by the exercises [19]. Contemporary press coverage [20] made much of the 
Zede's performance, however, and the popular clamour forced the Admiralty 
to examine the performance of French submarines with some care. 
British submarine policy 1453-1900 
The naval authorities never ignored the submarine. Though it has always 
been implicitly assumed that the Admiralty had no interest in and little 
understanding of underwater craft before the late 1890s at the earliest, a 
systematic examination of the public records shows that the submarine was 
not an unknown bugaboo. Two primitive boats were built with British 
A 1871-1904, Harvard PhD 1937 p. 548. The significance of the Zede's achievement was 
somewhat lessened by the revelation that Ajaccio was an inviolate port into which, 
according to the manoeuvre rules, enemy ships could not venture. Marder, ABSP p. 357n 
116] 'French submarine boat Gustave Zede' 29 January 1901, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1365 
[17] The Times 5 July 1901 p. 9 col. b 
[18) Gamble naval attache's report no. 139,26 September 1901 p. 16, Adm 1/7554 
(19) The confusion arose because the British were, as usual, short of reliable information 
on French submarine development. On this occasion the consul at Ajaccio had chosen to 
absent himself on leave for the whole of the manoeuvre period, appointing in his place - 
as Admiral Fisher warmly recounted -a local deputy who had an incomplete grasp of 
English and a quite insubstantial understanding of naval affairs. "Needless to add, " Fisher 
exploded. "that I have not succeeded in obtaining the desired information from Ajaccio... 
which would enable me to inform Their Lordships how far it was a pre-arranged affair 
in order to give prominence to and to popularize the submarine boat policy of the French 
Admiralty. " Fisher report 'Serious disadvantage to the public service caused by British 
consul having been on leave during the French naval manoeuvres off Ajaccio' 16 July 
1901, Adm 1/7505. See also Bacon minute to NII) report of 11 January 1901, Adm 
1/7462. 
[20] See citations in Marder, ABSP p. 358n 
2.1 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1998 -1901 
m 
government funds, one in 1814 [see appendix 2] and the other in 1855. 
The Royal Navy recorded details of more than 320 nineteenth century 
submarine projects. It made thorough assessments of more than a dozen of 
the boats that were actually built. Britain had a submarine policy long 
before the weapon was finally adopted in the period 1900-01. 
That policy was broadly consistent between 1856 and 1899. It was based 
on the naval certainty that Britain need not and should not innovate, but 
should study the experiments conducted by its maritime rivals and rely on a 
superior industrial capacity to out-design and out-build them once a new 
weapon was perfected. Though this was a sensible strategy, it could lead to 
naval complacency, political and economic inertia and (consequently) to 
recurrent panics; the scramble to acquire a submarine in 1900 was caused 
by the belated realisation that the--French navy had acquired an appreciable 
lead in construction, just as the nineteenth century naval scares were 
sparked by recognition that the British surface fleet was losing ground to its 
rivals. The Royal Navy is, therefore, open to criticism not for declining to 
formulate a submarine policy, but for failing to develop the policy it had. 
Naval conservatism was more instinctive than institutional. Its apparent 
prevalence resulted in part from the leisurely pace of the administrative 
system and from that system's failure to allocate responsibility; equally, it 
was emphasized by a lack of funds, the necessity of budgetary stringency 
and the politicians' tendency to judge the Navy on economic as much as 
military grounds. 
It would have been odd if the rapid pace of technological change did 
not leave some officers bewildered and anxious to cling to ideas that they 
understood. But the relatively advanced level of much nineteenth century 
debate sometimes goes un-noticed by those dazzled by Fisher's tales of 
rigid naval conservatism [21]. In fact the 'conservative's arguments were 
essentially practical. They doubted, for instance, that steam engines were 
reliable, that breech-loaders were safe, and that Whitehead torpedoes were 
accurate; they pointed out that Victorian submariners could not see where 
they were going when submerged. They were right to voice their disquiet. 
For all its supposed conservatism, the Admiralty made adequate 
technological assessments of the nineteenth century submarine projects that 
came to its attention, measuring the potential of such boats against a set of 
1 1211 Cf. Fisher, Memories (London 1919) and Records (London 1919); Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford 1973) pp. 265,300 
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unstated but consistent criteria. To the RN a useful underwater craft would 
need mechanical power, a useable weapons system, the ability to see where 
she was going and - most importantly - the seakeeping to steam outside 
local waters. Boats that did not possess these capabilities were dismissed as 
inefficient. 
The Victorian Royal Navy was not alone in expecting too much of early 
submarine builders. The specifications laid down by USN for its 1887 open 
competition were not met by any boat designed before the 1930s. And as 
Murphy points out [22], Victorian projectors who habitually made the most 
extravagent claims for their inventions were themselves largely to blame for 
encouraging naval insistence on outstanding performance. 
It must nevertheless be admitted that the RN's strategists failed to 
recognise the likely significance of peripheral innovations such as the 
submarine. Although almost equally untried weapons - the breech-loader, 
the turret, the fish torpedo - were tested because they might be useful to 
the battlefleet, emphasis on the importance of fleet actions and trade 
protection generally over-rode interest in the Navy's third great role, 
coastal defence. It was the Royal Engineers, not the Royal Navy, who drew 
attention to the value an efficient submarine would have in local waters 
and, in many naval minds, it was the duty of the Engineers, not the Navy, 
to concern themselves with harbour defence. This, coupled with 
over-reliance on purely technical assessement, precluded adequate 
examination of the likely impact efficient boats might have on naval 
strategy. 
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that it was the RN's poor 
capacity for strategic planning that gave rise to the most peculiar failing 
outlined in section 1: the inability of an organisation which had conceded 
by 1855 (and effectively as early as 1804) that an efficient submarine would 
one day be produced to recognise prior to the early years of the twentieth 
century that such boats now existed. 
In his important work on military innovation, IB Holley suggests that 
"the greatest stumbling block to the revision of doctrine... [is]... probably 
not so much vested interests as the absence of a system for analyzing new 
weapons and their relation to prevailing concepts of utlizing weapons", and 
' [22] William Scanlan Murphy, Father of the Submarine: the life of the Reverend George Garrett Pasha (London 1987) pp. 360-1 
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hypothesises that "the pace at which weapons develop is determined by the 
effectiveness of the procedures established to translate ideas into weapons" 
[23]. The Victorian Navy had no such procedures and no such system. With 
the exception of the Surveyor and, later, the Director of Naval Intelligence, 
no Admiralty officer had a staff capable of analysing data and making 
projections. The RN was therefore generally unable to evaluate the 
excellent intelligence provided by its network of consuls and naval attaches. 
Confronted by a rival intent on maintaining security, such as the submarine 
service of the French Navy, it was unable to make a realistic estimate of 
the pace of technological change. 
Similarly, rejection of the submarine as a suitable vessel for the 
seagoing Royal Navy was not accompanied by an evaluation that recognised 
its value, even in a relatively primitive form, as a scourge of the blockade, 
harbour -infiltrator, panic-monger and coast-defender. 
This failing was compounded by another fault, the (perhaps 
understandable) failure to take civilian inventors and the activities of minor 
naval powers sufficiently seriously. The RN was more interested in the most 
obscure doings of the French than it was in the valuable work of John 
Holland, even after the Irish-American was commissioned to build a 
submarine for the US Navy [see below]. Had it taken Holland as seriously 
in the 1890s as it did in the 1880s, when his involvement with O'Donovan 
Rossa and the Skirmishing Fund made the Fenian Ram a direct threat to 
Britain, the Navy might have realised a little sooner that the submarine was 
beginning to fulfil its potential. 
In the end, though, it mattered little that Britain's first submarines were 
acquired hastily and with no real conception of their function or their 
potential. By purchasing boats of a tested American design, the RN 
rendered the French lead in submarine construction effectively worthless. 
Though it had worrying defects, therefore, Britain's 'wait and see' policy 
worked spectacularly well, from the materiel point of view, in the case of 
the submarine. It follows that the Royal Navy's nineteenth century 
submarine policy was broadly sensible and - essentially - quite correct. 
In the twentieth century, however, the strategic problems posed by 
submarine boats became more complicated and the defects of the British 
I 
[23] IB Holley, Ideas and weapons: Exploitation of the aerial weapon by the United 
States during World War 1; a study in the relationship of technological advance, military 
doctrine, and the development of weapons (Hamden, Conn. 1971) pp. 15,19 
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system more worrying. In particular, the tendency to assess materiel without 
relating its development to strategy caused many naval officers to dismiss 
the submarine as late as 1914. They did so not because they were utterly 
ignorant of underwater warfare but because they had seen submarines touted 
for decades without ever becoming a significant threat. 
Acquiring the design 
"The matter of submarine boats cannot be ignored and must be taken up 
by us, " minuted Walter Kerr in March 1900. "Our first want is a design. " 
[24] This want is central to the understanding of turn-of-the-century 
British policy. 
There was, in 1900, no hope of securing a French design from which 
to work, but considerable strides were also being made in the friendlier 
waters of North America. Interest in submarines, sparked by the Civil War, 
had never entirely died away in the States, and between 1887 and 1893 the 
USN held three open competitions for boats designed to meet the Navy's 
stringent specifications - including the ability to steam at two knots for 
eight hours under water and for 30 hours at 15 knots on the surface - 
and examined the designs of, among others, Nordenfelt, Lake, Baker and 
Holland [25]. Holland's plans were declared superior on each occasion, and 
in 1893 cash was appropriated for the construction of the steam-powered 
Plunger, a less-than-satisfactory boat which the inventor had designed to 
meet the USN's unrealistic demand for surface speed. It soon became 
apparent that Plunger would be an abject failure and Holland resorted to 
desperate measures, financing the construction of another boat built to his 
own specifications himself. This craft, usually known as the Holland VI, 
was completed in 1899, offered to the USN, and put under trial. She 
emerged triumphantly, and six boats of a slightly modified type were 
ordered in August 1900 [26]. 
[24] Kerr minute 22 May 1900, Adm 1/7462 
[25] Frank Cable, The birth and development of the American submarine (New York 
1924) pp. 95-103; Murphy op. cit. p. 160 
[26] Richard Morris. John P Holland 1841-1914: inventor of the modern submarine 
(Annapolis 1966) pp. 79-111 
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The Holland Company had, by now, metamorphosised into an 
aggressive, commercial concern anxious to sell boats to all comers. In the 
last months of the nineteenth century the firm had been taken over by the 
man who supplied it with electric storage batteries, a German-American 
patent lawyer named Isaac Rice. 
Rice (who was, incidentally, a leading member of the Peace Society) 
made his name and fortune as a negotiator for America's railroad 
companies before going into business for himself in 1893 and spending 
freely in an attempt to monopolise the production of storage batteries in 
the United States. He saw that submarine construction would create further 
demand for batteries and complement his existing interests in electric launch 
manufacture and the mass-production of electric cars [27]. 
Attracted by his supplier's reputation as a tough negotiator, impressed 
by his circle of Washington contacts and - like many practical inventors - 
anxious to return to the workshop, John Holland agreed to transfer his 
submarine patents to a new firm to be controlled by Rice. Although careful 
not to offend Holland (whose name was well known and whose potential 
for securing the Irish vote would prove useful on Capitol Hill), Rice made 
sure that the inventor's control over the newly-formed Electric Boat 
in excess of $90 a week and in 1904 he left the EBC to resume - at the 
age of 63 - his career as an independent submarine designer [28]. 
Having established the Electric Boat Co., Rice set about promoting 
Holland submarines. He publicised the private trials of the Holland VI and 
took care to inform interested foreign governments that the designs were 
available to interested parties. "It must be admitted, " wrote the British 
naval attache, Captain Ottley, late in 1899, "that the leading spirits of 
the... company are enterprising and wealthy people, who have taken the 
thing up with the avowed intention of making the boat a success... The 
Holland Company does not hold itself in any way bound to manufacture 
solely for the American Govt., nor do I gather that there is any present 
desire on the part of the authorities to monopolise the invention. " Holland's 
design still had major defects, Ottley thought, but it could soon be 
[27] For Rice's' background, see Vickers papers VP 632/161 and 632/362, Department of Manuscripts, Cambridge University Library, and RC Trebilcock, The Vickers brothers: 
armaments and enterprise 18S4-1914 (London 1977) pp. 99-101. The Electric Boat Co. is 
now a division of the General Dynamics Corporation. 
[28] Morris op. cit. p. 123 
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perfected by British naval expertise [29]. 
In 1900 Rice embarked on a promotional trip to the Old World. He 
did not scruple to make use of his extensive contacts among the 
multi-national banking houses of New York; the merchant bankers August 
Belmont & Co. were shareholders in the EBC, as were Rothschild's [30], 
and before he sailed for Europe in July Rice asked Belmont to provide 
him with an introduction to Rothschild's London office. "As far as England 
is concerned, [I] expected to be guided entirely by the advice I might 
receive from Lord Rothschild, " wrote Rice, and he "almost immediately 
through the kindness of Lord Rothschild began negotiations with the 
Admiralty. " [31] The American must have been surprised and delighted to 
find such well-prepared and fertile ground for his proposals in a country 
he had every reason to suppose would rebuff him [32]. 
Possession of the right 'contacts' was undoubtedly an important plus for 
any unknown visiting the Admiralty with a business proposition. Prince 
Albert's name had opened many doors for Wilhelm Bauer, and in 1859 the 
Chicago lawyer William Delaney used an introduction from Sir William 
Pakington, a relative of the then First Lord, to interest the Surveyor in 
Lodner Phillips' submarine. When George Garrett persuaded the Admiralty 
to examine Resurgam it was with the help of Albert Durstan, a naval 
engineeer attached to Portsmouth dockyard, and Hugh Birley, a well-known 
Manchester figure and friend of the First Lord and the Secretary of the 
Admiralty. Now Rice showed that he had a distinct advantage over John 
Holland, who had visited Great Britian with so little success only two years 
earlier. The name of Rothschild carried quite enough weight to secure him 
an immediate interview with George Goschen [33]. 
Rothschild's influence was significant but should not be exaggerated. He 
could direct an existing British intention to benefit Rice's own financial 
interests, but he could not create interest where there was none. Having 
decided to build its own submarine boats, however, the Royal Navy had 
[29) Ottley naval attache's report no. 9,18 December 1899, Adm 1/7471 
[30] Rice to E. Naumberg of the EBC 9 January 1907, VP 632/161 fol. 91 
[31] Rice to A. Trevor Dawson of Messrs Vickers 7 November 1906, ibid fol. 76 Rice's 
letter of introduction from Rothschild (13 July 1900) is in Adm 1/7515 
[32] Cable op. cit. pp. 332-3 
[33) On Bauer, see section 1.2; on Phillips' submarine, see Surveyor to Delaney 30 
December 1858, Adm. 91121 fol. 742; on Garrett, see Murphy op. cit. pp. 51-2,54-5 
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little choice but to negotiate with the American patent lawyer; its only 
alternative was to start designing submarines from scratch [34]. When 
Rothschild wrote to Goschen asking whether Rice should be provided with a 
letter of introduction, the First Lord replied in the affirmative [35]. 
In acquiring the rights to the Holland's invention, the British were 
buying a quarter-century of experience. Whatever its doubts about the 
performance of the American craft, whatever its belief in its superior design 
capability, the Admiralty could not deny that there were compelling reasons 
for closing the deal. "The purchase of the Holland boats would give 
substantial advantages in point of assured and immediate success, since we 
profit by all the years of work and experiment on actual vessels which Mr 
Holland has performed, " noted Sir William White - still, for the moment, 
the Director of Naval Construction [36]. Lord Selborne, who became First 
Lord of the Admiralty in 1901, remarked that "the value and importance of 
this step as enabling us for the first time to commence an investigation of 
this invention can scarcely be exaggerated. " [37] 
The decision to order five Holland-class submarines was taken by the 
Board of Admiralty over the protests of White and the Treasury that such 
a number was excessive and that individually the boats were too expensive 
[38]. White still believed that Britain did not need submarines, but his 
rearguard action was to be the last serious attempt to block their 
introduction. The DNC's ineffectual opposition shows just how difficult it 
was for any naval hierophant to influence a policy that was largely reactive 
and dictated by the activities of Britain's naval rivals; there were too many 
other factors to be considered for the resistance of one officer to be 
decisive. 
Contemporaries were puzzled by the Admiralty's superficially extravagent 
first order for five submarine boats. The decision was, however, in keeping 
with the RN's cautious and negative submarine policy. Surviving references 
[34] Cf. draft letter to the Treasury 25 October 1900, Adm 1/7515 
[35] Rothschild to Goschen 23 July 1900, ibid 
[36] White memo 31 November 1900, Adm 1/7516 
[37] Selborne memo 15 January 1901, Adm 1/7515 
[38] White memo 19 September 1900, ! bid; Treasury to Admiralty 9 November 1900, ibid. 
Wilson originally suggested ordering only one submarine, but by September had decided to 
request the purchase of five boats. Memos of 3 August 1900, Adm 1/7462, and 17 
September 1900, Adm 1/7515 
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suggest that a multiple order was placed so that a Holland boat could be 
sent to each of the Home Ports, thereby giving as many ships as possible 
the opportunity of exercising against a submarine [39]. Altogether more 
puzzling was a simultaneous order for the first A class submarine, a quite 
radical reworking of the basic Holland type [see section 3.2]. It seems 
probable that permission to develop a more advanced sixth boat was given 
on the grounds that France and the United States were making rapid 
progress with their own programmes; equally importantly, Al was an 
experimental design intended to test the seaworthiness of a 'large' 
submarine of the sort necessary to keep the seas around the British coast 
and provide the Royal Navy with experience of building and operating the 
more powerful petrol engines needed to power such a craft [40]. The order 
for Al was thus important for several reasons. It reaffirmed the continuity 
of British policy - for the RN had long insisted that only seagoing torpedo 
craft were of use to the world's greatest naval power - and marked the 
beginning of genuine interest in submarines for their own sake. It 
emphasised the Navy's confidence in its ability to design a submarine, and 
it demonstrated the energy and resources the Admiralty was prepared to 
devote to submarine construction. 
There remained the choice of a shipyard. Isaac Rice suggested that the 
first British boat, Holland 1, should be built in the United States by EBC 
sub-contractors, but this proposal was unacceptable to the world's greatest 
sea-power [41]. The Royal Navy's insistence that its submarines be built in 
the United Kingdom meant (as Lord Rothschild had doubtless already 
realised) that the EBC needed a British partner, and if Rice had no strong 
preference for any particular concern, Rothschild did: he favoured the 
ambitious combine of Messrs Vickers, Sons & Maxim. 
[39] Wilson memo 17 September 1900, ibid 
[40] Bacon report 'Type of submarine boat for 1904', 7 November 1903, Adm 1381180B 
section 31, National Maritime Museum 
(41] 'Notes of an interview between Mr Rice, the Controller and the Director of Naval 
Construction' 16 October 1900, Adrn 117515 
3.1 SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION 1900-1914 "" 
Materiel 
SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION AND. DEVELOPMENT 1900-1914 
Submarines and the British arms industry 
In 1900 the Royal Navy was supplied by the world's finest naval armaments 
industry. Private companies, supplemented by four Royal Dockyards, met 
the needs of the huge Imperial market and exported successfully to every 
corner of the world against increasingly stiff competition. The arms firms 
remained efficient, thanks to investment in new technology, while British 
manufacturing industry declined in relative importance and other nations 
industrialised. Many of their products were world-beaters. At the turn of 
the century the capital ship was the most complex machine ever built. 
Yet building warships has always been a dangerous business. Even in 
1900 demand was unpredictable; the profits of an arms race often had to 
sustain the industry through long, lean years of retrenchment. Over-rapid 
expansion of capacity during a crisis could prove disastrous, and the 
domestic market was dominated by a monopsonist - the state. There were 
no private customers for warships. 
Arms firms sought protection in vertical integration and diversification 
into consumer goods. Vickers itself was the first company to boast it could 
build a battleship complete from the keel up. All the great names - 
Thames Ironworks, Browns, Palmers, BSA and Scotts, Vickers and 
Armstrongs - could be found on a list of the 100 largest British 
companies; five, including Vickers, were in the top 20 [1). 
I [1) Much of the background material concerning the British arms industry in the pre-war period is drawn from notes taken during a series of lectures on 'Government, industry and 10- 
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These large, thoroughly independent, companies could design and build 
warships as good as or better than those produced by the Director of Naval 
Construction. Vickers, the youngest of the great arms firms, was well suited 
to the task of developing the submarine, and worked enthusiastically after it 
discovered that, ton for ton, underwater craft were more profitable than 
any other class of warship. (Profits of over 100% were not unknown. ) With 
the help of a group of talented Inspecting Captains - Reginald Bacon, 
Edgar Lees and Sydney Hall - the company produced submarines that 
were among the best in the world. But caution and the desire for 
continuity dictated that each class from the Hollands to the E boats was 
designed primarily as an advance on its predecessor. None was built to 
meet the specific strategic and tactical needs of the Royal Navy [see also 
sections 4.2 and 6.1]. 
The first major change in construction policy came in 1910 with the 
appointment of Roger Keyes to the submarine service. Keyes, who thought 
Holland's original design had been stretched to its limit, began to order 
submarines from foreign manufacturers. He laid down a pair of 
experimental boats twice the size of any previous submarine and installed 
steam engines in one of them. The continuity of Bacon, Lees and Hall was 
broken. Keyes ended the de facto monopoly of construction enjoyed by 
Messrs Vickers and consciously reversed many of his predecessors' policies. 
Vickers and the submarine 
Late in the nineteenth century the great Armstrongs combine dominated the 
British arms industry from its factories and shipyards along the Tyne, 
intimidating a succession of governments. Vickers (then a Sheffield 
steel-making company) was recruited to the arms industry in 1888 with the 
promise of government work in order to weaken the Eiswick concern's 
increasingly powerful bargaining position. 
The company was then c ontrolled by two third-generation Vickerses. 
Albert's entrepreneurial gifts were complemented by a genius for the 
4 the arms race: Great Britain 1890-1914' given at Cambridge University by Mr RC 
Trebilcock of Pembroke College during the academic year 1983-4. Mr Trebilcock plans to 
incorporate the material in a forthcoming work, The Perpetual crisis: an economic history 
of the armaments industry 1890-1914. 
3.1 SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION 1900-1914 1® 
selection of top-quality managers, while the company Chairman, 'Colonel 
Tom' (a militia officer), was an expert steelmaker. The Vickers brothers 
were ably assisted by a gifted Board of Directors led from 1896 by 
Lieutenant A. Trevor Dawson, a naval gunnery specialist. By 1900, its 
order books filled by the Boer War, Vickers was almost as powerful as 
Armstrongs. 
When Isaac Rice approached the company, it had only recently 
diversified into shipbuilding by purchasing the Naval Construction Company 
at Barrow-in-Furness (1897). But though the Barrow yard had built both 
Nordenfelt 11 and Norden felt IV, and Vickers had also absorbed the 
Maxim-Nordenfelt concern itself, the Vickers brothers had shown no 
previous interest in the submarine; indeed, both men doubted that 
underwater craft were practicable [2]. According to Charles Craven, a young 
submariner who became Managing Director of Vickers-Armstrong in the 
1920s, Rice "was informed... that there was no possibility, in their opinion, 
of the British Navy building submarines. " It was left to the American to 
surprise his hosts with the news that the Admiralty had already ordered five 
submarines, provided they could be built in British yards [3]. 
Acting on the advice of one of their principal shareholders, the Vickers 
brothers decided to investigate the possibilities of a deal. Their advisor was 
none other than Lord Rothschild, who had invested heavily in the Maxim 
gun company and taken up a large number of Vickers shares when the two 
firms merged in 1897 to become Messrs Vickers, Sons & Maxim. (In 
addition Albert, especially, was on close terms with Cassel and many of the 
banking families among whom Rice and Rothschild moved easily. ) 
Rothschild's protege Sigmund Loewe - who had recently joined Vickers 
from a German arms firm - had already met Rice on a trip to the 
United States in 1898 [4]. He assumed a central role in the early 
relationship between Vickers and Electric Boat [5), and was allocated 600 of 
(2) RC Trebilcock, The Vickers brothers: armaments and enterprise 1854-1914 (London 
1977) p. 105 
(3] 'Statement by Sir Charles Craven on the relations between the Electric Boat Co. and 
Vickers Ltd', 9 January 1936, to the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of 
and Trading in Arms, Parliamentary papers Cd. 5292, Q. 2300, p. 324 
[4] JD Scott, Vickers: A History (London 1960) p. 63; Trebilcock op. cit. p. 100 
[5] Cf. Loewe signature to Vickers/EBC agreement 27 October 1900, Vickers papers, 
Cambridge University Library VP 57/60/1; Loewe to H. Atkinson 10 January 1901, VP 1003 
fol. 1; Loewe to Societe Anon. des Forges et Chantiers, same date, ibid fol. 2; GA Grindle 
to Loewe 27 March 1901, ibid fol. 59; Rice to Loewe 29 April 1902, VP 632/161 fol. 12 
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the 4,600 preferred shares in the EBC when they were issued [6]. "There 
is little doubt, " observes JD Scott, the British firm's official historian, "that 
Lord Rothschild intended from the beginning that the negotiations should 
result in an agreement between Electric Boat and Vickers. " [7] 
Though Rothschild's motives for arranging a marriage between Vickers 
and the EBC were financial, Vickers' precise reasons for accepting the 
contract were never explicitly stated. Although (remarkably) it was obvious 
there would be profit in even the earliest boats, repeat orders were far 
from guaranteed and it would have taken remarkable vision to have seen a 
formidable weapon in the tiny Holland class. But the prospect of building 
submarines was not intrinsically unattractive. Vickers avoided the 
considerable expense of research and development by purchasing EBC 
designs, and the manufacture of underwater craft entailed little modification 
of the shipyard at Barrow. No special plant for submarine construction was 
laid down before 1912 [8], and there was no increase in demand for any 
of the components which caused armaments bottlenecks at the turn of the 
century, notably armour plate, with its technically demanding formulation, 
and heavy guns - each of which required twelve months of quite literally 
continuous machining in the boring, rifling and winding processes [9). In 
addition, the Boer War had generated little in the way of orders for naval, 
as opposed to military, equipment, and Vickers' shipyards had spare 
capacity. 
The company's willingness to begin production was therefore logical - 
and Rice's offer must have become almost irresistible when it became clear 
that the Admiralty was prepared to concede a virtual monopoly of 
submarine construction to Barrow. The initial contract (December 1900) 
promised Vickers "about half" of the Admiralty's orders for submarines, the 
remainder going to the state-owned Royal Dockyards. But the same 
contract stipulated that the Barrow firm should receive a 12,500 royalty on 
every boat built by the Dockyards [10], and this deterred the Navy from 
[6] Rice to Albert Vickers 28 June 1904, VP 632/161 fol. 45 
[7] Scott op. cit. p. 63 
[81 Cf. Hugh Lyon, 'The Admiralty and private industry' in Bryan Ranft, ed, Technical 
change and British naval policy (London 1977) p. 61 
[9] Cf. Report of the committee on shipbuilding arrears, Parliamentary papers Cd. 1055 
(] 902) 
[10] Draft of Admiralty contract with Vickers 13 December 1900, VP 624/150 fols. 14-16 
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placing orders with state yards before 1908 [see graph 2). Of the 84 RN 
boats completed by August 1914,74 were Vickers-built. 
As well as forcing the Admiralty to give preference to the Barrow 
company, Vickers' contract with the EBC also effectively committed Britain 
to the Holland submarine and its derivatives. Having agreed to pay the 
EBC royalties of a half-share of profits on all submarines built at Barrow 
of whatever type - "a feature that is unique in patent experience", gloated 
Rice [11] - Vickers had little incentive to invest in alternative technology 
or acquire the rights to other designs. For its part, the Admiralty gave an 
assurance that it had no intention of placing orders with other private 
firms, and undertook not to pass on details of the Vickers/EBC design to 
any third party. The principal effect of this guarantee was to prevent 
Admiralty officials from correcting or suggesting improvements in designs 
submitted by Vickers' rivals; Admiralty 'advice' was, in the eyes of the law, 
tantamount to communicating details of the Holland design, since the 
expertise of the Controller's Department had been acquired by studying 
EBC plans and patents. It was, in short, practically impossible for the 
Admiralty to involve itself with any British firm other than Vickers without 
placing itself in breach of contract [12]. The only alternative was to order 
submarines from a foreign arms firm - and that would fly in the face of 
the British naval tradition of self-sufficiency. 
The Admiralty was, therefore, committed from the first to upholding 
Vickers' monopoly. This unique concession was a remarkable one [13], and 
it may seem odd that the naval authorities were prepared to grant it. 
There were, however, good reasons for the decision. The deal seemed less 
restrictive than it was to become; it gave the Admiralty administrators less 
(11] Rice to E. Naumberg 9 January 1907, VP 632/161 fol. 90 
(12] Cf. AW Smallwood minute 16 May 1912 and Admiralty solicitor's opinion 14 June 
1912, Ships' Covers, National Maritime Museum, Adm 138/246C section 34; also 
Controller's minute 13 September 1911, Adm 1381404B section 2 and Hall report 19 
March 1909, Keyes papers, British Library KP 415 
[13] The Vickers monopoly was unusual but not entirely unprecedented in the pre-war 
period. Vickers and Armstrongs exercised a duopoly over heavy gun manufacture. Yarrow 
and Thornycroft divided up destroyer contracts, and Nobel made covert attempts to corner 
the UK cordite market by acquiring controlling interests in rival manufacturers. See RC 
Trebilcock, 'A special relationship: government, rearmament and the cordite firms', 
Economic History Review 1966. It should also be noted that before 1914 all German 
submarines were built either by the private Germania Yard at Kiel or by the Imperial 
Dockyard at Danzig. Similarly, all French submarines were built by state dockyards. 
'Germany: war vessels 1914', nd (1914), NID No. 896, Jellicoe papers Add. Mss. 49003 Pols. 
113-17; Gary Weir, 'Tirpitz, technology and building U-boats, 1897-1916' in 
International History Review 1984. 
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to worry about than the complications of arranging an equitable multiple 
transfer of patents, and naturally pleased Rice - who was unwilling to 
divulge details of the increasingly valuable Holland designs to more than 
one firm. The new skills demanded by submarine construction (which have 
been characterised as the art of cramming a quart into a pint pot) had to 
be taught to only one group of workmen. And, simply, the tremendous 
future demand for submarine vessels was not forseen, although a contract 
drawn up in 1902 obliged Vickers to accept orders of up to 25 boats a 
year, the first six to be delivered within eight months [14]. The financial 
cost to the Royal Navy - which had paid out nearly half a million pounds 
in royalties to the Electric Boat Co. by 1916 [15] - also went uncalculated 
in 1900. 
Finally, Vickers' 1900 deal with the EBC pre-empted any Admiralty 
attempt to bring other companies into the frame. If it wanted to acquire 
submarines quickly, the Navy had little option but to reach an agreement 
with Barrow. "It was recognised, " recalled Bacon, "that this close 
co-operation gave Messrs Vickers a great advantage in manufacture over 
other firms, but this had to be accepted as part of the peculiar conditions 
under which we were working. " [16] 
The Admiralty's chief concern was its determination to keep the 
submarine programme a secret - at first from the country and then from 
foreign rivals. Its initial order (18 December 1900) was not announced until 
May 1901, and Holland I was launched without a public ceremony. The 
secrecy surrounding the RN programme was such that when Lieutenant. 
Forster D. Arnold-Forster (first captain of the first British submarine and 
nephew of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty) visited Barrow, he 
found the Hollands under construction in an obscure part of the yard in a 
building labelled 'Yacht Shed'. Parts were labelled 'For pontoon No. 1' [17]. 
The Navy did all it could to keep the results of preliminary trials to itself, 
and as late as 1908 (two years after the French had abandoned their own 
[14] The contract appears to have been lost but is quoted in Trebilcock op. cit. p. 106. The 
document appears in full in the US Congressional 'Hearings before the special committee 
investigating the munitions industry' (Nye comittee), September 1931, volume I p. 314, copy 
in VP 145/1 
(151 'Royalties paid to the Electric Boat Co. in respect of submarines December 1902 - 
November 1934', 30 November 1934, VP 59/135 
[16] Reginald Bacon, From 1900 onward (London 1940) p. 73 
117) FD Arnold-Forster, The ways of the navy (London 1931) p. 240 
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security blanket), dockyard workers at Chatham were sworn to secrecy [18] 
- all this at a time when the technical details of the latest battleship were 
freely available in the trade press. So anxious were the naval authorities for 
discretion that Vickers was forbidden to "build, design, or sell for, or to, 
any person other than the British government any submarine boat of any 
kind whatsoever" before 1909 [19], a period subsequently extended by 
contract renewals. This clause suggests that the Vickers monopoly was in 
part a quid pro quo offered to the firm to compensate for lost export 
opportunities. 
Since the Electric Boat Company was still free to market Holland's 
designs abroad (the firm had supplied Russia, Japan and the Netherlands 
with 13 boats by 1907), the Admiralty's policy may seem over-cautious. In 
fact it merely recognised the degree to which the UK improved the EBC's 
original designs. While RN submarines retained Holland's ideas in outline, 
the specifics of design from the A class onwards were essentially British. 
The submarine was like a conjuring trick: baffling when seen for the 
first time but easily copied once the secret was explained. Holland was 
effectively redundant from the moment his secret came into the possession 
of the Royal Navy. The inventor's life-work was condensed into nine 
patents acquired by Vickers from the EBC, but after experimenting with the 
Holland prototypes the stubbornly independent Bacon was able to write 
(with some exaggeration) that "none of the Holland patents are of the 
slightest use except the one which deals with the disposition and shape of 
the tanks. Further I told the late Controller [May] that I was quite 
prepared to design a SM boat which would in no way infringe the Holland 
patents. " The real reason for negotiating with the Irishman, as Bacon 
explained it, was simple: "By accepting the patents, we received, not 
merely the patents now under review, but the whole of the accumulated 
experience of the American exporters, which was more valuable than any 
printed or accepted patents. It was this that the Admiralty really bargained 
for. " [20] 
118J Marder, ABSP p. 362; Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine boats: the beginnings of 
underwater warfare (London 1983) p. 119; contemporary Chatham News quoted in Philip MacDougall, The Royal Dockyards (Newton Abbott nd, 1982) p. 167 
[19] Trebilcock op. cit. p. 106 
(201 Bacon memo 28 August 1905, Adm. 138/246A section 4. 
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Vickers and the Electric Boat Company 
cm 
The inequality of Vickers' partnership with the EBC soon began to sour the 
relationship between the two companies. Vickers' eagerness to acquire 
Holland's patents had led it to accept an agreement which, as we have 
seen, anticipated neither the profitability of the UK operation nor the 
persistant failure of the American firm to make money. 
In exchange for the comparatively valueless patents and the invaluable 
'jump start' it received, Vickers agreed in 1900 to sign over royalties 
equivalent to half of its submarine profits. For Rice, the patent-lawyer, 
the 50-50 split of profits was a triumph, for as he noted, "our licensees... 
furnish all the working capital and pay us a portion of their profits without 
any risk to ourselves. " [21] The arrangement was modified in 1913 to a 
60-40 split in favour of the Barrow firm - an indication of British 
supremacy in the partnership - but the deal nevertheless cost gross 
royalties of £1,137,380 on submarines ordered up to the end of the Great 
War [22]. 
Soon, however, the Electric Boat Co. ran into trouble. Despite placing 
an order for six submarines in 1900, the USN was not a good customer for 
Rice. For one thing it was still a small navy; for another, despite the naval 
scares of the Spanish-American War, it had no pressing need for minor 
harbour defence vessels such as Holland submarines. And when, later in the 
pre-war period, the Americans did acquire maritime ambitions, they 
preferred to spend their money on building up a blue-water navy [see 
section 5.3). 
Despite his political influence, therefore, Rice had constant trouble with 
the American politicians who controlled naval spending. Though he affected 
optimism in a constant stream of reassuring letters to Vickers, it was only 
thanks to repeated injections of British cash and occasional success with 
export orders that the EBC survived - building no more than 12 
submarines for the USN in the first seven years of the century to the 40 
constructed at Barrow for the Royal Navy in the same period. Being almost 
entirely dependent on a single product, the American firm could not spread 
[21) Rice to E. Naumberg 9 January 1907, VP 632/161 fol. 91 
[221 Nye Committee hearings vol. 1 pp. 313-14. Royalties calculated from 'Royalties payable 
to the Electric Boat Co. ... 1902-1934' 30 November 1934, VP 59/135 
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its risks as Vickers did, and it is likely that the EBC would have fared 
badly if forced to compete with its British partner in a free market. By 
1905 the only profits Electric Boat could show were $250,000 from 
Japanese work, and the firm had already begun to borrow heavily from 
Vickers in the shape of advances on British construction profits [23]. Two 
months into 1906 these loans already totalled $340,000 (including interest) 
[24], and though the Holland type beat its American rival, the Lake 
submarine, in comparative trials for the US Navy a year later, Rice was 
shortly reduced to begging Albert Vickers not to sell his 1,600 preference 
shares - the largest single holding of Electric Boat preferred stock. "It 
will, " the American wrote, "be equivalent to an announcement that you 
have lost confidence in the company... The result of this may not only 
produce a panic among our shareholders, but it will also mendaciously be 
used by our competitor Mr Lake... " [25] 
The reaffirmation of British supremacy in the field of naval. architecture 
was thus practically complete long before the First World War. It was very 
much in keeping with Vickers' repeated triumphs in an increasingly 
competitive foreign marketplace during the early 1900s - an unusual 
example of industrial success in a period that saw the UK's relative 
industrial supremacy severely undermined. 
Vickers and the Admiralty, 1900-1911 
Submarine construction quickly became vitally important to Vickers. Of the 
182 vessels laid down at Barrow between December 1900 and August 1914, 
93, or 51%, were underwater craft [261. Just eight capital ships left the 
yard in the same period [27]. 
Net profit on submarine construction amounted to £1,250,000 between 
1900 and 1914, the best years being 1906 (£178,000) and 1909 (. C237,190) 
[23] Rice to Messrs Vickers 6 November 1905, VP 632/161 fol. 66 
[24] Rice to Albert Vickers 8 November 1909, ibid fol. l24 
[25] Rice to Albert Vickers 30 January 1907, ibid fol. 96 
[26] This figure includes three sets of submarine engines for Japan. 'Submarines built by 
Vickers Armstrong', nd (? 1934), VP 740/357 
[27] Ibid; Siegfried Breyer, Battleships and battlecruisers 1905-70 (London 1973); 
Trebilcock op. cit. pp. 107-08 
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which were otherwise particularly bleak for Barrow. The yard's 'Hull & 
machinery' account shows that submarine work contributed 56% of profits 
1905-14 [28], and provided steady employment for shipyard workers whose 
jobs were rarely secure [see graph 3]. 
Individual submarines earned Vickers substantial sums. Holland No.! cost 
a total of £27,052 and was sold for 035,142 -a 30% profit. And though 
the cost price of subsequent vessels fell dramatically, purchase price 
remained unchanged; of the six submarines ordered in December 1900, 
Holland No. 2 made the biggest profit (116.5%), Al the smallest (26.5%), 
and Vickers was enriched to the tune of £89,376 -a 70% overall profit 
[29] at a time when it was usual for arms firms to accept a small loss on 
the first vessels of a new class in return for the chance to make money on 
later orders. 
The private shipbuilding industry was able to dominate the submarine 
trade thanks only to military imperatives that kept the Royal Dockyards 
relatively inefficient. The dockyards had a very specific role. In peacetime 
they were geared to building capital ships while maintaining an 
uneconomically substantial reserve capacity to allow rapid expansion of 
output in time of war. They were also, traditionally, equipped to provide 
repair. and maintenance facilities for the whole fleet [30]. The dockyards 
were not expected to build small torpedo craft, and most RN torpedo boats 
and TBDs were built by private firms. Nor, with all the other demands 
made upon them, was it realistic for the state yards to produce the highly 
specialised diesel/electric motors needed by submarines [31]. 
The Admiralty's policy was therefore to divide warship construction 
between private and state-owned shipyards. In the 1900s two thirds of all 
orders were supposed to be allocated to private firms (though in practice 
orders were divided roughly 60: 40), and the private arms industry's control 
of submarine construction was more than offset by the Royal Dockyards' 
domination of capital ship building. 
The early decision not to build submarines in state shipyards made it 
[28] Trebilcock op. cit. pp. 107-08 
[29] VP 739 bundles 5,7,8 
[30) Cf. Andrew Lambert, Battleships in transition: the creation of. the steam battlefleet 
(London 1984) p. 44 
[3l) Director of Dockyards report 8 December 1911 fols. 14 -16, Adm 11611272B 
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difficult for the Admiralty to check the prices quoted by Vickers. In 1906 
the DNC noted that "the cost of these boats is not a matter which can be 
estimated on ordinary lines in view of the Vickers monopoly" [32], and 
when Lord Graham observed that "the monopoly allows for fancy prices 
being charged" [33], he was doing little more than stating the obvious. 
After Chatham dockyard completed its first submarine in 1908, a 
comparison of prices charged by Vickers and the state yard revealed a 
disturbing picture of profiteering by the private arms firm. Vickers routinely 
passed on the costs of design work, the modification of shipyard equipment 
and the EBC's royalties to the government, and by 1914 the Controller was 
driven to protest that "tenders... are so high that it is evident there is a 
general feeling with the Contractors that we can be squeezed over this very 
specialised form of construction. " (34] 
Once granted, however, the monopoly proved difficult to break. Vickers 
could hardly be faulted for its efficiency before 1909-1910, and though the 
Admiralty carefully exercised its right to place submarine orders in state 
yards from 1908, the royalties payable on dockyard work made Chatham 
submarines no more economic than boats ordered from Barrow. In addition, 
Vickers soon developed unrivalled expertise. "We cannot do better than 
co-operate with Messrs Vickers in building the numbers we want, " wrote 
Bacon in 1905. "They have experience which it will take three years for 
any other Firm or the Dockyards to acquire... The division of work 
between Vickers and ourselves will provide just sufficient for both. There is 
no reason to increase the number of builders, in fact there is every reason 
against it. " [35] 
Having failed to develop a broad base of submarine contractors, the 
Admiralty soon found itself caught in what might be termed a 'quality 
trap'. Vickers' experience enabled the RN to keep pace with the rapid 
development of the submarine, but evolution was so rapid that the Navy 
could not risk halting production while a rival arms firm produced a viable 
[32] Watts memo 'New designs of submarine boats' nd (July 1906) Adm 138/360A section 
22 
[33] Graham to Tweedmouth 26 October 1907. Tweedmouth papers case B, 19071447, 
Naval Library MOD 
(34] Moore memo 18 June 1914, Adm 1381435 section 24 
[35] Bacon memo 26 August 1905, Adm 138/246A section 4 
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design [36]. The same consideration encouraged close co-operation between 
Vickers and successive Inspecting Captains of Submarines, further cementing 
relations between the Navy and the arms industry. The first three men 
appointed ICS - Bacon, Edgar Lees and Sydney Hall - were all technical 
specialists who felt at home among engineers and arms makers. When 
Bacon resigned his commission in 1909, it was to take up the position of 
managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Works, a fledgling arms firm 
set up by the major shipbuilding concerns of John Brown, Fairfield and 
Cammell Laird. Lees left the submarine service in 1906 to run the 
Whitehead torpedo works at Weymouth [37), and in 1910 Hall came close 
to accepting an offer from the Clydebank shipbuilder Alfred Yarrow, who 
thought his expertise would help the company to break into the submarine 
export market [38]. These men knew that, whatever Vickers' motives, the 
company had worked hard to develop the submarine, and they felt it 
should be rewarded for its efforts. "They have served us right well in the 
past, " wrote Bacon. "Let us stick to them in the future. " [39] 
Despite the protection of the monopoly agreement, however, Vickers 
faced potential or actual competition throughout the pre-war period. When 
Isaac Rice arrived in Europe, the Southampton torpedo boat specialist 
Thornycroft was already fleshing out plans for a submarine. Scott, Cammell 
Laird, Armstrongs and Yarrow all looked seriously at the possibility of 
building boats for the foreign market before the monopoly agreement was 
terminated in 1911, and in 1914 Swan Hunter was invited to design a 
submarine for Greece [40]. An Admiralty document prepared in 1912 listed 
six private firms that could be invited to tender for British orders: Vickers, 
Scott, Armstrongs, Beardmore (a Vickers subsidiary), Denny and Thornycroft 
[41]. 
(36] Cf Lees report 'Proposed experimental submarine boat... ' 16 November 1905 and Lees 
to Jackson, same date, both Adm 1381360A section 12 
[37] The Whitehead Company was then jointly owned by Vickers and Armstrongs. Lees 
had dinner with Albert Vickers on 11 June 1906; it was probably then that arrangements 
were discussed. VP 1004 fo1.131 
[38] Fisher to Hall 11 June 1910, FP 487; Hall to Fisher IS June 1910, FP 489; Fisher 
to Hall 18+21 +28 June 1910, FP 490,491,492 
[39] Bacon memo 26 August 1905, Adm 138/246A section 4 
[40] 'Australian naval commission' 4 May 1907, digest cut lla, Adm 12/1440; 'Greece' nd 
(early 1914), digest cut Ila Adm 12/1525 
(411 Untitled memo I May 1912, Adm 138/246C section 27 
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From 1900 to 1913 Vickers did all it could to protect its privileged 
position - as, later, the company fought to keep the lead the monopoly 
had given it. Early in 1905 it stopped the EBC granting Holland licences to 
Armstrongs [42]. In 1912, the Admiralty's decision to place orders with 
Scotts and Armstrongs [see section 3.2] goaded Vickers into sending letters 
threatening legal action for patent infringement to both its rivals. Only a 
vigorous government protest persuaded Vickers to drop the action; the First 
Lord, Churchill, summoned Trevor Dawson to his office and (in the words 
of Francis Hopwood, the Additional Civil Lord responsible for construction), 
"told him very plainly that relations with his firm would become very 
strained if the firm endeavoured to stop other firms from building 
submarines for us. " Hopwood underlined the Admiralty's determination not 
to be browbeaten by minuting: "If Vickers, enjoying as they do such a 
large part of our patronage for submarines, attempted to restrain 
Armstrongs from building us a new type of boat because of the 
infringement of some small patented part of a great whole, I should be 
prepared to see Vickers penalized to the greatest limit consistent with our 
own interests. I hope the question will not arise... Vickers have too keen 
an eye for the main chance. " [43] 
Thornycroft was probably the first of Vickers' rivals to approach the 
Admiralty with a fully worked out design. In 1901 its interest in torpedo 
craft took it into partnership with the well known Danish naval architect 
William Hovgaard, who had become interested in submarines during the 
1880s [44]. In 1887 he designed a boat to meet the conditions laid down 
by the USN in its first open competition, and over the years these plans 
were modified until in 1900 he offered the submarine to the Danish and 
then the British and American navies. The RN was sufficiently impressed to 
pay Hovgaard £100 to come to London and explain the finer details of his 
plans to the Controller, but the design was eventually rejected because, 
unlike Holland, the Dane had never experimented with anything larger than 
[421 Rice to Albert Vickers 3 January 1905, VP 6321161 fol. 56 
[43) Hopwood minutes 4 July and 27 June 1912; Moore memo 'Future construction of 
submarine boats - procedure' 24 June 1912, all Adm 13812460 section 34. Doubtless 
Vickers relished an ironic reversal of roles; in the 1890s Armstrongs had vigorously resisted 
its attempt to end the Tynesider's artillery monopoly with a 'campaign of a hundred 
patents'. Trebilcock op. cit. pp. 61-3 
[44) Cf. William Hovgaard, Submarine boats (London 1887) and 'Proposed designs for 
surface boats and diving boats' 23 August 1888, TrINA XXIX (1888) pp. 351-65 
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a model [45]. 
After making an equally fruitless trip to America, Hovgaard decided to 
enlist the support of a British shipyard, and after making extensive 
modifications to the plans to incorporate ideas drawn from French designs, 
Thornycroft submitted the revised Hovgaard submarine to the Admiralty in 
1902. It was turned down, principally because the Royal Navy was by now 
committed to the Holland type [46]. 
By 1909 delays at the Barrow yard were causing sufficient concern for 
the Admiralty to warn Vickers - by inviting rival tenders from its 
competitors - not to take its monopoly for granted. Thornycroft rose to 
the challenge with a boat developed in co-operation with Holland's great 
rival Simon Lake, who had first attempted to break into the British market 
through the agency of the Naval 'Electric Co. in 1902. Lake tailored the 
submarine to Admiralty specifications, but though RN officers reported she 
would make an efficient boat - her advanced double hull design made her 
eminently habitable, and she possessed better surface buoyancy than 
Holland's submarines - the design was rejected on the grounds that Lake 
submarines were uneconomical to run [47]. 
Armstrongs also saw Lake as the designer most likely to challenge 
Holland and break the Vickers monopoly. The company knew that more 
than one British naval officer believed the Lake type was far superior to 
the RN's Vickers/EBC submarine, and as early 1901 the British naval 
attache in Washington, Captain Lewis Bayly, had recommended Lake 
submarines to the Admiralty via a personal communication [48]. In July 
1905 Bayly's successor, Dudley de Chair, sent the Admiralty a report 
recommending the purchase of five Lake boats [49), and when his proposal 
was rejected, the attache confidentially informed Lake that he "thought 
[45) White memo 30 November 1900, Adm 1/7516 
[461 Thornycroft to Admiralty nd (late 1902), Adm 1381180B section 25 
[47) 'Lake type submarine torpedo boat' 5 April 1902, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1377; 
William Jameson, The most formidable thing: the story of the submarine from its 
earliest days to the end of World War I (London 1965) pp. 102-04; Watts report August 
1911, Adm 138/404B section 1; Hugh Lyon, 'The Admiralty and private industry', in 
Ranft op. cit. p. 57 
[48) Bayly to Sturdee 6 December 1901, Adm 1/7529 
[49) 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1904' (USA) NID No. 738 (July 1904) p. 90. 
Adm 231/41; 'The Simon Lake X' 3 February 1905 in 'Reports on foreign naval affairs 
1905' NID No. 777 (January 1906) pp. 181-3, Adm 231/44; Dudley de Chair, The sea is 
strong (London 1961) pp. 122-4 
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Armstrong's works would make his boat and manage his affairs better than 
any other firm in England" [50]. Lake agreed. He had already approached 
Armstrongs with the proposal that they should go into partnership, and de 
Chair's connections with the Tyneside firm [51] ensured him an interested 
hearing. So did the proposal itself, for Lake - who was no fool - dwelt 
on the dubious safety record of the Holland type [52] and stressed the 
money to be made from submarine construction, assuring Armstrongs that 
"the profits in submarines in present prices are very satisfactory. " [53] 
Only the American's own excessive financial demands - he eventually 
over-reached himself by asking for a 33% royalty on selling price, plus a 
$100,000 advance, rather than the EBC's half share of profits - forced 
Armstrongs to pull out of the deal [54]. 
Lake's final attempt to break into the British market was also the last 
challenge to Vickers before the monopoly was terminated in March 1911. A 
number of Vickers' main shipbuilding rivals - including Browns, Fairfield 
and Cammell Laird, the three firms involved in the Coventry Ordnance 
Works project - formed a syndicate to build a large submarine to the 
design of Lake and Captain Bacon. The Admiralty examined the plans of 
the proposed submarine, which would have displaced 810 tons and carried 
the heavy armament of nine torpedo tubes, but it was passed over in 
favour of the rival overseas designs championed by Scott and Armstrongs 
[55]. 
Both firms had turned to Europe in search of partners with whom to 
challenge the Vickers monopoly. Scott was granted a licence to build FIAT 
submarines as early as 1908 [56]. The agreement made the Clydeside 
[50) De Chair to d'Eyncourt 2 February 1905, d'Eyncourt papers DEY 6, National 
Maritime Museum 
[51] De Chair to d'Eyncourt 29 October 1905, ibid 
[52] Lake to d'Eyncourt 29 December 1905, ibid; 'The present condition of the submarine 
problem' in 'Papers on naval subjects 1907' NID No. 818 (August 1907) p. 100, Adm 
231/47 
[53] Lake to Armstrongs 13 January 1906, DEY 6 
[54) Ibid. Lake himself claimed to have abandoned the British market after his more 
lucrative Russian trade was threatened by the Tsarist authorities. Submarine: the 
autobiography of Simon Lake (New York 1938) pp. 209-212 
[55) Jameson op. cit. p. 104 
[56] Scotts Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd., 250 years of shipbuilding by Scotts at 
Greenock (Glasgow 1961) p. 90 
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shipbuilder privy to all the secrets of the successful Laurenti designs and 
enabled it to tender for submarine orders as soon as Keyes gave Vickers 
notice the RN would look elsewhere for new boats. It also made Scott the 
first British arms firm to employ established European expertise to build 
submarines; FIAT boats saw service with the Italian, American, Portuguese, 
Swedish and Danish navies. 
Armstrongs, meanwhile, struck a less advantageous licensing deal. After 
abandoning Lake, the Tyneside firm chose to go into partnership with the 
French Schneider concern, which employed the well 'known submarine 
designer Maxime Laubeuf as a naval architect. But, realising that both Scott 
and Vickers had secured a head start, Armstrongs was rushed into signing 
a highly restrictive 1912 agreement [57] that did not require the French 
company to send Armstrongs its plans until after an order had been placed. 
Not only did this agreement deny the Tynesiders the chance to pick 
Laubeuf's brains; it also threatened to seriously disadvantage the company, 
which discovered too late that Keyes's submarine committee planned to 
force arms firms to submit fully worked out designs with their initial 
tenders. As the Elswick firm's eminent naval architect Sir Philip Watts 
observed, "Armstrongs might just as well not have made any agreement 
with Schneider, as they are probably as capable as Schneider of designing a 
submarine of unspecified type. " [58] 
The end of the monopoly, 1911-1914 
Try as it might to hide behind the monopoly agreement, Vickers could not 
prevent rival firms from chipping away at its position. By 1911 Scotts and 
Thornycroft, and to a lesser extent Armstrongs, could tender for orders, 
and the Royal Dockyard at Chatham had already produced a number of C 
class submarines. This made it easier for Keyes to end the monopoly. 
Vickers' position had begun to deteriorate by 1909. Demand for surface 
warships to meet the growing German threat put strain on the company's 
shipbuilding resources. The latest types of submarine were much bigger and 
[57] Correspondence between Schneider and Armstrongs July-September 1912, Armstrong 
papers, Tyne & Weir archives centre 31/7858-80 
[58) Watts to Keyes 16 September 1912, KP 4/23 
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more complicated than the A, B and C class boats which Barrow had been 
used to turning out, and the time each submarine spent in shipyard hands 
increased alarmingly as congestion became a problem [see graph 3]. To 
make matters worse, Vickers' management had become complacent, and 
though tremendous profits had been generated by the submarine programme, 
little had been ploughed back into new plant. Vickers did finance the 
construction of a tender from its own pocket [59], but the L80,000 spent 
on modernising the submarine yard in 1912 was the only major investment 
of its kind - and as the Barrow manager James McKechnie pointed out, 
"this sum, when compared with the amount of money passed between the 
Admiralty and ourselves for the construction of submarines... is 
insignificant. " [60] 
Delays - especially delays in engine construction, another effective 
Vickers monopoly [61) - were of the order of 6-7 months by 1911 [62]. 
Similar hold-ups were not uncommon elsewhere (the French submarine 
programme especially ran into chronic problems [63]), but they were 
intolerable to the world's major naval power, and when Keyes presented his 
case for terminating the monopoly, he was in no doubt that the main 
factor was "the inability of Vickers to complete the submarines they are 
building -for us within several months of the contract dates... Messrs 
Vickers' pretentious estimates cannot be accepted. The administration of the 
firm suffers from a most persistent and apparently incurable optimism. " [64] 
Keyes had his own reasons for desiring an end to the monopoly [see 
below and section 4.2], but his report found a receptive audience at the 
Admiralty. The whole idea of a monopoly was unattractive in the laissez 
(591 Vickers minute book No. 5, resolution of 30 October 1907 to spend L20,000 on a 
submarine tender, VP 1363 fo). 282 
1601 McKcchnie to Dawson 6 March 1912, quoted in Trebilcock op. cit. p. 107 
1611 "It all depends on the engine, " wrote Hall in 1911; "it is a pity Vickers are not 
quicker. " Hall to Admiral Briggs 7 February 1911, copy in KP 4/1. For the engine 
monopoly, see DNC's department report 'Warship construction during the 1914-1918 war' 
31 December 1918 p. 212, Adm 1/8547/340, and 'Emergency war programme - new 
construction in destroyers and submarines for', 11 August 1914, Adm 1/8340/256 
1621 Director of dockyards report 8 December 1911 fols. 14-I6, Adm 116/1272B 
[63] Cf. 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1906-1907' (France) NID No. 834 
(September 1907) p. 11, Adm 231/48 
[64) Keyes report 'Attempts to bring new forces into the field of production', January 
1914 KP 4111 
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faire climate of the time. It was unfair [65], and - more significantly - 
it gave Vickers altogether too much power. In addition, the RN had 
supported the agreement out of expediency rather than as a deliberate 
policy, and had never intended it to be permanent. Vickers' monopoly was 
not clearly established out until 1902 [66], and the Engineer in Chief was 
anticipating its end as early as January 1904 [67]. 
Even Bacon, who so often championed the arms firms, believed the 
Admiralty should take a stronger lead. "I have always strongly urged, 
though not always successfully, that in the New Agreement Messrs Vickers 
should be looked on as a manufacturer rather than a patentee, " he argued 
in August 1905, pointing out that if the RN took the initiative in preparing 
submarine designs, "the Admiralty would be in a position to say, 'if you do 
not fall in with the terms we consider just, and you cannot satisfy us that 
you can build on the terms we propose... then we will build for ourselves 
independent of the Holland patents'. " [68] 
At this stage there was, as Bacon realised, no need for the Admiralty 
to resort to litigation or to other private firms. By ordering submarines 
from Chatham dockyard, the RN introduced an element of threat into its 
dealings with Vickers and ensured its position as the dominant partner in 
the relationship. Few boats were actually built on the Medway, but if the 
Admiralty had taken up its option of placing half of all orders with the 
Royal Dockyards, Vickers would have been hard hit. The submarine 
business was already too valuable to Barrow for the company to risk losing 
it, and in March 1909 the Vickers board decided to cut its losses and 
concentrate on maintaining its supremacy in the private sector. Alarmed by 
the Admiralty's ostentatious invitation for tenders from other arms firms, 
the company therefore meekly conceded its right to claim royalties on 
Royal Dockyard construction in return for a renewal of the private 
monopoly to March 1911 [69]. Vickers had realised it had no power to 
[65] Cf. the views of the First Lord, Tweedmouth, in a letter to Robertson 10 May 1907, 
Tweedmouth papers case B 1907/152, Naval Library 
[66) Vickers agreement with the Admiralty 17 May 1902, cited in Trebilcock op. cit. p. 1(>6 
[67] Dunstan minute 15 January 1904, Adm 1/7745 
[68) Bacon memo 26 August 1905, Adm 138/246A section 4 
(69) Admiralty to Vickers 25 March 1909; Vickers to Admiralty 27 March 1909, ibid 
section 131 
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coerce the authorities. So much for arms manufacturers manipulating 
nations. 
Only once the monopoly was finally abolished did Vickers attempt to 
regain Admiralty favour. But though the company's experience of submarine 
construction made it certain that contracts would continue to come in - 
"You had to be given an order! " wrote Keyes [70] - and in absolute 
terms it won more orders after 1911 than before, its relative supremacy 
was shattered. 
Vickers' first move was to spend money on upgrading facilities at 
Barrow. After ordering a swift internal enquiry, the company's financial 
controller, Sir Vincent Caillard, sent yard manager McKechnie a strongly 
worded letter concluding: "The evidence reveals a very serious state of 
things which we all think should be put right immediately, and 
'immediately' should, in our opinion, be not later than next week. " [71] 
About £37,500 was earmarked for modernising plant and speeding up engine 
manufacture, the main cause of the delays, in the years 1912-13 [72], and 
McKechnie was soon able to reassure Commodore Keyes that "we have 
recently had the whole process of manufacture and supply of submarine 
boats under review and have, at great expense, considerably improved the 
facilites for rapid production in connection with this work. " [73] 
This was not altogether true; in the short term it was very difficult for 
Vickers to speed work on submarines significantly. The company's 
shipwrights were still expected to work to painstaking standards of accuracy 
in very confined spaces. (Chatham had trouble meeting its delivery dates 
for the same reason in this period [74]. ) Vickers also had to clear the 
considerable existing backlog of orders. "The point is that you are several 
months behind in your 1910/11,1911/12 and 1912/13 orders, " Keyes 
remonstrated. "In three years you will have delivered eight submarines! You 
must see that if we continued to trust entirely to you and Chatham we 
should very soon be left hopelessly behind Germany... I expect you think 
[70) Keyes to Dawson 24 June 1913, VP 741 
[711 Caillard to McKechnie 25 June 1912, VP 600 
[72) Vickers minute book No. 6,16 October 1912, VP 1364 fol. 232 
[73J McKechnie to Keyes 23 December 1912, Adm 116/3462 
[74) Keyes to Committee on Acceleration of Shipbuilding 28 December 1912, ibid 
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that the recent expansion will enable you to make up lost time. I know 
that this is very unlikely to happen unless there is some very drastic 
improvement in the shipyard; you will never pick up unless you take no 
fresh orders for a year or two! " [75) 
By 1914 Vickers itself had to admit that the state of its relations with 
the Admiralty was "somewhat serious" [76]. The company was still behind 
with its deliveries, and government protests against the high prices charged 
for submarines were reaching a crescendo. Vickers was formally rebuked for 
submitting an excessive estimate for the experimental Nautilus [77], and the 
arms firm was forced to revise its prices for the V class coastals after the 
Admiralty complained they were "altogether excessive" and warned that "the 
high prices- you are asking for these vessels will be taken into serious 
consideration when allocating future submarines ' for HM Navy. " [78] 
Vickers was now severely burdened by royalties owed to the EBC, 
which - at X5,000 per boat In 1914 [79] - were much higher than those 
paid by its competitors to their own licensors [80]. In the immediate 
pre-war period, Barrow was the most expensive of the Admiralty's major 
contractors. While the RN estimated that an E class boat would cost 
£120,000 or less if built in a state dockyard, Armstrong's tender quoted 
£127,460, Scott's was for £135,000 and Vickers put the figure at £140,000 
[81]. Even allowing for EBC royalties, this figure was still high, and the 
RN's six-boat 1914 order was split 4-2 between Chatham dockyard and 
Armstrongs. By the time war was declared, Vickers had lost the dominant 
position it once enjoyed in submarine construction and design. Keyes's 
patronage went to rival firms manufacturing continental double-hull types 
quite unlike the Holland submarines. 
(75] Keyes to Dawson 24 June 1913, VP 741 
(76] Dawson to Zaharoff 14 July 1914, VP 59/134 fols. 8-9 
[77] Admiralty to Vickers 11 December 1912, Adm 138/362 section 17 
[78] DNC dept. submission nd (early 1913), Adm 138/404A section 8; Admiralty to Vickers 
13 November 1913, ibid section 12b 
(79] Dawson to Zaharoff 14 July 1914, VP 591134 fols. 8-9 
[80) In January 1913 Scotts raised the price of its S class boats by 40% to 170,000 each. 
The Admiralty grudgingly accepted the increase with the proviso that they would expect "a 
considerable reduction in price in the event of your being called on to submit tenders for 
similar submarine boats in the future. " AW Johns to DNC 29 January 1913, Adm 
138/404B section 12; Admiralty to Scotts 17 June 1913, ibid section 12a 
(81] Moore memo 18 June 1914, Adm 138/435 section 24 
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Five major classes of submarine were developed in the period of the 
Vickers monopoly. The five American Hollands were followed by 13 
British-designed A boats, 11 Bs and 38 Cs - usually denoted 'coastal' 
types -8 Ds and, eventually, by more than 50 'overseas' Es, the boats 
that formed the backbone of the submarine service during the 1914-18 
war. 
The first British submarines to deviate completely from the Holland type 
were the S and W class boats ordered by Roger Keyes, the fourth 
Inspecting Captain of Submarines, in 1911-12. Both were foreign coastal 
types built under licence by British shipbuilders - the S class by Scotts 
and the W class by Armstrong Whitworth - while the monopoly was being 
wound iup. They were followed by two more small classes of coastal 
submarines, the Admiralty-designed Fs and Vickers' V class boats, and by 
two large experimental craft, Vickers' diesel/electric Nautilus and Scott's 
Italian-designed, steam/electric - Swordfish. Both experimental boats were 
failures, but they paved the way for the large submarines of the J and K 
classes - the former diesel/electric and the latter steam/electric fleet boats 
- produced during the war. Finally, the wartime British submarine service 
was brought up to strength by 15 double-hulled G class overseas 
submarines and 10 smaller H class boats, the latter designed by the Electric 
Boat Company and built under licence by Vickers' shipyard in Montreal 
[82]. 
Under the leadership of Bacon, Lees and Hall, there was considerable 
continuity in British submarine design. The Navy's Holland boats were 
almost identical to the 107/123 ton (surface/submerged) Adder class serving 
in the US Navy [83]. Bacon developed the A class submarine (built 
1900-1908) directly from Holland's plans. The B class of 1904-06 were 
[82] A full history of the H boats with a discussion of the pivotal role they played in 
Anglo-American-Canadian relations in the war years can be found in Gaddis Smith, 
Britain's clandestine submarines 1914-1915 (New Haven 1964). See also Robert Hessen, 
Steel Titan: the life of Charles M. Schwab (New York 1975), pp. 211-16 
(83J Britain's Holland class boats were built from plans supplied by the EBC. The 
Admiralty had so little control over the design that, although the drawings sent to Vickers 
contained serious flaws which delayed the construction of Holland I by around three 
months, it felt unable to intervene to correct the errors. Rear Admiral Sueter to RN 
Submarine Museum, nd, Submarine Museum A1976/5; see also Frank T. Cable, The birth 
and development of the American submarine (New York 1924) pp. 198-203; Bacon op. cit. 
pp. 63 -4 
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described by the Navy as "improved As", and Vickers' protest that the new 
design was a great advance was not unconnected with its attempt to charge 
a significantly higher price [84]. The C class (1906-1910) were "B boats 
with improved internal arrangements" [85], displacing an additional six tons 
and possessing about the same speed. 
Each of the first five Holland boats had a crew of two officers and five 
men, was armed with one 18" torpedo tube and propelled by a single shaft 
gasolinelelectric motor capable of 7/5 knots. Both the submarines' modest 
radius of action (250/25 nautical miles) and their lack of any sort of 
superstructure restricted them to inshore duties; the crew were, in addition, 
expected to serve in the most primitive conditions, in danger from the 
gasoline and electric engines - both of which were prone to develop 
dangerous fumes. Petrol explosions were not at all uncommon in pre-war 
submarines [86]. 
From an operational point of view, the Hollands were also 
comparatively inefficient. When working at or near the surface, the 
submarines normally progressed by Holland's uncomfortable 'porpoising' 
method. Their low superstructure made them hard to see, but it also made 
things difficult for the captain, whose chances of spotting enemy warships 
were only marginally increased by the provision of a primitive periscope 
rigged through the ventilator [87]. 
Holland I was launched on 2 October 1901, made her first dive at 
Barrow on 20 March 1902, and arrived at Portsmouth in the summer of 
the same year. Sea trials suggested that Bacon's Al, at 185/203 tons almost 
twice the size of the Holland boats and fitted with a six-foot conning 
tower, would be a more welcome addition to the fleet, and indeed she was 
a formidable boat for her time. The 103' submarine's brand-new 500hp 
Wolseley petrol engine - the most powerful yet built -- could propel her 
at 10 knots on the surface (two knots below design speed), and electric 
motors enabled her to run at 6 knots submerged [88). Later vessels in the 
[84) Vickers to Admiralty 21 May 1903, Adm 138/180B section 35 
[85] Watts memo 'New designs of submarine boat' nd (July 1906) Adm 138/360A section 
22 
[86] Bacon op. cit. pp. 59-60; Compton-Hall op. cit. p. 40; AS Evans, Beaneath the waves: 
a history of British submarine losses 1904-1971 (London 1986) pp. 22-3 
[87) Compton-Halt op. cit. p. 119 
[88) Bacon op. cit. pp-68-9 
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A class managed 11.5/6 knots and had double the Holland 1's radius of 
action, and A13, launched in April 1905, was the first British submarine 
powered by a diesel engine. She spent much of her working life as an 
experimental vessel, proving that the new Vickers diesel was considerably 
safer than a petrol engine and could match the older motors' performance. 
As the first submarines designed in Britain, however, the As had serious 
design faults and, like all the low-buoyancy Holland boats, were 
particularly liable to plunge under water without warning if a critical surface 
speed was exceeded [89]. SS Hall considered "the principal defect of this 
class is their want of endurance in the surface condition" [90], and the 
boats were obsolescent by 1914. 
The first B class submarine came into service late in 1904. The new 
design, a co-operative effort between Bacon and the Vickers draughtsmen, 
was an improvement on the As - 40' longer, with two 18" torpedo tubes 
in the bows and two pairs of hydroplanes, one on the bridge (later moved 
to the bow) and one astern. These gave the captain greater control over 
the boat when submerged. Since the Admiralty was still experimenting with 
diesel engines, the Bs were given 600/190hp petrol/electric motors offering 
12/6.5 knots. They had a 370 mile radius of action and, at 280/314 tons 
displacement (already larger than contemporary French boats), 11 per cent 
positive buoyancy [91]. Bacon was anxious to improve the speed and 
sea-keeping of British boats [92], and B class -vessels were among the first 
RN submarines to serve overseas, operating out of Gibraltar and Malta 
from 1912 [93]. 
There was little difference between the B class boats and their 
immediate successors, the 38 vessels of the 286/321 ton C class. But the Cs 
had electrically (rather than manually) operated hydroplanes, making them 
more manouevrable, and were the first British submarines with two 
periscopes -a useful insurance. They were still thought of as coastal 
[89) Ibid pp. 61 -2; Evans op. cit. p. 32 
[90] Hall 'Memorandum on submarines' 8 April 1910, Adm 1/8119 
191) The difference between surface and submerged displacement. The higher the positive 
buoyancy, generally speaking, the more seaworthy the submarine, although boats with a 
high positive buoyancy often rolled excessively. 
[92] Bacon report 'Type of submarine boat for 1904, B type' 7 November 1903, Adm 
138/180B section 31 
[93) Michael Wilson, 'The British B class submarine' parts 1-2, Warship vol. 5 pp. 38-44, 
74-9 
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submarines, but were reasonably seaworthy. In 1911 three C boats made a 
remarkable journey to Hong Kong, partly under their own power, sailing 
via the Mediterranean and around India and arriving in the Far East in 
considerably better shape than the Russian Baltic fleet had done five years 
earlier. Although the voyage was made under escort and at a comparatively 
leisurely pace [94], it suggested that the endurance of even the early 
submarines was considerably greater than was generally suspected. The 
implications of this discovery were never fully explored, however [see 
section 4.1 ]. 
Though the rapid development of the British submarine service in the 
years 1901 -1914 proved the navy was capable of assimilating novel 
technology, the conviction that underwater craft were vulnerable, defensive 
weapons stunted efforts to develop a progressive doctrine for their 
employment. "I am in no way ashamed to say that Captains of Boats have 
themselves protested at times of the limitations I have imposed on them, " 
wrote Bacon [95]. And though the nascent War Staff considered using C 
boats off the German coast as early as 1907-08 [see section 6.3], the 
specialists of the submarine service (who retained considerable control over 
submarine design [96)) had less strategic vision and continued to describe 
the much larger Ds as coastal vessels [97]. 
The D class was a significant departure for the Royal Navy. The new 
submarines had nearly twice the displacement of the Cs and were 
considerably more habitable, thanks to the decision to abandon the Holland 
single hull design and mount their ballast tanks outside the pressure hull on 
either side of the superstructure. Their size also made them more 
seaworthy, though they had only 6% positive buoyancy - less than the 9% 
of Al [98]. 
[94] Hall 'Report on passage of HM Submarines C36, C37 and C38 from Plymouth to 
Suez' 16 March 1911, Adm 1/8213; Kenneth Eduards, We dive at dawn (London 1939) 
p. 57 
[95] Bacon 'Report on submarine boats' 31 May 1903 enclosure 1. Adm 1/7725 
(96] AN Harrison, Development of HM Submarines from Holland No. 1 (1900) to Porpoise 
(1930), unpublished government paper BR 3043 (1979), section 3.5. Copies in National 
Maritime Museum and RN Submarine Museum. 
(97] Cf. Controller's precis of a 'Meeting of the submarine boat design committee' 24 
June 1905, Adm 138/360A section 1; Keyes report 15 August 1913, Adm 138/246C section 
49 
[98] HG Williams report 'New design D for a submarine boat' 15 May 1905, Adm 
138/360A section 2; Lees minute 29 August 1906, ibid section 33. 
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Considerable caution was displayed in the drawing up of the design, 
which developed over a three-year period from a prototype only 5' longer 
than the C class (which were 142') to a fully fledged 163' submarine with 
diesel rather than petrol engines, twin screws and an extra torpedo tube in 
the stern to increase firepower and make up for the new class's 
considerable turning circle. The design was the first to be worked out 
wholly by Admiralty draughtsmen [99], but Vickers was responsible for the 
diesels, which were economical and offered a surface speed of 14 knots and 
a radius of action in excess of 1,250 miles. They were also considerably 
safer than the old petrol engines, being powered by an inert fuel. The 
development of such efficient diesel engines revolutionised the potential of 
the submarine [100) and made overseas patrols a realistic possibility. 
The D class submarines were unusual in. another way. D4, completed 
late in 1911, was the first British boat to mount a deck gun. A gun 
armament was of considerable importance to wartime submarines; it gave 
them a weapon suitable for use in a commerce war against unarmed 
merchantmen and enabled them to conserve torpedoes for use against more 
dangerous targets. British boats could not have operated efficiently in the 
Baltic and the Marmara, as they did in 1915-1916, without guns. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the early RN submarines were not in fact 
fitted with guns for offensive purposes. They were supplied as last-ditch 
defensive weapons for a submarine caught on the surface - to allow the 
boat to "die hard", as Keyes put it [101]. Bacon saw deck guns as an aid 
to morale: "At present the knowledge that your sole defence is to skulk 
below water is not very inspiring - and for destroyers to know that 
submarines probably will not shed their teeth in firing torpedoes at them, 
and that beyond this they have no means of retailiation, is decidedly 
invigorating. " [1021 
The Es, developed directly from the D class, were Britain's most 
successful pre-war submarines. The first boats of the class were ordered 
[99] DNC memo 1 February 1906, Adm 138/360A section 18 
[100] Controller's precis of a 'Meeting of the submarine boat design committee' 24 June 
1905, ibid section 1. For the German experience, see Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat: the 
evolution and technical history of German submarines (London 1975) pp. 25-32 
[1011 Keyes report 15 August 1913, Adm 138/2460 section 49 
[1021 Bacon report on B class design 7 November 1903, Adm 138/180B section 31 
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under the 1910-11 programme and entered service in 1913. Like the D 
class, they had Vickers diesels and deck guns (it was discovered that the 
presence of a 12-pdr quick-firer actually improved stability [103]) - and 
with 18.5% positive buoyancy, the Es were fully capable of operating off 
an enemy coast. Mounting four or five 18 inch torpedo tubes, they were 
also more formidably armed than the A (1x18"), B and C class (both 
2x18") submarines. 
Thanks to their enhanced range, both the D and E class were labelled 
'overseas' submarines. Keyes defined the overseas type as boats "for work 
at considerable distances from their base, with large range of action, able 
to keep the sea in all weathers, and good habitability, so that the crews of 
the vessels could live on board in reasonable comfort for lengthy periods. " 
The earlier 'coastal' submarines, on the other hand, were "economical 
vessels of small displacement" - though "in order that these vessels should 
carry out their duties efficiently in the winter months, seagoing qualities and 
good habitability were considered essential. " [104] 
The gradual evolution of the first Holland designs, and the steady 
stream of orders that went to Vickers, gave British submarine development 
a continuity absent from the programmes of other nations. There was a gap 
of five years between the French order for Gyrnnote (1888) and Gustave 
Zede (1893), and another of six between the Zede and Morse and Narval 
(1899). French submarine policy was also bedevilled by a dispute between 
proponents of short range submarines and supporters of the longer-range, 
more seaworthy submersible [see section 5.31. In January 1905, for, 
instance, the incoming Minister of Marine (Thomson) cancelled the whole 
of his predecessor's submarine programme and substituted submersibles 
[105). The Germans did not follow U1 (launched 12 months late in August 
1906) until June 1908; the Japanese acquired seven boats during the 
Russo-Japanese war, but placed no further orders until 1907-08. 
The continuity of British submarine development was only broken by the 
Admiralty's March 1911 decision to end Vickers' virtual monopoly on 
1103) Keyes report 15 August 1913, Adm 138/2460 section 49; on gun fittings, see also 
Keyes memo '12-pounder gun as fitted in D4 - non-suitability for submarines' nd 
(June 1912), Adm 1381299A section 53a; Hall report 19 December 1909, Adm 1381360A 
section 75 
(104) Keyes report 15 August 1913, Adm 138/2460 section 49 
(105) 'Foreign naval progress and naval estimates 1906-1907' (France), NID No. 834 
(September 1907) p. 11, Adm 231/48. See also section 5.3. 
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construction. Under the terms of the agreement, the RN was obliged to 
give two years' notice of its decision. This meant that no orders for boats 
incorporating joint Vickers/ Admiralty patents could be placed with other 
British firms until March 1913, and - as we have seen - the Admiralty 
was forced to allow some of Vickers' competitors to build submarines to 
foreign designs. 
This arrangement was not altogether unwelcome to Keyes. Believing the 
basic Holland design could not be developed further, and encouraged by a 
committee of junior submarine officers who had chafed under the 
technocrats' paternalistic rule and who welcomed the chance to determine 
policy and examine foreign designs, the new ICS decided to experiment. 
"We still have a great deal to learn, " he wrote (106]. 
SS Hall's subordinates had monitored foreign submarine development 
with an increasing sense of unease. French and Italian types were built 
along novel lines and had many impressive features. They were light and 
handy, and, in particular, were almost all double hulled, being designed 
with a thin outer shell surrounding the pressure hull and containing ballast 
tanks. Unlike the British Holland boats, double hulled craft could be given 
an outer hull shaped to offer maximum performance on the surface. Keyes 
particularly disliked the "monstrous" saddle tanks introduced by Lees and 
Hall, which he thought ruined the surface performance of the D and E 
class boats and limited their ability to work with surface ships. "The fast 
Submarine Destroyer... will certainly never develop out of our heavily-built 
saddle-tank design, " he wrote [107]. 
Once the decision to experiment was taken, it followed that the RN 
would have to go to foreign yards for double-hulled designs. A controller's 
department report observed, "our progess in lightening the type without 
making too great a departure from experience is necessarily slow, and 
would no doubt be much accelerated by experience with this lighter type of 
vessel. " [108] 
Even so, the proposals for future construction put forward by Keyes's 
submarine committee in 1912 were ambitious. The RN was urged to 
consider a variety of foreign types, build large experimental submarines and 
1106) Keyes report 'Development of British submarines' 6 April 1914, Adm 1/8374/93 
[107] Keyes to Hall 19 October 1912, KP 4122 
[108) Admiralty report ? May 1912, Adm 138/361 section 4 
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order new coastal types to succeed the C class boats. Commander Percy 
Addison, Keyes's unofficial advisor on submarine design, returned from a 
visit to French and Italian yards with glowing reports recommending the 
acquisition of both Laubeuf and Laurenti designs [109]. 
It was at this point that the submarine branch ran up against the vested 
interests of the Controller's department. Although executive officers had 
always been involved in submarine design [110], the Admiralty's naval 
architects suspected that the new policy involved trespass upon their own 
territory. They admitted that the 1912 Laurenti design - which had left 
Addison "very much struck with the boat generally... it is an entirely 
different type from our own and I submit that we have much to learn 
from it... the whole arrangement seems extremely well thought out and 
complete" [111] - would be "quite efficient, and might be regarded as an 
equivalent of aC class submarine for all intents and purposes", but still 
worried that "if we are to profit by the skill and experience of the 
designers it will be necessary to give them a free hand as regards type of 
machinery, battery &c., imposing no conditions save those of a most 
general character. " [112] In particular, no changes could be made to the 
lightweight Italian design without increasing displacement and affecting the 
submarine's seakeeping. That, wrote the naval architect HG Williams, meant 
accepting "much that our traditions and experience would condemn as 
unreliable and likely to lead to trouble. " [113] 
[109] Addison report 12 November 1911, KP 4/2; 'Report as to the immediate future 
construction of submarines' 9 March 1912, Adm 138/362 section 1. On the importance of 
the latter report, see Harrison op. cit. section 1.7 
[110] Serving officers were actively encouraged to involve themselves in submarine design 
from the beginning (Keyes to Admiralty 25 February 1914, KP 4/13; Harrison op. cit. 
section 3.5). The Admiralty played little part in the early design decisions; it was not 
even sure of the Holland submarines' specifications a few months before the first boats 
were launched (Controller's minute 4 April 1901, Adm 138/180B section 2). Design work 
on classes A and B was initiated by Bacon; Lees was largely responsible for the C and D 
designs and Hall for the E class specifications, although the lines of boats from the A 
class onwards were decided after testing at the Admiralty tank at Haslar. Detailed design 
work was the responsibility of Vickers draughtsmen at Barrow, working in collaboration 
with the ICS, whose own design staff consisted of two part-time assistants seconded from 
the Controller's department until things were put on a more permanent footing in 1904 
(Hall to Keyes 3 January 1912 KP 4/22; Controller's 'Memo re. confidential information 
in The Times' March 1911, Adm 138/299A section 19; Bacon memo 'Staff for submarine 
boat designs &c. ' 19 December 1903, Adm 1/7445). 
fill] Addison report 12 November 1911, KP 4/2 
1112) DNC to Controller 31 August 1911, Adm 138/404B section 7 
(1131 HG Williams 'Report on a visit to the works of the Fiat San Giorgio company' 30 
August 1911, ibid 
3.2 SUBMARINE DESIGN 1900-1914 
The DNC and the Controller objected to the idea of placing orders 
with foreign firms partly because they believed British designs were 
inherently superior [114] and partly because they were determined that 
every sort of warlike store should be available from British manufacturers. 
The RN's determination to 'buy British' not only dictated the terms of the 
Admiralty's agreement with Isaac Rice and Armstrong's licensing 
arrangement with Schneider; it also guaranteed the Dublin optician Sir 
Howard Grubb - who had built a primitive periscope to Bacon's design in 
1901 -a monopoly on the construction of optical instruments despite his 
inability to turn out periscopes the equal of those in the French, Italian 
and German navies. This monopoly, which was eventually broken by 
Keyes's decision to order German and Italian instruments, lasted as long as 
Vickers' stranglehold on construction [115]. Similarly the Tudor company, 
which offered a German electric storage battery to the Admiralty in 1907, 
was denied RN orders after investigation revealed that the firm was partly 
German owned, though its product was superior to the British Chloride 
batteries then in use [116]. 
Unwillingness to order boats from foreign yards forced the naval 
authorities to hurry inexperienced British arms firms into production. Scotts, 
the first British firm to build submarines to continental designs, completed 
three S class boats between 1911 and 1914. But despite having an advanced 
double-hulled design, considerable positive buoyancy and lighter batteries 
and machinery than existing British types [117], their unfamiliar and 
unreliable FIAT diesel engines gave considerable trouble and made the boats 
hot and uncomfortable to live in. As completed - strictly to FIAT plans, 
the Admiralty being bound by its agreement with Vickers not to modify the 
design - they were not really suitable for service outside the calm waters 
[114] SS Hall noted that if a design "was accepted by the British Admiralty ... [this)... 
would at once stamp it as acceptable to other nations. Were our designs scattered 
broadcast there is little doubt that in a short time foreign nations would be able to obtain 
them in this country... For adjacent ... 
[nations]... to be able to obtain an unlimited supply 
would be very detrimental to this country's interests and would probably necessitate a 
permanent increase in the strength of our fleet. " Hall report 19 March 1909, KP 4/5 
(115] Bacon op. cit. p. 56; Keyes to Admiralty nd (probably March 1912), Adm 138/246C 
section 5; 'Development of British submarines' 6 April 1914. Adm 1/8374/93 
j116) 'Precis of action taken by Admiralty and correspondence with the Tudor Company 
respecting trials of their batteries for submarines' nd (1912), Adm 1381246C section 5 
1117) HG Williams 'Report on a visit to the works of the Fiat San Giorgio company' 30 
August 1911, Adm 138/404B section 7 
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of the Mediterranean, and all three of the 260 ton, 13/8.5 knot coastals 
were handed over to the Italian navy after Italy entered World War I. 
Armstrongs, meanwhile, was persuaded to go into competition with 
Vickers by an Admiralty promise of orders for four submarines within two 
years [118], and the company offered a five year old Schneider-Laubeuf 
design to the RN. Keyes and Addison protested that the submarine did "not 
lend itself to our coastal type" and suggested that "if it is absolutely 
necessary as a matter of policy to place an order for a Laubeuf boat, it is 
submitted that only one be ordered... it should be preferable to delay the 
order, increase the length and beam, fit beam tubes and bring the vessel 
up to the overseas type... Messrs Armstrong Whitworths would then be in a 
position to compete with Messrs Vickers for the overseas vessels" [119]. But 
their plea was rejected. The Admiralty was extremely anxious to introduce 
new private firms to submarine construction as rapidly as possible in order 
to guarantee supplies of underwater craft, and the Controller replied that 
the RN was "honour bound to order two vessels from Armstrong 
Whitworths and propose doing so. I think the Submarine Committee will 
find them much better boats than they imagine. " [120] 
In fact four boats of the existing French coastal design (developed for 
the Greek and Peruvian navies) were ordered under the 1913 programme. 
They were completed during the war, and their brief service careers proved 
Keyes and Addison right. Although the Laubeuf boats displaced 400/500 
tons, their flimsy superstructure and unreliable 760hp Schneider diesels made 
them unsuitable for the steep seas around the British isles and they too 
were sold to Italy shortly after their completion. 
In the immediate pre-war period, two more classes of coastals were 
ordered to supplement the now ageing B and C boats. Eight double-hulled 
submarines of the F class, designed by Admiralty draughtsmen, were 
ordered under the 1913-14 programme (only three were completed). They 
kept the old D class armament of 3x18" torpedo tubes and displaced no 
more than 353/525 tons. The double-hulled V class, designed by Vickers, 
were given the same radius of action as the Ds and were considered very 
habitable. Both coastal classes were reckoned suitable for overseas 
(1181 Controller (Moore) memo 18 June 1914, Adm 138/435 
(1191 Keyes minute 3 November 1912, KP 4/1 
(120) Moore to Keyes 23 November 1912, ibid 
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operations, and the V class - which were specially designed to dive rapidly 
[121] - undertook numerous patrols off the German coast during the war. 
Keyes's own ideas were incorporated in the G class overseas 
submarines, the only successful new boats designed during the Commodore's 
four years with the submarine service. Although only slightly larger than the 
E class, the double-hulled Gs had 274 tons (28%) positive buoyancy and 
swan bows, making them extremely seaworthy. They carried four 18" 
torpedo tubes - two in the bow and two in Hall's favourite broadside 
configuration - and one 21" tube in the stern. Twin diesel/electric motors 
offered a respectable 14/10 knot performance, although the large external 
ballast tanks made the boats slow to dive. 
As efficient anti-submarine weapons came into service during the war, 
this deficiency made all the high-buoyancy submarines developed by Keyes 
increasingly vulnerable to counter-attack and forced them to spend more 
and more time on diving patrols, where their superior surface qualities 
counted for little. The new types were also difficult to build, and firms 
new to submarine construction foumnd it impossible to meet the delivery 
dates requested by the Admiralty. The first Gs did not enter service until 
the end of 1915 - months after the first E class boats ordered under the 
Emergency War Programme of November 1914 were ready for action. 
Keyes's large experimental submarines were less successful and far more 
complicated than the Gs. Vickers' Nautilus was (at 18 knots) only 3 knots 
faster than the existing 6601810 ton E boats and was considerably less 
manoeuvrable. But she was 242' long and displaced a staggering 1270/1694. 
tons. Keyes, who considered it "absolutely necessary that we should build 
one vessel of this large size in order to be in a position to judge the 
advisability or otherwise of laying down still larger vessels" [122], did not 
remain with the submarine branch long enough to take delivery of the 
boat, which spent five years rather than the contracted 18 months in 
shipyard hands. Even then, Vickers made such a bad miscalculation in the 
design of the submarine's giant diesel engines that she was scrapped without 
seeing service [123]. 
[121) Admiralty to Messrs Vickers 12 August 1912, Adm 138/404A section 4; Keyes report 
15 August 1913, Adm 138/246C section 49 
(122) Keyes report 15 August 1913, Adm 138/246C section 49 
(123) Addison to Keyes December 1917, KP 4/12; 'Memo on HMS Nautilus 2 May 1918, 
VP 599 fols. 386,388 
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Scotts' Swordfish, a 231' steam powered submarine with a double hull 
along 75% of her length, was certainly the most unusual boat built for the 
Royal Navy in the pre-war period. She mounted two 21" torpedo tubes in 
the bow and four 18" tubes on the broadside, displaced a very considerable 
932/1475 tons and boasted a 3,000 mile radius of action. Her 4,000hp 
Parsons steam turbines were supposedly capable of developing 18 knots, 
which would have allowed her to operate as a fleet submarine, and it was 
this tempting prospect that encouraged Keyes - who opposed steam power 
as late as 1913 [124] - to approve her construction. 
The Commodore was bold enough to claim that "submarine officers 
welcomed the idea of such a well-tried and simple means of propulsion as 
the steam turbine" [125], but his plans were condemned both by a 
"horrified" Hall and by Fisher, who thought the very idea of steam 
submarines "simply fatal! " [126] Both men pointed to the experience of 
French steam boats which, like later British K class submarines, were 
vulnerable to accidents caused by flooding through one of the numerous 
large hull apertures - notably those required by funnels and ventilators - 
common in this type of submarine. Moreover steam created operational 
problems. It was far more difficult to switch from surface to submerged 
propulsion (the K boats were fitted with no less than five types of motor 
to surmount this problem [127]), and crash diving was impossible when the 
funnel was up. Smoke from the engines also robbed steam submarines of 
their chief asset - invisibility - on the surface, although in practice the 
diesel powered D and E class submarines also tended to produce excessive 
quantities of exhaust. 
Swordfish's 37% positive buoyancy made her nominally very seaworthy, 
although a typically Italian low-slung superstructure limited her usefulness. 
She was the immediate precursor of the infamous K class boats of the 
Great War - which copied many of her features - and suffered some of 
the problems associated with steam submarines, being comparatively slow to 
[124] Report of conference summarised in 'Warship construction during the 1914-191E 
war' 31 December 1918 pp. 216-17, Adm 1/8547/340 
[125] Keyes report 'Development of British submarines' 6 April 1914, Adm 1/8374/93 
[126] Hall quoted in Addison to Keyes, December 1917, KP 4/12; Fisher to Churchill 
? October 1913, quoted in Randolph Churchill and Martin Gilbert, Winston Spencer 
Churchill vol. IV p. 1955 
[127] DNC report 'Warship construction during the 1914-1918 war' 31 December 1918 
p. 218, Adm 1/8547/340 
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dive. She also suffered a marked loss of stability in surfacing, and since she 
proved too slow to operate effectively with the Grand Fleet, she was 
eventually converted into a surface patrol craft and scrapped soon after the 
end of the war [128]. 
For all their deficiencies, it would be wrong to dismiss Nautilus and 
Swordfish merely as interesting failures. Hall - who thought the two boats 
were useless relics of the Keyes regime - wrote them off after taking 
command of the submarine service again in February 1915, and little effort 
was made to solve the considerable problems thrown up by the submarines' 
revolutionary design. Both boats taught the submarine branch valuable 
lessons in the building and managing of large underwater craft, and though 
it was certainly unfortunate that Britain dissipated her submarine building 
resources by multiplying the number of designs under construction in the 
late pre-war period, as Britain had reason to be grateful for the 
experience which the arms firms brought in to break the Vickers monopoly 
had gained by August 1914. 
The history of British submarine design and development to 1914 
accurately reflected the RN's general uncertainty as to the true value and 
proper function of underwater craft. The Admiralty's willingness to grant an 
effective monopoly on construction, the unwillingness of the Controller's 
office to involve itself in the design process before 1905, and the RN's 
failure to explain to Vickers and the submarine branch precisely what the 
boats they were designing were expected to do, were consequences of the 
decision to buy up the Holland patents to test the capabilities of the 
submarine, and thus treat it as an experimental vessel, rather than 
incorporate it fully into the Royal Navy. 
Bacon, Lees and Hall were technicians, not fortune tellers. They knew 
their designs were imperfect, and saw submarines as weapons of 
considerable but always limited importance which would help implement 
existing strategy, by protecting Britain against invasion and securing home 
waters so as to allow the battlefleet freedom of action, rather than as 
devices capable of changing naval warfare completely and forever. 
They produced a series of eminently sound, battleworthy designs - but 
never claimed or believed, as did the more visionary First Sea Lord, 
[128] Addison to Keyes December 1917, KP 4112; 'Paying off HMS Swordfish' l May, 10 
+ 27 August, 23 December 1918, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1603A; Scotts Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Co. Ltd, 250 years of shipbuilding by Scotts at Greenock (Glasgow 1961) 
pp. 95 -6 
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Admiral Fisher, that the submarine was "the battleship of the future" [129J, 
because their minds were focussed on the day-to-day struggle to perfect 
complex technology and not on strategy and the long-term future of 
underwater warfare. It was Keyes, the non-specialist, who understood that 
the submarine service was 'technology led' rather than 'strategy led' and 
who, with the backing of the Admiralty, instituted a policy of radical 
experimentation not just in the hope of producing better boats but of 
developing a more ambitious strategic role for the submarine. 
The ten years of the Vickers monopoly helped to dictate the course of 
early British submarine policy. The Barrow firm committed itself to the 
Holland design, a low buoyancy type intended for coast defence. Holland 
boats were provided with dangerous and inefficient petrol engines, and had 
only a limited radius of action; moreover the ballast tanks of the A, B and 
C class submarines were placed inside the pressure hull, restricting space, 
and though the cigar-shaped hull favoured by Holland offered excellent 
performance when submerged, his boats lacked an upper deck and thus had 
limited habitability. The spindle form of Holland's submarines also gave 
Vickers/EBC designs a tendency to dive unexpectedly when running on the 
surface at high speed. These deficiencies convinced Keyes that large, fast, 
overseas and fleet type boats could only be developed from the 
double-hulled submarines favoured by the French and Italian navies. 
There was little prospect of ordering double-hull boats from Vickers. 
By signing a contract with the Electric Boat Company guaranteeing the 
American firm a half share of the profits on all submarines built at 
Barrow, of whatever type, the company gave itself no incentive to improve 
the Holland type by incorporating the best features of continental 
submarines into new designs. By preventing the Admiralty from passing the 
Holland patents to other private arms firms, Vickers effectively encouraged 
its rivals to negotiate with European companies. When Keyes and his 
submarine committee decided to break Vickers' construction monopoly, 
therefore, Scotts and Thornycrofts were already able to offer continental 
designs, and Armstrongs soon followed their lead. 
Within the constraints imposed on it by the Holland patents, however, 
Vickers did much to improve submarine design. The Barrow company was 
I 
[129) Fisher paper 'The submarine, presented by lord Fisher to the Prime Minister sir 
months before the war', print of ? March 1917, citing a comment of 1905 reported in 
Truth 4 February 1914. FP 4402 
3.2 SUBMARINE DESIGN 1900-1914 
0 
both the most innovative and the most efficient of the major arms firms in 
the early years of the twentieth century. It successfully developed the diesel 
engines that made the overseas type possible, increased buoyancy by 
developing the. saddle tank concept, and - with the help of successive 
Inspecting Captains of Submarines - provided the Royal Navy with D and 
E class boats that coped well with the demands imposed on them by war. 
Whatever the failings of Vickers and the British armament-makers in 
general, they advanced submarine construction more rapidly and efficiently 
than had seemed possible in 1900. But perhaps they worked too rapidly; 
the near obsession with materiel that affected many senior officers was 
detrimental to strategic thought. It was left to the former Prime Minister, 
Arthur Balfour, to point out the dangers inherent in this state of affairs: 
"It seems to me almost inevitable, " he wrote in 1910, "that our changes in 
'materiel' will out-run the adaptive powers of our Naval tacticians. The 
ablest man, who has spent his life thinking in terms of 9 inch guns and 
torpedo boat destroyers, will not easily adapt himself to 13 or 14-inch 
guns or submarines. " [130] 
1 [130] Balfour to Fisher 20 October 1910, Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49712 fol. 62 
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THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF BRITISH SUBMARINERS 
1901-1918 
A volunteer service 
In July 1914 the submarine service was an all-volunteer force of upwards 
of three thousand men, manning 72 submarines attached to 16 depot ships 
at six naval bases around the world. But its beginnings were considerably 
more modest. 
The first British submarines arriving at Portsmouth in the summer of 
1902 were banished to the unsalubrious nether reaches of the harbour with 
the prison hulks and quarantine vessels, while their trial crews were brought 
up to strength with the addition of a batch of officer volunteers and men 
drafted from the battleships HMS Jupiter and HMS Anson [1]. Even 
allowing for the crew of Bacon's tender, the 1,000 ton converted gunboat 
Hazard, and the submarine mother ship HMS Thames, however, the total 
strength of the service at this time was little more than a hundred men. 
These were the pioneers - and tempting though it is to see the early 
submariners as far-sighted enthusiasts with genuine faith in the future of 
underwater warfare, the truth is that the crews of Britain's Holland craft 
were not fervent proponents of the submarine. Most of them had selfish or 
prosaic reasons for volunteering. 
The British submarine service offered a number of inducements to 
I 
[1] 'Crews - completion of for first three submarine boats' 6 May 1902, digest cut lla, 
Adm 12/1377; Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine boats: the beginnings of underwater 
warfare (London 1983) p. 122 
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young officers and men, of which money was probably the most important. 
At a time (1912) when the basic pay of an ordinary seaman was ls. 3d. a 
day, his counterpart in the submarine service was earning ls. 6d. submarine 
pay on top of the basic rate, and a Chief Petty Officer 2s. 6d. extra, 
thanks to hard-lying money [2]. Officers were even better off. "Those 
joining the submarine service became dazzled by the rise of 5s. a day, " 
remembered Rear Admiral Vernon Haggard, "and, besides buying a car, 
were apt to get married as well. As this did not add to their usefulness or 
efficiency, Commodore Keyes introduced a rule that an undertaking not to 
marry within the first two or three years should be a condition of their 
acceptance. " [3] Volunteers lucky enough to be appointed to command a 
submarine did particularly well, for in addition to the hard lying allowance, 
young lieutenants captaining their own boat were entitled to draw command 
pay, a rare privilege for men so junior in rank. Commanding officers could 
thus earn 20s. 9d. a day, extremely high wages for the time and more than 
double the lieutenant's standard 10s [4]. 
There is little doubt that high pay played a vital part in attracting 
volunteers to 'The Trade' - the name by which young submariners soon 
began to refer to their profession. SS Hall believed that "with regard to 
the pay being in proportion to the responsibilities I would submit that it is, 
and that in view of the discomforts being undoubtably - much greater in the 
submarine than in the destroyer the proportion is reasonable. " Without a 
monetary inducement it would be impossible to find enough volunteers to 
keep pace with the rapid expansion of the service [5] - and men tempted 
by their new-found affluence to marry or sign hire-purchase agreements 
could not afford to quit the service and return to their old level of pay. 
The Trade also offered volunteers generous shore leave, and drew many of 
its crews from the Portsmouth district because that was where most 
(21 Pay table dated 1 August 1912 and table (nd) headed 'Comparison of pay of seamen 
and infantry', Adm 116/1661; Admiralty paper 'Service in submarines' ? September 1913, 
Adm 116/1122; 'Submarine allowances' 28 July 1915, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1539B 
(3] Vi Haggard, Memoirs 1913-1915, undated typescript in the RN Submarine Museum, 
A1984/42 pp21-2 
[4) 'Command money for officers in command of submarines' 13 September 1910, digest 
cut Ila, Adm 12/1476; 'Memorandum relative to service in submarines... ' nd (late 1906) 
Adm 1/7921; WS Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western Approaches (London 1954) 
pp. 5-6 
[5) Hall report 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122. See also Hall to Burney, 27 March 1909, 
Adm 1/7988 
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submarines were based [6]. Boats were permanently stationed at the Home 
Ports, and with rare exceptions they returned to those ports each evening; 
not for them the inconvenience of months spent at sea. Nor were 
submariners liable for service overseas before 1910 - another appreciable 
incentive to join the branch. 
A number of additional privileges were granted to the young service. 
Submariners were allowed to count service in boats as sea-time even if 
allocated harbour-defence duties - an important concession, since the 
regulations stipulated that a fixed period of service afloat was necessary to 
qualify for promotion to the higher ranks [7]. For officers there was the 
inducement of freedom of action and the chance to experience the 
responsibilities of command at an early age. Doubtless the dangers and the 
chance to be a thoroughly disruptive influence in exercises and elsewhere 
also appealed to some [see section 5.1]. 
Privileges were necessary to attract recruits to a service that was always 
on the brink of a serious manpower shortage. The submarine branch was 
established as an all-volunteer force, since it was considered impolitic to 
draft men into a potentially hazardous specialisation, and unwise to dilute 
the quality of the men serving with unhappy and uncooperative General 
Service ratings. But despite the Admiralty's inducements, volunteers 
remained scarce and in 1904 the RN was forced to make the Trade a 
closed service. This meant that for an experimental period - fixed at three 
years in 1904 and renewed indefinitely in 1907 - submarine COs were 
forbidden to draft men away to General Service. Instead, officers and men 
signed on for five years in the branch, to be followed by at least two 
years' General Service and a possible three further years in boats. Officers 
were to command submarines for two-year commissions [8). The initial - 
and desired - effect of this ruling was to make it difficult for existing 
volunteers to leave the submarine branch. 
The Trade nevertheless continued to expand more quickly than the 
supply of volunteers. By 1913 even the closed service arrangement was no 
[6] 'Memorandum relative to service in submarines... ' nd (late 1906), Adm 1/7921 
[7] Ibid 
[8] 'Meeting to consider submarine manning' 29 August 1904, Adm 1/7644; 'Drafting - 
ratings in submarine service to be exempt' February 1905, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1414. 
See also 'Report by Captain Bacon on the statement that men became nervous after the 
accident to Al', 15 May 1904, Adm 1/7718 
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longer adequate, and Keyes proposed that unlimited service in submarines 
be permitted, arguing that the loss of skilled men who had completed eight 
years and were ineligible for further service, or who were serving their 
three years with the fleet, could no longer be tolerated. Men should be 
allowed to spend their whole careers in the submarine branch, the 
Commodore suggested, noting that "the efficient manning of this 
rapidly-expanding service is becoming increasingly difficult under the 
existing regulations. " After some haggling with M-branch, the Admiralty 
acceded to Keyes's request in the autumn of that year [9]. 
By making the Trade a closed service, the Navy risked producing a 
highly-trained group of out-of-touch specialists who might be unfit for 
General Service after their spell in submarines, and who would probably 
clog advancement in the fleet [10]. But the decision did enable young 
submariners to devote time to their profession, and the high standards of 
competence displayed by the British submarine service during the Great War 
were a direct consequence of the Admiralty's ruling. Although only 
infrequently allowed to exercise against the surface fleet, and hampered as 
they were by an overall lack of strategic direction [see section 6.1), 
submarine officers became masters at handling their craft. The thorough 
understanding of underwater warfare generally displayed by British 
submariners compares well with (for example) the contemporary failure of 
both the British and US armies to develop effective tactics for the machine 
gun, which recent authorities have attributed partly to the tendency of both 
services to move young officers from machine gun units before they had 
really come to grips with the new weapon [11]. 
The other long-term consequences of the closed service arrangement 
[9] 'Memorandum relative to service in submarines... ' nd (late 1906) and minutes, Adm 
1/7921; Keyes paper 7 February 1913 in Adm 116/1122; Admiralty paper 'Service in 
submarines' ? September 1913, ibid 
[101 Bacon 'Report on training' 8 May 1904, Adm 1/7644 and DNI minute of 4 July 
1904, ibid. The case of stokers was especially pertinent: their duties in submarines were 
quite unlike those of stokers in the fleet, and lack of useful general service experience 
could render them unfit for the higher ranks. This was recognised by the stokers 
themselves, and in consequence almost all who passed for Leading Stoker or Stoker Petty 
Officer immediately left the Trade, invoking an Admiralty injunction that the 'closed 
service' should not stand in the way of promotion. Report 'HMS Forth - stokers serving 
in submarines' 17 August 1908 and minutes, Adm 1/7979; drafting regulations (revised to 
1909), sections 97-101. Adm 1/8034 
[11] Cf. Tim Travers, The killing ground: the British Army, the Western Front and the 
emergence of modern warfare 1900-1918 (London 1987) p64; David Armstrong, Bullets 
and bureaucrats: the machine gun and the United States Army 1861-1916 (Westport, 
Connecticut 1982) pp. 86-88 
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were probably even more significant. By isolating submariners, to a 
considerable degree, from the surface navy, the authorities limited the effect 
that big-ship disapproval of the submarine might have on the development 
of the Trade. The same policy also impeded the spread of accurate 
information concerning submarines through the fleet, seriously hampering 
appreciation of the dangers posed and making it easy for all but the most 
concerned officers to ignore the underwater weapon. [These points are 
examined in detail in section 5]. 
The shortage of suitable volunteers which afflicted the Trade was caused 
in part by än unwillingness to serve in submarines - the danger, 
discomfort and claustrophobia must have deterred many. But even those 
anxious to join the branch had to reach high standards that greatly 
increased the problems of recruitment. Officer-candidates had to have a 
first-class torpedo certificate and were generally expected to join the 
service as sub-lieutenants: "The whole secret, " wrote Fisher (who had little 
to learn from the Jesuits), "is to catch them very young and then mould 
them while they are so young and plastic and receptive to be just what 
you want them. " [12] Admiralty regulations also specified that submarine 
officers should be hard-headed, careful, good rough navigators and have 
reasonable mechanical and electrical knowledge [13]. 
These rigid criteria were imposed for a reason: the submarine depended 
almost entirely on her captain for her success. In the days before the 
invention of sonar and hydrophones, only the officer at the periscope had 
any idea of what was going around the boat, and only he could pick a 
target, judge how best to approach her, and then aim and fire a torpedo. 
"The handling of the vessel remains as it apparently must a one man 
show, " wrote Hall. "However perfect the submarine and her crew, she must 
be not only useless but dangerous with an indifferent captain, for the 
moment the vessel dives, i. e. just at the time when she performs her vital 
duties, the captain being the only man who can see outside the boat 
controls and orders everything; this constitutes the weak point of the 
submarine, unless the greatest care and discrimination is exercised in 
[12) Fisher to Esher 10 March 1904, quoted in MV Brett (ed), Journals and letters of 
Reginald, Viscount Esher (4 voll, London 1934) II, 48-9; Bacon 'Report on training' 8 
May 1904, Adm 1/7644; Lees report 'Modifying the system for obtaining officers for the 
submarine service' 2 August 1905, Adm 1/7795 
[13] 'New Admiralty scheme for the entry, training and employment of officers, men and 
boys for the Royal Navy' May 1903, Arnold-Forster papers Add. Mss. 50285 fols. 154-5; 
'Selection of officers for the submarine service' 12 January 1912, digest cut lla, Adm 
12/1500 
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selecting these officers. " [14] His successor, Keyes, agreed: "The 
personality of the captain comes in to a greater extent in a submarine than 
in any other class of vessel, " he observed. "The military value of a 
submarine is entirely dependent on his skill and nerve, its efficiency on his 
technical ability, and the lives of his crew on his good judgement. " [15] 
As with the officers, so with the men. To guarantee the safety of the boat, 
every submariner had to be a first rate hand. The drafting regulations 
stipulated that all ratings entering the branch had to be literate, and stated: 
"No man will be passed whose ability is not assessed as either 'superior' or 
above. 10% of all advancements will be given to ratings whose ability is 
assessed as 'exceptional'... " [16] 
The demands of the submarine service created a number of problems 
for the RN as a whole. The rapid expansion of the Navy around the turn 
of the century resulted in widespread shortages of qualified specialists, and 
torpedo officers and men trained beyond the most basic of standards had 
never been plentiful. In the early 1890s only five Lieutenants (T) were 
trained annually; in 1900 four of the 16 available places on the Vernon's 
course were unfilled and in 1902, seven [17]. Torpedo lieutenants were thus 
kept in almost permanent employment; with the exception of 1907 there 
were never more than four Lieutenants (T) on half-pay or extended leave 
in the years 1900-1912. Nor were specialist ratings readily available. In 
1901 the Vernon reported a shortfall of 537 Leading Torpedomen and 92 
Torpedo Instructors; not until 1905 was there a small surplus [18]. 
Although the ranks of torpedo lieutenants available for duty in the fleet 
were not obviously depleted by the demands of the Trade (few submariners 
qualified as Lieutenants (T) since the syllabus for prospective Lts 
(Submarines) included a course of torpedo-work), the submarine service did 
demand a first-class torpedo certificate of its recruits and therefore took 
up men who might well have otherwise gone on to the Vernon's torpedo 
[14] Hall to Fisher 3 August 1909, Fisher papers FP 413, Churchill College Cambridge 
[15] Keyes paper 25 February 1914, Keyes papers KP 4/13, British Library 
[16) Keyes memo 'Advancements in submarine service' 28 May 1913, Adm 116/1122; see 
also 'Ordinary seamen for S/M service' 20 December 1917, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1582A 
[17) Alan Cowpe, Underwater weapons and the Royal Navy 1869-1918 (London University 
PhD 1979-1980) pp. 276-7,279-81; HMS Vernon annual report 1902, Adm 189/22 
[18) HMS Vernon annual reports 1900-1912, Adm 189 series. The total of Lts (T) 
available rose from 48 in 1900 to 157 in 1908, falling back to 148 four years later. 
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course. By 1914 the numbers of lieutenants and lietenant-commanders 
qualified in submarines had outstripped the numbers qualified in torpdeoes 
[19]. 
The peculiar demands of the Trade meant that there was also a 
perpetual shortage of some classes of rating in the submarine branch itself. 
Recruitment of petty officers and stokers was never a problem, but the 
submarine service's insistence on recruiting men with the non-substantive 
'Seaman Torpedoman' (ST) rating did give rise to trouble. It was not 
allowed for under the scheme of complement, "but in practice, " M-branch 
reported, "with very few exceptions, only seamen holding the torpedo rating 
of ST or above are taken. No allowance is made for submarines when 
calculating the total requirements of STs... the result is a heavy drain upon 
those men. " In January 1913 it was calculated that the submarine service 
employed 594 of the 4,271 available ST ratings (14%), while the Navy as a 
whole had a shortfall of 489 STs [20). 
The pre-war submarine service also insisted, on the grounds of safety, 
that its engine-room staff contain a high proportion of Chief Engine Room 
Artificers and ERAS First Class, depriving the surface fleet of a portion of 
its best-qualified and most experienced engineers. Not until 1914 did the' 
Commodore (S) concede that submarines had by and large proved 
themselves reliable and negotiate an agreement that enabled many CERAs 
and ERAS First Class to be relieved by lower-ranked engine-room ratings 
[21]. 
[19] The following figures are extracted from the Navy List - 
January 1906: Lieutenants qualified in torpedoes 108 
Lieutenants qualified in submarines 50 
Submarine Lts qualified in torpedoes 4 
January 1910: Lieutenants qualified in torpedoes 146 
Lieutenants qualified in submarines 69 
Submarine Lts qualified in torpedoes 5 
July 1914: Lts and Lt-Cdrs qualified in torpedoes 139 
Lu and Lt-Cdrs qualified in submarines 170 
Some redressing of the balance occurred; it was not uncommon for submariners leaving 
the Trade to take the torpedo course in the hope of improving their prospects of 
promotion. Lees report 'Modifying the system for obtaining officers for the submarine 
service' 2 August 1905, Adm 1/7795 
(20] Duff memo 'Non-substantive torpedo ratings in submarines' 24 January 1913 and 
enclosure, Adm 116/1122. See also 'Complements - ratings overborne' 14 January 1911, 
digest cut lla, Adm 12/1488 
[21] Bacon report 'Submarine boats and bases - complements... ' 4 February 1904, Adm 
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Much more serious was RN reluctance to provide submarines with 
specialist signals ratings or adequate signalling equipment [22]. The Navy as 
a whole was short of wireless operators, and none could be spared for the 
submarine service. This factor, together with a general failure to fit boats 
with long-range WT sets, did much to undermine the effectiveness of 
wartime submarine reconnaissance and patrol, since it was often impossible 
to report German ship movements to London [see section 6.3] [23]. 
During the war, the rapid growth of the submarine service and the 
obvious dangers of life in the Trade caused further manning problems. 
Regular circulars containing appeals for volunteers were issued, and 
increasingly strong measures had to be adopted. Late in 1915, "reports of 
the doings of British submarines in the Sea of Marmara" were issued to the 
Fleet to stimulate recruiting, and from 1917 all ratings graduating from the 
torpedo schools were asked (rather pointedly, one imagines) whether they 
had considered volunteering for submarines [24]. 
Officer recruitment was generally more satisfactory, both before and 
during the war, though it sometimes proved "difficult to get the stamp of 
Officer required in sufficient numbers. " [25) But although spare crews were 
provided for submarines in the ratio of one for every three serving crews, 
there were never enough officers to provide a trained reserve [26]. 
One reason for this was that annual wastage in the submarine branch 
was fairly high. In 1904 Bacon noted that it was running at about one 
officer in six, and due allowance was made for this figure when planning 
the expansion of the Trade [27]. The drop-out rate was influenced by 
41 1/7739; Hall report 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122; 'Engine room ratings for submarines' 24 September 1914, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1525 
[221 Cf. CG Brodie, 'Some early submariners' part 111, Naval Review 1963 p191 
[23] Keyes minute 15 March 1911, and Bethell (DNI) minute 27 March 1911, Adm 
116/1361; Keyes memo I8 November 1912, Adm 1/8269 
[24) Cf. 'Volunteers' nd (1915), and 'Report of the doings of British submarines' 15 
October 1915, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1539B; 'Volunteers' 19 January 1916, digest cut 
ila, Adm 12/1561A; 'Torpedo ratings volunteering for S! M service' 9 August 1917, and 
'Volunteers' 9 October 1917, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1582A; 'Volunteers for SIM service 
needed' 29 August 1918, digest cut ]la, Adm 12/1603A 
See also Hall reports of 30 August 1916 and late August 1917. Adm 137/2077 Pols. 53, 
74 
[25] Hall report 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122. See also Hall to Fisher 3 August 1909, FP 
413 
[26] Keyes memo 18 November 1912, Adm 1/8269 
[27J Bacon 'Report on training' 8 May 1904, Adm 1/7644 
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several factors, including desire to return to the surface fleet, failure to 
come up to the standards of the Service, and mental strain. It is interesting 
to note, however, that peacetime figures were actually higher than those 
recorded during the war. Fourteen officers out of 370 reverted to the 
general service in 1916 and 30 officers of 570 a year later, ratios of 1 in 
26 and 1 in 19 [28]. Presumably patriotism, a sense of duty and the 
relaxation of standards on the part of the Submarine Service partly account 
for this trend. 
Foreign navies experienced similar problems and ran their submarine 
services along very similar lines. There was a general agreement that 
underwater craft should be manned by volunteer specialists serving long 
periods for high pay. The French created a closed service in which officers 
and men could enlist for an unlimited period, the minimum being two 
years. All were volunteers and most were specialists; ratings qualified in 
torpedo-work were preferred, but some ordinary seamen were borne in the 
larger submersibles. There was a strict medical examination. New recruits 
received three months' training, and spare crews were organised in the ratio 
of one to every five operational boats. Submariners were especially favoured 
for promotion [29]. 
Germany too formed a volunteer service, and had no difficulty finding 
recruits. In addition to hard-lying money, extra pay was awarded for days 
on which the submarine actually dived. This amounted to 4s. for officers 
and 1s. 6d. for ratings, and compared favourably with allowances in other 
navies [30]. German submariners were rewarded by unusually rapid 
promotion - more especially during the war, of course - and as the need 
for officer-recruits intensified there was a significant drain on the best 
officers of the High Sea Fleet, which contributed eventually to the rise of 
indiscipline and incompetence in surface ships. The U-boats usurped the 
traditional responsibilities of the capital ship, causing -much resentment; 
[28] Hall reports 30 August 1916 and late August 1917, Adm 137/2077 Pols. 53,74,80. 
See also Keyes paper 7 February 1915, Adm 116/1122; CG Brodie, 'Some early 
submariners' part 1, Naval Review 1962 pp. 428-9. 
Unsurprisingly, the most prominent British submariners in the 1914-18 war had served 
in submarines for years. For example, Charles Little transferred in April 1903, Leir and 
Cromie in October of the same year, and CG Brodie and Horton twelve months later. 
[291 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1905-06' (France) NID No. 810, September 
1906, pp. 12-13, Adm 231/47; 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1906-07' (France) 
NID No. 834, September 1907, p. 6, Adm 231/48 
[30] 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1906-07' (Germany) NID No. 834, September 
1907, p. 61, Adm 231/48 
4.1 MANNING BRITAIN'S SUBMARINES 1901-1914 
0 
towards the end of the war the High Sea Fleet's principal occupation was 
escorting submarines to and from their bases [31]. In wartime Britain this 
problem was largely averted; considerable emphasis was placed on 
co-operation between the submarine service and the fleet. British 
submarines performed support roles, conducting patrol, recconaissance and 
anti-submarine operations on behalf of the Grand Fleet. 
Most submarine personnel in the pre-war United States Navy were also 
volunteers, although there was no ruling to this effect. Officers served a 
three-year 'tour' before returning to the General Service; they were then 
free to volunteer for a further spell in boats. Ratings were generally 
specialists "of excellent habits as to steadiness, sobriety &c. " They too had 
to serve three years in the submarine service. Special attention was given to 
overcoming the problems of stagnant promotion which bedevilled a closed 
service with a static materiel base, and ratings qualified for promotion were 
held in reserve until they could be transferred to a newly-commissioned 
boat at the higher rank [32]. The Russians, meanwhile, made an effort to 
improve the quality of their submarine personnel by establishing a training 
division in 1905. Enlisted men received higher pay and accelerated 
promotion, but there was a shortage of officers willing to serve in boats 
[33]. The Imperial Japanese Navy introduced something akin to the British 
system. Its submarine branch was an all-volunteer force, and the supply of 
men considerably exceeded demand. Officers were expected to serve two 
'tours' of two years each, interspersed with a spell of General Service. 
Although conscripts could volunteer, most submarine ratings were 
long-service men. It was anticipated that they would be retained for two 
or three years, after which their efficiency would begin to decline [34]. All 
these navies were thus agreed that the dangers and discomforts of 
submarine life would soon exhaust personnel; all were certain that the 
incentive of extra pay was vital, and all organised spare crews and a 
system of reliefs. Crew endurance was considerably under-estimated. 
[31] Holger Herwig, The German naval officer corps: a social and political history 
1890-1918 (London 1983) pp191-4 
[32] 'Foreign naval administration and personnel' (USA) NID No. 870. August 1910, p. 54, 
Adm 231/52 
[33] DW Mitchell, A history of Russian and Soviet seapower (London 1976) p. 276 
[34] 'Japan: fleet, dockyards &c. ' in 'Reports on foreign naval affairs 1907' vol. 1, NID 
No. 815 p. 86, July 1907, Adm 231/47 
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Crew health and endurance 
Before 1914 it was widely believed that human stamina - rather than 
mechanical or logistical shortcomings - would dictate the time a submarine 
could spend at sea. The boats which the Royal Navy's pioneer submariners 
sailed were so cramped and so unhealthy that, according to Fisher, "the 
only limit to their marvellous efficiency... is the endurance of the crews" 
[35]. A 1903 paper suggested that the mental strain of service in the 
submarine branch would undermine the professional competence of any 
officer within two years [36]. 
The submarine was a small, enclosed craft. British crews were not 
normally expected to live on board, being billeted in depot ships, and 
conditions therefore became cramped in the extreme during protracted spells 
at sea. The air was polluted by petrol or diesel fumes; the boat was 
unpleasantly hot in summer and decidedly cold in winter or under water. 
Most submarines reeked of food and frequently of vomit; in the early boats 
the toilets were no more than pails. It was impossible to keep clothes dry. 
Underwater craft were usually damp with condensation, and water cascaded 
through hatches located only feet above sea-level. In particularly bad 
weather these were battened down, but even in calm seas few of the crew 
got much fresh air. 
In wartime a submarine might frequently be closed up and remain 
submerged all day, leaving the air so foul that matches would not burn. 
Boats were claustrophobic and even in peace there was always the fear that 
something would go wrong, that the crew would be crushed as the hull 
split apart under the pressure of water, or left to suffocate slowly on the 
bottom after an accident. The men of the Trade earned their hard-lying 
bonus: "It is only after going on board a submarine on her return... that 
one realises what a tremendous strain is imposed on the personnel, " wrote 
Commodore Hall in 1916. "They are all young men in the prime of life 
who have undergone rigorous selection for fitness, but they are obviously 
much tried after seven or eight days during which they are continually in 
[35] Fisher paper 'The oil engine and the submarine', December 1913, FP4293/9 
[36] 'Submarine personnel', April 1903, in Naval necessities II p. 455, Adm 116/3093. See 
also 'New Admiralty scheme for the entry, training and employment of officers, men and 
boys for the Royal Navy', May 1903, Add. Mss. 50285, fols. 154-5 
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what constitutes 'action' to a submarine. " [37] Submariners, in short, were 
required to display "two o'clock in the morning courage for the whole time 
they are at sea. " [38] 
In recognition of the dangers and discomfort of life in a submarine, 
hard-lying pay was awarded as early as November 1901 [39] and was, as 
has been seen, a key factor in securing volunteers. The early coastal craft 
were of course the most uncomfortable; on Al's maiden voyage (from 
Barrow to Portsmouth) "the crew had a very unpleasant time", as Bacon 
recorded: 
"Here they were boxed up in a confined space, practically cut off 
from outside help, rolling and pitching sharply and considerably, with 
the incessant roar of breaking seas all round the hull, suddenly finding 
appliances they trust to, and whose scientific action they only partially 
understand, evidently going wrong. Pungent and irritating fumes, the 
exact nature of which they are ignorant, are given off and affect their 
noses eyes and throats - naturally tales of explosions and poisoning in 
submarine boats, so sedulously propagated by our sensational press, 
must have occurred to their minds. Yet through all this 'Unknown' 
they keep their heads and preserve excellent discipline. Surely it is 
occasions such as this that throw a prophetic light on what the 
behaviour of our personnel will be in time of war! " [40] 
Submarines of the B and C classes were hardly more luxurious, and 
although conditions improved so mewhat in the overseas boats, with their 
greater displacement and higher conning towers [41], Keyes remembered. 
"that the hardy fishe rmen of the North Sea hailed the submariners of those 
days as comrades, and always threw fish to them when the weather 
[37] Hall report 30 August 1916, Adm 137/2077 fol. 57. For conditions, see also Hall's 
vivid report of 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122; Cecil Talbot's account of his first trip in a 
submarine, diary entry for 13 April 1904, Talbot papers 81/42/2, Imperial War Museum; 
and of course the extensive secondary literature. 
[38] Hall report late August 1917, Adm 137/2077 fol. 78 
[39] 'Extra pay for submarine crews' 4 November 1901, digest cut 11 a, Adm 12/1365 
[40] 'Submarine Al - report by Inspecting Captain of Submarines on passage from 
Barrow to Portsmouth' 3 August 1903, Adm 1/7644 
[41) Hall minute 20 April 1910 to Report No. 1 of Submarine Committee, quoted in the 
Technical History vol. 40 p. 12, Naval Library MOD 
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permitted. " [42] 
There was real concern for the health of men in such a working 
environment. Both officers and men were given careful physical 
examinations upon volunteering, and periodic reports were made thereafter 
by a naval surgeon. The ratings, confined below, were thought to be 
especially at risk, not least from petrol engine fumes - hence the presence 
of a cageful of white mice, suspended over the engines where they would 
give early warning of escaping gas "by turning up their little feet" [43]. 
Officers were reckoned more susceptible to purely mental stress, although 
the odd case of periscope-induced eyestrain was diagnosed; with officer 
efficiency at such a premium, the afflicted individuals were swiftly invalided 
out of the service [44]. 
By 1904 Bacon was agitating for more submarine officers, noting, "I 
have had the conviction forced on me that we cannot rely too much on 
the officers trained forming an efficient reserve - since I am convinced 
that the mental and nervous strain, on the Captain of a Boat, tells on him 
in time, and that with increased service in Boats the essentials of a good 
captain more often decline than increase. " [45] But with both space and 
air in short supply, it was important to keep crew numbers down, and even 
men exercising on a daily basis and returning to port each night were 
exhausted by the continual round of work - which included recharging 
batteries and air reservoirs in the evening. Such conditions soon led to "a 
general lowering of their state of health, making them less alert and rather 
more what is commonly called 'jumpy'; not exactly nervous but with a 
tendency in that direction. " [46] For a time Bacon was forced to restrict 
training at sea to alternate days. 
In 1905 the Admiralty reckoned the seagoing endurance of contemporary 
submariners at three days in good weather, less if conditions were bad. In 
(42] Keyes NM 1,40-1 
[43] Compton-Hall op. cit. p. 124; RWG Stewart 'Medical report on the health of officers 
and men employed in submarine boats' January 1904, Adm 1/7719; Hall report 12 May 
1910 in 'Submarine service - recruiting for service in submarines' Adm 116/1122; 
'Physical requirements' 31 March 1910, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1476 
[44] 'Officers suffering from eyestrain' 17 September 1918, digest cut ha, Adm 12/1603A; 
CL Kerr, All in the day's work (London 1939) pp. 128-9 
[451 Bacon, 'Report on training' 8 May 1904, Adm 1/7644 
[46] Bacon report 'Crews for submarine boats' 29 May 1903, Adm 1/7666 
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the boats of 1910 it was calculated as between four days and a week, and 
SS Hall cautioned that "these times must not be exceeded. " [47) The 
experiments of the Submarine Committee confirmed that in practice crew 
endurance was the greatest limiting factor in mock operations [48], and the 
Controller's Department acknowledged that "habitability has been seriously 
considered and... too much stress cannot be laid on its importance from 
the point of view of the health and endurance of the personnel. It is 
considered that the lack of habitability in our submarines places a limit on 
their range of action. " [49] 
Pre-war estimates of crew endurance had a marked effect on the 
development of British naval policy. If submariners could tolerate no more 
than three or four days at sea, it was difficult to conceive of an effective 
overseas submarine - particularly one that could operate in the Atlantic 
Ocean. The implications were equally serious for any attempt to blockade 
the enemy's coast with submarines, since the number of boats needed for 
an effective operation leapt dramatically when low endurance was taken into 
account. If a submarine took a day to reach her appointed station on the 
German coast, for example, and a day to return, spending one day on 
patrol, at least five boats would be needed to cover that patrol area: one 
on her way to the Bight, one patrolling, one returning to port, the fourth 
replenishing and the fifth refitting with her men on leave. But if a 
submarine could patrol for a week or more, only three craft would be 
needed to cover the same area. When Henry Jackson, the Chief of Staff, 
suggested in 1913 that three flotillas of 12 overseas submarines might be 
enough to blockade the German coast, one flotilla being on station at any 
given time, Keyes argued four flotillas would still be preferable [50]. 
Development of coastal submarines, on the other hand, seemed a much 
more practicable idea. Coastals were intended to return to a local port each 
evening, handing over their responsibilities to surface torpedo craft by night. 
Given help in recharging batteries and air bottles, crews assured of billets 
on a comparatively comfortable depot ship could patrol day after day, their 
[47] 'Meeting of the submarine design committee on 23 June 1905' (precis by Jackson 
dated 24 June 1905), Adm 138/246A section 1; SS Hall, 'Memorandum on submarines' 8 
April 1910, Adm 1/8119 
[48] Submarine committee report no. 4,12 August 1910, Adm 1/8128 
[49] 'Report as to the immediate future construction of submarines' 9 March 1912, Adm 
138/362 section 1 
[50] 'Record of conference held in First Lord's room on 9th December [19131', KP 4110 
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endurance limited only by the mechanical shortcomings of their boats. The 
idea of providing a submarine cordon for Britain's coasts thus seemed not 
altogether unrealistic [see section 6.2]. 
British estimates of low crew endurance also emerge as one of the key 
factors in the RN's persistent tendency to under-estimate the potential of 
enemy submarines in the pre-war period. A number of factors combined 
to mislead the Navy. Recollection of the appalling conditions suffered by 
torpedo boat crews remained strong [see section 1.4]. In 1884, for example, 
the Vernon noted that "the question of cooking is of no importance if the 
boats are forced against the sea, because there is so much shaking, caused 
by vibration, that even a crew of the most inured sailors are not in a fit 
state to appreciate a colossal meal" [51]. Equally telling was the Navy's 
unwillingness -to subject its submariners to particularly trying conditions 
before 1914; the supply of volunteers was always problematical, and the 
pre-war submarine service had to make some concessions to the comfort 
of officers and men who, in time of war, were prepared to make sacrifices 
and endure conditions that might have led to mutiny in peacetime. And, 
finally, the RN failed to adapt judgements based on the performance of 
early submarines as later, more capable types came into service. There was 
a world of difference between the endurance estimates of 1905 and those of 
1910, and - though this was not widely recognised -a similar revolution 
in submarine habitability was effected between 1910 and 1914. 
The Admiralty's pre-war solution to the problem of crew endurance 
was to provide 'spare crews' who could do maintenance work and recharge 
batteries, besides relieving their fellow submariners at regular intervals - 
perhaps even at sea. There were several advantages to this system: the 
reserves were available to train up new recruits to the rapidly expanding 
service, and they added to the nucleus of experienced submariners, which 
proved invaluable when submarine construction began to speed up. Spare 
crews also increased the proportion of active submariners in the submarine 
service -a factor of concern to the Mobilisation Branch, which 
nevertheless complained in 1912 that of 2,800 men borne no more than 
901 were in boats at any one time [52]. 
1511 Cowpe op. cit. p. 119, citing HMS Vernon annual report 1884, Adm 189/4 
[52) Duff memo 21 December 1912, Adm 116/1122. The balance of 1,900 men was made 
up of the spare crews and support staff based on the depot ships. 
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Bacon's instinct was to press for double crews, but this measure would 
have exacerbated the problems of recruitment, and was in any case deemed 
a needless luxury. A compromise of one spare crew for every three boats 
was reached in 1903, and this system operated until 1914. Late in 1915 the 
pressure of war and the increased seaworthiness of overseas submarines led 
to a reduction in the number of spare crews borne [53]. 
As the spare crew system grew in complexity, concentration on what 
should have been at best a stop-gap solution to the problem of crew 
endurance undoubtedly impeded British reconsideration of the issue. The 
Admiralty continued to believe that, despite their superficially impressive 
radii of action, German boats would not be able to operate efficiently off 
the Scottish coast - some 500 miles from their bases and much further 
from home than British submarines sailing from Harwich to the Bight - let 
alone along the Atlantic shipping lanes. The Intelligence Department thought 
that "none of the first twelve German submarines are fit for the open 
sea", and reported that the endurance trials of the submarines U17 and 
U18 - which consisted of the voyage from Kiel to Sylt and back, a 
distance of about 600 miles each way - ended with "practically every 
member of the crews in a state of exhaustion. They speak warmly of the 
nautical qualities of the type, but complain of the habitability. " Only "under 
stress of emergency" would these later boats remain at sea "for many days 
on end", though they were otherwise "well able to operate in the open 
seas even in winter" [54]. 
The RN does not seem to have appreciated the implications of the 1912 
German naval manoeuvres, which saw U-boats keep the seas for up to 
eleven days, and which led the Kaiser's naval authorities to conclude that 
war patrols off the British coast of up to five days' duration were possible 
[55]. Nor did it have time, before the outbreak of war, to react to the. 
news that U-boats of the U31-41 class possessed a theoretical range of 
almost 8,800 miles at 8 knots. When German submarines appeared off the 
Scottish coast shortly after the outbreak of war, Jellicoe was convinced they 
[53] Bacon report 'Crews for submarine boats' 29 May 1903, Adm 1/7666, and minutes to 
this report; Hall memo for Admiral May 25 February 1910, Adm 1/8119; 'Spare crews' 6 
November 1915, digest cut lla, Adm 1211539A 
[54] 'New German submarines' 19 January 1914, War Staff report in Adm 138/2460 
section 45d; Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organisation, conflict, innovation: a study of German 
naval strategic planning, 1888-1940 (Lund 1973) pp. 61 -2 
[55] William Jameson, The most formidable thing: the story of the submarine from its 
earliest days to the end of World War I (London 1965) p. 111 
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were operating from tenders in the North Sea disguised as neutral merchant 
vessels [56]. 
It is hard to over-state the importance of Britain's misconception. 
Failure to anticipate the true endurance of German submarines left UK 
ports without submarine defences in 1914 [see sections 7.2 and 8.1], and 
thus had a considerable effect on British naval strategy in the first months 
of the war -a period in which the battlefleet was often kept at sea far 
from the likely war zone for fear of submarine attack. Without defended 
ports, the Grand Fleet was also unable to support the transfer of the 
Expeditionary Force to France, which duty was left to the old battleships of 
the Channel squadrons. Lack of protected bases could thus have rendered 
the RN at a decided disadvantage had the High Sea Fleet adopted a more 
aggressive stance in 1914. 
Submarine safety and morale 
When HM Submarine Al sank on 18 March 1904, she did so with all 
hands - two officers and nine men - and ended the remarkable 
forty-year safety record of the submarine boat. Her crew were the first 
submariners to lose their lives since Flach's boat went down in Valparaiso 
harbour, but seven more British submarines were to be lost before August 
1914 - CII, A3, B2 and C14 in collisions, A4 by flooding, A8 after a 
battery explosion and A7 in an accident caused by a design fault. There 
were in addition several near-disasters - more explosions, narrow escapes 
from swamping and the consequences of diving too deep, non-fatal 
collisions. The trick, for the officers of the Trade, was to persuade the. 
Navy, the public and themselves that the submarine was not inherently 
dangerous. Submariners argued that British boats were simply suffering 
teething trouble. This was broadly true, but it meant the problem of safety 
never received adequate consideration [57]. Tell-tale signs that all was not 
well with the A class design, in particular, were ignored because successive 
[56) Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat: the evolution and technical history of German 
submarines (London 1975) p. 328; Jellicoe to Admiralty 14 November 1914, Adm 137/965 
fol. 167 
[57) Cf. Bacon, 'Notes on the causes of accidents to submarine boats and their salvage', 
TrINA Vol. XLVII (1905) p. 404 
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Inspecting Captains felt they had to prove the submarine to be a viable 
weapon. "The attitude of the official mind was one of lukewarmness, and 
general scepticism as to the reliability of submarine boats, " wrote Bacon. 
"Any accident would have given an opportunity for the ignorant to revile 
and say, 'I told you so. '" [58] He and his successors could not afford to 
admit that mistakes were being made. 
Because the submarine operates in a hostile medium, any accident is 
potentially a serious one. For a surface warship to go down with all hands 
is rare; in submarine warfare it is commonplace - and particularly so in 
the early years of the century, when safety came a poor second to 
operational efficiency. A good example of this rule was the British decision 
not to fit watertight bulkheads in their submarines on the grounds that they 
would impede the passage of orders [59]. The first RN boats to have 
bulkheads were those of the E class [60]. 
Early attempts to improve safety standards were complicated by the fact 
that pre-war mishaps and disasters fitted no particular pattern. Put simply, 
fatal submarine accidents could result in the crushing, gassing or drowning 
of the crew. Many were caused by the vulnerability of the submarine 
underwater, particularly to collision in exercises; SS Hall called the 
submerged boat "an invisible vessel worked by a one-eyed man in rather 
bad light with an horizon of about one and a half feet and a field of only 
40° at any one time. " [61] A great deal of effort was therefore put into 
making manoeuvres safe, with consequences that are examined in section 
5.2. 
The men of the Trade nevertheless understood that in the event of an 
accident their chances of escaping were slim. Hall once went so far as to 
suggest that the provision of any safety devices was inadvisable they 
lowered morale by reminding of danger, the ICS asserted [62] - and 
[58] Bacon, From 1900 onward (London 1940) p. 66 
[59) Hall statement reported in TrINA XLIX (1907) pp. 59-60; see also Hall report 12 
May 1910, Adm 116/1122; Bacon in RUSI Jo. XLVIII (1904) p. 1304. The presence of 
watertight doors might have saved several lives in pre-war accidents, but in the absence 
of other safety features they would generally have been of little real use. 
[60] Watts report 'Submarine boat design of the FIAT San Giorgio', August 1911, Adm 
138/404B section 1; ET d'Eyncourt, A shipbuilder's yarn: the record of a naval 
constructor (London nd [1949)) pp87-88 
(61] Hall report 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122 
[62) Hall submission, nd (c. 18 May 1908), Adm 116/1057. Similar arguments were 
deployed when it was proposed to issue RFC pilots with parachutes during the Great War. 
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certainly Germany's earliest volunteer submariners can hardly have been 
encouraged to learn, shortly before their first dive, that a grateful 
Admiralty had just insured their lives for £2,500 apiece [63]. Over the 
years, British submariners learned to take refuge in grim humour when on 
duty and in drink during their leisure hours; it is hardly surprising the 
Submarine Service contained an unusually low proportion of teetotallers [64]. 
If the worst did happen, the submariner had two broad options - 
escape, or wait for salvage. At first the general expectation seems to have 
been that a stricken submarine could quickly be raised and her crew saved, 
but in fact salvage was rarely a viable idea. All too often bad weather 
prevented lifting for weeks when the life expectancy of a trapped crew was 
measurable in hours and days [65]. The Admiralty also declined to fit 
British craft with drop keels, which had been used from the earliest times 
to give boats extra buoyancy in an emergency, because it was expected that 
any accident severe enough to sink a submarine would be too sudden and 
devastating for a drop keel to be of any use. This opinion was only 
grudgingly revised after the detachable keel of the French Bonire saved her 
crew after a collision in February 1906 [66]. 
Later efforts concentrated on individual life-saving apparatus. Devices 
such as enclosed lifeboats for the crew (as had been fitted to Le Plongeur 
[63]'Germany - fleet, dockyards &c. ', September 1906 in 'Reports on foreign naval affairs 
1906' NID No. 804 pp. 32-3, Adm 231146 
[64] The following figures have been extracted from 'Encouragement of temperance in the 
navy' 4 December 1908, Adm 1/7996 [Submarines = depot ships Mercury, Thames, 
Hazard, Forth, Bonaventure and attached boats. Sample 1,438 men. Royal Navy = Home 
ports; Home, Channel, Mediterranean and East Indies squadrons. Sample 68,405 men]: 
(a) Proportion of Temperance men: 
Submarines 7.3% Royal Navy 13.4% 
(b) Proportion of grog men willing to sign pledge in return for extra pay of Id. per day: 
Submarines 7.2% Royal Navy 17.8% 
It is also interesting to note that Russian submariners made up the hard core of 
Bolsheviks in the Baltic Fleet. 210 of the branch's 775 men (28.5%) were Party members 
in 1917. See Jacob Kipp, 'Undersea warfare in Russian and Soviet Naval Art: historical 
background 1853-1941', paper presented to Undersea Warfare Conference, Dalhousie 
University, Halifax, 21-24 June 1989. 
[65] In 1917 lives were saved on K13 by partial salvage. However this submarine was on 
trial near a major naval base, so the circumstances were unusual. See Don Everitt, The K 
boats: a dramatic first report on the Navy's most calamitous submarines (London 1963) 
pp55-91 
[66] Lets in TrINA XLIX (1907) p. 56; Bacon in RUST Jo. XLVIII (1904) pp. 1303-04; 
DNC 'Memo re: detachable keel in Nautilus and V1-4' 5 December 1913, Adm 138/404A 
section 15 
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in the 1860s) were dismissed as clumsy and liable to break free and so 
betray the submarine's position in war - as, incidentally, were the 
telephone buoys intended to allow communication with a stricken vessel that 
were fitted to the boats of several other nations. Because the chief 
avoidable danger came from gas, some attention was given to the 
Hall-Rees helmet -a precursor of devices such as the Davis Submerged 
Escape Apparatus and the USN's Momsen Lung - but its bulk made it 
unpopular with crews. So did its reliance on the decomposition of sodium 
peroxide to produce oxygen; the chemical burst into flames when it came 
into contact with water [67]. Refinements such as escape chambers had no 
place in the small pre-war submarines, and in general it must be admitted 
that provision for escape was poor before 1914. There is little doubt that 
some lives were needlessly lost. On the other hand the Navy did learn 
from its mistakes, and disasters helped to accelerate the development of 
the diesel engine (far more reliable than its petrol-fuelled predecessor), 
watertight doors, and double-hulled high buoyancy submarines. 
It seems unlikely that the doubtful safety record of the British 
submarine had much effect on the phlegmatic submariners' morale, and 
belief that the type was dangerous, being implicit, helped to blunt criticism 
when accidents did occur. There was a feeling that such incidents were 
inevitable in a navy which devoted itself to realistic preparation for war; 
accidents were the price that had to be paid for increased operational 
efficiency. As Admiral Fisher put it to one journalist after the Al went 
down, "the right thing to say a propos of the submarine loss is that you 
can't have an omlette without breaking any eggs. " [68] 
Captain R. H. S. Bacon (ICS 1900-1904) 
Few billets in the Navy offered the freedom of action enjoyed by the 
Inspecting Captain of Submarines (ICS). Each ICS co-operated closely with 
Vickers, supervising every aspect of the design, development and 
t. onstruction of submarines, and was given a largely free hand in developing 
[67) The Admiralty case 'Submarine life-saving 1907-1913', Adm 116/1057, is chiefly 
concerned with the Hall-Rees helmet; see also WO Shelford, Subsunk - the story of 
submarine escape (London 1960) pp. 30-1 
[68J Fisher to Newbolt 2 May 1904, FP 5416 (in bundle headed 'Navy reform'); see also 
Kerr minute 21 March 1904, Adm 1/7718 
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tactics and devising training programmes for the Trade. Admiralty 
supervision was unusually loose, and the personal interests and prejudices of 
each ICS became important influences on the development of British 
submarine policy. It is therefore necessary to say something of the character 
and abilities of the first four Inspecting Captains of Submarines. 
The first ICS was Captain Reginald Bacon (1863-1947). He entered the 
Navy in 1877, qualified as a torpedo lieutenant and commanded a flotilla of 
torpedo boats in the manoeuvres of 1896. In 1897 he served as a member 
of the punitive expedition to Benin City and was awarded the DSO, 
describing the experience in the first of his several books, Benin: city of 
blood. In 1899, while serving as a commander in the Mediterranean fleet, 
Bacon met Admiral Fisher and was swiftly drawn into the circle of young 
officers employed by Fisher as an informal staff. Promoted to Captain in 
1900, he left the Mediterranean Station and was appointed to command the 
new submarine branch [69]. 
By 1900 Captain Bacon had been singled out as a most promising 
officer. He was the acknowledged possessor of a fine technical brain, and 
Admiral Fisher's enthusiasm for his abilities can hardly have hindered his 
career. That the Admiralty shared Fisher's opinion of Bacon is evident not 
just in its decision to appoint so junior a captain to a comparatively senior 
position but in the laudatory minutes that attached themselves to his earliest 
reports [70]. 
Bacon was well-qualified for his new posting, having served in the 
torpedo service throughout the 1890s. He had spent several years on the 
staff of HMS Vernon, and his character was dominated by a flair for things 
mechanical. He developed one of the first practical modern periscopes and 
produced efficient submarine compasses. Later in his career Bacon made a 
significant contribution to the development of the Dreadnought design, was 
appointed Director of Naval Ordnance and then Managing Director of the 
Coventry Ordnance Works, where he developed siege guns for the BEF 
before taking command of the Dover Patrol (1915-18) and conceiving 
several bizarrely-ingenious methods of bombarding the enemy's coast. After 
his retirement he settled down to write books with titles like A simple 
[69] Bacon's autobiography appeared in two volumes: A naval scrapbook 1877-1900 
(London 1932) and From 1900 onward (London 1940). He left no private papers. 
[70] Minutes to Bacon report 'Complements for submarines' 27 July 1901, Adm 1/7533. 
See also minutes to Lees, 'Submarine flotilla - 2nd annual report on' 1 March 1905, 
Adm 1/7795 
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guide to wireless for all whose knowledge of electricity is childlike [71]. 
Few of Bacon's contemporaries denied his brilliance, but many felt that 
he was also blinkered, arrogant, slow to acknowledge his mistakes and a 
poor leader of men. There is no doubt that the ICS's mastery of the 
technology with which he dealt reinforced the independence of the 
submarine branch; he was a remote and stubborn centraliser who rarely 
admitted he needed help from anybody. "I must insist, " he wrote in 
rejecting one practical suggestion, "that my experience as to the 
performance of boats is greater than that of many critics who have never 
seen an attack being made. " [72] 
Bacon was right far more often than he was wrong - but when he did 
make a mistake it could be serious. This weakness became more 
pronounced later in his career (as Admiral commanding the Dover Patrol, 
for instance, he persisted in the belief that German submarines were not 
passing through his channel mine barrage in the face of clear evidence that 
they were), and it does not seem to have manifested itself strongly while 
he commanded the submarine branch - but the trait did underpin the 
unfortunate knack which Bacon developed of polarising the opinions others 
held of him. He was not, like Keyes, a friend to all men. To Maurice 
Hankey, during the war, he was "the one officer with offensive spirit"; to 
Tyrwhitt of the Harwich Force a worse enemy than the Germans, unwilling 
to take risks and "our bugbear... the Streaky One has obsessed everyone at 
the Admiralty and does exactly what he pleases with them... You will 
understand me when I say he is not a white man. " [731 
This said, it must always be remembered that the odium which still 
attaches itself to Bacon's name was earned long after he left the submarine 
service. In 1906 he returned to the Mediterranean under Fisher's bete noir, 
(71] For a naval officer, Bacon was something of a polymath. He also wrote poetry (for 
which he could find no publisher) and fiction peopled with chaste heroines and 
square-jawed naval officers. Only Bacon could have suggested naming the first British 
submarines Discosaurus, Piscosaurus, Nothosaurus, Pleisiosaurus, Somosaurus and - for 
HM Submarine Al - Ichthyosaurus (because this boat was "fitted with an optical tube 
corresponding to the marvellous eye of the reptile, which was two feet in diameter. ") See 
Bacon memo 'Naming submarine boats' 3 July 1902. "The names... suggested by Captain 
Bacon are rather formidable, " shuddered the Senior Naval Lord as he vetoed the 
suggestion. (Minute of 5 July 1902; both extracts are from Adm 138/180B section 21) 
172] Bacon report 16 January 1904, Adm 117719 
[73] Hankey to Richmond 18 February 1916, in Marder, Portrait of an Admiral: the life 
and papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London 1952) p. 201; Tyrwhitt to Keyes 29 
December 1916, KP 15/23, in Halpern I, 376 
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Lord Charles Beresford. While in the Mediterranean, Bacon sent Fisher a 
number of letters that implied criticism of the senior officers on the 
station, and unbeknown to him the First Sea Lord had them printed for 
private circulation as part of his campaign against naval 'fossils'. Inevitably 
the letters got out, in 1909, elevating the author (whose criticisms were 
judged to have broken the Navy's cardinal rule of discretion) to 
unprecedented heights of unpopularity [74]. Bacon's subsequent decision to 
leave the Navy and take up a lucrative post in the arms industry did 
nothing to restore his honour, and nor did Fisher's 1915 decision to give 
his protege command of the Dover Patrol over the heads of many officers 
who had served through the intervening period. During the war, Bacon was 
faulted for his lack of aggression and refusal to risk his (scarce) resources. 
Historians too have contributed to the barrage of criticism, recently 
questioning (perhaps unfairly) his decision, while DNO, to turn down AH 
Pollen's controversial 'Argo clock' rangefinder when it was offered to the 
RN [75]. None of these controversies should be allowed to affect the 
assessment of Bacon's early achievements as ICS, which were very 
considerable. 
To Bacon goes the credit of establishing the semi-autonomous 
submarine branch and of developing boats that (despite flaws in the 
A-class design) consistently performed well in peace and war. Equally 
importantly, his determined caution ensured that the submarine branch was 
developed along sensible lines. The first ICS was acutely aware of the early 
shortcomings of underwater craft - quite properly, one feels, given the 
unknown qualities of the new weapon. "I should particularly emphasise that 
I do not commend rashness, in fact my life is spent in preaching caution, " 
he wrote in 1904, adding in another paper: "The only fear regarding the 
safety of the Boats is that familiarity may breed over-confidence. " [76] 
Bacon's philosophy was that "success belongs to the man who pays attention 
to infinite details. " [77] 
[74] Bacon letters dated c. 12 April 1906 and 15 April 1906 are reprinted in Marder, FG 
11, pp. 72-4,75-77. See also Fisher to McKenna 5 April 1909, FP 376. 
(751 Jon Sumida, In defence of naval supremacy: finance, technology and British naval 
policy 1889-1914 (Boston 1989) pp. 121.132-3 
[76] Bacon report on training 8 May 1904, Adm 1/7644; Bacon report 31 May 1903, 
enclosure 1, Adm 1/7725 
[77] Bacon report 16 January 1904, Adm 1/7719 
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There is little doubt that the Inspecting Captain's determination to 
concentrate on technical matters and on detail did partly close his eyes to 
the broader picture, inhibiting the development of ambitious strategy and 
emphasising the shortcomings of the submarine. Bacon's methodical, 
risk-free approach paid dividends in peacetime, but it would have been 
limiting in war. Britain was perhaps fortunate that Roger Keyes headed the 
submarine service in August 1914; certainly he lacked Bacon's gloomy 
imagination [78]. 
There is no doubt that " Bacon was the most significant figure in the 
pre-war Submarine Service. He founded it, largely determined its policies, 
and designed much of the materiel with which the British submariner 
worked. Equally importantly, he chose his own successor, Captain Edgar 
Lees, and Lees in turn selected Commander Sydney Hall as his relief [79], 
ensuring a strong measure of continuity [see section 3.2]. Both Hall and 
Lees served in the submarine branch while Bacon was ICS, and both 
somewhat resembled him in character. Certainly it was caution - the 
hallmark of Bacon, Lees and Hall - that dictated the measured technical 
development of the submarine, and caution which (communicated to the 
Admiralty via the Inspecting Captains' reports) reinforced the idea that 
submarines were ideally suited to harbour and coastal defence. 
Nor did the first Inspecting Captain's involvement with the Submarine 
Service end in 1904. In 1905 he conducted the inquiry into the loss of A8 
and advised on the recruitment of officers to the submarine branch. Hall 
and Fisher were still seeking his opinion as late as 1913 [80]. 
Captain SS Hall (ICS 1906-1910; Commodore (S) 1915-1919) 
Like Bacon, Sydney Hall (1872-1955), the third Inspecting Captain of 
Submarines, was primarily a technician. An inventor and a torpedo man, he 
[781 This difference in approach was perfectly illustrated by the Zeebrugge Raid of April 
1918. Bacon. who commanded the Dover Patrol until January 1918, had been planning 
such an action for some time, but he was fully aware it would most likely be a costly 
failure. Keyes pressed ahead with a plan which Bacon did not support. The attempt to 
block the canal entrance predictably failed-and cost several hundred lives. The huge boost 
this dashing assault gave to British morale at a critical time in the war, however, made 
the attack worthwhile. 
[79) Bacon asked for Lees as his assistant in December 1902: 'Appointment of a 
commander for service in submarine boats' 20 December 1902, Adm 1/7605; 'Appointment 
of Commander SS Hall' 6 January 1904, digest cut ha, Adm 1211402 
[80] Cf. 'HM Submarine A8' 4 December 1905, Adm 117996 
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understood the intricacies of the submarine far better than his successor, 
Keyes, who recalled that "the technical knowledge of Brandt and Hall was 
immense, there was no small detail with which they did not concern 
themselves. " [81] Hall was, in addition, at least as innovative as the first 
ICS. He designed the first submarine escape helmet, and was also 
responsible for the D class submarine gun mounting - the plans for which 
he drew up one Sunday after being told that Vickers had given up the job 
as too difficult [82]. 
But SS Hall was more than just a technical specialist. Although 
undistinguished as a strategist, he had the imagination to recognise before 
the war that submarines would be used to torpedo merchant vessels, and by 
1920 he was prophesying the rise of air power and proclaiming that the 
battleship was obsolescent [83]. This sort of independent spirit, or refusal to 
conform, made Hall an ideal man to head the semi-autonomous submarine 
branch. After the ICS returned from a far from prestigious spell in 
command of an old second class cruiser in the Mediterranean, Keyes 
charged that "service in the fleet bores you, and you have never been at 
any pains to hide this. The Diana had a reputation for avoiding rather 
than conforming to the customs of the service. I know that you think this 
very petty, but others don't... " [84] 
Sydney Hall was offered the Inspecting Captaincy in 1906 at the 
instigation of his predecessor, Edgar Lees. The second ICS is an 
insubstantial figure, and the period 1904-1906 remains largely unilluminated 
by official correspondence or personal papers. Usually characterised as quiet 
and scholarly, Lees seems to have been too preoccupied with technical 
matters to give attention to the organisation of personnel. CG Brodie's 
description of the young service as "a youthful rabble without tradition or 
leader" belongs to this period; he comments that as a young submariner 
he never laid eyes on Reginald Bacon, and only once glimpsed Captain 
Lees in the distance [85]. Hall complained of the "hugger mugger state of 
[81] Keyes, NM I, 25 
[82] Hall to Keyes 15 December 1912, KP 4/22 
[83] Cf. Hall's articles in The Times, 10 December 1920 pp. 11-12 and 14 December 
1920 pp. 13-14 
[84] Keyes to Hall nd (December 1913), KP 4/22 
[85] CG Brodie, 'Some early submariners' part I, Naval Review 1962 pp. 427-9 
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the service when I took over" [86], but his opinion of Lees was influenced 
by disapproval of the latter's design for the C boats and for HM 
Submarine D1. "When I took over from Edgar Lees the C class and DI 
were settled, the only thing I could do with them was to insist on a 
general smoothening up of the hull and superstructure, " he wrote. "I really 
feel in no way responsible for them, they do... so greatly exceed the 
capacity of their crew. " [87] This was too harsh a judgement (Hall 
disliked everyone's designs except his own), and Lees deserves particular 
credit for developing the D class. That he was 'head-hunted' by Vickers 
in 1906 to run the Whitehead torpedo works at Weymouth is a 
confirmation of his technical ability, while a stint in the royal yachts during 
the 1880s indicates early recognition of a social facility and of a promising 
career [88). 
The basis of SS Hall's policy was his attention to the selection of 
personnel. As ICS he always stressed that the crew of a submarine were far 
more important than the materiel. "There is no vessel, " he wrote, "in 
which the efficiency of the personnel, particularly the officers, bears such a 
very large proportion to the total efficiency. I have always said that a2 or 
3 knots gain in speed, or any other considerable advance in materiel, is 
not commensurate with the state of the captain's digestion. " [89] Emphasis 
on personnel led Hall to promote the policy of continuity in submarine 
development and emphasise the value of large classes of identical boats. "I 
always advised the Admiralty, " he wrote in 1911, "that simplicity and a 
homogeneous lot was in my opinion worth more than any possible gain in 
materiel. " [90] In planning for war Hall assumed that a large-scale 
shuffling of captains and crews would be necessary;. it followed that 
efficiency could best be maintained by ensuring that wherever they went, 
submarine personnel found themselves serving in familiar craft. Similarly, 
flotilla-work would be enhanced if all boats performed identically. Hall 
[86] Hall to Keyes 7 December 1913. KP 4/22 
[87) Hall to Keyes 3 January 1912, ibid 
[88] On Lees and Vickers, see section 3.2. On Lees' early career, see 'Appointments to 
the Royal Yachts' 12 May 1888, Adm 116924A. Lees was posted to yachts at the same 
time as Rosslyn Wemyss, a future First Sea lord. 
[89] Hall to Fisher 17 February 1914, FP 783. This important letter contains a detailed 
account of Hall's submarine policy. 
[90) Hall to Keyes 7 October 1911, KP 4/22 
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opposed Keyes's 'fleet of samples' and supported the Vickers monopoly for 
the same reason [91]. 
The ICS's belief in the importance of personnel had other consequences: 
the emphasis on training which he promoted meant that in 1914 British 
submariners were probably more uniformly competent than those of other 
nations, and it was this aspect of Hall's work that Keyes thought the chief 
glory of the British submarine service [92]. The same policy left Hall 
impatient of those junior submarine officers who were more interested in 
experimenting with materiel and who generally supported Keyes: "A 
constant stream of ideas and inventions and improvements in design 
continually pours in from the submarine service itself which, unless steadily 
resisted, involves constant alterations, tests and trials which are a waste of 
money and time and in my opinion detract from war efficiency, " Hall 
reminded Fisher. "You may remember that there were various types of 
submarines pushed at me, not only submarines but engines batteries and all 
parts of submarines which I resisted with all my power because they really 
do not matter. To repeat, given a strong vessel and interchangeability as 
far as possible, the all-important element is personnel. " (93] 
Slightly reactionary as these views at first appear, they in fact represent 
a practical approach to submarine policy. Constant innovation and the 
temptation to delay while new devices are perfected have long bedevilled 
weapons procurement in every field, and over-elaborate weapons systems 
which simply refuse to work in the field are discarded in the course of 
most campaigns. It is to Hall's credit that this last criticism could hardly be 
made of his boats in 1914. 
Hall's belief in the superiority of British submarine design was however 
potentially dangerous. Though he turned out to be largely correct in his 
views, both he and his predecessors were too closely involved with technical 
development to be objective. It was Keyes the non-specialist's curiosity 
which led him to experiment abroad, and it was this policy which proved 
[91] Hall to Fisher 17 February 1914, FP 783. See also Hall to Fisher 3 August 1909, FP 
413. 
Hall still held the same opinion in 1920 - see his evidence for the Post-war 
Questions Committee, Adm 116/2060 fols. 726-38, esp. fol. 730. For Keyes's view, see 
Keyes to Hall 19 October 1911, KP 4/22. 
[92) Keyes to Hall 19 October 1912, KP 4/22; Keyes NM I, 25 
[93) Hall to Fisher 17 February 1914, FP 783 
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Hall to be right. Nor should it be forgotten that the RN had much to 
learn in some areas, such as that of periscope design. 
RIB Keyes (ICS 1910-11; Commodore (S) 1911-1915) 
Roger Keyes was not a specialist. He knew little about submarines, although 
his brother Adrian had served in them in the early days of the service, 
and he knew his own technical abilities were minimal. But he was a 
seaman, an enthusiastic extrovert untainted by the disputes which threatened 
the unity of the pre-war Navy, and therefore just the man the First Sea 
Lord, AX Wilson, wanted to 'sell' submarines to a still-suspicious Fleet 
[94]. 
Keyes was a child when he joined the Navy in 1885, and in many ways 
he remained a child at heart. His early service smacked of the nineteenth 
century, not of the twentieth; he was posted to foreign stations and served 
in colonial wars. His view of the Royal Navy, its traditions and its purpose, 
were shaped by the stirring pages of James' naval history which he had 
devoured in his youth [95]. "Roger does not read very much, " wrote his 
friend, the businessman and amateur conservative politician FS Oliver, "but 
one thing he does read, which seems to have gone right to his spirit - 
the doings of Elizabethan sailors. " [96] 
The most obvious point to make about Keyes is that he possessed 
'offensive spirit' in abundance, and thus embraced a great British naval 
ideal. Bacon and Hall thought problems through, weighed risks and 
sometimes counselled inaction where Keyes, spurred on by his own 
conception of naval tradition, would have. rushed in headlong. 
Keyes's self-confidence, and also his undoubted bravery, stemmed from 
a belief in 'joss', or luck, acquired on active service in China during the 
Boxer Rebellion. "I am an absolute fatalist and have the greatest faith in 
my good luck - so am content to sit quiet and good until whatever is 
[94] Keyes NM 1,23-4 
[95] Cf. Keyes to his wife 11 December 1914, KP 2/5 
[961 FS Oliver to his brother 16 May 1918, in Stephen Gwynn (ed), The anvil of war: 
letters between FS Oliver and his brother 1914-1918 (London 1936) p. 320 
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'written' comes along, " he told Walter Cowan [97]. The submariner CG 
Brodie got to know Keyes well during the Great War and sums up his 
character perfectly: "Courting danger, and exhilarated by it, Keyes's ardour 
seemed natural to him, but it must have been partly self-taught. In the 
small cabin where I best knew him, Kipling's If was above his wash basin. 
He told me he read it every morning, and that simple avowal made me 
ashamed of my own self-conscious reservations about that bracing poem. 
Victorian virtues are useful in wartime; Keyes was fearless and made others 
forget their fears. " [98] 
Keyes's fearlessness found an outlet in the Great War. Writing to 
Doveton Sturdee upon the outbreak of hostilities, he declared: "I have 
dreamt of, and lived for, real war ever since that mild bickering I was 
fortunate enough to see in China... These last three years I have been 
trying to train the submarines for war, and war only... " [99] In the belief 
that Britain had to seize the physical and psychological initiative, he was 
(with Commodore Tyrwhitt) directly responsible for initiating events which 
led to the Battle of the Heligoland Bight (28 August 1914), sending 
submarines and a light surface screen to reconnoitre German coastal waters 
[see section 8.1]. The battle that ensued bore all the hallmarks of a Keyes 
action. Although dashing and aggressive, the operation was poorly planned 
and co-ordinated. Without the timely appearance of Beatty's 
battle-cruisers (of whose presence they were unaware), the two 
Commodores could easily have been responsible for a disaster [100]. But 
then Keyes firmly believed that sailors could do the impossible if well 
enough led [101] -a belief he maintained through the Gallipoli campaign 
to Zeebrugge. 
When war was declared the Commodore had to be formally cautioned 
not to expose himself to risk [102), and soon he found the sailor's enforced 
197) Keyes to Cowan 11 June 1917, Cowan Mss. COW/6, National Maritime Museum, in 
Halpern 1,398-9 
198) CG Brodie, Forlorn hope 1915: the submarine passage of the Dardanelles (London 
1956) p. 44 
1991 Keyes to Sturdee (Chief of the War Staff) 21 August 1914, KP 4/34 
11001 On the Battle of Heligoland Bight, see Keyes diary c. 28 August 1914, KP 2/6; 
Marder, DSF 11,50-5 
[1011 Brodie op. cit. p. 44 
1102] Keyes to Jellicoe 4 August 1914, KP 4/30 
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inactivity such a burden that he wrote: "I think next time I come into this 
world I shall be a soldier - it was stupid of me not to have thought of it 
before making up one's mind to go into the Navy. History is quite clear 
on the subject. Soldiers fight almost every day of a war. Sailors about once 
a year at the most if they are lucky. " [103] Here was the root of Keyes's 
personality, and of his popularity. He struck a deep chord in the traditional 
hearts that most sailors still possessed, and it was one which Hall and 
Bacon could never play. Submarine history has been 'pro-Keyes' ever 
since. 
Unlike Hall, whose 1920 decision to retire was based on a refusal to 
return to sea in the belief his career would advance no further [104], 
Keyes loathed dealing with the Admiralty and pined for active service. In 
August 1914 he had been due. to join the battlecruiser fleet as captain of 
the brand-new HMS Tiger, but the outbreak of war kept him with the 
submarine branch. Trying to make up for his disappointment, he went to 
sea as often as he could, and though the Commodoreship was supposed to 
be a desk job, the Official History noted that "under Commodore Keyes it 
tended to become an active command. " [105] 
Roger Keyes had an open personality and made friends - particularly 
powerful friends - with ease; his extensive network of acquaintances, 
especially among naval 'salt horses', saved him from reprimands for 
disobedience and insubordination on occasion, and it was this ability to 
move in what might be termed the 'traditional', sea-going circles of the 
RN that Wilson wanted to tap. Early in his career Keyes had served in 
China with Jellicoe, Field, Warrender, Colville, Callaghan and his 
long-time lieutenant, Wilfred Tomkinson. Winning early promotion for 
exploits such as the cutting out of six Chinese destroyers above the Taku 
Forts, he commanded a TBD flotilla in the Channel and befriended the 
influential Admiral Noel, then' served several years as naval attache to Italy 
and Austria and two as captain of a second-class cruiser before being 
appointed to the Submarine Service. The new ICS also fell in with the 
Navy's fox-hunting set - men such as Beatty, Cowan and de Robeck with 
[103] Keyes to his wife 11 December 1914, KP 2/5 
[104] Waistell to Keyes 15 September 1915, KP 4/40; Keyes to Brock 13 January 1921, 
KP 8/1, in Halpern 11,49 
[105] Julian Corbett and Sir Henry Newbolt, Official history of the war: Naval 
operations (5 vols, London 1920-31) 1,16n 
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whom he was to work closely during the war [106). Through his family he 
was acquainted with many army officers; his father, for example, had once 
saved the life of the young Ian Hamilton, while Braithwaite, another 
Dardanelles general, was an old friend. 
But Keyes's most important ally was the pugnacious Churchill, who 
described the Commodore as "a brilliant officer, with more knowledge and 
feeling for war than almost any naval officer I have met" [107], and lent 
him the support he needed to resist Fisher's determination to return Hall to 
the submarine service. The First Sea Lord held a low opinion of the 
Commodore (S), and Keyes confessed himself "disgusted at the old villain's 
ruthless pursuit of me. " [108] (This, for him, was strong language. ) 
Fisher's antipathy had two roots. He had, firstly, once confused Keyes with 
John Keys, Lord Beresford's secretary, who had been trying to get 
pro-Beresford marterial published in The Times. (The Commodore had 
actually maintained strict neutrality in the dispute, but by this time Fisher 
was convinced that anyone who was not for him had to be against him. ) 
More importantly, Hall had convinced the Admiral that Keyes's submarine 
policy was dangerous and (particularly) that it was a negation of Fisher's 
own work in the field. We shall come to Fisher's contribution to submarine 
development in section 5.1; suffice it to say here that his opinions were 
contradictory and somewhat unfair to Keyes. Since Keyes did not join the 
submarine service until after Fisher retired in 1910, the Admiral's antipathy 
was of little note until 1914, but his enmity and the methods he chose to 
employ in removing Keyes were then largely responsible for the 
considerable acrimony which attended Hall's return at the end of the year 
[109]. 
Much of the anguish felt by Keyes's friends [110] was due to genuine 
[106] Keyes NM 1,45-7 
[107] Churchill to Fisher 24 December 1914, FP 870. See also Marder, FG III pp. 105, 
109 
(108) Keyes to his wife 3 February 1915, KP 2/8 
[109] On Fisher's relations with Keyes, see Keyes diary 28 October 1914, KP 2/6; Keyes 
to his wife 31 October, KP 2/3,8 November KP 2/4, and 22 December 1914 KP 2/5; 
Keyes to Addison 22 May 1917, Addison papers, Royal Navy Submarine Museum 
A1986/77; Halpern I, 50-1; Keyes NM I, pp. 20-1,53-5; Mackay op. cit. pp. 454-5,465 
[110] See eg Addison to Keyes 7 November 1914, KP 4/41; Tomkinson to Keyes I May 
1915, ibid; Tomkinson war diary entries for 4,7 and 18 November 1914 and 3 February 
1915, Tomkinson papers TOMK 2/1, Churchill College Cambridge 
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revulsion for Fisher's methods. "It is perfectly disgusting and contemptible 
the way that JF and his accomplices have got rid of Keyes and Addison, 
and made it look as if they were being shot out for mismanagement after 
all the good work they have done the last four years or so, " wrote 
Tomkinson in his diary, "perfectly iniquitous I call it, and I hear that it 
has been handed round in the clubs &c. that this is the reason they are 
leaving. There is no end to the meanness and blackguardisms of that 
crowd... " [111] But Keyes's advisors also realised that Hall distrusted them 
and blamed them for the policy of experimentation with foreign designs. 
They were the officers who had pestered Hall with suggestions and 
inventions, and to whom he referred when he told Fisher that "there is in 
submarine work a strong tendency to attach a great deal of importance to 
materiel; it is particularly evident in the younger officers of average 
capacity or below it, and in those who do not have to look outside any 
one submarine or flotilla of submarines... " [112] These men feared a return 
to the paternalistic system of leadership which the old ICS had practised, 
and which would inevitably lead to the curtailment of the freedom of action 
they had enjoyed under Keyes. Most of all, they resented the thought that 
their own influence upon submarine policy would soon be history. 
The junior officers of the submarine branch played a much more 
significant role in determining policy under Keyes than they had ever done 
under Bacon or Hall. Unlike his predecessors, whose self-confidence 
sometimes bordered on arrogance, Keyes was always troubled by a supposed 
lack of intellect - "I am so very conscious of being thick-headed, " he 
told Beatty [113]. Jellicoe thought that "Keyes is a fine fellow but is not 
blessed with much brains" [114], Fisher that he was "very shallow" [115]. 
In fact the Commodore was probably of no less than average intelligence 
and was, rather, burdened with poor powers of expression - "most 
inconsequent or irrelevant, jumping backwards and forwards without any 
regard for logical order, which I daresay produces the impression on a 
[111) Tomkinson war diary 9 February 1915, TOMK 2/1. 
[112] Hall to Fisher 17 February 1914, FP 783 
[113) Keyes to Beatty 19 February 1918, Beatty Mss., in Halpern 1,457 
[114] Jellicoe to Hamilton 9 November 1915, Hamilton Mss., in AT Patterson (ed. ) The 
Jellicoe papers: selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral of 
the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of Scapa (London 1966) 1,187 
[115) Fisher to Jellicoe 4 April 1915, quoted in Marder, FG III, 186 
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particularly tidy, finicky mind that Roger's mind must be a disorganised 
chaos, " wrote FS Oliver. Keyes, Oliver thought, saw the solutions to 
problems in "an intense vision", and his "mental vistas" were "quite 
untrammelled by the immense mass of minor business" which so 
preoccupied Bacon, Lees and Hall [116]. But this vision, though intense, 
was nebulous. The Commodore saw an ideal outcome, not a precise plan, 
and that is why he needed a good staff [117]. 
One of Keyes's first decisions upon taking command of the Submarine 
Service in 1910 was to appoint a committee of six junior officers to advise 
him on technical problems. He was indubitably eager to make full use of 
the brains of his subordinates and took them into his confidence, thus 
circumventing his most serious shortcoming. Moreover Keyes showed himself 
a fair judge of character. All six submarine officers on the committee 
enjoyed distinguished careers [118]. 
The Commodore's most trusted advisors were Percy Addison, who 
supervised and directed technical development, and later Arthur Waistell, to 
whom he turned for help in drafting reports and memoranda. It was to 
these men that Keyes 'willed' the submarine service in. the event of his 
death [119]. Given his acknowledged technological illiteracy, it would not be 
rash to suggest that Keyes's construction policy was really Addison's, and 
that the latter -a man whom Keyes described as "a most zealous officer 
of exceptional ability" - was almost as important a figure as his 
commanding officer [120]. Certainly it was Addision who bore the brunt of 
Hall's wrath at Keyes's submarine policy and who left the submarine branch 
because he found it impossible to work in the same office as Fisher's 
[116] FS Oliver to his brother 25 May 1918, in Gwynn op. cit. pp. 332-4 
[117] Keyes never denied that his staff work was poor. CG Brodie recalled that when 
Keyes was Chief of Staff to the British naval forces off Gallipoli, "an experienced assistant 
could have spared him much of the (routine work], but I started very green. Several times 
during the first hectic days he told me, 'You are the worst staff officer in the world. ' 
This was painfully true, but if he thought it had hurt, he would add, 'except me', which 
was not entirely wrong, either... " Brodie op. cit. p. 3 
[1181 Cf. William Jameson, The fleet that Jack built: nine men who made a modern 
navy (London 1962) p. 295. 
1119] Keyes to Sturdee 5 August 1914, Adm 137/2067 fol. 603. On Addison, see Keyes 
diary 28 October 1914, KP 2/6, and Addison to Keyes 7 November 1914, KP 4/41. On 
Waistell, cf Keyes to Sturdee 1 November 1914, KP 4/34; Tomkinson to Keyes 1 May 
1915. KP 4/41. 
[120] Keyes report on Addison 30 August 1912, Addison papers, Royal Navy Submarine 
Museum A1986/77 
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appointee [121]. 
The poisonous atmosphere created by the Hall/Keyes dispute could have 
jeopardised the efficiency of the submarine branch, and it was fortunate 
indeed that both men respected the sincerity with which the other held his 
views, and found that in extremis they were capable of "working together 
for the confusion of the enemy - which is the only thing that matters. " 
[122] But privately their criticisms of each other were harsh [123], and 
from 1910 the Trade experienced a little of the atmosphere that bedevilled 
the French submarine service in the pre-war period. 
Hall himself remained convinced the Trade's problems in 1914 were 
"entirely due to the Authorities having thought that the time had arrived 
for taking the submarine business out of the hands of specialists - and it 
had not! " [124] Certainly it might have been better for the RN if 
construction had continued upon the lines laid down by Hall and his 
predecessors - but as was suggested above, there was little proof at the 
time that this was the case. Equally, Keyes's greatest achievement was 
certainly to promote integration with the fleet - which eventually led to 
acceptance of the submarine as a valuable weapon, and caused him to 
oppose Hall's return on the grounds that "although the submarine service 
owes you a great debt in regard to its early development, you have not 
made good a claim, which you might well have done, to come back to 
command what has become very much a recognised part of the seagoing 
fleet. " [125] But the policy enjoyed only limited success in the short term, 
since familiarisation was not the same thing as integration, and the process 
was not sufficiently advanced in 1914 for the majority of officers to 
recognise the new threat they faced. The strategic implications of the 
submarine were in consequence far from fully worked out. Bacon, Lees, 
Hall and Keyes had fashioned a formidable new naval arm which only they 
properly appreciated and understood. They did what was expected of 
[121] Keyes to his wife 12 November 1914, KP 2/4. See also Hall to Keyes I December 
1913, KP 4/22 
[122] Keyes to Hall 20 January 1915, KP 4/27 
[123] Keyes thought Hall "was the man whose short-sightedness and narrow-mindedness 
was responsible for our poor position in regard to submarine construction. " (Diary 28 
October 1914, KP 2/6) Hall wrote that "it is tragic that our Vote for submarines should 
be frittered away on 'freaks and coastals'. " (Hall to Fisher 26 April 1914, FP 803) 
[124J Hall to Fisher 26 April 1914, FP 803 
[125J Keyes to Hall nd (December 1913) KP 4/22 
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captains and commodores; the problem of assessment was the province of 
admirals and Admiralty. 
5.1 NAVAL ATTITUDES TO THE SUBMARINE 1901-1914 
The problem of 
assessment 
Naval factions and the submarine 
In the early years of the twentieth century, the Royal Navy employed tens 
of thousands of officers and men. From its ranks came professors and 
poets, world-famous novelists, kings, gods and even Field Marshals; 
collectively, these men expressed an astonishing variety of opinions. The 
surprising thing about British assessment of the submarine is not that the 
new weapon created controversy - though it did - but that the debate 
was as muted as it was poorly informed. 
Three factors combined to prevent accurate evaluation of the submarine 
before 1914: naval factionalism, prejudice and ignorance. Of these, 
ignorance of the precise capabilities of underwater craft - one of the 
major themes of this thesis - was the most important, since it fuelled 
prejudice and permitted factionalism to flourish. Before 1914 the submarine 
was quite untested. It had not seen action for 50 years, and there was no 
telling what it was capable of and what it might or might not do. 
Optimists, particularly Fisher, predicted it would displace the Dreadnought. 
Sceptics, including Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, a former DNI, disagreed: 
"The submarine may have some value, " the latter concluded, "but they are 
too untried in war to make it safe to place exclusive reliance on them. 
The war efficiency of these vessels is liable to be over-rated. " [1]. 
1 11] `Notes by Sir Reginald Custance' 30 August 1913, Adm 116/3381 
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The dispute between Fisher and Custance was a dispute between naval 
factions [see also sections 1.4 and 6.1]. Although submarines had been 
introduced before Fisher became First Sea Lord, they became intimately 
associated with his 1904-1910 regime, and officers who opposed Fisher 
were likely to oppose the submarine also. Many were offended as much by 
the tactless bludgeoning tactics and open favouritism displayed by the new 
administration as they were by Fisher's innovations, but men who thought 
the First Sea Lord was compromising national security by scrapping warships 
and building Dreadnoughts saw the submarine as a symbol of what they 
considered to be the abandonment of traditional British strategy. 
The discontent that Fisher aroused came close to splitting the Navy in 
the latter years of his term as First Sea Lord. It resulted in a more or less 
open dispute with Lord Charles Beresford, which eventually threatened the 
efficiency of the RN itself [2], and was compounded by an equally serious 
struggle between the 'Blue Water' school of navalists and those who 
demanded the strengthening of Britain's land defences to combat the 
possibility of invasion [3]. The First Sea Lord's enemies included many 
naval traditionalists, pressure groups such as the Imperial Maritime League, 
and a substantial portion of the press; Fisher himself added greatly to their 
numbers by impulsively but consistently branding those who disagreed with 
him as enemies. Under his leadership, the united front presented by the 
Navy to the public (which had long been one of the service's most 
impressive assets) was badly fragmented. The submarine became a pawn in 
the greater controversies that engulfed the administration. 
The early boats, with their comparatively puny offensive capability, 
simply did not complement the existing conception of the Royal Navy as an 
instrument for all-out attack. "They are being exploited along entirely the 
wrong lines, " observed Beresford's colleague Custance. "My view is that if a 
weapon of this sort is developed with an eye for its use in offensive 
warfare, its use in the defensive will be covered, but that the reverse does 
not hold. " 'Charlie B. ' encountered Hall's flotillas in the manouevres of 
1908, which "were really planned to show the utility of sub-marines. " He 
[2] Ruddock Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford 1973) pp. 361-6,394-'i, 403-03, 
412-17 
[3] Ibid pp. 381-6,392-8 
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was sure "we have deserted the only true and traditional policy of the 
British - i. e. to find out the enemy in Blue Water and destroy him, and 
the General has been informed that the submarines will prevent invasion 
and put down any enemy even in their own ports. Total falsity. 
Sub-marines were within 120 miles of me for three days and did nothing. " 
[4] Beresford called them 'Fisher's playthings', and even in 1914 could 
remark that the submarine was an essentially defensive weapon which could 
not defend herself, best operated by day in clear weather [5j. 
The association of the submarine with Fisher and the reformist regime. 
was strengthened by the First Sea Lord's relationships with the influential 
Inspecting Captains Bacon and Hall. Bacon was, as we have seen, always 
regarded as a protege of Fisher's, - and althöiigi -'°the evidence suggests that 
the Sea Lord learned his enthusiasm for the submarine from Bacon, rather 
than the other way around [6], the association, and Bacon's later fall from 
grace, did much to taint the reputation of the Submarine Service. The 
objects of Fisher's violent enthusiasms often elicited a degree of distaste 
from naval officers, and as SS Hall remarked to Keyes, "the awful stigma 
attaching to a creation of Fisher and Bacon must necessarily have taken 
years to remove. " [7] 
Hall, a more junior officer than Bacon, was just as strong a swimmer 
in the 'Fishpond' [8]. He owed the Secretaryship of the 1913 Royal 
Commission on Oil Fuels (and a CB) to Fisher's patronage, and was 
appointed to command the Submarine Service during the war almost 
[4] Custance to Bridge 1 September 1904, Bridge papers BRI 18 (file 3). National 
Maritime Museum; Beresford to Noel 9 February 1909, Noel papers NOE 5, 
'Correspondence with important persons', National Maritime Museum. 
[5] Beresford's address to the Institution of Naval Architects, July 1914, TrINA LVI 
pp. 268-70; 'Playthings' quote referred to by Fisher in a letter to Balfour, 11 May 1913, 
Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49712 fol. 93 
[6) It has often been supposed that Fisher exercised considerable influence over Bacon, 
and thus directed the course of British submarine development. In fact little evidence can 
be produced to support such an assertion. Bacon did not come fully under Fisher's spell 
until 1904, when both men were serving at Portsmouth - and by then the younger man 
had already been ICS for nearly three years. There is no correspondence in the First Sea 
Lord's papers to suggest a significant collaboration before that year. Fisher's previous 
appointments as CinC Mediterranean and Second Sea Lord did not involve him in a close 
study of the submarine, and it must be supposed that he learned his enthusiasm for the 
weapon from Bacon rather than vice versa. 
[7] Hall to Keyes 7 December 1913, Keyes papers KP 4/22, British Library 
[8] A contemporary term for the group of officers who enjoyeri Fisher's patronage, similar 
in influence to the 'bunch of keys' favoured by the nineteenth century Sea Lord Sir 
Cooper Key. 
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immediately after Fisher's return to the Admiralty. Many of the First Sea 
Lord's opponents saw Hall (unfairly) as little more than a puppet [9]. In 
exchange for his support, Hall kept Fisher supplied with information and 
advice after the latter's retirement in 1910. Nor was he averse to appealing 
to Fisher's influence when he disapproved of Keyes's policies [10]. 
Though he owed much to Fisher, Hall knew that the Sea Lord's 
increasingly autocratic style of leadership was causing concern in many 
quarters and was anxious to eschew the taint of partisanship. Fisher was a 
"dangerous friend", and at one point Hall was forced to ask for "a promise 
from JF not to canvass me for any more jobs! " [11] He once told Keyes 
that Fisher's overt backing made him "feel like a 'pariah"' among his 
brother officers [12]. 
The First Sea Lord was undoubtedly -among the most vociferous 
supporters of submarine warfare. Without the powerful influence he wielded, 
it is not impossible that the British submarine would have evolved 
differently, and quite likely that it would not have been built in the 
quantities that it was and - most significantly - adapted to the coastal 
defence role it fulfilled. But Fisher could not could not resist weaving 
underwater craft into his wilder flights of fancy and incorporating them into 
schemes that did them no credit. Hall captured this dichotomy when he 
wrote, "I forgive him his unbounded interest in the submarine service 
because he nurtured it in the teeth of great opposition. " [13] 
The submarine boat became a stick with which mostly retired officers 
could beat the Fisher administration. "Submarines (pushed by Fisher) the 
arm of the weak navy are being turned upon us with disastrous results, " 
charged Admiral Noel during the Great War. "Their introduction alone is 
enough to condemn the Naval Administration of that time. " [14] 
Underwater craft were as much a symbol of change as they were a 
[9] Keyes diary 26 October 1914, KP 2/6 
[10) Cf Hall to Fisher 17 February 1914, Fisher papers FP 783, Churchill College 
Cambridge 
[11) Hall to Keyes c. 23 February 1914, KP 4/22; Hall to Keyes 22 June 1913, ibid. See 
also Hall to Keyes, nd (December 1913), ibid 
[12] Quoted in Keyes to Hall nd (December 1913). ibid 
[13] Hall to Keyes, nd (December 1913), ibid 
[14] Noel to Redesdale 28 April ? 1915, Noel papers NOE 5, 'Correspondence on naval 
matters 1904-1917' 
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weapon in Fisher's eyes, and he presented himself as the prophet and 
architect of that change. That is why the Sea Lord's opponents were 
anxious to decry submarine warfare. The naval 'conservatives' who broadly 
refused to believe in the new weapon were not simply thick-headed 
reactionaries, and they did not deny that the submarine would become a 
powerful weapon - merely stressing that it would take a considerable time 
to perfect. Officers such as Custance and Beresford should no more -be 
blamed for looking to the past for unsound guidance than Fisher and 
like-minded 'progressives' should be praised for casting their imaginations 
unsupported into the future. It was both parties' tendency to reduce the 
submarine to little more than a footnote in a great naval debate that really 
hindered serious consideration of the weapon. 
Piracy and prejudice 
It was in France, late in the eighteenth century, that the idea submarine 
warfare was morally repugnant first established itself and Fulton's 1797 
submission to the Directory was rejected by the aged naval minister, 
Pleville-le-Pelley, on the grounds that submarines could not conform to 
the rules of war [15]. 
There has always been something diabolical about underwater weapons. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mines (known for years as 
'infernal machines'), torpedoes and submarines represented the unknown; 
devastating, invisible, difficult to resist and impossible to avoid, they evoked 
distrust and distaste in roughly equal measures. In 1900 many British naval 
officers would probably have agreed that the Royal Navy and the world 
would be better off without them. But most seamen are pragmatists; there 
is not a single document among the Admiralty papers to suggest that its 
submarine policy was ever affected by moral revulsion, and much negative 
evidence to suggest that it was not. 
We have seen that the submarine was adopted by the Royal Navy as 
I [15] Wallace Hutcheon, Robert Fulton and naval warfare (unpublished PhD thesis, George 
Washington University 1975) p. 47 
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the result of an unprejudiced assessement, thai it was by and large sensibly 
developed, and that submariners themselves were practically a protected 
species. By 1914, moreover, the British submarine service was easily the 
largest in the world. The RN might have been guilty of failing to exploit 
the full potential of the weapon, but it never actively retarded its 
development. 
At least part of the notorious naval 'prejudice' against submarines had 
nothing to do with the submarine itself. The behaviour of some young 
submariners could almost have been calculated to irk their superiors, who 
resented being asked to put themselves out of action, during manoeuvres, 
by submarines "loafing around the North Sea mopping up anything that 
comes ... [their]... way" [16]. Nor were the pioneer submariners noticeably 
more restrained on land, where Max Horton (arguably the most successful 
British submarine commander of the Great War) was described as "a 
desperate motorcyclist" and EC Boyle charged with "riding a motor bicycle 
at a speed dangerous to the public" after knocking down a teenaged girl. 
(He was fined £S plus costs, which his fellow submariner Talbot considered 
"pretty excessive". ) Keyes remembered that Lieutenant Norman Holbrook 
(the first submariner VC) "used to drive rather furiously - and was the 
man who ran into Captain Nicholson with, the latter said, a car full of 
lovely joy riders. " He was "rather the same type as Horton -a bit of a 
swashbuckler. " [17] 
Submariners had their own peculiar dress code. Grimy officers were 
labelled "unwashed chauffeurs" by their cleaner battlefleet brethren [18], and 
one young CO admitted that after five days at sea he and his crew looked 
"a pretty filthy lot of pirates" [19]. Even the more senior submariners were 
inclined to let their standards slip; Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Shove 
was noted for his "matted, dishevelled hair and a high watermark above his 
collar", and kept a pet rat up one sleeve of his monkey jacket [20]. On 
[16) Hall to Fisher nd (1913), FP 648 
[17] Hall report on Horton October 1907, quoted in WS Chalmers, Max Horton and the 
western approaches (London 1954) p. 4; Talbot diary 16 May 1905, Talbot papers 81/42/2, 
Imperial War Museum; Keyes to his wife 14 and 15 December 1914, KP 2/5 
[18] Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine boats: the beginnings of underwater warfare 
(London 1983) p. 19 
[19] Talbot diary 16 June 1906, Talbot papers 81/42/3 
[20] Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine warfare: monsters and midgets (Poole 1985) p. 20 
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one notable occasion Commander Frank Brandt, Hall's 
second-in-command, was surprised by a visit from the Admiral 
Commanding Devonport Dockyard, and "summoned hastily from below, [he] 
met his admiral at the top of the gangway in carpet slippers, his trousers 
turned up, and his unbuttoned monkey jacket displaying to the scandalised 
eye of the flag officer a vast expanse of pink flannel shirt. " [21] As 
Richard Compton-Hall concedes, "some of the first submariners were 
thought a little strange, even at the time, but this is not surprising. They 
had, after all, sacrificed a far more secure career in the surface fleet, and 
a proportion of them were bound to be refugees from the glitter, gunnery 
and gaiters... Responsibility and risk were counted far more highly and they 
attracted some unusual and colourful characters. " [22] 
In a navy that encouraged the growth of tight-knit groups which might 
become cliques, pride and prejudice were commonplace. The torpedo 
service in general was looked down on by the battleship navy; the quarter 
deck sneered at engineers and doubted the usefulness of aircraft. But - at 
least in the case of submarines - such feelings were not wholly destructive. 
They were warmly reciprocated by the submariners themselves, who thereby 
strengthened their own sense of identity, just as the destroyer crew 
described as "decent enough chaps, but socially quite impossible" gloried 
thereafter in being referred to as SQIs [23]. British submariners revelled in 
their piratical reputation, and this is surely an indication that it was not 
one that did them much harm. 
Most naval officers, it seems safe to assume, were 'cautious or muddled 
progressives' in the late pre-war period - ignorant of the -submarine's 
true capabilities, perhaps, but certain that it was a weapon of some power 
and potential [24]. The majority of them would rarely if ever have 
encountered underwater craft at sea, and they probably gave comparatively 
[21] Charles Kerr, All in the day's work (London 1939) p. 123 
[22] Compton-Hall, Submarine boats p. 143 
[23] Ibid p. 185. 
Many tales of anti-submarine prejudice have a polished quality which suggests that 
they may entertain better than they inform. Take for example one story told by Charles 
Little, who related that on joining DI in 1908 he was warned that no service club would 
accept him as a member (Mariner's Mirror 62 (1976) p. 199). By that time Little had 
already served four years in submarines; one wonders why the 'warning' was not given 
earlier. See also Fisher to Churchill 30 December 1911 in Randolph Churchill and Martin 
Gilbert, Winston Spencer Churchill Companion II pp. 1364-5. 
[24] Cf Tim Travers, The killing ground: the British army, the Western Front and the 
emergence of modern warfare 1900-1918 (London 1987) p. 64, where much the same 
thing is said of army officers and the machine gun. 
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little real consideration to the submarine, but a number of high-ranking 
officers who saw the weapon in action did become enthusiasts. Admiral Sir 
William May criticised Custance's conservative views and observed, "Sir 
R. C. in my opinion underrates submarines altogether. " [25) By 1904 he 
had concluded that "in a few years when we come to sea-going vessels, 
there will be a real revolution in naval warfare" [26]. George Callaghan, 
who was in command of the Grand Fleet on the outbreak of war, was 
sufficiently perturbed by the performance of underwater craft in the 1912 
and 1913 manoeuvres to write a paper on anti-submarine warfare, 
concluding that "the value of the submarine as a weapon, both of offence 
and defence, is enormous. " [27] In 1914 one of the Navy's greatest 
gunnery experts, Percy Scott, caused a furore by declaring that battleships 
had been rendered obsolete by submarines and aircraft [see section 6.1]. 
Callaghan and his successor, Jellicoe, were assessing relatively advanced 
submarines, but their positive opinion of the boats' capabilities had no more 
effect on the development of pre-war British naval policy than the more 
critical evaluations of Fisher's opponents. Britain had been forced to adopt 
the submarine by the activities of foreign powers; the design that the RN 
acquired from America largely determined the direction taken by a technical 
evolution that itself had an appreciable influence on policy. The immutable 
tenets of Imperial strategy were equally significant, and the semi-autonomy 
of the Submarine Service made it almost immune to external pressures, 
particularly from retired officers such as Beresford, Custance and Noel. In 
some circumstances, such as those that permitted the submarine to put in 
respectable performances in the manoeuvres of 1912 and 1913, senior 
officers could have a peripheral impact, but even a man like Fisher failed 
to wield direct and prolonged influence over submarine policy. 
Fear of discrimination was, therefore, a more significant problem than- 
discrimination itself. Many ambitious officers were reluctant to join a branch 
that was reputed to prejudice one's prospects of promotion. In 1905 Edgar 
Lees noted that submarines were not considered 'good service', and five 
years later SS Hall observed, "there is certainly an impression amongst 
[25] May comments on 'Notes by Sir Reginald Custance' August 1913, Adm 116/3381 
[26] May to Fisher 3 January 1904, in Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49710 fol. 78 
. 
[27] Callaghan paper 'Remarks on North Sea strategy' 28 August 1914, fol. 24, Adm 
116/3130 
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younger officers that once they come into submarines they give up all 
chances of the higher ranks of the service even if they ever get promoted 
at all. There have I know been many cases where captains have told young 
officers wishing to volunteer that they were making a great mistake and 
jeopardising their career. " At the time, the question of advancement was 
still a hypothetical one since few of the junior officers recruited to the 
Trade had actually served long enough to qualify for promotion. Rumours 
flourished in this limbo of uncertainty, and Hall suggested that "if a 
definite number of promotions were given for a batch or two of submarine 
officers, I mean those who have specialised in it, the volunteering would 
probably improve. " [28] 
In this context, it is interesting to compare the pre-war Submarine 
Service with the post-war Fleet Air Arm [29]. The FAA was a specialist 
branch officered by volunteers who received bonus payments - 30s. a week 
flying pay in the 1920s - and served four-year tours interspersed with 
two years' General Service. There was a shortage of suitable recruits, and 
it was impossible to maintain the desired reserve of officers. So serious did 
this problem become that the FAA was forced (from 1938) to accept 
short-service commissioned officers who had little or no general naval 
experience. 
Like the submarine branch, the Air Arm was in an anomalous position. 
Dual control was exercised by the Royal Navy and the RAF, and many 
naval officers doubted the loyalties of FAA fliers. This was a disincentive 
to men who had chosen to make the Navy their career, and one officer 
recalled that "those of us who might have had inclinations to fly carefully 
suppressed their feelings in order not to appear disloyal to their service. " 
[30] Senior officers deplored the way that Air Arm men disappeared into 
the maw of the RAF every time their ships entered port, and prospective 
fliers (like submariners) were often warned that they risked ruining their 
careers by transferring to the new branch. 
The problems thrown up by dual control contributed much to the Air 
[28] Lees report 'Modifying the system for selecting officers for the submarine service' 2 
August 1905, Adm 117795; Hall report 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122. Similar feelings were 
expressed in the young Royal Naval Air Service - see Sueter memo 'Proposals for special 
letter in Navy List for air officers' 6 August 1913, Adm 1/8332 
[29] The following passage on the Fleet Air Arm is based chiefly on Geoffrey Till, Air 
power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945 (London 1979) 
[30] Ibid p. 45 
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Arm's inefficiency in the early years of World War II, and had an 
especially unfortunate effect on the quality of naval aircraft. The FAA's 
difficulties only emphasise the extreme good fortune of the early twentieth 
century Submarine Service, cocooned in its cheerful semi-autonomy and 
free to experiment with materiel and develop its unique spirit well away 
from the disputes thrown up by inter-service bickering. 
About 70% of FAA pilots were supplied by the RAF, and the Navy 
men who joined the branch were rather a mixed bunch. Murray Sueter, a 
former submariner appointed Director of the RN Air Division, admitted that 
the wartime Royal Naval Air Service attracted unconventional officers who 
irritated the more orthodox sea-dogs [31], and in February 1938 Lieutenant 
Commander Rundell of the aircraft carrier Furious awaited his first sight of 
a new batch of Air Branch officers "prepared for any eventuality from a 
Dartmoor convict to a Senior Wrangler. " 132] In fact the educational 
attainments of the average FAA recruit were considerably lower than those 
of aspiring submariners; the Air Arm had the lowest standards of any 
specialist branch. Many recruits were embarking upon a second career, 
having been passed over for promotion elsewhere; Keyes himself referred to 
FAA pilots as mere "engine drivers - it was a necessary job to have 
filled, but not requiring very high mental attainments. " [33] This scathing 
indictiment was somewhat unfair, for like submariners, Air Arm men were 
distinguished by a dedication to and enthusiasm for their particular trade. 
The Navy proved tolerant of the FAA. There is little evidence that 
prejudice blighted the careers of naval airmen; indeed one pioneer flier, 
Caspar John, eventually became First Sea Lord. Powerful sceptics such as 
as Admirals Sir Dudley Pound and Charles Madden were at worst only 
intermittently obstructive, and in general there is no evidence that members 
of either the Air Arm or the Submarine Service were at a disadvantage 
when it came to promotion. The truth was that in a closed service, 
advancement was bound to reflect the growth of the service itself, and that 
at times of rapid development prospects could be good, particularly for the 
men. In 1906 Captain William Hall observed that the chances of promotion 
within the submarine service were not so bleak as had been supposed, and 
131) lbid p. 112 
[32) Ibid p. 56 
[33) Ibid pp. 47-8. Keyes's paper was dated December 1926. 
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that all men who had joined as Leading Seamen could expect their Petty 
Officer rating in due course, thus allowing all but a small percentage of 
ABs advancement as well. Seven years later an M-branch study showed 
that promotions within the Trade were actually running at double the 
normal rate for all ratings except Leading Stokers [34]. Only when officers 
and men reached the more senior ranks was there a problem; the Trade 
was simply too small to have more than a few vacancies for warrant 
officers or men above the rank of lieutenant-commander [35]. 
A shortage of skilled manpower, which as we have seen caused 
problems for the Submarine Service, also led the naval authorities to 
introduce measures intended to boost recruitment of officers and men to 
another sometimes-despised branch of the service - the engineers [36]. 
Like submariners, qualified and capable engineers were hard to come by in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But while the creation of 
a submarine service hardly threatened the position of executive officers in 
the big-ship navy, the advent of a class of naval engineers did, and 
prejudice against men of the engineering branch was both more deeply 
rooted and more widespread than dislike of submariners. 
Recent studies of both the British and the American navies [37] have 
suggested that deck officers of both services were reluctant to grant 
engineers equality of status with the military branch not simply because they 
felt such men were neither fully professional nor their social equals [38], 
but also because the creation of engineer officers and a steam-powered 
navy threatened the position of men trained to sail. Conflict between the 
[34] Captain William Hall's notes to the revised 'Memoranda relative to service in 
submarines... ' 6 November 1906, Adm 1/7880; M-branch paper 9 June 1913, Adm 
116/1122. In the Fleet, only 5.4% of ABs were promoted annually; in the submarine 
branch the figure was 13.1%. For Leading Seamen the respective figures were 13.5% and 
22.5%. These statistics certainly reflect the rapid expansion of the submarine service as 
much as they do the high quality of the men in it. 
[35] Admiralty paper 'Service in submarines' ? September 1913, Adm 116/1122 
[36] Christopher Bartlett, Great Britain and sea power 1815-1853 (Oxford 1963) 
pp. 320-2; Geoffrey Penn, Up funnel, down screw! The story of the naval engineer 
(London 1955) pp. 125-6 
[37] The problem was certainly not confined to these two services - in 1912 the British 
attache reported mistreatment of engineers in the German navy was "real and 
unpleasant... in the shape of a policy of pin-pricks and of aloofness; greater than ever 
was the case in other navies... " Report dated 16 July 1912 in 'Naval attache's reports, 
Berlin 1906-1914', Naval Library, Ministry of Defence, Ca. 2053 
[38] Lance Buhl, 'Mariners and machines: resistance to technological change in the 
American Navy, 1865-1869', Journal of American History 1974 pp. 714-15,717 
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two branches was particularly severe in the post-Civil War USN, which 
was run down so rapidly that every executive officer feared for his job and 
his chances of promotion. Engineers demanding equal rank and status thus 
threatened to further crowd a navy that offered increasingly little chance of 
rewarding service [39]. Similarly, the executive branch of the Royal Navy 
opposed Fisher's 1902 reform scheme - which proposed to allow engineer 
officers the opportunity to attain flag rank and command warships - 
chiefly because they doubted that mere 'mechanics' could ever understand 
the sea, and thus become 'interchangeable' with deck officers, as Fisher 
proposed [40). 
Submariners posed far less of a threat to the officers of the surface 
fleet. They belonged to a closed service and had little contact with the 
big-ship navy for much of the year. The Submarine Branch was only 
3,000 men strong in 1914, whereas there were already around 26,000 
engineers in the Senior Service by 1900 [41]. Submariners were drawn, too, 
from the ranks of young executive officers, and though battleship sailors 
might laugh at the sight of a grimy submarine officer fresh from a tussle 
with an uncooperative petrol engine, he remained 'one of them'. No 
submariner could be accused of being an RAF officer in naval uniform, nor 
an uneducated civilian dressed as an engineer. 
Existing prejudice was broken down as greater interaction between the 
Trade and the surface navy was actively encouraged in the last years of 
peace. To qualify for the higher ranks, officers needed watchkeeping and 
disciplinary experience which could not be gained in submarines. Advantage 
was therefore taken of the stipulation that lieutenants could not serve their 
eight years in boats consecutively to send them to the surface fleet as 
watch officers -a system initiated by Edgar Lees [42]. 
At first, postings were for three-year periods, but this threatened to 
disrupt the efficiency of the submarine service and arrangements were made 
to modify the requirement to two years and then to one-year stints [43]. 
[39] Ibid p. 722 
[40] Mackay op. cit. pp. 266,275 
[41] Penn op. cit. p. 126 
[42] Lees report 2 August 1905, Adm 1/7795 
[43] 'Service for promotion' 27 March 1907, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1440; 'Officers of the 
submarine service' 9 June 1914, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1525. See also Chalmers op. cit. 
p. 7 
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Watchkeeping attachments gave young officers the chance to appreciate the 
perspectives of the big-ship navy while showing the quarter-deck that 
submariners often made above-average naval officers. It was thus an 
important step towards the full integration of submarines into the Royal 
Navy. "They proved wonderful ambassadors, " wrote Keyes of his big-ship 
submariners. "[They] recruited ardent spirits like their own and so we built 
up a magnificent corps d'elite. " [44] 
Exercises and manoeuvres 
In the absence of real combat experience, , the 
Edwardian Royal Navy 
assessed its submarines by conducting manoeuvres and war games designed 
to suggest tactics and reveal potential. It enjoyed only limited success in 
anticipating developments in submarine warfare, however; most exercises 
were artificial, unreliable, and structured in such a way that they tended to 
confirm the reliability of existing strategy rather than encourage the 
assessment of developing technology. 
Before the first British submarines became available for comprehensive 
trials, evaluation was restricted to war games played by officers attending 
the Greenwich War Course. The games were, of course, highly artificial. 
Under Jane's rules, submarines could not reload within half an hour of 
firing a torpedo, and when submerged the submarine captain sat with his 
back to the rest of the players watching proceedings with the aid of "a 
small fragment of looking-glass, not exceeding half-an-inch in diameter. " 
Greenwich rules were almost equally disadvantageous to the underwater 
weapon [45), although officers at Greenwich were showing healthy respect 
for submarines as early as 1901 [see section 6.3). 
The annual manoeuvres should have offered better insights into the 
capabilities of the submarine, but various factors complicated evaluation of 
the new weapon. In particular, considerations of safety were paramount in 
formulating rules for the attack of submarines; nothing was allowed that 
would, in any way endanger either crew or boat. A necessary side-effect 
[44] Keyes, NM I, 46. See also Hall to Fisher 30 January 1912, FP 555 
[45] 'Strategical wargame at Greenwich, January-May 1901' NID No. 642, November 1901 
pp. 9,14, Adm 231/35; Jane's rules cited by Compton-Hall op. cit. p. 29 
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was that manoeuvres frequently lost all semblance of reality. Submarines 
cruised accompanied by a parent vessel carrying a large red flag, were 
ordered to display at least two feet of periscope at all times, and had to 
surface whenever they came within 1,000 yards of any other vessel. 
Critics of the submarine alleged that the rules favoured 
underwater craft by preventing escorts from harrying them; proponents 
countered by arguing that the red flags and parent ships which encumbered 
submarines enabled surface vessels to keep well clear. Hall charged that the 
mother ship "entirely does away with the surprise... without being of any 
practical use to the submarines" [46], and noted after the 1910 manoeuvres 
that "it is almost impossible to unravel from these reports when the 
submarines were sighted due to rising in accordance with the 1,000 yard 
rule, and when their hulls or periscopes were sighted at some distance, 
either before they dived or in the act of attacking. " [47] 
Even when a submarine did get into position to deliver an attack, the 
rules generally forbade the actual firing of torpedoes fitted with collision 
heads, for fear that unacceptable damage would be caused below the 
waterline of the target ship. AK Wilson proposed that torpedoes should be 
fired during the 1904 Spithead manoeuvres, but even Fisher doubted the 
wisdom of the idea, and the cost of converting two old destroyers to 
withstand the impact of collision heads proved prohibitive [48]. Eventually it 
was decided that a limited number of practice torpedoes could be fired, so 
long as conditions were perfect, but even they were set to run under their 
targets [49] and not until 1910 did submarines have another opportunity to 
discharge torpedoes in fleet exercises [50]. Despite representations from 
senior officers, the practice-was again prohibited in 1912 and 1913 [51]. 
[46] Hall memo 25 February 1910, Adm 1/8119; 'Fleet exercises 1908', July 1908, Adm 
116/1090 
[47] Hall to Neville 18 April 1910, Adm 1/8119 
[48] On Fisher's dispute with Wilson, see 'Manoeuvres with destroyers' 20 January 1905, 
digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1414; Esher to Brett 14 March 1904, in Maurice Brett, ed., 
Journals and letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher (4 voll, London 1934-8) 11,50 
[49] Wilson to Admiralty 23 August 1904, Adm 1/7719; DNO minute 14 January 1905, 
ibid; Admiralty to CinC Channel Fleet 9 July 1905, and reply 2 August 1905, Adm 
144/27 fols. 70-1. 
[50] Admiralty to Hall 24 May 1910, Adm 1/8119 
[51] Admiralty scheme of manoeuvres, June 1913, May papers MAY 10, National Maritime 
Museum; 'Report of Admiral of the Fleet Sir William May' nd (1913), ibid; Callaghan 
paper 'Remarks on North Sea strategy' 28 August 1913, Adm 116/1214. 
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The day-to-day operations of the Submarine Service were just as 
stringently controlled. Torpedoes were routinely run on courses marked out 
for the purpose, but these exercises were not tests of the weapons' 
accuracy. There was no target, and a successful run merely proved that the 
torpedo worked [52]. Dummy attacks on cruisers or battleships were 
restricted to the annual manoeuvres, and the substitutes available as targets 
for the rest of the year were usually either too small (torpedo boats) or 
too slow (sea-going depot ships) to be acceptable substitutes. The speed 
and manoeuvrability of target vessels were further restricted by 
considerations of fuel economy and safety. 'Tango-ing' (as evasive 
zig-zagging was then known) was forbidden for fear of damaging an 
attacking submarine [53]. 
In pre-war exercises, as in the annual manouevres proper, torpedo 
firing was carefully controlled. Although the importance of adequate practice 
was understood, and although torpedoes with collision heads could safely be 
fired under controlled conditions, the cost and effort involved in locating a 
rogue Whitehead had a sobering effect. A lost torpedo meant a formal 
Court of Inquiry [54]. Submarines were therefore encouraged to close the 
range decisively, and the majority of practice torpedoes were fired from 
unrealistically advantageous positions for fear of losing or damaging an 
expensive piece of equipment. In consequence, the percentage of torpedo 
hits recorded was high and British submarines were never fitted with the 
maximum possible number of torpedo tubes that wartime experience proved 
to be necessary [see section 6.2]. 
In Bacon's 1903 trials, 15 out of 20 attacks on the tender HMS Hazard 
were reckoned successful [55]. Exercises conducted after the 1904 
manoeuvres resulted in 8 torpedoes out of 11 hitting a towed target, 
152) Alan Cowpe, Underwater weapons and the Royal Navy (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of London 1979-80) pp. 165-6 
[53) Rules and conditions cited in 'Submarine administration', Admiralty Technical History 
vol. 21 (October 1921) p. 18, Naval Library MOD 
[54) Callaghan report 21 January 1913. Adm 1/8629; Talbot diary 27 September 1906, 
Imperial War Museum 81/42/3. In the inter-war period, similar restrictions on the nature 
and frequency of anti-aircraft practices made exercises unrealistic and misleading, and 
suggested that ships were less vulnerable to air attack than they actually were (Till op. cit. 
pp. 69,190). In his book on American development of the machine gun, David Armstrong 
points out that strict limitations on the availability of practice ammunition severely 
compromised evaluation of the automatic weapon. See Bullets and bureaucrats: the United 
States Army and the machine gun, 1861-1916 (Westport, Connecticut 1982) p. 152 
(55) Bacon report 'Remarks on the practices with submarine boats' 16 January 1904, Adm 
117719 
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leading the ICS to the highly optimistic conclusion that a 1: 4 ratio of hits 
to torpedoes fired might be expected in wartime [56]. Extensive torpedo 
practice conducted by the submarine branch in the years 1907-08 resulted 
in the discharge of 418 torpedoes and 67.2% hits against a moving target. 
Pleasingly consistent results were returned by all classes of submarine; 
A-boats averaged 65.75% hits, B class submarines 69.5% and the C class 
68%, and these figures must have confirmed Hall in his belief that men 
were more important than materiel. More than half (50.7%) of all attacks 
made resulted in hits [57]. 
The Russo-Japanese war and the relatively realistic British manoeuvres 
of 1913 showed how unreliable such figures were. Just three of the 19 
torpedoes fired during the Japanese assault on Port Arthur found a mark, 
despite good weather and the advantage of near-complete surprise. Only 
three of 275 Whiteheads discharged in the trio of major torpedo attacks 
that preceded the Battle of Tsushima, and no more than four of the 87 
expended in the subsequent night action, scored hits [58]. In 1913, three of 
24 torpedoes fitted with collision heads fired by destroyers against a fleet of 
'enemy' ships steaming in line ahead struck home [59]. Submarines did not 
use Whiteheads in 1913, but during the Great War HMS Vernon recorded 
that British boats discharged a total of 348 torpedoes at enemy warships; 
just 31 of these (8.9%) hit their targets [60]. (Naval intelligence calculated 
that German U-boats, whose prey were generally slower merchant vessels, 
recorded 40% hits in 1915, improving this to 50% two years later [61]. ) 
Nor were the Royal Navy's torpedoes reliable. 27 per cent of the 
Whiteheads fired by British submarines during the war suffered some form 
of mechanical failure, and unbeknown to the submarine service the collision 
heads fitted during peacetime exercises were about 60lbs lighter than 
[56] Bacon and Charlton report 6 June 1904, Adm 144/27 fols. 56-8 
[57] Figures calculated from data in Hall's '5th annual report on submarines' 5 March 
1908, Adm 1/7988. Salvo firing in some exercises rather disguised the number of 
unsuccessful attacks made in which no torpedoes were fired. 
[58] BNA 1906 pp. 110-15; Cowpe op. cit. pp. 167-72 
[59] Churchill to Asquith 30 August 1913, Adm 116/3381 
[60] HMS Vernon annual report 1917 pp. 163-4. Adm 187/37; HMS Vernon annual report 
1918 p. 152, Adm 187/38 
[61] Holger Herwig, 'Luxury fleet': the Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (London 1980) 
p. 164 
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guncotton warheads, with the result that in war the depth-setting was 
incorrectly calculated and British torpedoes tended to run deep throughout 
1914. Several German warships thus escaped an otherwise correctly-aimed 
Whitehead. Because they set their dummy torpedoes to run under their 
target, assessing hits by looking for torpedo tracks, British submariners also 
failed to recognise "the difficulty of getting a torpedo discharged at a depth 
of about 30 feet to pick up the shallow depth necessary to strike a torpedo 
craft at the short range essential to ensure success against a small vessel 
manoeuvring at speed" - about 800 yards [62]. Officers who had regularly 
'hit' destroyers and torpedo boats in exercises found the feat almost 
impossible to repeat in wartime. 
Manoeuvre restrictions on underwater craft and torpedo firing permitted 
wildly-differing interpretations of submarine performance, and the ease with 
which evidence could be made to support opposing viewpoints tended to 
discredit manoeuvres and thus reinforce the status quo. As Geoffrey Till 
points out in his study of airpower and the Royal Navy, the sort of 
restrictions imposed on aircraft and submarines "worked to the inevitable 
benefit of weapons like the battleship, whose value was already established, 
rather than to the... unproved alternatives. " [63] 
The factor of seniority also came into play, for by naval custom it fell 
to the senior officer present - invariably the captain of the warship 
attacked - to decide whether a submarine's torpedo would have hit and 
whether his counter-attack had been successfully delivered. "I think it will 
be universally conceded, " noted Rear-Admiral EE Bradford, "that the 
system... is open to abuse and requires amendment. " [64] The 
Umpire-in-Chief of the 1912 manoeuvres, Admiral May, drew attention to 
the same problem in his report. "A senior officer, " he wrote, "may well 
feel that he has been over-powered, but hesitates to put his own ship out 
[62] Keyes to Sturdee 1 November 1914, KP 4/34, quoted in Halpern 1,42-49. The 
figure for torpedo failures was calculated by Nicholas Lambert of Worcester college, 
Oxford, and I am indebted to him for permission to quote from his analysis. 
[63] Till op. cit. pp. 69,190. The parallel of the great capital ship controversy is 
instructive: the evidence of manouevres and the experience of the Russo-Japanese war led 
one group to argue for small, manoeuvrable battleships with low speed, heavy armour and 
a multitude of small-calibre guns, while a rival faction emphasised the value of high 
speed, light armour and the heaviest possible armarment. Such divergences of opinion 
make the submarine look uncontroversial. 
[64] Bradford report 24 July 1912, Adm 1/8269 
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of action due to fear of his motives being misconstrued, as well as to 
reluctance in voluntarily giving up the chance of further experience in 
conditions resembling war.... There is a growing feeling in the service now 
that for a junior to approach his senior on the opposite side is a risk 
greater than the occasion warrants. " [65] Two years later, a writer in the 
Naval Review observed that "the umpires' reports are composed in the big 
ships, with the feeling of solid security that is engendered in them, so that 
though each year sees a little more notice given to submarines, the reports' 
have rather the same colouring one would have expected if... the captain 
of the Titanic had reported upon the safety of his ship before leaving upon 
her last voyage. " [66] 
Reports on the manoeuvres of 1912 and 1913 confirm that some officers 
did use their seniority to overrule subordinates in command of submarines, 
and thus helped to obscure the threat posed by the new weapon. Even 
Custance noted "a general tendency... to put these vessels out of action 
somewhat too readily by the Senior Officers of larger ships. " It should be 
stressed, however, that their animus was not specifically directed at the 
captains of underwater craft, but applied equally to the relatively junior 
officers commanding torpedo boats, destroyers and even cruisers [67]. There 
is also good evidence that the senior officers who umpired the manoeuvres 
- May prominent among them - were willing to overturn the more 
outrageous decisions made by senior officers on the spot [681. 
5.3: The foreign context - Russia and the United States 
If the Royal Navy could not rely upon its own manoeuvres to provide an 
accurate assessment of submarine development - and there was general 
[65] 'Naval manouevres of 1912 - remarks by Umpire-in-Chief' 5 August 1912, Adm 
1/8273. For a more colourful account, see Fisher to Balfour 8 September 1913, Add. Mss. 
49712 fol. 126 
[661 'The influence of the submarine on naval policy, part III' in Naval Review, August 
1914 p. 49 
[67) Custance paper 'Criticisms of the 1913 manoeuvres' nd (? September 1913), Adm 
116/1169. See also Callaghan report 'Manoeuvres 1912: General remarks by the 
Commander-in-Chief' 5 August 1912, Adm 1/8269; Churchill to Asquith nd (30 August 
1913), Adm 116/3381 
[68] See the detailed breakdown of claims and counter-claims in Umpire-in-Chief's 
report of August 1913, MAY 10 
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agreement that it would be unwise to do so - it could at least hope to 
glean useful insights from a study of its rivals. From 1901 to 1905 and 
beyond, this effectively meant the French, for although both the Russians 
and the Americans had developed submarines, neither did so with sustained 
vigour. Unfortunately for the British, pre-war French submarine policy 
oscillated between extremes, while the Germans - who at least brought a 
calm appraisal of technological limitations and strategical needs to the 
subject - gave no sign of appreciating the peculiar potential of the weapon 
that they were to exploit during the Great War. But a comparison between 
British, French, German, American and Russian evaluations of the 
submarine casts favourable light on many aspects of British submarine 
policy, as well as helping to explain why it took so long for the 
submarine's true worth to be recognised by the Royal Navy. 
As we have seen, Russia was quick to realise that submarines were well 
suited to the coastal role that was so important to the Tsarist navy. Like 
France, she developed an imaginative submarine policy and produced some 
interesting and innovative boats, but paid the penalty for maintaining an 
inefficient arms industry. In addition, Russian submarine policy lacked 
ambition in the pre-war period. 
After the last Drzewiecki boats were delivered, the navy discontinued 
submarine construction until the turn of the century. A boat named Pyotr 
Koschka built to the plans of a naval lieutenant, Kolbasev, was launched in 
1902, but was not a success. She was too small and there were problems 
with the external Drzewiecki torpedo drop-collars (fitted instead of internal 
tubes), designed to allow torpedoes to be angled and fired on a variety of 
bearings [69]. The Pyotr Koschka was followed in 1903 by Delfin, which 
at 175/200 tons was quite an advance on her predecessor, and the latter 
boat was sufficiently successful for the Navy Ministry to place an order for 
10 more submarines to both Russian and foreign designs. 
Submarine development was spurred on by the Russo-Japanese war of 
1904-05. The greater part of both Russia's Pacific and the Baltic fleets 
were wiped out, and after the Battle of Tsushima the Tsarist navy slipped 
overnight from third to sixth place in the naval rankings, falling behind the 
United States, Germany and Japan. 18 first- and second-class battleships 
I 
[69] For an assessment of the Drzewiecki drop-collar (which was widely fitted in French 
and Russian submarines), see Bacon report 'Drzewiecki torpedo discharge gear for 
submarine boats' 2 July 1901, Adm 1 17522 
5.3 THE SUBMARINE POLICIES OF RIVAL POWERS 
were lost, and the submarine service was probably the only branch of the 
navy to grow during the conflict [70]. 
Several old Drzewiecki submarines were brought back into service, and 
the Russian navy went to extraordinary lengths to smuggle its new Lake 
craft past American customs boats on the lookout for contrabrand of war 
[71]. A public subscription of £1.4m was raised and used to order 18 
destroyers and three submarines from Russian yards [72]; at least eight 
boats were dismantled and sent by rail to the Pacific theatre [73]. Russian 
boats were used to patrol the approaches to Vladivostock, operating up to 
120 miles from the port. They encountered Japanese warships on only one 
occasion; in the spring of 1905 three submarines, including Delfin, were on 
a patrol line 70 miles from Vladivostock when they sighted two Japanese 
destroyers. The Holland boat Som, which was closest to the TBDs, 
attempted to manoeuvre into position for a surface attack, but the Japanese 
ships withdrew [74]. Old photographs also show that at least one Drzewiecki 
boat was present at the siege of Port Arthur. 
Of course, nations at war often buy up weaponry almost 
indiscriminately, and the significance of Russia's dealings with Lake, Holland 
and Krupp, the leading German submarine builder, should not be 
over-estimated. Nevertheless, it was not something that would have been 
done even five years earlier. The Russo-Japanese war was an important 
proving ground for underwater warfare, and the submarine emerged from it 
as a viable weapon. 
Both the mine and the locomotive torpedo won dramatic victories in the 
Far East. Four battleships - two on each side - were lost to enemy 
mines, and the death of Admiral Stefan Makarov in a Japanese minefield 
was a turning point in the war at sea. The British Admiralty took note of 
(70] DW Mitchell, A history of Russian and Soviet sea-power (London 1974) pp. 267-71 
[71] PA Towle, The influence of the Russo-Japanese war on British military and naval 
thought (unpublished University of London PhD thesis 1973) p. 376; Simon Lake, 
Submarine (New York 1938) pp. 171-84 
[72] 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1905' (Russia), NID No. 776, July 1905 p. 40, 
Adm 231/44. 
[73] Jacob Kipp, 'Undersea warfare in Russian and Soviet naval art: historical background 
1853-1941', paper delivered at the Undersea Warfare Conference, Dalhousie University, 
Halifax, 21 -24 June 1989 pp. 12-13; Michael Wilson, Baltic assignment: British 
submariners in Russia 1914-1919, London 1985 p. 44; Mitchell op. cit. p. 275 
[741 Kipp op. cit. p. 13 
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the "startling success" of "these deadly contrivances", and observed that 
"the results accomplished have been enough to rout any lingering traces of 
scepticism". A thorough revision of mining policy was recommended [75], 
and significant attempts were made to improve the underwater protection of 
British warships [76]. Even the notably conservative Admiral Beresford was 
driven to observe that "the war in the Far East has ... [shown]... the 
danger of under water warfare, a danger we have been in the habit of 
under-rating in this country. " [77] 
Torpedoes exercised a similar influence on the war, though a significant 
group of naval thinkers, led by Admiral Custance, concluded an analysis 
which suggested that the Whitehead threat had been much exaggerated [78]. 
In general the torpedoes used by both sides lacked the speed and range to 
be effective, and as we have seen, few actual hits were scored. The results 
secured by those few strikes were, however, impressive; at Tsushima five of 
the Russian ships sunk suffered torpedo hits, and the four Whiteheads that 
hit the battleships Suvoroff and Navarin (two each) were directly 
responsible for the respective losses of those ships. 
Few observers seem to have commented on the far more striking moral 
effect created by torpedo warfare. Every attack caused the enemy to scatter 
or turn away in confusion, and far from being a decisive weapon used to 
deliver the coup de grace, as its proponents had expected, the Whitehead 
emerged from the war as a demoralising weapon of confusion best used 
before a gun battle, or afterwards in mopping-up operations [79]. 
The submarine also helped towards the creation of a climate of fear. 
Knowing that the Japanese had acquired some Holland boats, the Russians 
of Rodzhestvensky's Baltic squadrons wove them into their collective 
fantasies, reporting sightings of submarines in the Baltic and off Sumatra. 
Rumours that Japanese boats had taken part in the Battle of Tsushima 
[75] 'Submarine automatic mines - memorandum by Admiralty' 13 March 1905, Cab 
38/8/22 
[76] Towle op. cit. p. 197 
[77] Beresford to Balfour 7 March 1908, Balfour papers Md. Mss. 49713 
[78] Reginald Custance, 'The Whitehead torpedo in war: its use against single ships by 
surface craft and submarines' (privately printed paper read to the War College 11 June 
1914), KP 4/8 
[79] Cowpe op. cit. pp. 167-72 
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reached the British Embassy in Peking. For its part, the IJN suspected 
Russian submarines were responsible for the loss of the battleship Yashima, 
which went down in a minefield in May 1904 [80]. Russian and Japanese 
fear of the elusive submarine presaged the cautious dread that swept the 
North Sea clear of major surface units during the Great War. 
The unsuccessful prosecution of the Russo-Japanese war led, not- 
unnaturally, to a revision of Tsarist naval policy. The big-ship school, 
which had been in the ascendant since the mid-1890s, was temporarily 
discredited. An ambitious rebuilding programme put forward in 1907 to 
restore Russian supremacy over the German Baltic fleet and rectify the 
damaging shortage of naval auxiliaries felt in the Far Eastern war collapsed 
in the face of left-wing opposition from the Third Duma of 1907-12. 
The Russian parliament insisted on linking naval reconstruction with 
administrative reform, and in addition feared a recurrence of the mutinous 
fervour which swept the navy in 1905. It was not until the appointment of 
Admiral I. K. Grigorovich as naval minister in 1911 that the Tsarist navy 
began to regain its feet [81]. 
In these conditions the submarine, which was cheap and had not been 
discredited by the war, enjoyed something of a vogue. The first post-war 
Russian programme called for the creation of two 'divisions of submarines' 
- one made up of new boats and the other of obsolescent types, which 
would serve as a reserve. Seven submarines - including Krab, the world's 
first submarine minelayer - were ordered for the Black Sea fleet, and a 
further seven for the Baltic fleet, as part of the 1907-08 programme. 
Russian designs nevertheless remained experimental, and the Duma's 
financial stringency meant that all the boats were delayed and a number of 
vessels had to be funded by public subscription. In 1912 funding was 
authorised for 12 new Baltic submarines and six boats for the Pacific, and 
by 1914 there were 48 submarines in service, half of them obsolete, built 
to at least 10 different designs. The most recently completed boat available 
to the Russians was the twin-diesel engined Akula, a successful and 
heavily-armed boat which had nevertheless been laid down as early as. 
1906. 
[80] Mitchell op. cit. pp. 222,237,245; 'Battle of Ushimer Strait' I August 1905, digest cut 
lla, Adm 12/1414 
[81] NE Saul, Sailors in revolt: the Russian Baltic fleet in 1917 (Lawrence, Kansas 1978), 
pp. 4-8 
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The Russians continued to build submarines to augment their coastal 
defences and operate in support of the army, as they had done in the 
nineteenth century. The shallow waters of the Baltic were particularly suited 
to the operations of underwater craft, while the Pacific fleet needed 
submarine boats to offset the local superiority of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy; in 1909 there were five submarines in the Baltic, five in the Black 
Sea but 14 (admittedly elderly) boats in the Pacific [82]. In the west, 
successive war-games played in the period 1900-1903 suggested that a 
landing and naval assault could lead to the fall of St Petersburg [83], and 
in consequence Russian Baltic submarines were generally confined to- 
operations in front of the minefields laid in the Gulf of Finland and the 
Bay of Riga during the Great War. With some British E-class submarines 
to support them, Russian boats did venture further afield, but they were 
generally unsuccessful. 
Few up-to-date craft were available; the poorly-trained personnel 
were increasingly unwilling to venture into a sea which fast became one 
enormous minefield. When German ships were sighted, Russian submarines 
tended to launch attacks from long range, and despite years of expertise in 
underwater warfare, Russian torpedoes often failed. In 1914 and 1915,23 
torpedo attacks were delivered by boats of the Baltic flotillas, but no hits 
were secured. Black Sea submarines had more success, patrolling the 
Bosphorus, laying hundreds of mines and sinking a number of Ottoman 
auxiliaries, but they could not cut the Turks' Anatolian supply lines to 
support the army's Caucasus campaign [84]. 
Russian naval planning became considerably more ambitious in the early 
stages of the war. 30 additional submarines were projected late in 1914, 
and the Chief of the Naval General Staff called for 114 boats to be built 
by 1917-18. Some of these craft would have been monstrous 2,000-ton 
cruiser submarines, and in 1912 a plan for a 4,500 ton boat to be armed 
with 60 torpedoes and 120 mines was allegedly considered. Such grandiose 
projects were however well beyond the capabilities of the contemporary 
Russian arms industry, and during the war the Tsarist navy had to be 
[82] Anon, The present condition of submarine boats', RUSI Jo. LIII pt. 1 (1909) 
pp. 1293-4; details of the 1908 and 1912 programmes from Kipp op. cit. pp. 16-18 
[83] Mitchell op. cit. p. 288 
[84] See eg Wilson op. cit. pp. 66,180-1; Kipp op. cit. pp. 20,23-4 
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supported by a British submarine flotilla and a consignment of a dozen 
350-ton Electric Boat Co. craft from the United States [85]. 
American submarine development was in its way as disappointing as that 
of Russia. At the turn of the century, the United States possessed 
submarine boats every bit as good as, and considerably more promising 
than, those of the French. But the US Navy was not enthusiastic about the 
new weapon. As we have seen, the private Holland company was largely 
responsible for creating what submarine designs there were, and the 
unrealistic specifications of the navy department had led to the construction 
of the unworkable Plunger. 
Having acquired a far better boat in the Holland VI, the USN 
singularly failed to take advantage of its good fortune; as the British naval 
attache noted late in December 1900, "even now the navy are very 
lukewarm as regards these boats. Few that I have met put any faith in 
them, except as being small beginnings from which great things may come. " 
[86] There were several reasons for this failure. For one thing, American 
home waters were considerably less vulnerable than those of Russia; for 
another, the perfection of the submarine coincided with a significant attempt 
to expand the US surface fleet with the eventual aim of making it 'a navy 
second to none'. The USN emerged from the Spanish-American war with 
considerable credit, and the conflict - fought far from America's own 
shores - did much to popularise a Mahanite conception of sea-power. 
There was an empire newly-won to be defended from avaricious rivals 
such as Germany and Japan, and the navy, encouraged by President 
Roosevelt, entered a period of rapid expansion in which emphasis was 
placed on building up its battleship strength. The fleet that emerged was 
noticeably top-heavy, deficient not only in submarines but in cruisers and 
destroyers as well [87]. 
The state of the turn-of-the-century US arms industry also slowed the 
pace of American submarine development. Construction was left in the 
hands of two small firms, the Holland and Lake companies - the former 
[85] Mitchell op. cit. p. 290 
(86] Quoted in 'Extracts from naval attaches' reports', HMS Vernon annual report 1901, 
Adm 189/21 p. 153 
[87] Cf. RW Turk, 'Defending the new empire, 1900-1914' in KJ Hagan, ed, In peace 
and war: interpretations of American naval history, 1775-1984 (Westport, Connecticut 
1984) pp. 186-205 
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having a virtual monopoly. Neither received significant support from the 
USN, and the evolution of the American submarine therefore depended 
upon the limited research and development conducted by private concerns. 
The USN treated its suppliers warily, and failed to co-operate with them 
as fully as did the British Admiralty with its contractors. Although the 
United States developed its submarines from the same Holland type chosen 
by the United Kingdom, therefore, it did so both less ambitiously and 
rather less successfully. The average American submarine was smaller, had 
an inferior radius of action, and was less heavily armed than its British 
contemporary. 
Thus, while both the American and British submarine programmes were 
similarly coherent, the USN lagged behind from the start. The British 
Hollands were (as we saw in section 2) put in hand after the United States 
laid down its own, nearly-identical Adder class, but they were in service 
some months before the American boats. The Adder's periscope was 
distinctly inferior to the British type, and as late as 1905 ventilator 
problems meant that she was taking a quite unacceptable 28 minutes to 
dive [88]. The United States had eight submarines built or building in 1900, 
but only ten more were added in the next seven years and in 1910 only 18 
boats were in service; by then the British had 60 [89]. The USN did 
introduce twin-shaft propulsion, but was well behind the Royal Navy when 
it came to developing the diesel engine. The RN fitted an experimental 
model to A13 in 1905, while the Americans persevered with the petrol 
motor until the Skipjack was commissioned in 1911: a significant failing. 
Nor did the United States follow Britain's lead away from the basic Holland 
type by fitting 'saddle tanks' for water ballast and using the extra space 
created inside the pressure hull to enhance habitability and create boats 
capable of operating overseas. By 1914 the USN had, produced the H class 
submarine -a boat as good, in her way, as the British E, and one that 
was successful in British service. But she was 300 tons smaller, less 
seaworthy and had diesels which, though they were capable of similar 
speeds, developed barely half the horsepower of the British engines. 
American submarine development was further retarded by a variety of 
[88] 'United States: fleet, dockyards &c. ' in 'Reports on naval affairs 1904' vol.!!, NID 
No. 745, January 1905, Adm 231142 
[89] William Jameson, The most formidable thing: the story of the submarine from its 
earliest days to the end of World War I (London 1965) pp. 94,103 
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factors. To begin with, the USN was never able to decide between the 
rival Lake and Holland designs. Simon Lake had competed against Holland 
in the 1893 USN competition, and by 1902 the Connecticut Yankee had 
completed three prototype boats. But Lake's submarines were not conceived 
on the same lines as Holland's; the inventor believed underwater craft had 
commercial potential and envisaged their use for cable maintenance, oyster 
fishing and salvage. Lake boats were fitted with diving chambers, 
cable-cutting apparatus and wheels for running along the seabed - 
modifications that failed to impress the British Admiralty, which commented: 
"All this class of appliance is absolutely out of place in a sea-going 
submarine... it is precisely as reasonable to suggest fitting destroyers with 
buckets so that they can be used in their spare moments as dredgers. " [90] 
A succession of competitive trials (1907) indicated that both the Lake 
and Holland types had considerable merits, but it was generally felt that 
the Electric Boat Co. 's Octopus was superior to the Simon Lake X [91]. 
However the government refused to allow the EBC a monopoly, and 
ordered three Lake submarines of the G class between 1910 and 1912, and 
three more as part of the L class in 1914 [92]. 
Further problems were caused by the suggestion that flotillas of 
underwater craft might provide a cheap alternative to a surface fleet. The 
revival of the USN as an ocean-going force dated only to the mid-1880s, 
and civilian navalists and many serving officers feared that America might 
revert to her old, cheap policy of maintaining a navy suitable only for 
coast defence. As Isaac Rice informed Vickers, the USN was therefore 
"opposed to submarine boats for the reason - as ex-President Roosevelt 
told me several years ago - that they fear that if they advocate 
submarines, Congress will no longer vote for battleships. " [93] 
One final bone of contention was the damaging division of responsibility 
for the naval aspects of coastal defence. The Army artillery corps, which 
[90) Admiralty note marked 'Letter enclosed by Sir Andrew Noble', nd (1905), d'Eyncourt 
papers DEY 6, National Maritime Museum 
[91] 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1906-07' (USA), NID No. 834, September 1907 
pp. 120-4, Adm 231/48 
[92] Bayly to Sturdee 6 December 1901, Adm 1/7529; Rice to Vickers 24 February 1903, 
Vickers Papers VP 632/161 fols. 17-19, Cambridge University Library; Rice to Vickers 8 
November 1909, ibid fol. 124 
[93) Rice to Albert Vickers 30 December 1910, ibid fol. 133. See also Frank Cable, The 
birth and development of the American submarine (New York 1924) p. 171 
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- like the Royal Engineers - was charged with the maintenance of mine 
defences, took an early interest in submarines, and the ensuing coast 
defence debate aroused a great deal of acrimony between the two services. 
Matters were not helped by the army's declared preference for the Lake 
type ("a most valuable auxiliary to the fixed mine defences... it will give 
the nearest approach to absolute protection now known" [94]), which was 
designed to allow divers in and out of the boat for the inspection or 
destruction of minefields [95]. 
The submarine was, nevertheless, a useful addition to the American 
naval arsenal. In the early years of the twentieth century, US attention was 
fixed firmly on the Caribbean, where territories seized during the 
Spanish-American war seemed threatened by an expansionist Germany. The 
Venezualan disputes and the construction of a Panamanian canal in their 
different ways suggested that the USN could and should concentrate its 
battleships in the Atlantic, and in 1905 all capital ships were withdrawn 
from the Pacific theatre [96]. This strategy left the Philippines and the 
Hawaiian Islands exposed to the growing threat of Japan, and the American 
'Orange plan' of 1907 assumed that in the event of war between the two 
powers, the IJN would have a free hand in the Pacific for several months. 
During this time the Japanese were expected to attack both Manila and 
Honolulu, as well as Samoa, Guam and the Panama canal [97]. To 
compensate for this weakness, about half of America's submarine force was 
sent to the Pacific between 1909 and 1914. Six Adders went to the 
Phillipines in 1909, to be joined in 1912 by the three boats of the Viper 
class. Several Carps were despatched to Honolulu, while Octopus-type 
submarines were used to patrol the approaches to the Panamanian canal. 
Before 1914, therefore, American submarine policy was definitely 
defensive. The USN boats in service at that date were all short-range 
[941 Quoted in 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1904' (USA), NID No. 738, July 1904 
p. 90, Adm 231/41. For an analysis of US coast defence policy, particularly in the 
nineteenth century, see Robert Browning III, Two if by sea: the development of American 
coastal defense policy (Westport, Connecticut 1983), esp. pp. 161 -7 
[95] 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1904' (USA), NID No. 738, July 1904 p. 90, 
Adm 231/41; 'United States: fleet, dockyards &c' in 'Reports on naval affairs 1904' vol. 11, 
NID No. 745, January 1905, Adm 231/42. See also Army board report 'Submarine boats in 
their military aspect of submarine defence' nd (1904), Naval Library pamphlet P. 475 
196] Turk op. cit. p. 187 
197] 1bid p. 196 
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coastal craft, and a fair proportion were obsolesecent. The huge distances 
that separated the United States from any potential enemy discouraged 
consideration of more ambitious projects, for many years. 'Fleet' submarines 
were not developed until 1915. American policy, though sensible, thus 
contained few lessons for the RN since it developed broadly parallel to, but 
slightly behind, British submarine strategy. 
The foreign context - France 
The French navy, on the other hand, continued to develop submarines with 
some enthusiasm. None of the great naval powers could match France's 
commitment to underwater warfare, which was maintained at the expense of 
her battleship and cruiser programmes; for three consecutive years 
(1906-08) the proportion of the French construction estimates devoted to 
submarines topped 20%, and in the period 1901-1914 it averaged 15.3%. 
In Great Britain, submarine building never represented more than 9.5% of 
total construction, while in Germany the maximum was 13.4%, in 1914. 
'British and German averages (for the years 1901-1914 and 1905-1914 
respectively) were 4.9% and 7.9% of the construction estimates [see 
appendix 3]. 
Unfortunately for the French, the Marine Francaise never developed 
submarines as consistently as did the British and German navies. Rival 
designers made furious attacks on each other; successive Ministers of Marine 
spent much of their time undoing the work of their predecessors. There 
were long and bitter disputes between the proponents of true submarines - 
boats powered solely by electric motors which were intended to patrol 
submerged in the approaches to a port during the day, returning to 
recharge their batteries at a shore station by night - and those who 
contended that longer-range 'submersibles' [98], with improved buoyancy 
and diesel or steam engines for running on the surface (which meant that 
batteries could be recharged at sea), were the only sensible way forward. 
The debate began with the commissioning of the Narval in 1900, and was 
I 
[98] Since the French made a distinction between 'submarine' and 'submersible', I have 
adopted their usage in this section. Elsewhere in the thesis, the term 'submarine' is 
applied, in the British sense, to all submergible boats. 
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not settled in favour of the submersible until about 1909 [99]. 
The Narval was the world's first double-hulled submersible. Her design 
called for the pressure hull, which had to be circular to present the best 
possible resistance to water pressure, to be sheathed in an outer shell. This 
second hull housed large ballast tanks which gave increased buoyancy on 
the surface (but slowed diving time), and was designed to improve 
sea-keeping. The inventor, a naval architect named Maxime Laubeuf, also 
provided the boat with a reasonably efficient dual-propulsion system. His 
plans won an open competition similar to those organised in the United 
States, defeating 28 other entries. 
The Narval was not, in fact, a large boat, being of only 117/202 
tonnes displacement; at 111 ft she was 48ft shorter than the old Gustave 
Zede. She was, however, an advance on her contemporary, the submarine 
Morse, whose displacement of 143/149 tonnes left a tiny safety margin of 
six tonnes positive buoyancy (4%). (By way of comparison, the British A 
class had a 9% margin, while French submersibles of the Brumaire class 
boasted 28% positive buoyancy. ) Morse, which had originally been designed 
for petrol/electric propulsion, was completed with only a single-shaft 
electric motor. The French followed these two boats, Morse and Narval, 
with numerous classes of submarines and submersibles. The Morse was 
succeeded by six similar submarines (two of them paid for by a public 
subscription raised by Le Malin) and twenty tiny (71/74 tonne) 
harbour-defence vessels of the Naiade class. Meanwhile six improved 
Narvals were ordered in 1900, only four of which were eventually 
delivered. 
Plainly an assessment of the relative virtues of submarine and 
submersible was called for, and between 1901 and 1903 three experimental 
craft (named X, Y and Z) were laid down. They were provided with a 
variety of engines for surface propulsion: Z had a diesel engine, Xa 
twin-shaft benzol motor and Y an experimental closed-cycle diesel. When 
the most successful (and most orthodox) of these boats, the submarine Z, 
was completed, she was matched against the latest submersible, Aigrette - 
the world's first diesel-engined boat - in a series of competitive trials 
held at Cherbourg in March 1904. 
[99] On the general development of French naval policy in this period, see John Walser, 
France's search for a battlefleet: French naval policy 1898-1914 (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) 1976). Walser discusses the uncertainty of 
French strategic policy on several occasions - cf. pp. 49-50,107-11,199-200,406. 
5.3 THE SUBMARINE POLICIES OF RIVAL POWERS 
®1 
The trials were authorised by the Minister of Marine, Camille Pelletan. 
Pelletan favoured submarine development, and according to one authority, 
"at no point during his ministerial career did he question the assumption 
that the submarine and the torpedo boat were superior to the armour and 
artillery of the battleship. " [1001 He accepted that future designs would 
have to be larger to ensure better seakeeping, but stressed the virtues of 
minimal surface buoyancy: "The chief guarantee that a submarine posseses 
against destruction is that of being able to disappear quickly, " proclaimed 
the Minister, "and it is this quality that gives superiority to the submarine 
proper over the submersible type. " [101] Pelletan felt strongly enough on 
the subject to cancel an order for 11 improved Aigrettes in 1902, allegedly 
to show his dislike for Laubeuf, the designer. Paradoxically, however, the 
trials which he had ordered conclusively proved the versatility of the 
submersible. 
Surface and submerged speed, diving time and habitability were 
compared. To the surprise of all concerned, the Aigrette proved herself 
superior in each instance, winning even the tests of diving time and 
performance submerged in which Z had been expected to have the edge. In 
fact the submarine managed only 4.1 knots underwater - her design had 
called for 7.1 knots - and took a full ten minutes to dive when ordered 
to do so unexpectedly; before the trials began her advertised diving time 
had been around 90 seconds. The Aigrette was only a third of a knot 
outside her designed submerged speed of 6.7 knots, and dived in five and a 
half minutes - impressive for the day, if still a dangerously slow time by 
the standards of the First World War [1021. 
Pelletan was dismissed in January 1905, and his successor, Gaston 
Thomson, proved to be a proponent of the submersible. Thomson cancelled 
as many as possible of the tiny 44-ton Guepe type submarines favoured by 
his predecessor and made plans to substitute a smaller number of 
submersibles. However the change in policy caused a hiatus in French 
construction, which had already suffered from Pelletan's attempts to 
introduce sweeping changes; no boats were commissioned in the year 
[100] Ibid p. 199 
(101] Speech by Pelletan (December 1903) reported in 'Foreign naval progress and 
estimates 1904' (France) NID No. 738, July 1904 pp. 39-40, Adm 231/41 
(102] 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1905' (France) NID No. 776, July 1905 
pp. 18-19, Adm 231/44 
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1906-07, and the completion dates of those ordered under the 1906 
programme were put back to 1909 or 1910 [103]. 
The inefficient and strike-ridden French dockyards took years longer 
than their foreign rivals to build submarines in the pre-war period. The 
submersible Amiral Bourgois was ordered under the 1906 programme and 
not completed until 1914, and in 1908 Brassey's naval annual noted that 
"it appears that of 53 submarines and submersibles laid down from 1903 to 
1907 not one has been completed for service, although four are under trial 
and six others have been launched, the rest being in hand or existing only 
on paper. " [104] Dockyard inefficiency was compounded by the navy's 
tendency to delay construction while conducting trials with its numerous 
experimental vessels - with results that can only have reinforced SS Hall's 
commitment to a policy of homogeneity and infrequent improvements in 
materiel. In addition, the large numbers of boats under construction at any 
one time meant that the estimates were sometimes eked out in a ridiculous 
way. For example, £12,216 was spent on the submarine Naiade in 1902 of 
an estimated total cost of £14,600. In 1903 expenditure was £1,857, and 
the boat was still in shipyard hands in 1904, £712 being appropriated for 
work on her in the estimates for that year. In 1906, £68,752 was 
earmarked for the construction of the submarines Emeraude, Opale and 
Rubis; next year work on the three boats, together, cost the French Navy 
£670 [105]. 
By early 1914, the French had submarines and submersibles of nineteen 
different classes or sub-classes built and building. 28 separate types had 
been constructed or projected since 1885. Only three classes of submarine 
were built in any numbers - there were 20 tiny Naiades (all of them 
stricken just before the war) and 34 boats of the Brumaire and Pluvoise 
classes. These latter types were nearly identical, 18 steam-powered 
Pluvoises being built to a Laubeuf design between 1905 and 1911 while 16 
diesel-engined Brumaires, with the same hull but slightly greater speed, 
were ordered in 1905-06 and completed between 1912 and 1914. 
The backwardness of French naval technology was exacerbated by both 
[103) 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1906-07' (France) NID No. 834, September 
1907 pp. 9-11, Adm 231/48; Murray Sueter, Evolution of the submarine boat, mine and 
torpedo, Portsmouth 1907, pp. 105-06 
[104) BNA 1908 p. 20; see also Walser op. cit. pp. 22,134 
[105) See BNA 1902,1903,1904,1906,1907 for breakdowns of French naval estimates. 
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shortage of funds and the strategic uncertainty that pervaded the Marine 
Francaise before the war. The navy had to make do with construction 
estimates of £3-4 million per annum while the British and German 
estimates spiralled upwards to top £13 million and £9 million respectively, 
and French preoccupation with the Prussian military threat not unnaturally 
dominated the issue of national defence, causing funds to be diverted to the 
army. To make matters worse, Pelletan persisted in treating the navy as an 
administrative and budgetary unit rather than as a combat arm, curtailing 
manoeuvres and exercises, and discouraging staff work and planning as the 
tools of warlike nations. Naval bases were run down, and individual ships 
were kept on the active list into extreme old age [106]. 
Although Gaston Thomson and his successors largely reversed Pelletan's 
policies, their effect on the efficiency of the French Navy had not been 
entirely overcome by 1914. Traditionally second among the world's naval 
powers, France had dropped to an inglorious fourth place by 1914 - 
behind Britain, Germany and the United States, and roughly level with 
Japan. Her naval strategy was undermined by unexpected political and 
military developments, beginning with the entente cordiale. The great 
French ports never came under attack, the country's numerous harbour 
defence boats were not required to go into action during the Great War, 
and the British and Italians necessarily shouldered much of the burden of 
blockading the German and Austrian fleets, robbing French submersibles of 
a possible role in the war at sea. 
In the pre-war period most French submarines and submersibles were 
in any case designed for coast defence. The Marine Francaise was probably 
the first navy to recognise the implications underwater craft had for the 
blockade and for the naval defence of colonies. The success of submarine 
flotillas in the 1902 manoeuvres, wrote one French submariner, was 
"sufficiently considerable to enable it to be confidently affirmed that, with 
the present boats, imperfect as they may be, an enemy will suffer severe 
loss in attempting to enter or leave a port the approaches to which are 
guarded by hostile submarines. " [107] Submarines and submersibles were 
soon distributed around the coasts and overseas as part of the country's 
I 
[106] Walser op. cit. pp. 217-18 
[107] Precis of report by Commander Heilmann of the French submarine service in 
'French manoeuvres 1902' NID No. 692, June 1903 p. 65, Adm 231/37 
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defences mobiles. From 1903 flotillas were stationed along the French 
Mediterranean littoral and at Bizerta on the Tunisean coast, promising 
domination of appreciable areas of sea [108]. "With torpedo boats and 
submarines, " Pelletan maintained, "what do we have to fear for our 
colonies? " [109] 
Most French submarine boats were, however, kept in home waters to 
guard a chain of ports de refuge intended to give battle squadrons 
protection from torpedo craft or superior enemy forces. "It may be said 
that the sole reason for fortifying many of the French ports was that by so 
doing the places fortified would be made into retreats in which French 
fighting vessels would be safe from their pursuers, " a British report 
observed [110]. 
French boats frequently proved their worth in harbour defence roles. In 
the 1906 Mediterranean manoeuvres, submarines guarding Marseilles 
torpedoed 14 of the 23 warships attacking the port, scoring at least 18 hits. 
Three days later, a second operation saw the same boats protecting a 
defeated squadron bottled up in Marseilles by a larger fleet. Very similar 
results were obtained on this occasion, 14 of the 22 attacking ships being 
hit by a total of 23 torpedoes. Conditions were favourable for torpedo 
attack, and the surface fleet was not permitted to counter as vigorously as 
it might have done, but the manoeuvres did demonstrate the dangers of 
closely blockading a port defended by torpedo flotillas [111). After the 
exercises had been terminated, Vice-Admiral Fournier, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the defences mobiles (who had been, it should be 
noted, a fervent proponent of underwater craft since about 1898), 
announced that submarines had torpedoed his flagship eight times in the 
manoeuvre period and had prevented him from carrying out several of his 
intended plans [112]. 
Britain and France differed fundamentally on the question of port 
[108] 'France: fleet, dockyards &c. ' in 'Reports on foreign naval affairs 1904', NID 
No. 712, August 1904 p. 68, Adm 231/39 
1109] Quoted in Walser, op. cit. p. 221 
[110] 'France: coast defences' vol. 11, NID No. 729, August 1904 p. 5, Adm 231/41 
[111] 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1906-07' (France) NIP No. 834, September 
1907 pp. 28-9, Adm 231/48 
[112] Sueter op. cit. pp. 109-110; Herbert Fyfe, Submarine warfare (2nd edition, London 
1907) p. 18. On Fournier's personal beliefs, see Walser op. cit. pp. 19.64,69,165-7,242 
5.3 THE SUBMARINE POLICIES OF RIVAL POWERS 
0 
defence policy. British submarines were (as we shall - see) intended to 
safeguard harbours and the coasts in the absence of the surface fleet; 
French boats were there to protect ships. From this point of view, Gallic 
interest in small, manouevrable short-range vessels made sense. British 
submarines had to secure long stretches of coastline against possible invasion 
or raids. They would operate, moreover, in the heavy seas around the 
British Isles. French boats protecting a newly-arrived battle-squadron could 
predict with more certainty just where and when an attack would be 
delivered. Knowing this, and having only the approaches of a port de 
refuge to patrol, continually-submerged, electrically -powered submarines 
designed for optimum underwater performance might have the edge over a 
larger submersible which would have to crash dive when an enemy hove 
into view and then operate in shallow and confined waters. The weakness 
of France's construction policy was that many of her all - electric 
submarines never really embodied the theoretical virtues of the type. When 
naval planners began to envisage more ambitious roles for their submarine 
flotillas, important shortcomings were laid bare. 
It did not take much imagination to envisage the submarine boats that 
so effectively protected their own ports creating havoc in the harbours of 
an enemy. The idea of infiltrating defended ports had been mooted in the 
1890s, but there is little evidence that it was popular among policy-makers 
until about 1905-06, when the navy reverted to the construction of 
400-ton submersibles [113]. Even then, the more seaworthy submersibles 
produced in large and homogenous classes by the Thomson administration 
were still designated 'defensive' weapons; their longer range was intended to 
permit the defence of the whole coastline rather than the immediate 
approaches to a port. From 1906 flotillas were based at Toulon, Rochefort, 
Cherbourg, Dunkirk, Bizerta and Saigon [114], and a number of large 
coastal or 'anti-blockade' submersibles of the Gorgone and Clorinde classes 
were ordered as late as 1909-12 - years that saw Britain and Germany 
step up production of 'overseas' submarines. 
The French did, however, develop a number of plans for deploying 
boats off an enemy's coast. In the 1909 manoeuvres, two Pluvoise class 
steam submersibles and the submarine Emeraude were sent 400 miles to 
I 
[113] Cf. Lees report 'Proposed experimental submarine boat' 16 November 1905, Adm 
1381360A section 12 
[114] Arthur Hezlet, The submarine and sea-power, London 1967 p. 18 
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blockade Cherbourg. They remained on a diving patrol off the port for 
three days, and the exercise indicated that the submersibles, at least, could 
have remained on station longer if necessary. Several Pluvoises performed 
impressive feats of navigation in the same period; one, the Papin, made an 
unescorted 1230 mile journey from Cherbourg to Oran - across a stormy 
Bay of Biscay - and covered 2,300 miles in three weeks [115]. 
Work on purpose-built sous-marins de haut mere was, nevertheless, 
still in its infancy when war broke out. Four experimental craft of varied 
design - Amiral Bourgois, Charles Brun, Archimede and Mariotte - were 
ordered between 1906 and 1908, but of these only the Archimede 
(completed 1911) and the less-than-satisfactory Mariotte (1913) were 
serviceable in August 1914. The equally experimental Gustave Zede joined 
them shortly after the outbreak of war; she was one of two winners of a 
competition to produce a 'high seas' submersible organised in 1909 [116]. 
French submarines and submersibles gave valuable but unspectacular 
service in the Great War; the majority served out the hostilities as port 
defence craft or on patrol in the Mediterranean. It is difficult, and perhaps 
unfair, to compare the performances of Entente submarines, but the Marine 
Francaise was disappointed by the performance of its boats. An unsuccessful 
attempt to send the submarine Mariotte (popularly known as 'the 
toothbrush' in reference to her unusual hull-form) into the Sea of 
Marmara in July 1915 caused the depressed Admiral Guepratte to confide 
to Keyes that though French "had taken such pride in their submarine 
service before the war, and thought they were the best, we went 
everywhere as we liked, our crews were splendid - they with the best 
intentions were always failing. " [117] 
The foreign context - Germany 
For a nation later so intimately associated with the submarine, Germany 
paid little attention to underwater warfare before 1914. The first U-boat 
[115] Jameson op. cit. pp. 93-4 
[116] Henri Le Masson, Les sau-marins Francais, des origenes (1800) a nos jours (Brest 
1980) pp. 114-16 
[117] Keyes to his wife 30 July 1915, KP 2113, in Halpern I p. 172. See also Jameson 
op. cit. p. 144; Compton-Hall op. cit. pp. 90-1; Kenneth Edwards, We dive at dawn 
(London 1939) pp. 90-2 
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was not commissioned until 1906, and in 1914 the Imperial German Navy 
had only 29 boats to set against the RN total of 72. However, most of 
these submarines were of large, seaworthy types and proved perfectly suited 
to commerce raiding. 
Individual Germans did show considerable interest in underwater craft. 
At the inaugural meeting of the Technical Shipbuilding Society (1899), the 
chairman, Professor Busley, gave a speech on submarine development to 
date at the specific request of the Kaiser. The navy's Torpedo Inspectorate, 
charged with monitoring foreign submarine development, also favoured 
construction [118], and a low-key research programme was instituted at the 
Imperial dockyard at Danzig [119). 
But proponents of the submarine faced intractable opposition from 
Alfred von Tirpitz, the State Secretary for the Navy, who was responsible 
for a revolution in Imperial naval policy. In the 1890s, Germany's economic 
and military domination of continental Europe was not reflected in its 
overseas trade and colonial possessions; and given the Mahanite climate of 
the age, a reassessment of Imperial policy was widely favoured. Tirpitz's 
solution to the problem of German naval inferiority - the famous 'Risk 
theory' - was startling in its originality and staggering in its implications. 
The idea that Wilhelmine Germany should fight a Franco-Russian alliance 
with cruiser squadrons (favoured by Tirpitz's predecessor, Hollmann) was 
abandoned. The new State Secretary was determined to build a fleet that 
could challenge British naval superiority. He persuaded the Reichstag to 
adopt an ambitious and irreversible programme of capital ship construction, 
cancelled programmes he felt were diverting funds from battleship 
construction, and propounded the big-ship doctrine of the 'decisive battle' 
[120]. 
Tirpitz's plan required considerable political nerve from its creator. The 
Reichstag would reject any indisciplined scheme for a 'limitless fleet', and 
had to be assured that the new projections were both precise and unlikely 
to be supplemented by unexpected demands for the construction of other 
[118] Eberhard Rossler, The U boat: the technical history of German submarine 
construction (London 1975) pp. 17-19 
[119] GE Weir, 'Tirpitz, technology and building U-boats, 1897-1916' in International 
History Review, May 1984, p. 178 
[120] Jonathan Steinburg, Yesterday's deterrent: Tirpitz and the birth of the German 
battlefleet (London 1965) esp. pp. 101,120-3,127 
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warships. Tirpitz thus developed a sharp sense of priorities. The Grand 
Admiral was well aware that he could not afford to give his opponents the 
opportunity to criticise him for extravagence; everything, including 
experiments with submarines, had to be subordinated to the Risk Theory if 
it was to carried through successfully [121]. "The consistency of his strategic 
doctrine and his devotion to the battleship became both a professional 
trademark and a factor supporting his political power, " notes Gary Weir 
[1221. 
Asked to justify this position by pro-submarine elements in the 
Reichstag in May 1904, the Grand Admiral gave it as his opinion that 
"submarine will be of only secondary consideration in the formation of a 
navy, and they will bring about no great revolution, unless other technical 
difficulties are solved" [123]. He declared that Germany should wait another 
two years before obtaining and testing some boats [124]. In conversation 
with the British naval attache, Reginald Allerby, Tirpitz expressed a similar 
opinion: "He... believes that on service there will be few opportunities for 
a submarine to fire a torpedo with any effect, " Allerby reported in March 
1905. Tirpitz told the attache that "we are, of course, going to try them", 
but did "not anticipate great results. " [125] The Imperial navy remained 
highly critical of the slightest technical inadequacy in foreign boats, drawing 
attention to the defects of its rivals' periscopes in tones that closely parallel 
the British strictures of the 1850s [126], and emphasising that submarines 
had not as yet shown themselves useful for anything more than coastal 
defence [127]. 
German reluctance to experiment with submarines was compounded by 
the Navy's refusal to commit government money to fund research. Tirpitz 
[121] Ibid pp. 67,78,128-30 
[122] Weir op. cit. pp. 175,178 
[123) Tirpitz quoted in 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1904' (Germany), NID 
No. 738, July 1904 p. 74, Adm 231/41 
[124] Quoted in Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, conflict, innovation: a study of 
German naval strategic planning, 1888-1940 (Lund 1973) p. 59 
(125) Report of 4 March 1905, in 'Naval attaches' reports Berlin, 1906-1914', Ca2053, 
Naval Library 
[126] Gemzell loc. cit. 
[127] Report of 4 March 1905, in 'Naval attaches' reports Berlin, 1906-1914', Ca2053, 
Naval Library; Weir op. cit. p. 180 
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insisted that private arms firms should bear the risk of developing new 
technology - as he had done in the late 1890s when several arms firms 
began to develop improved armour plating. The Admiral also encouraged 
private firms to design their own turbines when it would have been cheaper 
and quicker for the navy to build them under licence from Charles Parsons 
[128]. 
Several German arms firms did take an interest in submarine 
construction; the Howaldt Yard at Kiel had built boats to private designs in 
1891 and 1897 [1291, and in 1902 Germaniawerft, a Kiel shipyard owned 
by the Krupp armaments conglomerate, hired a Spanish submarine designer 
named RL d'Equevilley-Montjustin. D'Equevilley had been associated with 
Maxime Laubeuf in Paris, but sought work in Germany after his designs 
had been turned down by the French naval ministry in 1901. (There were 
persistent, but unfounded, rumours that he had fled with the plans for 
Laubeuf's latest submersible, the Aigrette. ) Germaniawerft advised Krupp 
that it would be worth building an experimental boat to the Spaniard's 
design, and early in 1902 FA Krupp authorised construction of a 16-tonne 
prototype, Forelle. The submarine was completed by June 1903 and 
underwent six months of trials, during which period she was visited by both 
the Kaiser and his brother, Prince Heinrich. The latter, a senior naval 
officer, took part in a diving trial, and the head of the Torpedo 
Inspectorate, Rear Admiral Zeye, also looked over the boat on several 
occasions [130]. 
Germaniawerft was still unable to interest the Navy Office (RMA) - 
the department responsible for procurement - in submarine construction, 
and a projected 200-ton boat for the Dutch navy was never built. In 
1904, however, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war brightened this 
gloomy outlook. Two Russian naval officers inspected the Forelle in March, 
and a month later the German firm secured a contract for three larger 
submarines; for good measure the Russians purchased Forelle as well. 
D'Equevilley produced the plans for three 205-ton boats of a 
double-hulled type influenced by Laubeuf's designs, but like the Forelle 
1128] Weir op. cit. pp. 176-8 
[124] Rossler op. cit. pp. 14-15 
[130] Ibid pp. 15-17 
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fitted with Korting paraffin engines for surface propulsion. Petrol engines 
were considered too dangerous; the designs were drawn up only months 
after serious petrol explosions had disabled the British submarines AI and 
Holland No. 2 and the American Fulton. The Germania submarines - 
Karp, Karas and Kambala - were completed in 1905 and taken over by 
the Russians, who sent them to the Black Sea. 
By this time Tirpitz had sufficiently secured his political position to risk 
separating (after "special and particular reflections") the appropriations for 
torpedo boats and submarines from his Fleet Bill [131]. He was now free 
to order submarine boats, but still did so with extreme reluctance. 
However, the Grand Admiral's requirement that the preliminary work be 
done by the private arms industry at no cost to the state had been met, 
and it was increasingly clear that the modern submarine was a capable, 
seaworthy warship. "I refused to throw away money on submarines so long 
as they could only cruise in home waters, " wrote Tirpitz in his memoirs. 
"As soon as seagoing boats were built, however, I was the first to 
encourage them on a large scale. " [132] 
Like Britain, Germany acquired its first submarines to assess the 
potential of underwater craft. It had comparatively little need to build boats 
for local defence - the ports on its short North Sea coastline were already 
well-protected by natural defences and costly fortifications [133] - and 
preferred to construct submarines capable of operating overseas. The 
Germans, like the British before them, thus entered the field of submarine 
construction almost on a par with their foreign rivals, who had only 
recently begun to build longer range submarines themselves. 
The specifications set out for Germany's first boats were certainly 
rigorous enough to indicate a serious concern for seaworthiness. The RMA 
particularly required its submarines to cope with rough weather in the Bight 
and demanded safe engines - which meant using paraffin again [134]. The 
contract for UI (April 1904) went to Germaniawerft, but progress was slow, 
[131] Tirpitz quoted in 'Foreign naval progress and estimates 1904' (Germany), NIL 
No. 738, July 1904 p. 74, Adm 231/41 
[132] Tirpitz, My memoirs (London 1919) p. 138 
[133] Report of 14 April 1910, in 'Naval attaches' reports Berlin, 1906-1914', Ca2053, 
Naval Library 
[134] Rossler op. cit. pp. 19-21 
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and in 1905 a plan calling for the construction of two single-hulled and 
six larger double-hulled boats was abandoned [135]. U1 was essentially a 
copy of the Karps, redesigned in places because the Russians had required 
a boat which could be broken up for transport overland; the fearsome 
U-boat flotillas of World War I were developed from a design produced 
by a Spaniard adapting French ideas to meet Russian specifications. 
UI was delayed both by her redesign and by the low building priority 
accorded to her; she was delivered (twelve months late) in December 1906, 
arousing little excitement. Her completion was not reported by the German 
naval press until October 1907 [136], and the director of the Germania 
yard informed the British naval attache that he regarded submarines "as 
mere toys", albeit toys with a future [137]. U1 displaced 238/278 tons, had 
a range of 1,400 miles at 8 knots, a speed of 9/8.5 knots, and a single 
torpedo tube. But she managed a 587-mile round-trip in the North Sea 
shortly after commissioning; the first cruise by British submarines (1903) 
resulted in three of the five Hollands breaking down in the first few miles 
and none managing to circumnavigate the Isle of Wight [138]. 
The RMA now embarked on a programme designed to produce 
submarines with a 2,000 mile radius of action (1,000 miles at high speed), 
armed with 4 torpedo tubes and capable of 15/10.5 knots [139]. The order 
for U2 went to the Danzig navy yard in March 1906; she was half as big 
again as U1, and her successors, U3 and U4, displaced 414/502 tons. All 
these boats were essentially experimental models. Each was accorded low 
priority, and the U2 (fitted with a new and troublesome Daimler paraffin 
engine in an attempt to meet the unrealistic specified surface speed) was in 
builder's hands for three years. U5-U8 were not ordered until 1908; a 
year later, however, Admiral Zeye died and his successor, Lans, ordered 
four more boats and began to accelerate the programme. 
Submarine construction estimates were doubled in 1908 and had 
[135] Ibid p. 17 
[136] Holger Herwig, 'Luxury' fleet: the Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (London 1980) 
p. 87 
[137] 'Germany: fleet, dockyards &c. ' in 'Reports on naval affairs 1907', NID No. 797, 
October 1907 p. 46, Adm 231/46 
[138] Reginald Bacon, From 1900 onward (London 1940) pp. 64-5 
[139] Jameson op. cit. p. 99 
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doubled again by 1910. In 1906, Germany had planned to build only 20 
submarines by 1920, but a new programme calling for six boats a year was 
introduced in 1912, with the aim of creating a 72-boat submarine service 
[140]. The Korting paraffin engine, which belched smoke and sparks and 
rendered German submarines visible for miles, even at night, was succeeded 
by diesels from August 1910; the first set was fitted to U19. The new 
engines drove the submarine at 15/9 knots and gave her a range of 7,600 
miles at 8 knots, five times that of U1. Just as importantly, the German 
blast-injection design was less likely to make smoke than the Vickers 
solid-injection diesel [141]. U-boats were now taken more seriously by 
many naval men. The submarine school in Kiel was opened in 1912, and 
in 1913 an independent U-boat Inspectorate was established. 
But Tirpitz remained unconvinced by the claims advanced for German 
submarines. The Grand Admiral was not unaware that many proponents of 
the new weapon were personally hostile to him, that the submarine 
provided a rallying point for opponents of his regime, and that some 
parliamentarians advocated submarine construction as a cheap but effective 
alternative to his big-ship programmes [142]. He allowed U-boats to 
participate in the 1909 manoeuvres only reluctantly, and prevented them 
from doing so in 1910 and 1911. In 1912, however, Tirpitz's absence from 
Berlin gave Admiral von Capelle the chance to include submarines in the 
fleet exercises once again. They scored some impressive successes in their 
11 days at sea; only two of the 12 U-boats participating were ruled out of 
action, and that dozen were credited with sinking more ships than the 80 
destroyers and torpedo boats present [143]. 
Tirpitz and his supporters refused to pay close attention to the results 
of the 1912 manoeuvres. In 1914, German naval operations plans still 
envisaged that the majority of available submarines would be stationed on a. 
patrol line off the coast, ready to intercept the British Grand Fleet when it 
made its expected rush into the Bight. According to one long-term plan, 
36 of Germany's 72 projected boats would make up the line, most of the 
[140] 'Germany: war vessels 1914', NID No. 896, proof copy in Jellicoe papers Add. Mss. 
49003 Pols. 113-17 
[141] Rossler op. cit. pp. 25-8; Herwig op. cit. p. 88; Jameson op. cit. p. 100 
(142] Gemzell op. cit. pp. 60-1,95-7,107 
(143] Herwig op. cit. p. 88; Jameson op. cit. p. 101 
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remaining vessels forming a reserve so that 12 submarines could be relieved 
daily. A flotilla of 12 older U-boats were to protect the approaches to 
Kiel itself. So certain were the Germans that their enemies would institute 
a close blockade and offer the long-awaited decisive battle that there were 
only rudimentary plans for despatching U-boats to operate in the North 
Sea or off the British coast. A dozen submarines were to be allotted this 
task [144]. In 1914 Germany had no intention of sending U-boats further 
afield than the eastern seaboard of Great Britain, and none to use them as 
commerce destroyers [see section 6.3]. 
British naval intelligence found it difficult to guess what the Germans 
intended to do with their submarines; the Imperial Navy maintained a 
policy of strict secrecy, and the NID was forced to admit that "what little 
information has been obtainable has been very conflicting" [145]. Moreover 
the tardy development of effective German submarines gave the Royal Navy 
little opportunity to make an accurate assessment of their capabilities; 
diesel-powered U-boats, which were the only type suitable for covert 
operations off the British coast, were late into service, and so limited was 
the pre-war German training programme that (by peculiar chance) 
Weddingen's U9 - which in September 1914 sank the three British 
Bacchantes of the 'Live bait squadron' stationed off the German coast - 
was the only U-boat ever to have practised firing salvoes of torpedoes and 
reloading the tubes while submerged [146). Al) efforts were devoted to 
perfecting a 'submarine trap' for Royal Navy squadrons attempting to 
impose a close blockade [147]. 
[144) Rossler op. cit. pp. 32-3 
1145) 'Germany: war vessels 1914', Add. Mss. 49003 fol. 113 
[1461 Testimony of Lt. Speiss of U9, quoted in Compton-Hall, Submarine boats: the 
beginnings of underwater warfare (London 1983) p. 177 
[1471 Fisher to Jellicoe 30 November 1914, Add. Mss. 48990 fols. 165-72; Prendergast & 
Gibson, German submarine war 1914-1918 (London 1931) p. 24 
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Planning 
BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY AND THE SUBMARINE, 1901-1914 
British naval strategy and the submarine 
In the pre-war period Imperial strategy depended, as it traditionally had, 
on the Royal Navy's ability to secure 'command of the sea'. Maritime 
supremacy was to be achieved either by winning a decisive battle against 
any likely combination of enemies, or by blockading rival fleets in their 
ports, thus securing supply lines, protecting commerce and preventing 
invasion [1). British strength was measured in the Dreadnoughts that would 
dispute the decisive battle and in the cruiser squadrons to be deployed 
along trade lanes. 
The development of naval rivalry with Germany - and the need to 
keep up with rapid technological change in gunnery and gun calibre, 
armour plate and engineering - distracted British attention from peripheral 
weapons such as the submarine. This, combined with general service 
ignorance of a weapon developed in a closed service, and the continued 
absence of an Admiralty staff with responsibility for planning, delayed a 
realistic strategic appraisal of the submarine. And since underwater craft 
had been developed for use against a dominant naval power rather than by 
[1] The Navy's 1906 War Orders - which were "based on the possibility of war with 
France and Germany and Russia" - defined the duties of the British Channel fleet as, in 
order of priority: (1) to watch the enemy and if possible bring him to action; (2) attack 
enemy commerce-destroyers; (3) prevent invasion; (4) conduct combined operations with 
the army; (5) escort merchant shipping. Paper in Adm 116/900B cited in Bryan Ranft, 
ed., Technological change and British naval policy 1869-1939 (London 1977) p. 20 
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a power that already enjoyed command of the sea, it proved difficult for 
Britain to integrate the submarine into its naval strategy. 
The submarine - and to a slightly lesser extent underwater weapons 
generally - fell outside the existing 'hierarchy of power' governing naval 
thinking. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a warship's importance 
was dictated by it size and broadside. It was generally accepted that a 
sloop or corvette could never hope to defeat a frigate, while no other class 
could stand against a line-of-battle ship. Close blockade of the enemy 
coast by a battlefleet was thus a practical policy, since it was impossible to 
harry a blockading fleet of battleships in the modern sense of the term. 
The development of underwater weapons undermined the dominance of 
the battlefleet. War games and exercises demonstrated that constant fear of 
attack acted to restrict the actions of a fleet whenever it sailed into coastal 
waters occupied by submarines. The 'moral effect', to use a contemporary 
term, that underwater craft had on the strategy and tactics of enemy 
surface ships was considerable and bore little relation to the actual strength 
of the available flotillas. It was quickly recognised as the most significant 
contribution the submarine had to make to naval warfare. 
Only a brave or foolhardy Admiral would run the risk of losing capital 
ships, on which the outcome of a naval war depended, by deliberately 
risking them in waters known to be infested with submarines. Bacon's six 
primitive boats, patrolling off Spithead in the manoeuvres of March 1904, 
"exercised an extraordinary restraining influence on the operations of the 
Home Fleet, besides inflicting most serious damage on their vessels. " Surely, 
wrote the ICS, "no other type of vessel has assumed so suddenly so vast 
an influence on the daytime operations of an enemy. " [2] Hall 
emphasised "the great value of the moral effect of the submarine menace, " 
which should be "constant and apparent off the German coast", and Keyes 
agreed that though Britain's overseas flotillas were weak in numbers, they 
could still play a decisive role because "the submarine menace to an enemy 
will be more moral than real. " Late in 1914 he confided to his wife: "the 
submarine rules the sea to an extent I never thought possible - mainly by 
moral force - they can't be everywhere only one doesn't know where they 
aren't! " [3] 
[2] Bacon to Admiralty 24 March 1904, Adm 1/7795 
[3] Memo by Hall and Captain Thomas Crease, November 1914, Fisher papers FP 4309, 
Churchill College Cambridge; Keyes minute 10 May 1914, Keyes papers KP 4/5, British 
Library; Keyes to his wife 10 October 1914, KP 2/3 
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As the effective range of the latest submarines increased, it seemed that 
capital ships would be permanently at risk anywhere in the narrow seas. 
"We might, " wrote Arthur Balfour, the former Prime Minister, 
"conceivably find ourselves surrounded by seas in which no enemy's 
battleship could lie, and which no enemy's troops could cross, but 
which would yet be as little under our control, for military or 
commercial purposes, as if we were the inferior maritime power. If 
there were any chance of such an extensive hypothesis being realised, 
we should not only be useless allies to any friendly power on the 
continent, but we should-have the utmost difficulty in keeping ourselves 
alive. " [4] 
Even Fisher, who took a less pessimistic approach, accepted that "where 
two countries with about the same length of seaboard and an equal number 
of submarines face each other across a comparatively narrow sea (say 300 
miles or less), the central waters between will clearly be equally dangerous 
to both. " [5] 
During the Great War, submarines, mines and torpedo flotillas did 
indeed have the decisive strategic effect of turning the southern half of the 
North Sea into a 'naval nomansland' in which the Germans constantly 
risked being caught in a sweep by the Grand Fleet, or attacked by 
patrolling underwater craft, but in which the British also ran considerable 
risks from German mines and torpedo flotillas. Since the Allies exercised 
effective command everywhere but in the southern half of the North Sea, 
the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Sea of Marmara, however, the main effect 
of the creation of these disputed waters was to severely limit the activities 
of the High Sea Fleet and effectively neutralise German naval power. The 
Fleet had to be preserved, to fight a decisive battle if one was offered on 
its terms, or as a bargaining counter in any peace talks. Only U-boats 
were able to operate outside the Baltic and North Sea [6J. 
Although the moral effect of the submarine was generally recognised, 
[4] Balfour to Fisher 20 May 1913, FP 691 
[5] Fisher paper The oil engine and the submarine', November 1913, FP 4293 p. 6 
[6] Cf. Geoffrey Till et al. Maritime strategy and the nuclear age (L. öndon 1982) 
pp. 126-7; Marder, DSF 11 pp. 42-9 
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her actual value in war was a matter of some dispute. The first boats had 
been acquired to act as trial horses in anti-submarine exercises, and the 
Admiralty had no immediate plans for employing them in any other 
capacity. The French, however, were using their boats as local defence 
vessels, and the British Holland boats, with their low freeboard and limited 
endurance, were also suitable only for employment in coastal waters. 
The first reports on the submarine flotilla concluded that underwater 
craft had considerable potential in local defence. The "accepted function of 
submarine boats, " wrote the umpires of the March 1904 manoeuvres, was to 
supplement coastal artillery, replace minefields and generally "to introduce a 
restraining care and vigilance on fleets acting at a considerable radius from 
a port. " [7] In addition, submarines were valuable complements to existing 
torpedo flotillas, which were deadly at night but highly vulnerable to 
counter-attack in daylight. "Submarine boats are daylight craft only. At 
night-time, owing to the loss of light, their one great attribute, 
'invisibility' due to submersion vanishes, the necessity for diving vanishes, 
and the more efficient destroyer under this protective cloak of darkness 
takes their place, " noted Bacon. "This is the key in the use of submarine 
boats: submarines by day, destroyers by night. " [8] 
Invisibility, then, was a submarine's chief asset. Uniquely among 
warships of limited performance, she had the option of declining battle and 
was almost impervious to attack [see section 7]. Though the torpedo boat 
had been successfully countered by the classic orthodox response of turning 
a new weapon against itself, submarine could not fight submarine, and this 
virtual immunity from attack, combined with a frustrating elusiveness, 
overcame most of the limitations imposed by the poor seakeeping, poor 
endurance and low speed of early boats. 
By 1905, proponents of the submarine had begun to suggest it could 
operate outside coastal waters. British flotillas, Fisher wrote, could "not only 
have their radius of action largely increased by towing, but they can be 
towed to the vicinity of the enemy, and almost up to striking distance, and 
be let go to fasten on to their prey without any visible sign of so doing, 
even in broad daylight! " They could be used to seal the Straits of Dover 
[7) Umpires' report on the 1904 manoeuvres 28 March 1904, Adm 1/7795 
[8) Bacon report 31 May 1903, Adm 1/7725; see also Fisher, undated paper (1904) in 
Naval Necessities I p. 59, Adm 116/3092; Callaghan to Admiralty 3 August 1912, Adm 
1/8269 
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and Gibraltar, and "with no class of weapons will audacity and offensive 
action be repaid so well as with submarines. " [9) 
Fisher's views were not yet widespread in the Navy, and many officers 
still doubted that submarines were anything more than harbour defence 
craft. In August 1905, for example, Admiral Ottley, secretary to the RN 
Design Commitee, observed: 
"The question as to whether it is worth while building a vessel which 
costs as much as a destroyer with less than half a destroyer's speed, 
and a third of its radius of action, and incomparably worse 
sea-keeping, appears to depend on the possibilities of extending such 
a vessel's tactical sphere of operations by towing. If submarines can be 
designed that could be safely and easily towed at high speeds and in 
any weather, without hampering a battle squadron, the tactical 
possibilities before them can hardly be over-rated, but unless this can 
be done the policy of spending large sums of money upon a type of 
vessel which has very narrow limitations is at least very questionable 
for a Power which is necessarily always obliged to aim at a wide 
maritime supremacy as we are. " [10] 
The tendency to think of submarines as 'weapons of the weaker power' - 
a phrase which, as Lord Sydenham observed, "easily passed into currency 
without examination" - was common in this period (11]. So was the 
inability of many naval officers to adapt existing strategic thought to 
accomodate underwater craft. The majority view was that submarines should 
help to win the decisive battle by accompanying the battle squadrons to sea 
[see section 8.2], or - if their seaworthiness prevented this - take the 
peripheral role of freeing other surface craft for operations with the fleet 
[12]. The Navy thus developed a tendency to think of the submarine as a 
substitute - for mines and torpedo boats at first, and later for destroyers 
and larger classes of vessel. Many of the specialist boats built during the 
[9] Fisher paper 'Submarine boats' April 1905, in Naval Necessities 11. Adm 116/3093 
pp. 446-53 
[10] Ottley memo 4 August 1905, Adm 138/360A section 10, National Maritime Museum 
[11] Lord Sydenharn, "'The weapon of the weak"', Naval Review 1933 pp. 47-53 
[12] Cf. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's exposition in '"The weapon of the weak"', RUSI 
Jo. August 1932 pp. 497-503 
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war aimed to combine the best features of a surface vessel - destroyer, 
monitor or minelayer - with the submarine's 'great attribute', invisibility. 
What now appear to be the type's main roles - covert patrol and 
commerce destruction - were not the bold inventions of some desk-bound 
strategist, but discoveries made as practical experience was gained. 
By 1912 the rapid development of the submarine had made it the 
destroyer's equal in many respects. John de Robeck, the Admiral of 
Patrols, noted that "each year sees the destroyer and the submarine 
approach each other both in character of design and in the nature of their 
duties, " and Callaghan, the CinC, judged that "in some respects they are 
already superior to the destroyer, viz. radius of action, immunity from 
detection and from damage from gunfire, and number of torpedoes carried. " 
[13] This suggested that, as well as being towed and scouted for by 
destroyers as British flotillas were from 1911, the submarine could substitute 
for the TBD in some circumstances - freeing British destroyers to act with 
the fleet. An Operations Division report of August 1912 observed: 
"There can be no doubt that the development of the submarine is 
tending to modify the function of the destroyer. Until recently it had 
been considered that these functions are, firstly, to operate against 
hostile torpedo craft, and, secondly, to deliver torpedo attacks on 
larger ships. The submarine is rapidly assuming the latter function, but 
it cannot assume the former. " 
The 1912 manoeuvres were used to test tactics for screening a battlefleet 
with destroyers, and by 1914 most British TBDs had been switched from 
offensive duties with the torpedo flotillas - where they had orders to to 
attack enemy ships - and attached to the battlefleet. Their function, the 
Operations Division report continued, was 
"to accompany the fleet to (1) assist in repelling attacks by destroyers 
and submarines of foreign powers, (2) to attack an enemy fleet during 
or after action, (3) for defence against the submarine, and (4) for use 
as minesweepers. " [14] 
I 
[13] De Robeck to Admiralty 17 June 1912, Adm 1/8273; 'General remarks by CinC on 
manoeuvres' 5 August 1912, Adm 1/8269 
[141 George Hope memo 23 August 1912, Adm 1/8269; Marder, DSF I pp. 329,335-6 
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Fear of submarine and enemy destroyer attack was such that the Grand 
Fleet quickly became obsessed with the need for the strongest possible 
destroyer screen. Jellicoe expressed the greatest possible reluctance to go to 
sea without a minimum screen of 40 TBDs for the battle squadrons alone. 
Not only did this deprive British anti-submarine patrols of modern torpedo 
craft, which they sorely needed; it also limited the seagoing radius of action 
of the fleet itself to that of its TBDs, about 1,800 miles, and made its 
commanders unwilling to manoeuvre in heavy weather, when torpedo 
flotillas were unable to accompany the capital ships [15]. The threat of 
attack by underwater weapons against which he had little defence 
considerably increased Jellicoe's caution. In a paper written in October 
1914, he declared he would not follow the enemy if he turned away during 
an action (as happened at Jutland) because the intention was probably to 
draw the Grand Fleet into a mine and submarine trap. It was, wrote the 
CinC, "quite within the bounds of possibility that half our battlefleet might 
be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a 
false move is made. " Furthermore the best safeguard against submarines 
"will consist in moving the battlefleet at very high speed before deployment 
takes place or the gun action commences. This will take us off the ground 
on which the enemy desires to fight but it may, of course, result in his 
refusal to follow me. " [16] Underwater craft thus significantly limited the 
chance of either side winning a decisive victory at sea during the Great 
War. 
In the last years of peace the Admiralty did develop a real 
understanding of the submarine's potential, and by 1913 the RN possessed a 
comparatively sophisticated scheme for using submarines offensively. This 
was due in part to the development of an Admiralty War Staff with 
responsibility for formulating strategy. 
As early as 1908 the 'war staff' - then an ad hoc group of senior 
officers and representatives from the Naval Intelligence Department - had 
suggested stationing submarines off an enemy coast [see section 6.3]. More 
formal consideration of Britain's strategic needs began in 1909 with the 
establishment of the Navy War Council (converted into an Admiralty War 
Staff in January 1912) [17], and by July 1913 - with the experience of 
[15) Cf. Marder, DSF II pp. 75,422; DSF V pp. 300-02 
[16) Jellicoe to Admiralty 30 October 1914, Jellicoe papers Add. Mss. 49012 fols. 23-5 
(17) Marder, DSF I pp. 247-8,265-6 
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two more or less realistic sets of manoeuvres to guide it - the Staff had 
turned its attention to the submarine. 
In the opinion of Henry Jackson, the Chief of Staff, "the operations 
carried out in last year's manoeuvres [1912] demonstrated practically that 
the submarine has progressed beyond the stage of a local defence craft. " 
The latest overseas submarines, he wrote, "are capable of more offensive 
action in war at a distance from their bases than was anticipated a few 
years ago; in fact a great potential appears to lie in this direction and the 
policy of further developments in design to meet war requirements is fully 
concurred in by the War Staff. " [18] As for coast defence, "the best form 
of protection against all kinds of attack may ultimately be found in strong 
submarine patrols, with supports of military forces and guns on shore... No 
great degree of fixed defences is required as the submarines should suffice 
to keep the enemy's important armoured units at a distance. " [19] 
The Admiralty's last-minute recognition of the full potential of 
submarine warfare had significant consequences for British strategy in 
general. The submarine's performance in 1912 -14 was all the more 
shocking for being unexpected. The development of an efficient overseas 
boat finally put an end to the old policy of close blockade, which had 
been in difficulties for several years. In its place, the Admiralty adopted 
the intermediate blockade and, from July 1914, the distant blockade, which 
envisaged cutting German forces off from the Atlantic in the Channel and 
between the Shetlands and Norway. The change of policy wrong-footed 
German strategists, who had confidently expected the Grand Fleet to steam 
into the Heligoland Bight on the first day of war, ready to institute a close 
blockade. This, it was anticipated, would give German mines and torpedo 
flotillas the opportunity to reduce British naval strength to the point where 
the High Sea Fleet could challenge the RN in a decisive battle. Instead the " 
HSF was reduced to impotence by its inability to catch and destroy 
individual squadrons of the Grand Fleet. 
The development of underwater weapons thus forced a reassessment of 
German naval strategy and led directly to the declaration of an unrestricted 
submarine war against commerce. This the Royal Navy had failed in its 
turn to consider before 1914. It was contrary to international law, and the 
1181 Jackson minute 18 July 1913, D'Eyncourt papers DEY 31, National Maritime Museum 
119] War Staff commentary on Callaghan paper 'Remarks on North Sea strategy', 29 
September 1913. Adm 116/1214 
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RN could not believe its enemies would be so desperate or despicable as to 
resort to such measures [see section 6.3]. 
The War Staff's comments sum up British submarine policy in the last 
months of peace. Submarines could be used offensively and defensively. 
They were the best available weapons for coastal work, and now offered 
the RN the ability to re-establish a blockade in hostile waters. It was also 
possible to look some way into the future and make a case for the 
development of much larger boats. The First Lord, Churchill, argued that 
the Navy should have three types of submarine: coastals, to act as partial 
substitutes for land based local defences; overseas boats, "to take the place 
of the TBDs and the inshore squadron", and "the ocean submarine", a 
"decisive weapon of battle ... 
[that]... must count as a partial substitution of 
battleship strength. " [20] 
Churchill's argument was not new. Fisher, one of the earliest and most 
enthusiastic proponents of the submarine, had for years believed that 
underwater craft would render the old-fashioned battleship obsolete. In July 
1904 he had suggested that the construction of capital ships should be 
suspended on the grounds that "a battle fleet is no protection to anything, 
or any operation, during the dark hours, and in certain waters is no 
protection in daytime, because of the submarine. Hence what is the use of 
battleships as we have hitherto known them? None! Their one and only 
function - that of ultimate security of defence - is gone - lost! " [21) 
His advocacy of the battlecruiser - fast enough to elude submarine attack 
- was based in part on these conclusions [22]. 
The idea that submarines would replace the battleship - with all the 
radical implications for British strategy that suggested - was still potent 
enough to arouse considerable national controversy in June 1914. The 
proposal originated, so far as the public was concerned, in a letter to The 
Times from the well-known gunnery expert Admiral Sir Percy Scott - one 
of the less likely submarine enthusiasts thrown up by the Royal Navy. 
Scott's thesis, that "submarines and aeroplanes have entirely revolutionized 
naval warfare" and "no fleet can hide itself from the aeroplane eye and 
120] Churchill minute 20 July 1913, DEY 31 
121) Fisher paper 'Admiralty House, Portsmouth', July 1904, quoted in Jon Sumida, In 
defence of naval supremacy: finance, technology and British naval policy 1889-1914 
(Boston 1989) p. 52 
122) Ibid pp. 52-5 
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the submarine can deliver a deadly attack even in broad daylight" led him 
to some clearly-stated conclusions: 
"Under these circumstances I can see no use for battleships and very 
little chance of much employment for fast cruisers. The Navy will be 
entirely changed; naval officers will no longer live on the sea, but 
either above it or under it... 
What we require is an enormous fleet of submarines, airships and 
aeroplanes, and a few fast cruisers... I do not think the importance of 
submarines has been fully recognized, neither do I think that it is 
been realized how completely their advent has revolutionized naval 
warfare. In my opinion, as the motor vehicle has driven the horse 
from the road, so has the submarine driven the battleship from the 
sea. " [23) 
Service writers hurried to counter Scott's arguments. 'A Naval Officer' 
pointed out - correctly - that they were broadly similar to the jeune 
ecole views prevalent in France in the 1880s, which had caused "complete 
confusion, the displacement of France as a high naval Power, and the 
reversion to the policy of building battleships and cruisers. " [24] The Navy 
League decried them as "calculated to do serious harm to the cause of the 
maintainance of British supremacy at sea" [25], and Lord Sydenham 
described the Admiral's letter as "rambling and unconvincing" [26]. Even 
Bacon urged caution and suggested that Scott was under-estimating the 
fallibility of the young officers in command of submarines [27]. 
But Scott had his supporters. SS Hall had already argued that "as the 
submarine grows and extends its activities the surface vessel... will be 
driven out of existence, " [28] and his views appear to have influenced 
[23] Percy Scott, 'Large ships or small: the needs of Great Britain at Sea', Times 5 June 
1914 p. 9 col. f - p. 10 col. a. See also Peter Padfield, Aim straight: a biography of 
Admiral Sir Percy Scott (London 1968) pp. 223-7 
[24] 'Limitations of the submarine', Times 6 June 1914 p. 10 col. a 
[25] 'Statement by the Secretary of the Navy League', Times 6 June 1914 p. 9 col. f 
[26] Lord Sydenham, 'The apotheosis of the submarine'. Times 8 June 1914 p. 50 col. a 
[27] Bacon, 'Surface ships or submarines? ', Times 15 June 1914 p. 6 col. a 
[28] Hall paper 'On the general question' 17 May 1913, FP 4287 
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Fisher, who had concluded by the last months of 1915 that even the 
battlecruiser was obsolete. "The greatest possible speed with the biggest 
practicable gun was up until the time of the aircraft the acme of sea 
fighting. Now there is only one word - submersible. " [29] 
The rapidity of technological change influenced naval strategy in a 
variety of ways. It should have promoted strategic thought (and in fact 
eventually did so) as it became obvious that existing principles no longer 
applied to the changing fleet. However, it also meant that many of the 
Royal Navy's most able officers devoted their time to solving technical 
problems. The RN lacked the experience of full-scale modern warfare that 
might have demonstrated the real potential of the submarine. 
Scott, Fisher and Hall under-estimated the staying power of the capital 
ship. Not a single Dreadnought was sunk by submarine during the Great 
War, and the commanders of underwater craft discovered that their 
submerged speed was insufficient, their torpedoes unreliable and their 
quarries considerably more elusive than had been anticipated. Their 
assessment was typical of a service that was technology-led rather than 
strategy-led: blinded by the technical specifications of the latest submarines, 
they drew inaccurate conclusions from accurate figures. 
The American army confronted similar problems in attempting to 
develop an equally revolutionary weapon - the machine gun - in the 
years of retrenchment following the Civil War. It lacked a staff to evaluate 
the guns it was offered, and was burdened by regulations that limited the 
participation of line officers in the testing and development of new weapons 
[30]. Assessment was further hindered by general ignorance of the 
capabilities of the new weapon, and army procedure also encouraged the 
creation of epigrammatic slogans - very similar to the 'weapon of the 
weak' tag applied to the submarine - that obstructed further original 
thought. The machine gun was labelled as a weapon suitable for the 
defence of fixed positions, or (in the British army) as a 'weapon of 
opportunity', rather than as a weapon with offensive potential [31]. 
The problems encountered by the Royal Navy as it attempted to 
[29] Quoted in Sumida, op. cit. p. 318 
[30] David Armstrong, Bullets and bureaucrats: the machine gun and the United States 
Army 1861-1916 (Westport, Connecticut 1982) pp. 55,73-4 
[31) Ibid pp. 89,114,151 -3; Tim Travers, The killing ground: the British Army, the 
Western Front and the emergence of modern warfare 1900-1918 (London 1987) p. 70 
6.1 THE SUBMARINE IN THE CONTEXT OF STRATEGY 
develop strategy and tactics for the submarine find perhaps their most exact 
parallel, however, in the early military history of the aeroplane. The US 
Army was as slow to acquire aircraft as the RN was to sign a contract for 
Holland submarines, ordering its first planes in February 1908, less than 10 
years before the US entered World War I but more than four years after 
the Wright brothers - whose had approached the military authorities in 
January 1905 - first flew [32]. In the subsequent rush to develop techology 
and strategy simultaneously, writes 113 Holley, "the problem of aircraft 
development was tremendously complicated by the prevailing uncertainty 
regarding tactical objectives; they were never clearly defined before the US 
entered the European conflict. Unlike most weapons, the airplane was 
capable of performing several tactical functions. Each of these required a 
specialised line of technical development. " The US Army, he suggests, 
failed to determine in advance what its aircraft were intended to do, 
allowing the capabilities of existing types to dictate tactics. Formulation of 
aerial doctrine became the province of technical men officially charged with 
making nothing but technical decisions. The air branch thus became 
technology rather than strategy driven [33]. 
The multi-purpose British submarine was a potentially a similarly 
versatile weapon. But by placing it in the hands of technical men who had 
no formal strategic training, the Admiralty delayed modification of the 
original doctrine - itself determined largely by the technical shortcomings 
of the original Holland boats - that underwater craft were suitable only 
for coastal defence. Bacon, Lees and Hall thought of all their designs as 
coastal boats, and Keyes, in 1911, was the first to use the expression 
'overseas submarine' [see section 3.2]. 
To summarise: the submarine was - as Tim Travers remarks of the 
machine gun in the British army - "readily accepted, but the problems of 
integration into the human side of the equation had not been thought. 
through. " Once the Royal Navy had acquired the novel, imperfect, but 
potentially revolutionary new weapon, it directed it into acceptable and 
traditional roles. The problem was not getting the submarine accepted as a 
[32) IB Holley, Ideas and weapons: exploitation of the aerial weapon in the United States 
during World War 1; a study in the relationship of technological advance, military 
doctrine, and the development of weapons (Hamden, Connecticut 1971) pp. 26-9 
133) Ibid pp. 32,39-40,55-60 
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piece of technology, but what was done with it [34]. 
Indeed, Travers's model of the military scheme for assessing new 
technology before and during World War I- which he uses to evaluate 
the army's development of the machine gun and the tank - also applies 
broadly to the submarine. "The following evolution is seen to take place, " 
he writes. 
"(1) the invention and introduction of the new piece of technology, 
with some resistance from the higher staff levels, and some arm 
resistance; (2) after a certain period of time, ready acceptance of the 
technology, especially at middle and lower levels of the officer corps; 
but then an important stage occurs, (3) a corresponding reluctance to 
think through the logic of the new weapon, and therefore a tendency 
to relegate the weapon to traditional, peripheral or subordinate roles. 
At this important stage (4) there emerge small but vigorous groups of 
supporters and opponents, with a large middle group of mostly 
non-thinkers; but (5) from the. small support group there emerge 
further one or two individuals who articulate appropriate tactics for the 
new weapon, which eventually enable the weapon to assume a 
semi-autonomous or separate role according to its own logic, and 
which firmly integrate the weapon into the tactical system. " [35] 
The submarine, like the tank and the machine gun, was an unwelcome 
innovation. Officers of the surface fleet found it difficult to accept its 
considerable potential, and though years of ever-improving performances in 
fleet exercises did persuade the majority, by 1914, that underwater craft 
could be formidable in certain circumstances, submarines were still seen 
largely as peripheral weapons best suited to coastal defence and perhaps 
scouting. They were not yet fast or seaworthy enough to operate with the 
fleet, and - because they could not be part of the collectivity - they 
suggested independence and thus, to some, lack of dependability. Above all, 
they had never proved themselves in war. The Navy, in accepting 
submarines as a necessary evil, did little to solve the riddle that they 
posed, and from which practically every strategist shied away: "Britannia 
may rule the waves, but who will rule above them, and below? " [36] 
[34) Travers op. cit. pp. 62-3 
[35) Ibid p. 76 
[36] Colonel Charles a Court Repington (military correspondent of The Times), 'New wars 10. 
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British coast defence policy to 1903 
The Royal Navy was Britain's chief bastion against the threat of invasion, 
and as such was responsible for defending the coast. The Admiralty 
believed, however, that an invasion fleet was best met and destroyed at 
sea, long before it sighted land. Unlike the Russian and American navies, 
therefore, the RN showed little interest in developing squadrons of 
short-range local defence vessels. 
The Royal Navy largely abdicated responsibility for inshore coast defence 
in the late 1800s. The 1882 Carnarvon Commission on naval efficiency 
reported: "The Royal Navy is not maintained for the purpose of affording 
direct local protection to seaports and harbours... Our seaports must rely 
for their immediate defences on local means, leaving the Navy free to act 
at sea. " [37] Artillery and engineer units were made responsible for 
fortifications and boom defences respectively. In April 1878 it was agreed 
that the War Office would also assume control of mines and mining, and 
from 1886 the army provided its own mining boats and equipment [38]. 
"The arrangement by which the War Office defends our ports, leaving us 
to do our duty at sea, is the basis of our War Policy, " declared the DNI, 
Battenburg, in 1903 [39]. 
Wise though it was, RN 'War Policy' was open to misinterpretation. 
The immense difficulty of mounting an invasion in the face of British naval 
supremacy was an awkward concept for the public to grasp, since the 
vessels protecting them were scattered across the Seven Seas. Moreover the 
RN's ability to prevent invasion had not been tested since the Napoleonic 
wars. In those days an invader's dependence on favourable winds made it 
easy to predict which moment would be chosen for an attack, but the 
development of steam propulsion returned the initiative to Britain's enemies. 
Steam made it possible to elude a British blockade and send an invasion 
4 for old', Blackwood's Magazine June 1910, p. 896. The chief reservation the British naval 
strategist Julian Corbett had about the submarine was its lack of experience in real 
warfare. See Some principles of maritime strategy (London 1911) p. 233 
[37) Carnarvon Commission, second report (1882) para 15, cited in 'Memorandum on the 
responsibility of the War Department for provision of land defences against attack by 
torpedo boats', November 1903, Cab 3/1/2A 
[38] War Office memo 'Submarine defences of ports' nd (? 1903), Adm 1/7717; see also 
Clarke memo nd (? 1888), WO 33/46 p. 221 
[39] Battenburg minute 26 February 1903, Adm 1/7717 
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fleet across the English Channel in short order. In 1845 Palmerston 
precipitated an invasion scare with his declaration that 'steam has bridged 
the Channel' [40]. 
The completion of the revolutionary French battleship Gloire caused a 
similar panic in 1859.160,000 militiamen were hastily called to arms and 
parliament voted £12 million for a chain of coastal fortifications -- 
'Palmerston's follies'. Confidence in the Royal Navy's ability to prevent 
invasion was again dented by the Franco-Russian entente and the 'Truth 
about the Navy' scare twenty years later. In 1888 there was another 
significant invasion panic, fuelled by the disquieting results of the annual 
manoeuvres and the bellicose proclamations of the jeune ecole on the 
subject of coastal bombardment. This scare in turn helped prompt a major 
five-year building programme paid for with funds voted under the Naval 
Defence Act of 1889. Public interest in invasion topics peaked in the 1890s 
as newspaper proprietors discovered that war scares sold papers and 
exploited this new market with great gusto. The 'invasion bogey' remained 
a hotly-debated topic of conversation [41]. 
The general quality of the debate was poor. The public was largely 
uninformed. War Office planning began with the assumption that invasion 
was possible [42], while the Royal Navy insisted that it was not. Certainly 
none of Britain's potential enemies had realistic plans for such a project - 
"the idea of an invasion of England is insane, " wrote the German 
Chancellor, Hohenlohe - although France hoped to use the threat of 
landings to tie British military and naval forces to their own shores [43). 
But the RN had no way of proving its case. Its understanding of the 
problem was-largely instinctive. 
The ensuing dispute between the navalist 'Blue Water school' and those 
who believed an invasion could successfully be launched as a 'Bolt from the 
E40] See James Baxter, The introduction of the ironclad warship (Cambridge, Mass. ) 
pp. 65-8 
141] Marder, ABSP pp. 67-81; Howard Moon, The invasion of the United Kingdom: 
public controversy and official planning 1888-1918 (University of London Ph. D. 1968) 
vol. 1 pp. 7-126 
142) Moon op. cit. I. 81 -6 
[43] Hohenlohe quoted in Paul Kennedy, ed, The war plans of the Great Powers, 
1880-1914, London 1985 p. 176; French plans in Moon op. cit. 1,123 and Theodore Ropp, 
The development of a modern navy: France 1871-1904, University of Harvard Ph. D. 1937 
pp. 531-3 
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Blue' (the 'Blue funk' school, as they were derisively known in Admiralty. 
circles) has been dealt with elsewhere [44]. The RN understood, however, 
that naval strength was measured in battleships and cruisers, not 
coast-defence vessels. The Navy's significance as a versatile instrument of 
foreign policy, and thus its position as the Senior Service, depended on its 
mobility. 
It was this consideration that underpinned the RN's obsession with 
offensive warfare in the face of evidence that underwater weapons and the 
limited endurance of the steam navy rendered its strategy largely untenable. 
In consequence, the Admiralty was reasonably content to leave the coastal 
defences of the British Isles in the hands of the army. 
The submarine and the mine 
Britain's coast defence forces had to guard against three significant threats: 
invasion, a raid to disrupt Britain's war effort, and a surprise attack on the 
fleet at anchor. 
The invasion question was kept alive by a succession of Defence 
Committee and CID reports on the problem (1903,1907-08 and 1913-14) 
which, though they found in favour of the 'Blue Water' school, suggested 
that a strong force of torpedo craft was needed to deter an enemy [45). 
Local defence flotillas and strong land emplacements would be needed to 
deal with a surprise attack on the British fleet - an attractive prospect to 
a weaker enemy - and, in addition, British naval forces would almost 
certainly be involved in any attempt to intercept a- raiding force, 
particularly if the landing was made at one of the defended ports. 
The difficulties of landing troops on an open beach, where there were 
no facilities to speed up disembarkation and transports were vulnerable to 
attack, suggested that an invader might try to seize control of a British 
harbour. Landing from a jetty was a rapid process - in the 1913 British 
[44] In addition to the sources cited in notes 41 -43, see AJA Morris, The scaremongers: 
advocacy of war and rearmament 1896-1914, London 1984, esp. part 2 
[45] 'Possibility of invasion during temporary loss of command of the sea' March 1903, 
Cab 3/1/11A; 'Invasion: report of a sub-committee appointed by the Prime Minister to 
consider the question of overseas attack' 22 October 1908, Cab 3/2/44A; 'Attack on the 
British Isles from overseas' 15 April 1914, Cab 3/2/62A 
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manoeuvres 1,000 men were put ashore at Immingham, on the Humber, in 
15 minutes - and the 1914 invasion committee remarked that a fleet that 
had crushed the immediate defences and anchored in port was almost safe 
from counter attacks by other torpedo flotillas. Furthermore the majority of 
British harbours, particularly those on the east coast, were not heavily 
defended. In 1900 there was only one first class naval base - Chatham - 
between Dover and Cape Wrath. Construction of a second base, at Rosyth, 
began in 1903, but work on the dockyards there proceeded so slowly that 
they had not been completed by 1914. In 1912 Cromerty was designated a 
second class base - capable of dealing with every contingency but major 
repairs - and Dover and Harwich were listed as third class ports ('war 
anchorages', with minimal resources), but the Thames, Humber, Tees, Tay 
and Tyne rivers, plus the towns of Hartlepool and Aberdeen, were listed as 
no more than 'fortified commercial ports'. Their defences were designed to 
deter torpedo boats and unarmoured cruisers, but not to stand up to an 
attack by battleships [46]. 
The typical scheme of defence for a port was based around coastal 
artillery mounted in forts. Harbour entrances were defended against torpedo 
boats and blockships by booms, searchlights and quick firing guns, and 
fields of observation mines (fired electrically by observers on the shore) 
covered the approaches to a harbour. In a fully-developed defence system, 
minefields and coast artillery provided mutual cover for each other, the 
theory being that mines could not be swept until the guns were silenced, 
which in turn was not possible until all underwater defences had been 
neutralised, thus allowing attacking ships to close the range decisively. 
The superiority of forts engaged in a duel with warships was generally 
accepted in the nineteenth century. The difficulty of suppressing fire from 
even poorly manned and equipped fortifications was demonstrated on several 
occasions, notably the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. From the naval 
point of view, the problem was that only a direct hit on the guns could 
put a shore battery out of action, while a ship was vulnerable to shell-fire 
along her whole length. The difficulty of spotting the fall of shot on land 
was also far greater than at sea, where water-spouts gave direction to the 
gunners. 
1 
(461 Arthur Vyvyan paper 'Remarks on the 1913 manoeuvres' nd (? 1913), Adm 116/1169; 
'Report and proceedings of the standing sub-committee on the North East coast defences', 
29 November 1912, Cab 3/2/54A 
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By 1903-04, however, improvements in the range and accuracy of 
naval gunnery suggested that modern warships could stand off outside an 
observation minefield and reduce fortifications by long-range fire. The 
Admiralty admitted that "it will probably be found that nearly all our 
existing minefields are insufficient in extent" [47], and it became obvious 
that new defences effective at least four or five miles from the coast were 
required. 
The increased threat of attack made the Royal Navy anxious to 
reacquire some measure of control over coastal defence and encouraged it 
to promote the submarine as a weapon that could replace the mine in 
British strategy. The Admiralty recognised that a surprise attack could have 
a devastating effect on a navy whose warships now spent more time in 
port, refitting and refuelling, than they once had. Fisher's nucleus crew 
system called for much of the fleet to be kept in reserve, and the drive to 
cut back overseas commitments further added to number of ships stationed 
in home waters. In addition, the Japanese attack on Port Arthur (8 
February 1904), in which three battleships were disabled by torpedoes and 
the Russian Pacific Fleet put on the defensive for the duration of the Far 
Eastern war, showed how vulnerable a major port could be to surprise 
attack. The Royal Navy, which was not itself averse to the idea of 
'Copenhagening' the rapidly-growing German fleet, took the threat of an 
enemy assault very seriously in the pre-war period, and the Admiralty felt 
uneasy that so much depended on defences over which it had so little 
control. 
Naval officers had little faith in the army's ability to work the coast 
defences efficiently. The services rarely co-operated amicably; the army's 
control over the procurement of naval ordnance caused such friction that 
the Admiralty insisted, from 1907, on the RN's right to develop 
its own heavy artillery, and naval manoeuvres consistently showed that army 
gunners had difficulty distinguishing friendly warships from foe [48]. Even 
the War Office was inclined to admit that military control of 'aquatics', the 
naval aspects of local defence, was an anomaly "injurious to both services, 
and likely to tend to great confusion in time of war. " [49] The engineer 
[47) Admiralty paper 'Submarine mines' October 1904, Cab 38/6/104 . 
148) Cf. the example of the 1904 Milford Haven manoeuvres, 'Great Britain: torpedo craft 
manoeuvres 1904', NID No. 754, December 1904, Adm 231/43 
[49) Arnold-Forster to Lyttleton (CGS) 19 May 1904, Add. Mss. 50308 fols. 4-5 
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mining specialist Colonel Ruck acknowledged "a strong undercurrent of naval 
opinion directed against both the form and the strength of military 
defences, " which he thought had been "shown chiefly in connection with 
the submarine defences, which have been looked upon with a certain 
amount of distrust by many naval officers. " [50] 
The disputes thrown up by mining were typical of those that bedevilled 
naval-military relations in the field of coast defence. In France, as John 
Walser points out, "the entire issue of responsibility for coastal defense was 
clouded in the debris of successive and often contradictory decrees", and 
the Marine Francaise - while asserting that its fleets provided the best 
defence against enemy assaults - was reluctant to allow the army control 
of fortifications without assurances that military personnel would be trained 
in warship recognition and naval affairs. The French army, on the other 
hand, expected the coast defence network to provide a reserve of men and 
artillery for its continental campaigns [511. In the United States, as we have 
seen, the same dispute was complicated by the army artillery corps' 
acceptance of responsibility for mining and its endorsement of a naval 
weapon, the Lake submarine, for mine maintenance [52]. 
The RN's determination to resume control over some aspects of coast 
defence was reinforced by Admiral Fisher's personal distrust of the land 
service and his suspicion that a worried public might support the creation 
of an army large enough to repel a full-scale invasion - with disastrous 
consequences for the Navy Estimates [53]. In his private papers, and in his 
dealings with the Committee of Imperial Defence, Fisher liked to give the 
impression that the submarine was a sure guarantee against invasion. Such a 
project was now "absolutely precluded, " he insisted [541, and the strength 
of the army could be safely reduced by 300,000 men [55]. 
"It affects the army, " the Sea Lord concluded in one famous passage, 
"because imagine even one submarine boat with a flock of transports 
[50] Ruck memo 29 January 1904, Add. Mss. 50318 fols. 189-90 
[51] John Walser, France's search for a battlefleet: French naval policy 1898-1914 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) 1976) pp. 95-6,391 
[52] For other examples of military demarcation disputes, see Armstrong op. cit. pp. 55-6, 
61-8,83-6; Travers op. cit. pp. 62-78; Holley op. cit. pp. 68-70 
[53] Ruddock Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford 1973) pp. 285-304,331-4 
[54] Fisher to Sandars nd (? late 1903), Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49710 fol. 55 
[55] Mackay op. cit. p. 299 
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in sight loaded each with some two or three thousand troops. Imagine 
the effect of one such transport going to the bottom in a few seconds 
with its living freight. Even the bare thought makes invasion 
impossible! Fancy, 100,000 helpless, huddled up troops in frightened 
transports with those invisible demons known to be near. 
"Death near-momentarily-sudden-awful-invisible-unavoidable! 
Nothing conceivable more demoralising!... How could there possibly be 
any bombardment of any place (fortified or not) with submarine boats 
present, or even suspected of being present? " [56] 
Fisher worked hard persuade Britain's decision-makers of his case, and was 
delighted when King Edward, emboldened by the prospects for naval coast 
defence, suggested the country should "spend money on submarines etc but 
don't waste money on an armed mob. " [57] 
The RN's distrust of military coast defence was further compounded by 
an absolute distrust of mine warfare. Although more than 50 British ports 
at home and overseas were provided with mine defences in 1903 [58], the 
RN opposed suggestions that more and larger minefields were needed, 
arguing they were dangerous and expensive luxuries. "Admiralty practice of 
late years, " noted Fisher, "has been to induce the military to shift these 
fields, more and more, into waters in which they can never be used, 
presumably to prevent their -actual use and attendant damage to our own 
fleet. " [59] The Navy's dislike of contact mines - effective though they 
were at some distance from the coast - was even greater, since they were 
indiscriminate (and thus probably illegal) weapons, difficult to maintain when 
exposed to tides and currents, useless to a Power enjoying command of the 
sea, and a threat to the mobility of the fleet [601. 
The Admiralty was fully prepared to over-state its case to secure the 
abolition of Britain's mine defences. It criticised observation minefields on 
[56) Fisher paper 'Invasion and submarines' nd (December 1903) FP 4940 
[57) Ponsonby to Fisher 9 October 1907, FP 259 
[58) Selborne to Arnold-Forster 14 November 1903, Arnold-Forster papers Add. Mss. 
50308 fols. 9-10. For details of British and colonial defended ports, see 'Defence of naval 
and commercial harbours - memorandum by lord Selborne' 27 July 1905, Cab 4/1/63B 
[59) Fisher paper 'Defence of naval arsenals' nd (1904) in Naval Necessities I, 92, Adm 
116/3092 
1601 Marder, DSF I pp. 328-9, DSF 11 pp. 70-1 
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the grounds that they were a danger to shipping, even though they could 
not obstruct the most heavily-used channels and electrically-fired mines 
had never accidentally sunk a friendly ship. HO Arnold-Forster, the new 
Secretary of State for War, charged that naval delegates had misled civilian 
members of the CID by deliberately confusing observation mines with the 
more dangerous mechanical 'contact' variety [61]. The War Office also 
disputed the Admiralty's claim that submarine flotillas would be cheaper to 
run than the RE coast defence establishment. Although the coast defence 
estimates amounted to £550,000 each year, the Director of Military 
Operations, Major General Grierson, pointed out that only £125,000 of that 
sum was spent on mines [62]. Submarines, at £40,000 a boat, were much 
more expensive [63]. In November 1904 the Admiralty tacitly admitted it 
had exaggerated by agreeing to describe minefields as 'inconvenient' rather 
than 'dangerous' in future [64]. 
Although the Admiralty had developed a genuine enthusiasm for the 
submarine's potential as a coast defence weapon, therefore, it promoted 
underwater craft in the mid-1900s primarily because it wanted the 
government to abolish the mine and return responsibility for inshore defence 
to the Navy. The submarine was a genuine naval weapon in a way that the 
mine was not. Bacon noted that his boats had "uses in defence by working 
offensively. " [65] Battenburg, the Director of Naval Intelligence, agreed: 
"It is thought that submarine boats may still take the place of the Royal 
Engineer mines and yet not be tied down to a particular port on our 
coasts, " he wrote [66]. In short, torpedo craft justified RN interest in the 
nautical aspects of coast defence because, according to Lord Walter Kerr, 
[61] Arnold-Forster diary 22,23 + 26 November 1904, Add. Mss. 50341; diary entry 12 
December 1904, Add. Mss. 50342; Arnold-Forster to Balfour 30 November 1904, Add. Mss. 
50318 fols. 184-5 
[62] Admiralty paper 'Submarine mines' October 1904, Cab 4/1140B; 'Submarine mine 
defences: dissent by Major General Grierson' 24 November 1904, Cab 38/6/11 
[63] Cf. figures in 'Report of a conference between Admiralty and War Office 
representatives to consider the future functions of submarine mines in war' December 
1903, section 2. Adm 1/7717 
[64] Arnold-Forster diary 25 November 1904, Add. Mss. 50341 
[65] Bacon report 16 January 1904, Adm 1/7719 
[66] Battenburg minute 26 February 1903, Adm 1/7717. See also Durnford minute 24 
December 1903 to Bacon report, ibid; Ballard minute 27 November 1912 to 'Establishment 
of shore depots for destroyer and submarine flotillas', Adm 1/8269 
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"in no case can the submarine, in my opinion, be classified as 'fixed 
defences'. They are free to move, up to the extent of their limitations. " 
[67] 
By 1903-04, therefore, the Navy had decided that the submarine was 
more than simply a harbour defence vessel. Fisher claimed that "submarine 
boats may in a broad sense be looked on as extending the defence of a 
port enormously beyond the range of gunfire, and as linking the defences 
of ports along ranges of coast now locally defended" [68], and Bacon 
deployed a similar argument, again emphasising the submarine's range: "By 
laying mines, and trusting to them for defence, money is being merely 
locked in fixed defences which have no mobility, " he wrote. "Such a 
defence can merely be a spotty defence, and can never provide a protected 
belt around our island... If boats of a fair speed were worked from suitable 
small harbours, a complete protection would be 'provided. " [69] The 
submarine was a formidable weapon on her own ground, the RN argued. 
Invisibility gave her the 'moral effect' of the mine, she could exercise 
discretion in picking a target, and, most significantly, she had (limited) 
offensive potential. "If submarine boats can do more efficiently and 
economically the work now done by the large submarine mining 
establishment of the Army, " concluded Lord Selborne, "then submarine 
boats must replace submarine mines. " [70]. 
Submarines and the Admiralty scheme of coast defence 
The Navy formally requested the abolition of Britain's mine defences at a 
joint army-navy conference held in December 1903. Mines, the RN 
delegates argued, were obsolete now the Navy was prepared to provide 
flotillas for coastal defence, and should be replaced by submarines which 
"with even their present capabilities will afford an equally efficient defence, 
[67] Kerr minute 6 January 1904, Adm 1/7717 
[68] Fisher, Naval Necessities lI p. 449, Adm 116/3093 
[69] Bacon report 31 May 1903, Adm 1/7725 
[70] Selborne minute 4 March 1903, Adm 117717; see also Drury minute nd (late 
December 1903), ibid 
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and have a more deterrent effect against sustained attack, than would a 
submarine minefield. " [71] 
Arnold-Forster raised no objections to handing responsibility for inshore 
coast defence back to the RN [72]. The army estimates would have to be 
cut now the Boer War was over, and any savings were welcome. The 
Royal Engineers were largely unenthusiastic about 'aquatics', which kept 
engineers away from more useful work, and the regiment had only ever 
accepted responsibility for observation minefields with reluctance. (Mining, 
the Inspector General of Fortifications once observed sarcastically, "must not 
be treated as a trifling and distasteful branch of the all-important and 
attractive career offered by our navy. " [73]) In addition, Arnold-Forster's 
service at the Admiralty had convinced him that the submarine was an 
important and devastating weapon. "The number of boats has greatly 
increased, and is increasing, " he noted. "It seems to me therefore 
. 
only 
reasonable that we should act in accordance with the expressed policy of 
the Admiralty, and take the first step towards divesting ourselves of a duty 
for the performance of which we get small thanks. " [74] 
The Admiralty authorised the removal of existing minefields early in 
1904, and from February 1905 mine defences were formally abolished in 
British naval and commercial ports [75]. In their place, the Navy devised a 
scheme for coast defence based on the deployment of the limited number 
of existing submarine and torpedo boat flotillas. 
Most submarines were immediately transferred to the command of the 
Home Port admirals at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham. Boats of the 
Holland, A and B classes were used strictly for local defence, and only the 
Dover flotilla of C class boats, established in 1907, remained under the 
orders of the CinC Home Fleet, with instructions to deny the Straits to 
enemy warships [76]. Although the local defence flotillas were stationed at 
1711 'Report of a conference between Admiralty and War Office representatives to consider 
the future functions of submarine mines in war' December 1903, Adm 1/7717 
[72] Arnold-Forster to Selborne 2 November 1903, Add. Mss. 50318 fols. 184-5 
173) Clarke to Surveyor-General of Ordnance 23 November 1885, WO 33/46 p. 9 
[74] Arnold-Forster to Lyttleton 16 August 1904, Add. Mss. 50308 fol. 13 
[75) 'Mines in commercial ports' February 1905, Cab 4/1/49B 
176] 'Position of Thames' 3 November 1903, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1389; 'Memorandum 
to Commanders-in-Chief, Channel Fleet and Home Ports, and Admiral (D)' 20 May 
1905, Adm 116/900B; 'Local defence' nd (1907), digest cut ila, Adm 1211440 
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the major naval bases before 1914 - not least for ease of maintenance 
and efficiency of training - it was planned that in wartime they would be 
divided up among Britain's defended ports, which would each be protected 
by two submarines [77]. Co-ordination of the local defence flotillas was the 
responsibility of the Admiral of Patrols, whose post was created in 1911 to 
unify the command of destroyer, torpedo boat and submarine flotillas. 
Underwater craft made a substantial contribution to the British coast 
defences. They could, as the Navy had promised, attack enemy craft some 
distance from port, and their invisibility and mobility made them all the 
more effective. They were particularly invaluable on the east coast, whose 
defences were traditionally weak, and provided additional protection for the 
main naval ports from their bases at Sheerness and - in the immediate 
pre-war period - Dundee. Moreover the submarine, because of her small 
size, offered protection to a number of small harbours such as Great 
Yarmouth, which could not accommodate larger warships and which had 
hitherto been omitted from the list of British defended ports. "Taking the 
East Coast as a whole, " concluded a War Staff evaluation, "the best form 
of protection against all kinds of attack may ultimately be found in strong 
submarine patrols, with the support of military forces and guns on shore. " 
[78] 
The Navy's new scheme of defence had severe defects, however. The 
east coast was more than 600 miles long and there were not nearly enough 
submarines to protect the whole of it. The enemy could attack at almost 
any point, and as Callaghan, the CinC, observed after the 1913 
manoeuvres, "submarines alone are not sufficient for the defence of ports 
unless maintained at all vulnerable points in much larger numbers than 
now. " [79). 
The problem identified by Callaghan was exacerbated by Fisher's 
appointment as First Sea Lord. Recognising that the Navy did not possess 
enough submarines and torpedo boats to take over immediate responsibility 
for all coast defences, Kerr had agreed with the War Office that the 
defence of British merchantile ports should remain in the hands of the 
[77] CID paper 'Coast defences of the United Kingdom and the question of a coast watch' 
by the Chief of Staff (Jackson), 15 December 1913, appendix I p. 16, Adm 1/8917 
[78] War staff comments 29 September 1913, Adm 116/1214 
[79] Callaghan paper 'Remarks on North Sea strategy' 28 August 1913, ibid 
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army until enough torpedo craft had been built to allow their safe transfer 
to naval control. Fisher's distrust of the military prompted him to demand 
the immediate removal of army minefields at all commercial harbours [80]. 
In the short term, this decision deprived some 36 British and 14 colonial 
ports of their naval defences; in the long term it created a sizeable 
problem for the already under-manned and under-equipped submarine 
branch. In an attempt to work up a comprehensive scheme of coastal 
defences, Bacon was reduced to the lame suggestion that 800 civilians from 
the Naval Volunteer reserve could be trained to man small coastal boats, 
which would be laid up in reserve at merchantile ports and commissioned 
on the declaration of war [81]. 
This was sheer fantasy. Bacon himself was a leading proponent of the 
view that only highly trained specialist ratings could handle submarines. 
Civilians had no part to play in the creation of an efficient submarine 
service, and the proposal was nothing more than a plain admission that 
Fisher's coast defence policy was an unrealistic one. In 1914, no 
commercial port possessed its own submarine boats. 
The First Sea Lord's response to the shortage of submarines was to 
step up orders for coastal boats. Having purchased five Hollands, 13 A 
boats and 11 B class submarines, the RN built no fewer than 38 C class 
coastals between 1905 and 1910. But even these vessels did not meet the 
demand for local defence submarines, and as late as 1914 the Navy was 
forced to assign overseas boats essentially coastal duties to make good the 
deficiency. "I consider it the most serious thing at present affecting the 
British Empire! " Fisher wrote in typically extravagent style. "That sounds 
big, but it's true!... I have not disguised my opinion in season and out of 
season as to the essential, imperative, immediate, vital, pressing, urgent (I 
can't think of any more adjectives! ) necessity for more submarines at once, 
at the very least 25 in addition to those now ordered and building, and 
[80] Arnold-Forster memo 'Submarine mining - withdraw] of colonial garrisons' 22 
November 1904, Add. Mss. 50318 fols. 175-6; Ottley 'Memorandum containing Admiralty 
views on submarine mines at commercial ports' 6 February 1905, Adm 118879 
[81) Selborne to Arnold-Forster 14 November 1903, Add. Mss. 50308 fols. 9-10; Bacon 
'Report on the suitability of Royal Engineer stations... ' 13 December 1903, Adm 1/7717; 
Bacon notes to 'Memoranda relative to service in submarines' 6 November 1906, Adm 
1/7880. In an earlier attempt to provide comprehensive coast defences, Fisher had 
proposed using naval militia to man improvised torpedo boats (Mackay op. cit. p. 127), and 
the Admiralty had once suggested laying up small ironclads which could be commissioned 
for the local defence of ports (Stanley Sandler, The emergence of the modern capital 
ship, Newark 1979 p. 173). 
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100 more as soon as practicable. " [82] 
In order to ensure the maximum possible number of boats were built, 
Fisher decided in 1905 to limit to limit the cost of each submarine to a 
maximum of £60,000 [83]. Fortunately for the Royal Navy, the new policy 
- which would have made it impossible to build Lees' £85,000 D class 
'overseas' boats - remained in force for only a few months; even so, 
there can be little doubt that the First Sea Lord's preoccupation with 
coastal submarines led him to abandon his previous interest in the offensive 
potential of underwater craft. With his tremendous energies chanelled into 
dealing with more urgent problems, Fisher did little to promote submarine 
development during his term of office. Not until he had left the Admiralty 
did he begin to agitate for the construction of large submarines. 
The shortage of local defence flotillas soon began to worry Britain's 
strategists. The CID concluded it would be unwise to assume an invasion 
fleet would be spotted before it landed. There was no guarantee that 
unusual troop movements would be noticed in advance, and an enemy 
would probably attempt to decoy the main British fleet well away from the 
landing area. The coastal submarines were slow, and without excellent 
intelligence would be unable to intercept an invasion or raiding force before 
it landed [84]. 
The naval authorities were thus forced to declare that 
"the patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of 
being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling duties, should be 
kept concentrated and ready for action at selected sally-ports along 
the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point where on sure 
information an enemy is attempting to land. There is to be nothing 
like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at the mouths of harbours, 
and that from time to time good bold reconaissances 60,70 and 80 
miles out to seaward should be pushed from each sally-port by the 
whole of the boats available. " 
182] 'Submarines -a letter to the Controller of the Navy' December 1903, FP 4941 
183] Fisher minute 10 August 1905 to Controller's report of 19 July 1905, Adm 138/360A 
section 10; Watts memo 'New designs of submarine boats' nd (July 1906), ibid section 22 
184) 'Attack on the Briitsh Isles from overseas' 15 April 1914, Cab 3/2/62A 
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"quite impossible with such a small force to maintain a regular patrol, 
or still less a line of observation... It is not possible with the forces 
available for the patrol flotillas to prevent the enemies' vessels from 
reaching the British coast. Their dispositions are intended to make it 
certain that they [the enemy] will be attacked in force with the least 
possible delay... absolute certainty is out of reach. " [85] 
The Admiralty therefore adopted the policy of holding submarines in 
reserve at strategic points along the coast. "There will be no question of 
patrols in the sense of a continual watch at sea, " decided Keyes in 1911, 
and in 1912 submarines were ordered to stay within a day's sailing of their 
home port [86). Strategically, this meant that the line of observation (the 
coast) was, uniquely, behind the line of resistance (naval torpedo flotillas). 
Militarily, it meant that during the First World War, the risk of German 
bombardments of east coast ports was tolerated in order to maintain a 
force constantly ready to strike at an invasion fleet. 
The 1912 manoeuvres confirmed that submarines, though effective in 
coastal defence, could not always prevent a landing. Despite the heavy 
preponderence of 31 coastal submarines to five on the Blue (defending) 
side, Battenburg's Red Fleet successfully 'landed' a force of 12,000 men on 
the North Sea coast and made off before the Blue flotillas could reach the 
spot. Three Blue submarines that were present did not materially interfere 
with the landing. Although highly artificial - the Blue boats argued they 
had not realised a landing was in progress because Battenburg's battleships 
had only to haul down one flag and hoist another to become 'transports' 
putting troops ashore - the manoeuvres did convincingly suggest that while 
a full-scale invasion remained unlikely, hit-and-run raids on a large scale 
were feasible. Submarines were involved in only nine of the 78 actions 
(11.5%) reported during the manoeuvre period [87]. 
[85) 'Admiralty notes' 14 April 1913, Adm 116/3381; Admiralty to Admiral of Patrols and 
Commodore (S) 11 November 1914, KP 4/11 
[86) Keyes memo 3 June 1911, KP 4/13; de Robeck orders 30 April 1912, ibid. See also 
Fisher paper 'Submarines' 20 April 1908, McKenna papers MCKN 3/4, Churchill College 
Cambridge 
[87) May's 'Narrative of events' 31 July 1912, MAY 10; DSF 1,352-3 
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The results of the 1913 exercises were still more disturbing to the 'Blue 
Water' school. On this occasion it was decided to land real troops from 
real transports, and Admiral Jellicoe took command of the Red Fleet. 
Having completely out-manouevred Callaghan and the Blue forces, Jellicoe 
successfully landed 48,000 men at Blyth and Sunderland on the north-east 
coast. The Red submarines (18 strong) were considerably more successful 
than the 30 defending Blue craft. During the two major raids only two 
ships were confirmed as sunk by Blue boats (eight were claimed), while 
Callaghan's fleet lost several major units to Red submarine attack. The 
inability of coastal boats to attack in shallow and confined waters was 
thoroughly exposed during the manoeuvres [88]. 
Submarines performed respectably enough under the more realistic 
conditions prevailing in 1913; they were involved in just under half of the 
163 actions. But the lesson of the 1912 and 1913 manoeuvres - and of 
two World Wars - was that the submarine was not 'the answer' to 
attempted invasions and raids that Fisher had claimed her to be. She was 
at best only a part of a complex scheme of defences, and a considerable 
force of boats would be needed to provide complete protection for the 
coast. "In attempting to -be strong everywhere, the patrol flotillas were weak 
everywhere, " Churchill informed the Prime Minister after the 1912 
manoeuvres. "[They] should be kept in had at good strategic points, neither 
scattered nor exhausted... so as to supplement and support the movements 
of the fleet. " [89] 
The Navy's inability to guarantee it could prevent landings by substantial 
raiding parties meant the land defences of the British Isles could not be 
scaled down. There had always been considerable disagreement between the 
War Office and the Admiralty as to the likely strength of a raiding party, 
but from 1904 to 1914 the maximum strength of an enemy force was 
regularly put at 70,000 men - regardless of the changing strength of 
Britain's coastal submarine flotillas [90]. Nor did the 46 boats available for 
local defence in August 1914 reassure the public that landings could not be 
made unopposed. Forts and fortifications were strengthened during the war, 
(88] 'Umpire-in-Chief's report' August 1913, MAY 10; Madden notes nd (August 1913), 
ibid 
[89] Churchill to Asquith 17 October 1912, Adm 116/3381 
(90] Moon op. cit. I, 81; Marder, DSF 1 pp. 344-57 
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and significant numbers of men were stationed in the UK to beat off an 
invasion. In 1914, Jellicoe suggested 300,000 troops should be based along 
the coast. Enemy landings seemed a serious possibility as late as 1917, and 
a major study of the threat of invasion was commissioned in that year [91]. 
The submarine, in short, provided a little additional security but made 
practically no difference to the scale of Britain's other coastal defences. 
Because the army retained responsibility for artillery and boom defences, it 
could not even be claimed that the submarine finally removed the danger 
of confusion' and uncertain co-operation between naval and military 
commands. 
The design of British submarines themselves, on the other hand, was 
heavily influenced by the Admiralty's decision to develop them for coastal 
defence. In the pre-war period little importance was attached to the speed 
with which a boat could dive because most submarines would serve in home 
waters where the enemy would come to them. There were no plans for 
coastal flotillas to undertake protracted diving patrols, and none for lengthy 
cruises in hostile waters during which extended surface cruising would be 
necessary to recharge exhausted batteries; in some quarters the ability to 
dive quickly was even. thought dangerous, because it increased the chances 
of an accident. In 1913, therefore, the RN specified a diving time of three 
minutes for standard overseas and coastal designs, and six for the 
double-hulled types with greater positive buoyancy then entering service. 
Wartime experience proved this was dangerously slow. "One of the chief 
lessons of the war, " recorded the DNC, d'Eyncourt, "is that a submarine 
must be able to dive very quickly and the times which were accepted... 
have to be considerably diminished. " [92] 
Submarines designed for coastal defence also mounted only a limited 
number of torpedo tubes. Tubes and spare torpedos were extremely heavy 
and consumed valuable space, and the Hollands were given a single 18" 
tube, the A class one or later two, the Bs and Cs two bow tubes and the 
D class one stern and two bow tubes. The difficulty of securing a hit in 
wartime conditions was not widely appreciated; in pre-war manoeuvres, as 
[91] Jellicoe to Admiralty 14 November 1914, Adm 137/965 fols. 168-9; 'Anti-invasion 
conference 1917', Adm 137/1939,1957,1971 
[92) D'Eyncourt submission 19 November 1915, Adm 138/435 section 56; see also DNC 
department submission nd (early 1913), Adm 138/404A section 8 
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we have seen, British submarines generally 'fired' at extremely close range 
- close enough to make the discharge of salvos to ensure a hit 
unnecessary - and were presented with more targets in a day than they 
would ' see in a year of real warfare. Coastals claimed fifty per cent hits in 
pre-war exercises, and the Admiralty, allowing for exaggeration, estimated 
that one torpedo in four would strike under wartime conditions [93]. "Two 
loaded torpedo tubes should be sufficient for practical purposes offensively, " 
wrote Bacon in 1903 [94]. 
In fact the restricted number of tubes mounted in wartime submarines 
seriously limited their chances of securing a hit. With only one or two bow 
torpedo tubes, commanders of the B, C, D and E class boats had to rely 
heavily on their own skill, and on the accuracy of their often unreliable 
torpedoes, to score a hit on the elusive enemy. Submarines designed during 
and after the war were given an altogether more realistic armament of four 
or six 18" bow tubes. 
The expectation, derived from experience with coastal boats, that 
submarines would attack from very short range also prompted the Royal 
Navy to favour beam torpedo tubes, a concept pioneered by the Italian 
submarine service, for its overseas types. Both the D and E classes lacked 
the manouevrability to make successful short-range attacks with bow tubes, 
and on one occasion aD class boat actually collided with its target after 
delivering an attack. "One effect of the increased size, " wrote SS Hall of 
the 180 foot E class submarine, "has been to depreciate the value of bow 
torpedo tubes on account of the great speed and great diameter of the 
turning circle of the boat, which increases the danger of firing from the 
bow at an enemy at close range; while the stern torpedo discharge, though 
not open to this objection, is tactically less easy to manage and possibly 
less accurate. " [95] 
Beam tubes were considered for the D class, and the original design for 
El called for the complete omission of bow tubes. Though the submarine 
was redesigned, the first eight Es were provided with two broadside tubes 
[93) 'Coast defences of the United Kingdom and the question of a coast watch' (Appendix 
2, note by Henry Jackson) 7 May 1914, Cab 3/2/71A 
[94) Bacon report on B class design 7 November 1903 fol. 10, Adm 138/180B section 31 
[95) 'New submarine boat designs 1910-1911' nd (? October 1910) Adm 138/299A section 
7a. See also Hall report 12 May 1910, Adm 116/1122 
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and only a single bow discharge [96]. Beam tubes were expected to be of 
great tactical value to submarines (particularly those taking part in a fleet 
action), since they would allow a boat to to attack while proceeding parallel 
to enemy vessels steaming in line ahead. However, the addition of another 
variable - the submarine's forward motion - to the already complex 
equation for aiming torpedoes made hits unlikely, and the accuracy of 
torpedoes fired from beam tubes fell off sharply when a submarine was 
moving at speeds greater than three knots. British submariners heavily 
favoured their bow tubes during the Great War, and by 1916 Hall was 
forced to admit that beam tubes were a failure [97). 
Finally, British coast defence boats had a low endurance. No provision 
was made for crews to live on board and it was unusual for A, B or C 
class submarines to undertake protracted cruises. Because it concentrated its 
attentions primarily on coastal designs, Fisher's Admiralty was slow to grasp 
the impact a seaworthy overseas submarine would have for its offensive 
strategy. 
The fall and rise of the British blockade 
Unless an enemy fleet could be persuaded to offer battle, the safest way to 
protect trade, prevent invasion, transport an army and secure British lines 
of supply was to keep enemy fleets bottled up in their own harbours. This 
achieved, the Royal Navy would be free to intercept the enemy's trade and 
thus deny him materials and foodstuffs vital to his war effort. Blockade was 
a slow, sometimes uncertain and often inefficient way of fighting a war, but 
it was the only strategy that enabled a naval power such as Great Britain 
to fight alone against a continental land power - and it had the advantage 
of costing less, in men and money, than the maintenance of an army. 
The earliest British assessment of submarines included sobering 
evaluations of their ability to smash a close blockade. By May 1903, Bacon 
had concluded that it was almost impossible for a ship to remain within 25 
miles of a harbour guarded by submarines. "The risks of allowing a large 
ship to approach such a port are so great, " he stated, "that I unhesitatingly 
I 
[96] AN Harrison, Development of HM Submarines from Holland No. 1 (1900) to Porpoise 
(1930), sections 4.4-4.5, BR 3043 (1979), copy in National Maritime Museum 
[97) Hall minute 5 December 1916, Adm 138/588A section 3 
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affirm that in war time it should never be allowed. " [98] The Admiralty 
took Bacon's report seriously enough to arrange more realistic exercises. 
The Spithead trials of March 1904 [see section 7.2], primarily intended to 
test anti-submarine tactics, set units of the Home Fleet against submarines 
guarding the approaches to Portsmouth; Bacon noted that "no blockade was 
maintained, since no ships dared to remain in the offing during the 
daytime. " [99] Fisher, who does not seem to have understood the 
implications for British offensive strategy, was delighted; submarines, he 
wrote, "succeeded in the recent manoeuvres in sinking millions sterling of 
battleships and cruizers and established such a 'Funk' as to keep the Home 
Fleet miles away from Portsmouth! " [100] 
In August 1904 a fleet assembled at Milford Haven for manoeuvres 
specifically designed to assess the effectiveness of torpedo craft operating 
against a close blockade [1011. Five Holland submarines and a force of 
torpedo boats and destroyers - designated Red fleet - were detailed to 
protect the port from a force of battleships, screened by cruisers and 
destroyers, which were to impose a blockade. The results were, Bacon 
wrote, "in every way satisfactory. " [102] His submarines put four 
destroyers out of action for the loss of two of their own number (one of 
them to a ship already technically disabled by enemy action) -a 
considerable improvement on the ratio of losses at Spithead. The major 
Blue warships spent most of the manoeuvre period at Queenstown, and 
although the largest ship lost by the attacking side was a cruiser, the 
submarine exerted a very considerable moral effect. "The existence of the 
submarines made the close blockade of Milford Haven more difficult, " 
reported the Umpire-in-Chief, "and the fact of their presence inspired 
fear, as they were repeatedly being reported off Queenstown (which caused 
the battlefleet, on its return to that port, to steam in with its nets down), 
whereas they never left the precincts of Milford Haven. " [103] 
[98] Bacon report 31 May 1903, Adm 1/7725; Marder, ABSP p. 368 
[99] Bacon report 24 March 1904, Adm 1/7795 
[100] Fisher paper 'Submarines - second postscript' April 1904, Balfour papers Add. Mss. 
49710 fol. 139 
[101) 'Great Britain: torpedo craft manoeuvres 1904' NID no. 754, December 1904 p. 5, 
Adm 231/43 
[102] Bacon report on the Milford Haven manoeuvres, nd (1904), Adm 1/7795 
[103] 'Great Britain: torpedo craft manoeuvres 1904' p, 70 
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Admiral Robinson, a former captain of HMS Vernon appointed to 
command Red Fleet, concluded that "battleships and cruisers are not safe 
within the radius of action of hostile torpedo craft, even though protected 
by a larger force of destroyers than is possessed by the enemy. " He drew 
attention to Bacon's innovative use of submarines by night, which caused 
the enemy many problems "as these vessels are on dark nights practically 
invisible, even when on the surface, and could attack and sink blockading 
vessels with very little risk of discovery... I do not think that a single 
submarine would have been seen by the Blue destroyers but for the rule 
compelling them to fire Very's lights and so disclosing their position", 
ending his report by emphasising "the impossibility of close blockade of a 
port in which submarines are available. " [104] 
Bacon too had seen nothing to alter his earlier conclusions. The TBDs' 
fear of the submarine would, he observed, have the effect of "totally 
altering the nature of what has hitherto been their close blockading tactics. " 
Destroyers would be forced to maintain a more distant blockade, and this 
would mean either greatly increasing the number of TBDs employed, or 
leaving dangerous gaps in the blockade line. The ICS concluded his analysis 
by asserting, "I look on this result achieved by the submarine boats as a 
fatal blow to the maintenance of close blockades by torpedo craft or 
destroyers. " [105] 
The 1904 manoeuvres concluded a period marked by growing anxiety 
about the efficacy of a close blockade. The advent of steam made the 
blockaded fleet more dangerous, less dependent on weather conditions, and 
less predictable in its movements once out. In 1884, Captain WH Hall of 
the Foreign Intelligence Committee (the forerunner of the NID), wrote a 
paper which suggested that "torpedo boats constitute the greatest danger to 
a blockading squadron" [106]. A year later, Admiral Hornby's squadron 
successfully evaded a less-than-efficient blockade in the first modern fleet 
manoeuvres. 
The 1888 exercises were also designed to test the potency of the British 
blockade. A fleet representing the French and commanded by Admiral Sir 
George Tryon was blockaded in Berehaven and Lough Swilly. A stream of 
[104) Ibid pp. 77-8 
[105] Bacon report on the Milford Haven manoeuvres, nd (1904), Adm 1/7795 
[106] Quoted in Alan Cowpe, 'The Royal Navy and the Whitehead torpedo', in Bryan 
Ranft (ed), Technical change and British naval policy 1869-1945 (London 1977) p. 28 
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ships, totalling five cruisers and a battleship, ran the blockade in three 
nights and proceeded to run amok on the west coast Britain, forcing the 
two divisions of the blockading fleet to abandon the operation, effect a 
junction, and attempt to hunt down the enemy raiding force. This in turn 
allowed the remainder of the 'Frenc h' fleet to leave its ports and unite at 
a pre-arranged rendezvous. Having evaded the British, this combined force 
descended on Liverpool, captured the city and wrecked the port of 
Holyhead. 
The blockade failed, noted the subsequent 'Report of the three 
Admirals', because too many of the blockaders were absent coaling at any 
given time, because the blockaded fleet had superior (overland) 
communications, and because "the constant torment of torpedo boat attacks" 
weakened the blockaders' resolve. The report suggested that, to be 
effective, a blockading force would need a superiority of 5 vessels to 3 
[107] - an almost unattainable standard. Although the close blockade 
remained the mainstay of British strategy, therefore, it was from the 
mid-1880s a less than wholly practical proposition. Sir Frederick Richards, 
the pragmatic Senior Naval Lord, confirmed in 1893 that a blockade would 
be "extremely difficult, if not impossible" to enforce [108J. 
The swift development of underwater warfare made inshore naval 
operations increasingly hazardous. By 1900 the Admiralty was describing the 
submarine as "a very serious danger" to the blockade. In the 1901 
Greenwich war game, players controlling the British fleet in the 
Mediterranean withdrew their units from the blockade of Toulon every 
night, "saving themselves from the risk of the torpedo by steaming away - 
so much so that 4am the nearest British ship was 100 miles away from the 
port. " It was admitted that had the French side been allowed submarines as 
well as torpedo boats, a daylight blockade would also have been impossible 
[109]. Two years later, another Mediterranean war game pitted the Royal 
Navy against a Franco-Russian alliance; again the results suggested that 
British officers recognised the dangers of submarine torpedo attacks on 
blockading squadrons. RN forces kept well off shore and the blockade was 
[107) Marder, ABSP pp. 107-09,111 
[108] Quoted in ibid p. 111 
[109) Admiralty to Treasury 25 October 1900, Adm 1/7515; 'Strategical war game at 
Greenwich January-May 1901' NID No. 642, November 1901 pp. 9,14, Adm 231/35 
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far from watertight. "The British fleet were extremely nervous as to attack 
by submarines, " commented the official report. "The fear of submarines and 
the presence of French cruisers prevented the British Admiral from seeing 
the French transports, and he did not know there were any at Bizerta. " All 
major losses incurred by British forces in the 1903 Greenwich game were 
inflicted by torpedo attack, and the report noted that "much more was 
achieved by the torpedo than has commonly been the case in manoeuvres, 
and besides the material effect, the fear of the torpedo exercised a most 
important influence. " [110) 
The manoeuvres conducted by Britain's naval rivals were no less 
portentious. The French regularly exercised their submarines against vessels 
representing British blockading squadrons [see sections 2.1 and 5.3], forcing 
Kerr to conclude that underwater craft seemed to "have achieved 
considerable success and a blockade must in consequence be maintained at 
a greater distance from their ports than formerly, thus affording greater 
facilities for their ships to evade an enemy. " [111] The Spithead and 
Milford Haven manouvres thus confirmed the worst suspicions of the RN. 
Clearly there should have been a reassessment (at the very least) of the 
British blockade strategy at this point. In fact there was none. 
There were several reasons for this failure. The acknowledged 
unreliability of manoeuvres made it easy to ignore awkward results, at least 
in the short term. British preconceptions, particularly those concerning the 
submarine's short range and inadequacy at night, took some time to dissolve 
away. This problem was, of course, exacerbated both by the lack of a 
naval staff and by the materiel preoccupations of the submarine service. 
Equally significantly, the counter-measures that were introduced were 
myopic, dealing only with the existing threat rather than anticipating its 
future development. It was suggested that the blockading forces need only 
withdraw a short distance out to sea to put themselves outside the range of 
submarines and torpedo boats, a solution that took no account of the 
rapidly increasing radius of action of underwater craft. It took the dramatic 
performance of submarines in the 1910,1911 and 1912 manoeuvres to 
change this attitude. 
The emergence of Germany as Britain's most likely naval enemy helped 
I 
1110] 'Strategical war game at the Royal Naval College Greenwich' NID no. 706, October 
1903 p. 14, Adm 231138 
[111] Kerr memo 20 January 1901, Adm 1/7515; ABSP pp. 388-9 
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to reawaken interest in the strategy of close blockade. The North Sea coast 
of the German empire was a mere 150 miles long. There were only two : 
naval bases on it, and the whole could be dominated by a fleet on 
deployed across the mouth of the Heligoland Bight, which seemed to form 
an ideal blockade line. The geometrical beauty of this arrangement, and the 
comparative weakness of the German navy in the early years of the 
century, were powerful incentives to the close blockaders, and help to. 
explain Admiral Wilson's determined advocacy of the seizure of Heligoland 
(preferably) or the island of Borkum to act as a forward base for the fleet 
[112]. 
Finally, it may not be too much to suggest that there was an element 
of desperation in the tenacity with which Britain clung to the close 
blockade. It was not at all evident that a more distant patrol line would be 
as effective, and the Admiralty failed to evolve alternate strategies that 
could bring equal pressure to bear on its enemies. Everyone (including the 
Germans) expected the British to establish a close blockade immediately 
upon the outbreak of war - if only because there seemed to be no 
alternative. The close blockade remained in favour largely by default, its 
efficiency greatly exaggerated and its usefulness largely unquestioned. 
To what extent, then, was the submarine responsible for the final 
abandonment of the close blockade? In the 1880s and early 1890s the 
torpedo boat menace had been promptly and efficiently dealt with by the 
development of quick-firing guns and the destroyer, forcing the TB to 
become a creature of the night, and leaving open the possibility of a close 
blockade by day. Other materiel developments were more difficult to 
counter than the torpedo boat; accurate, long-range coastal artillery pieces 
were produced, and mine warfare was a serious threat. But both were, it 
was thought, a danger only at short range. The heaviest artillery could not 
be relied on beyond 25,000-30,000 yards, and no blockader was likely to 
get as close inshore as that. The mine was a weapon of great but largely 
unrecognised potential, with particular value in the predominantly shallow 
waters of the North Sea. But international law forbade the sowing of 
minefields outside territorial waters, and the unrestricted mine warfare 
practised during the Russo-Japanese war suprised and shocked western 
opinion. The flexibility called for by British blockade policy largely 
[112] Marder, DSF I, 371 -2 
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precluded offensive mine warfare on the part of the Royal Navy, and 
inhibited careful consideration of the problem [113]. 
The submarine posed quite a different, seemingly insoluble condundrum. 
She had the range to engage blockading vessels. She. could attack an enemy 
force steaming outside territorial waters perfectly legally, and could not be 
avoided in the way that minefields, once located, could be avoided. She 
could (or so it was thought) discriminate between targets, perhaps even to 
the extent of picking off the Admiral's flagship. Most worryingly of all, the' 
usual techniques of countering a new weapon were inapplicable. Submarine 
could not fight submarine, except in the sense of exacting retribution by 
matching an atrocity with an atrocity. Surface vessels, on the other hand, 
were horribly exposed to torpedo boats at night and now to submarines by 
day. There would be no respite for a blockading fleet. It was the certainty 
of attack, together with the impossibility of defence, that finished the close 
blockade. 
The blockade line was gradually, grudgingly forced further out to sea. 
Late in 1906, Beresford's 'War tactics for the Mediterranean fleet' drew 
attention to the fact that "the effective radius of submarines is increasing, 
and the introduction of the submersible by the French is rendering the 
possibility of these larger vessels being met further off... large armoured 
cruisers are not to approach within 50 miles of a base where submarines 
are known to be unless it is for a specific object, small cruisers and 
destroyers being used inside this distance. " The Admiral predicted that 
"many traps will be laid to entice large cruisers into waters in which 
submarines are stationed, " and observed that the modified British policy 
would "prevent a close watch being kept on places like Toulon by any but 
small, fast vessels. " [114] 
In July 1908, war orders issued to the Channel Fleet still attributed 
greater influence to enemy destroyers and torpedo boats than to submarines. 
A close blockade was to be maintained by day, but at dusk British forces 
would pull back until they were 170 miles from the enemy coast. This was 
calculated to be the maximum distance torpedo flotillas could travel if they 
[113] Alan Cowpe, Underwater weapons and the Royal Navy 1869-1918 (London 
University PhD 1980) pp. 190-2,200,205-07 
[114] Beresford memo 'War tactics for the Mediterranean fleet', October 1906, Adm 
1161900B 
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left the blockaded ports at dusk and returned at dawn [115]. 
Two years later, however, estimates of the submarine's radius of action 
had to be revised. In August 1910, three C-boats were sent into the North 
Sea from Dundee to find a blockading force steaming 300 miles off the 
coast in an unknown position. Without the help of surface warships and 
without precise directions, the submarines located the blockaders and 
returned safely by night. On a second occasion, three more submarines 
located and 'torpedoed' a gunboat (representing the enemy battlefleet) which 
had been patrolling 270 miles out in the North Sea [116]. In the 
manoeuvres of 1911, the Dundee trials were repeated in more realistic 
conditions when six submarines acting on imprecise information located a 
division of eight battleships cruising in the Channel and got in five attacks 
on them [117]. The significance of these exercises for the policy of the 
close blockade was obvious; Fisher summed it up by stating unequivocally 
that "a blockade, however loose, is absolutely impossible for surface vessels 
provided hostile submarines are present. " [118] 
The 1911 naval war plans called for two destroyer flotillas supported by 
three cruiser squadrons to institute a blockade of the German Bight [119], 
and it was not until November 1912 that the Admiralty - in the face of 
some opposition from those who thought the threat from underwater 
weapons exaggerated [120] - finally adopted the policy of an 'intermediate 
blockade' by surface ships, recognising that to do otherwise would be to 
expose British ships to serious and continual attrition. The change in policy 
was initiated by Sir George Callaghan, who as CinC of Red Fleet during 
the 1912 manoeuvres had been considerably impressed by the performance 
of the Blue submarines [121], and supported by Captain Arthur Vyvyan, the 
[115] Marder, DSF 1,369-70 
[116] Submarine committee report no. 4,12 August 1910, Adm 1/8128; Hall report 
'Exercises carried out by submarines during the month of July 1910', 5 August 1910, ibid 
[117] Submarine committee report no. 13, nd (1911) cited in TH40 pp. 16-17, Naval 
Library 
[118] Fisher paper 'The oil engine and the submarine' nd (February 1914) p. 4, FP 
4293/9. See also 'Note concerning a past trial of submarines' nd (mid-1913), FP 4291 
[119] 'Blockade of the North East coast of Germany: procedure' 30 December 1910, Adm 
1/8132; Callaghan to Admiralty 31 August 1911, ibid 
[120] Cf. Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Early Beatty, the last naval hero: an intimate 
biography (London 1980) p. 56 
[121] Ballard memo 'Remarks on war orders for an observation force in the North Sea' 
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assistant to the Chief of the War Staff, who urged that "any attempt to 
keep a close watch on German exits with our existing force of surface craft 
would spell disaster. The cordon could be broken anywhere, our vessels 
would be destroyed in detail, and our general strategy totally disorganised. " 
[122]. The RN now proposed to stretch a line of destroyers and cruisers 
from the Norwegian coast to the Dutch island of Texel, with the battlefleet 
in suport but well to the rear. 
In July 1914 intermediate blockade was also abandoned in favour of the 
'distant blockade' actually maintained in the years 1914-1918. The exits to 
the North Sea were to be sealed by fleets stationed in the Channel and on 
the Scottish coast, where they were, in theory, concentrated well beyond 
the range of German torpedo craft. Even at this late date there were 
concessions to the old spirit of blockade. The plan called for large-scale 
sweeps of the North Sea to tempt the High Sea Fleet into a decisive battle 
- or at least convince it that it could not venture far from its bases 
without encountering the British battlefleet [123]. Sweeps also offered the 
Grand Fleet regular and realistic exercises, helping to maintain morale and 
battle readiness superior to that of the Imperial German Navy. The war 
showed that a well-screened fleet manoeuvring evasively and travelling at 
full speed made a very difficult target for submarine attack. 
The distant blockade, which so surprised the Germans when it was put 
into operation, and which served the British well in World War I, was 
introduced for a variety of reasons. Primarily it was a response to belated 
recognition that an intermediate blockade would still leave RN forces 
vulnerable to 'whittling down' that might eventually result in the loss of 
command of the sea. But it also recognised that cruisers and destroyers 
could not guard every mile of water, and would be exposed to very 
considerable wear and tear in' the North Sea. A determined German attack 
on an intermediate blockade line would have drawn in the Grand Fleet 
unsupported by a substantial proportion of its cruisers and torpedo flotillas, 
some of which would inevitably be stranded at the wrong end of the 
300-mile line of observation. In addition, the distant blockade recognised 
4 16 September 1912, Adm 116/866B; 'Naval manoeuvres 1912: general remarks by 
Commander in Chief, Home Fleet' 5 August 1912, Adm 1/8269; Marder, DSF 1,371 
[122] Vyvyan paper 'Remarks on the 1913 manoeuvres' nd (September 1913), Adm 
116/1169 
[123] Marder, DSF 1,372-7 
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Britain's exceptionally favourable geographical position relative to Germany. 
With the Channel sealed by Franco-British forces and the northern exits 
of the North Sea guarded by a Grand Fleet based on the Scottish coast, 
the High Sea Fleet was almost as useless as it would have been closely 
blockaded in its own harbours. 
The strategy of distant blockade neverthless required the maintenance of 
an observation force off the German coast. Submarines were to prove ideal 
for this role, but only in the last years of peace did the Admiralty come 
to the conclusion that its own boats were capable of instituting a form of 
blockade. "[It] is problematical, " wrote Keyes, "but worth trying for. " [124] 
The British concept of an 'overseas' submarine can be traced to three 
sets of war plans prepared by the war staff in 1908, which stated that "in 
view of the staying power of the latest submarines... we recommend their 
employment off the mouth of the Elbe and the Jade. " The boats were to 
patrol 'off the German river estuaries, being relieved every three days, 
preferably by boats sailing from a temporary base on Borkum; from there 
they could also act as a reserve in case of a German attack on the 
blockading fleet. The planners considered that "the possibilities of their 
successful employment are considerable, and, we are of the opinion, should 
not be forgone. " [125] 
The 1908 plans were ambitious. British submarine technology was not 
yet capable of producing boats of suitable range and endurance. The B and 
C Class submarines, which Keyes considered "quite capable of operating on 
the enemy's coast" [126], and which would have been detailed to watch the 
German littoral in the event of war, could certainly reach the patrol 
grounds - but they lacked endurance and their seakeeping was inadequate 
for winter cruises in hostile waters. During the Great War, operational 
experience with the C class showed that their navigational instruments were 
inefficient and their periscopes were of dangerously poor quality [127]. To a 
submarine, in wartime, such defects were a matter of life or death, and 
the Cs were really of use only in reasonably good weather. A critic of the 
[124) Keyes pencil draft of report, nd (? 1913), KP 4/17 
[125) War Plans W. 1 and W. 3,18 June 1908, Adm 116/1043B, esp. fols 744,753 
[126] Keyes memo 3 June 1911, KP 4/13 
[127) Waistell to Chief of War Staff, 8 March 1917, Adm 137/2071 fol. 265. See also 
Keyes to Chief of War Staff, 5 November 1914, Adm 13712067 fol. 681 
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1908 plans would have to conclude that a staging post such as Borkum 
would have been required if the Royal Navy relied only on B or C class 
submarines for close blockade work, and the capture and defence of an 
island close to the enemy coast would have entailed an unacceptable naval 
commitment - as later, more realistic war plans acknowledged. 
The development of the D class made the British plans much more 
realistic. The new submarines had two reliable diesel engines, were 180 tons 
heavier, and had 10% more positive buoyancy and more efficient 
navigational equipment than their predecessors. They could operate 
unsupported several hundred miles from their base. In the 1910 
manoeuvres, the newly-commissioned D1 steamed (with an experimental 
diesel engine) from Portsmouth to Milford Haven, and from there to the 
'Blue' bases on the Scottish coast, cruising without escort for 600 miles. 
Her crew lived on board for a month during the manoeuvre period, and 
she finished it with fuel enough to steam for another 400 miles. Two 
defending cruisers were attacked and 'sunk' during the cruise, and the 
submarine also performed a valuable scouting role [128]. By 1912 Rear 
Admiral Ballard, the Director of the Operations Division, could write that 
the D class "have amply proven their ability to undertake independent 
offensive operations and might be detailed forthwith to occupy positions as 
an advanced force on the German coast. " [129] All that was needed was 
an acceleration of the building programme for large overseas submarines 
[130). If enough boats could be made available, wrote Jellicoe, "they can 
undoubtedly carry out a blockade of an enemy's coast in the old sense of 
the word. " [131] 
Keyes estimated that a minimum of 48 overseas submarines, split into 
four flotillas of 12 boats each, would be needed to mount a blockade. The 
flotillas would be split into groups of three and at least one flotilla 
would be required on station at any given time. Jackson, the Chief of the 
War Staff, thought 36 submarines "might be sufficient", but even that 
[1281 Hall report 'Exercises carried out by submarines during the month of July 1910', 5 
August 1910, and Miller minute of 31 August 1910, Adm 1/8128 
f1291 Ballard memo 'Remarks on war orders for an observation force in the North Sea', 
16 September 1912, Adm 116/866B. See also accounts of D4's performance in the 1912 
manoeuvres, especially the 'Narrative of events by Umpire in Chief' 31 July 1912, entry 
for 16 July, May Papers MAY 10 
[130] War Staff comments, 29 September 1913, Adm 116/1214 
[131] Jellicoe report on 1913 manoeuvres, 6 August 1913, Adm 116/3381 
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number were not available in 1914 because Keyes's experimental programme 
had been funded at the expense of the procurement of overseas types 
[132]. No more than 19 D and E class boats were completed by the time 
war was declared; Hall's programme had called for a minimum of 30 to 
have been built by that time. In order to make up the deficiency in 
overseas hulls, an additional construction programme was therefore 
authorised early in 1914 [see section 8.1], Keyes conceding that "the 
necessity of developing, and developing rapidly, a really effective Oversea 
type of submarine" was "a matter of the first importance" [133]. 
Concentration on experimental submarines had one other serious 
consequence for the new British blockade strategy: British overseas boats 
were fitted with quite inadequate wireless telegraphy (W/T) sets, capable of 
broadcasting signals for only sixty miles. Although Bacon' had experimented 
with W/T as early as 1903, and though junior submarine officers acting on 
their own initiative had installed radio equipment in a number of B class 
submarines in 1910 [134], only a handful of D and E class boats had been 
fitted with approved sets by 1914. An official programme for the 
development of submarine W/T apparatus was instituted as a result of the 
1910 trials, with the aim of producing equipment capable of transmitting 
about 30 miles and receiving signals at a range of 60 miles, but 
procurement was slow - partly because no signals ratings were available for 
service in the submarine branch [see section 4.1]. Only nine sets were 
provided for in the 1912-13 estimates [135], and coastal submarines were 
left to obtain their intelligence from shore-based sources before sailing. 
German submarines, on the other hand, had long-range W/T sets suitable 
for boats of their considerable endurance. 
In August 1914 the British W/T installation programme was so far 
behind that several D and E class submarines were sent into the Bight 
without the equipment [136]. There were two unwelcome consequences. 
[132] Keyes 'Precis of submarine construction' nd (1913) KP 4/5; Keyes pencil draught of 
report nd (? 1913) KP 4/17 
[133] Keyes to Churchill nd (? late December 1913 or early January 1914), KP 4/11 
[134] Keyes minute 15 March 1911 and Candy report 24 July 1910, Adm 116/1361 
[135] Keyes memo 18 November 1912, Adm 1/8269; Keyes minute 15 March 1911, Adm 
116/1361 
[136] Keyes to Jellicoe 4 August 1914, KP 4/30 
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British boats had to be accompanied by surface vessels - destroyers - 
which could pick up visual signals and relay short-range W/T messages to 
the Admiralty [137]. These TBDs were placed in an exposed position, and 
their presence gave enemy scouts notice of British submarine incursions. It 
was the lack of good W/T sets, and the perceived need to tow submarines 
into action, not any failure to appreciate the benefits of operating 
submarines covertly and alone, that caused early patrols to be accompanied 
by a destroyer escort. More importantly, submarines were unable to fulfill a 
proper patrol function without a reliable means of communication. Had the 
High Sea Fleet come out in 1914, the British patrols could not have 
reported their presence to the Grand Fleet. A change of orders meant that 
Keyes had to take a destroyer and hunt up and down his patrol line until 
each submarine was located, persuaded to surface, and spoken to at close 
range - an obviously unsatisfactory procedure [138]. "When our submarines 
leave home they are lost to use, " complained Fisher. "It is vitally necessary 
that our submarines should be able to receive signals by day and night... at 
a distance of 300 miles maximum, also to send that distance at night as 
soon as possible. " [139] But British submarines only began to receive 
long-range W/T sets in August 1916 [140]. 
Despite this, the submarine had a profound effect on British naval 
strategy. No close blockade was instituted when war broke out; instead, a 
distant blockading force was based hundreds of miles from the German 
coast, while an observation blockade was maintained by overseas submarines. 
The waters in between - the bulk of the North Sea, in fact - became a 
naval nomansland in which surface units hardly dared to move for fear of 
submarines and mines. The supremacy of the underwater weapon helped put 
pay to the idea - cherished by the serving admirals of both sides - that 
the naval campaign should be decided by a decisive battle. The submarine, 
as the most fearsome of the underwater weapons, was largely responsible 
for the sterility of the war in the North Sea. 
1137) Henderson to Hamilton 10 December 1911, Adm 1/8273 
[138) Keyes to Chief of War Staff 17 December and 21 December 1914, both KP 4/32; 
printed in Halpern 1, pp. 59,61 
[1391 Historical Section summary of papers: Fisher to Assistant Director of Torpedoes 20 
April 1915, Adm 137/1071 fol. 431; see also Admiralty to CinC Portsmouth 13 June 1915, 
Adm 138/514 section 8, National Maritime Museum 
[140] Marder, DSF 111,238 
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In the Atlantic, in the Channel and in the Mediterranean, the war at sea 
was far from sterile - and again the submarine could claim the dubious 
credit for this unexpected turn of events. 
In 1914 Britain imported more than half her food by sea. Systematic 
plans for the protection of this commerce had been made since the early 
1870s, though they were not necessarily realistic and certainly took no 
account of the submarine peril. As Professor Ranft observes, "the 
near-defeat of 1917 was not due to previous lack of thought or to the 
allocation of inadequate resources... but to the poor quality of the thought 
and the consequent misuse of the resources. " [141] 
Before 1914, the main threat to trade was expected to come from 
enemy cruisers, perhaps disposed along the sea lanes prior to a declaration 
of war. Recognising that even limited success might spark off food panics 
or drive marine insurance rates to unacceptable levels, both Russia and 
France specialised - particularly during the ascendancy of the jeune ecole 
- in the production of fast cruisers which on occasion caused considerable 
disquiet in Britain. (The 1894 Rurik scare is a case in point. ) 
Plans to deal with marauding cruisers were defective in several 
important respects. The Empire's trade routes were thought of as roads that 
could be guarded by patrolling craft stationed at the nodal points where 
two or more routes crossed, and the emphasis in all British planning was 
on 'offensive' measures - however doubtful, however wasteful - to the 
virtual exclusion of defensive tactics, however efficacious. Convoy was ruled 
out by the anticipated inability of unpractised merchant vessels to steam in 
formation as well as by the apparent impossibility of escorting more than a 
fraction of the Empire's trade. There was, in addition, a belief that any 
modern naval war would be settled by decisive battle long before a guerre 
de course could bring Britain to her knees. Thus reassured, some strategists 
regarded seaborne trade as no more than suitable bait with which to lure 
enemy ships to destruction at the hands of the Royal Navy [142]. 
[141] Bryan Ranft, 'The protection of British seaborne trade and the development of 
systematic planning for war, 1860-1905', in Ranft (ed), Technical. change and British 
naval policy 1869-1945 (London 1977) p. 1 
[142] 'Great Britain: Naval manoeuvres 1906', NID No. 817, May 1907 pp. 323-5, Adm 
231147; Ranft op. cit. pp. 19-20 
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The likelihood of commerce war decreased when Germany became 
Britain's probable enemy. Geography was against the younger naval power 
and - as had been confidently predicted by the Admiralty - German 
commerce raiders were relatively ineffective in action. They sank a total of 
only 441,000 tons of British shipping between 1914 and 1918, the equivalent 
of a poor month's work by submarines during the 1917 'crisis of the naval 
war' [143]. 
The submarine was a new and unexpected enemy in the guerre de 
course. Experience was to show that she was an altogether more formidable 
foe than the fast cruiser, for surface raiders had to steer clear of ports and 
risk rapid retribution by attacking rich but well-protected sea lanes. 
Submarines had the priceless attributes of stealth and invisibility. They could 
disappear as soon as their work was done, lurk in the approaches to ports 
(where they were very hard to avoid), and could - in the absence of 
effective anti-submarine weapons - wreak havoc upon the best-protected 
shipping. 
None of the great naval powers regarded their submarines as commerce 
raiders before 1914. Their failure to do so is easily understood. Firstly, old 
conceptions of the submarine's potential lingered on. It was difficult to 
imagine short-range, low-speed coastal submarines as commerce destroyers; 
they might dominate the North Sea, but (as Arnold-Forster had suggested 
as early as August 1901) British shipping could be re-routed to major west 
coast ports such as Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool and Glasgow, where it would 
be out of reach [144]. Even if submarines did somehow break through the 
Channel defences, the RN expected their low speed and restricted field of 
vision when submerged would make them easy to avoid in the broad 
expanses of the Atlantic. It was commonly said that submarines were 
valuable weapons in seas, useless in oceans [145]. 
By assigning submarines duties in coastal waters or on a patrol line off 
the enemy's coast, the naval staffs of Europe pigeonholed underwater craft, 
and reconsideration of the submarine problem was given a low priority. 
Similarly, there was little attempt to re-evaluate the guerre de course, 
[143] Marder, DSF V, 110-111 
[144] Arnold-Forster to Selborne 8 August 1901, Add. Mss. 50294 fol. 6 
[145] Cf. assessment in Admiralty paper 'Naval position of New Zealand', April 1913, 
Adm 116/3381 
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which the RN was convinced could only be waged successfully by a power 
that had command of the sea. Less than three per cent of British shipping 
was lost during the Napoleonic Wars [146], and history suggested the most 
successful wars on commerce had been fought by the UK. This idea was 
reinforced by Mahan's writings. No second-rank power, the American 
strategist taught, had ever influenced the outcome of a war simply by 
attacking commerce; the strategy was useless unless, by stretching enemy 
resources, it made a favourable outcome to the decisive battle more likely 
[147]. 
More telling were the legal restraints on a guerre de course. Successive 
multi-national accords had codified war at sea, and it was widely accepted 
that attacks on the enemy's commerce would have to be carried out in 
accordance with international law. The Declaration of Paris (1856) had 
outlawed privateering at the insistence of Great Britain. Signatories accepted 
that merchant vessels should be stopped and searched only if they were 
suspected of carrying contrabrand of war. If contrabrand was found, the 
Declaration went on, provision should be made for the safety of the crew, 
and the capture conveyed to port by a prize crew. Neutral vessels were 
immune from capture whether or not they were carrying contrabrand. It 
was therefore expected that on the outbreak of war a weak naval power 
would simply lay up its merchant ships and rely on neutral carriers, or 
perhaps re-flag its merchant marine en masse. 
Most strategists believed the Declaration of Paris made a successful war 
on British commerce impossible. An Admiralty report on the 1906 trade 
manoeuvres concluded that a guerre de course "could not be sustained 
beyond 2-3 weeks... Public confidence would be quickly re-established and 
the security of British Trade assured. " [148] The 1908 war plans noted 
that "attacks on British commerce are the least serious of all the possible 
German operations of War" [149], and a year later AK Wilson (shortly to 
[146] Bryan Ranft, The naval defence of British seaborne trade, 1860-1905 (unpublished 
Oxford University D. Phil thesis, 1967) p. 249 
[147) Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and naval strategy: ideology, interest and sea power 
during the the Pax Britannica (Boston 1986) pp. 84-5,89-95; Geoffrey Till et al, 
Maritime strategy and the nuclear age (London 1982) pp. 153-4; Ranft op. cit. pp. 5-6; 
Marder, DSF I, 358-61 
[148] 'Great Britain: Naval manoeuvres 1906' NID No. 817, May 1907 p. 323, Adm 231/47 
p. 323 
[149] 'War plan W. 1: War with Germany' 18 June 1908, Adm 11611043B fol. 753 
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become First Sea Lord) told the CID that "neither party could do vital 
injury to the other, but that there would be enormous trade losses on each 
side... He expressed the opinion that British trade losses would cease fairly 
soon - in a much shorter time than six months for instance... " Beresford 
believed "it is ridiculous to assert that the trade of the Country would be 
paralysed and that our food supplies would be stopped. " [150] In 1913 the 
Assistant Director of the Operations Division, Herbert Richmond, expressed 
the opinion that an attack on British commerce would be temporarily 
destructive but that it was a nonsensical strategy for a power which hoped 
to win command of the sea. "It is to be doubted, " he wrote, "that the 
Germans would make the mistake of the later French school and attempt 
to reduce us by these means. " [151] 
Born of an age in which international law had taken a hand in 
'civilizing' warfare, none of these writers could conceive of a war in which 
the stakes were so high that almost any strategem would be contemplated 
- one so fiercely contested that war aims were virtually unlimited, and one 
in which the very existence of the belligerents as nation-states might be at 
stake. But submarine boats had to wage a guerre de course ruthlessly or 
not at all. It was doubtful that they could accurately identify suspicious 
craft or distinguish between belligerent and neutral ships through a 
periscope, yet they were at their most vulnerable on the surface. Were they 
to order a suspect vessel to stop and submit to a search, they ran the risk 
of being shelled, rammed or outrun by their prey. It was practically 
impossible to provide prize crews; the British tried it in 1915, but gave the 
idea up because "having 12 extra people in aD class submarine adds very 
greatly to the discomfort" - though it was possible at a pinch [152]. 
Abiding by international law was so chancy that on least two occasions 
serious consideration was given to the idea of allowing British boats to wage 
unrestricted submarine warfare [153]. 
To most authorities, though, the whole idea was "unthinkable" 
[150] 'Evidence of Sir A. Wilson on the scope of naval war plans', 1909, FP 4261; 
Beresford in address to Imperial Industries Club, nd (? 1909), ibid 
[151] Richmond paper 'Re. Commander in Chief, Home Fleet's letter on North Sea 
strategy', nd (1913). Adm 116/1169 
[152) D7 report of proceedings 24 December 1915, Adm 137/2075 fo1.12 
[153] G2 report of proceedings 18 August 1916, ibid fol. 67; Donaldson (Capt (S) Tees) 
report 'Operations with submarines against the enemy's trade', 21 January 1917, Adm 
137/1926 fols. 485-7 
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(Battenburg's opinion, according to Jellicoe) and "inconceivable" (Jellicoe's 
own opinion) [154]. "Submarines have a very limited sphere of action, " 
wrote the CinC in August 1914. "They can't hurt our overseas commerce, 
nor can they help theirs to get out. " [155] The civilian strategist Julian 
Corbett was sure that submariners "would not incur the odium of sinking 
merchant ships out of hand" [156]. Nor was he alone in this opinion: "The 
civilized world would hold up its hands in horror, " asserted Dr Pearce 
Higgins, the international lawyer who lectured at the Greenwich War Course 
[157]. In June 1913, Sir George Clarke (Lord Sydenham) wrote: "I cannot 
believe that submarines will sink unarmed ships and I do not see how they 
can easily convoy them into port. In more barbarous days unarmed ships 
were not summarily sunk, and modern societies would not stand such 
proceedings. " [158] Keyes, the Commodore (S), thought the whole idea 
"impossible" [159). 
There were in fact precendents to suggest that a ruthless war on 
commerce would be- waged by enemy torpedo craft. In the 1880s some 
proponents of the jeune ecole warned that their torpedo boats would be 
used without regard for the niceties of international law. Admiral Aube 
declared they would "send to the bottom cargo, crew and passengers, not 
only without remorse, but proud of the achievement. " [160] In 1903 
Admiral Lanesson stated that "even submarines" might be employed to sink 
merchant vessels [161]. Illegally-sown offensive minefields were a 
commonplace of the Russo-Japanese war. 
It should nevertheless be stressed that neither Germany nor France 
seriously considered a submarine guerre de course before 1914. It is true 
that the idea was suggested on several occasions - notably by 
[154] Jellicoe to Fisher 5 December 1914, FP 854; Jellicoe marginalia to Fisher paper, 
November 1913, FP 4290/3 
[155] Jellicoe to Churchill 30 August 1914, Add. Mss. 49012 fols. 17-19 
[156] Corbett to Fisher 30 November 1913, FP 752 
[157] Quoted in Hall to Fisher 26 April 1914, FP 803 
[158] Sydenham to Fisher 28 June 1913, FP 705 
[159] Keyes, NM 1,53 
[160] Quoted in Marder, ABSP p. 40 
[161] Ranft op. cit. p. 31; see also Marder, ABSP pp. 224-5; Cowpe op. cit. pp. 194-6 
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Kapitanleutnant Rust (1904), Karl Galster and Vice Admiral von Schleinitz 
(both 1908), and Kapitanleutnant Blum (June 1914) [162] - and that the 
German diesel/electric boats were quite suited to the role. But, as we have 
seen, Imperial Naval strategy was designed to produce conditions in which 
the High Sea Fleet might successfully challenge the Royal Navy for 
command of the sea. Nor was there any real connection between the 
French jeune ecole school and the German submarine war on commerce. 
French strategists accepted from the outset that they had to seek victory by 
some means other than by fleet engagements. The Germans did so only 
after the failure of their attempts to reduce the Grand Fleet to something 
approaching parity with the HSF. German submarines were to have assisted 
in this process, and were therefore primarily intended to promote a fleet 
action. Unrestricted submarine warfare sprang from German desperation; it 
was introduced reluctantly and in the face of considerable opposition from 
the naval high command. Even though Germany (confronted by the 
Admiralty's illegal decision to arm British merchant vessels) had a good 
moral case for breaking the law itself, the idea was popular only among 
junior officers [163]. 
Only a few British thinkers recognised, before 1914, that an illegal 
strategy might be resorted to by a nation which would otherwise be reduced 
to naval impotence. Fisher, Hall and Percy Scott accurately predicted the 
use of submarines in commerce warfare, and succeeded in half-converting 
Sydenham, Selborne and Balfour to their point of view. In one well-known 
passage Fisher pointed out that: 
"the 'protection of commerce' difficulties become far more acute when 
the potentialities of submarines as commerce destroyers are 
considered.., the question arises as to what a submarine can do against 
a merchant ship when she has found her... in fact it is impossible for 
the submarine to deal with commerce in the light and provisions of 
accepted international law... There is nothing else a submarine can do 
except sink her capture, and it must therefore be admitted that 
11621 Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat: the evolution and technical history of German 
submarines (London 1975) pp. 32-3; Gary Weir, 'Tirpitz, technology and building 
U-boats, 1897-1916', International History Review, May 1984, p. 181; Carl-Axel 
Gemzell, Organization, conflict, innovation: a study of German naval strategic planning, 
1888-1940 (Lund 1973) pp. 62,97,140 
1163) Till et al, op. cit. p. 170; Holger Herwig, The German naval officer corps: a social 
history, 1890-1918 (London 1983) p. 186 
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(provided it is done and however inhuman and barbarous it may 
appear) this submarine menace is a truly terrible one for British 
commerce and Great Britain alike, for no means can be suggested of 
meeting it except by reprisals. " [1641 
The idea of using submarines in so blatantly illegal a manner might have 
been abhorrent to Fisher's contemporaries, but it came naturally to a man 
convinced that war should be 'ruthless, relentless, remorseless. ' In 1916, the 
former Sea Lord wrote to his old adversary, Tirpitz, "I don't blame you 
for the submarine business. I'd have done the same myself. " [165] 
Balfour, the former Prime Minister and future First Lord, shared 
Fisher's pessimism. "The question that really troubles me, " he wrote, "is 
not whether our submarines could render the enemy's position intolerable, 
but whether their submarines could not render our position intolerable. " 
[166] Selborne too was convinced that the immunity of private property at 
sea would prove quite spurious once war broke out [167]. In general, 
though, Fisher's prediction came as something of a bombshell. In 1914 the 
then First Lord, Churchill, wrote: "There are a few points on which I am 
not convinced. Of these the greatest is the question of the use of 
submarines to sink merchant vessels. I do not believe that this would ever 
be done by a civilized power. If there was a nation vile enough to adopt 
systematically such methods, it would be justifiable, and indeed necessary, 
to employ the extreme resources of science against them: to spread 
pestilence, poison the water supply of great cities, and, if convenient, 
proceed by the assassination of individuals. " [168] 
For many, fierce reprisals seemed the only possible response. When 
unrestricted submarine warfare was introduced, the Admiralty received 
suggestions from five different sources "that German prisoners be carried on 
Merchantile Marine [vessels] as hostages to act as deterrent to S/M 
[164] Fisher paper The oil engine and the submarine', February 1914 fols. 9-10, FP 
4293/9; see also Hall to Fisher 26 April 1914, FP 803 
[165] Fisher to Tirpitz 29 March 1916, in Marder, FG III p. 334 
[166) Balfour to Fisher 6 May 1913, Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49712 fol. 91; see also 
Balfour to Fisher 20 May 1913, FP 691 
[167] Selborne to Fisher 18 March 1914, FP 800 
[168) Churchill to Fisher I January 1914, FP 763 
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activity. " [169] Perhaps fortunately, the Sea Lords never acted on this 
advice. Instead, they began to develop the long-neglected anti-submarine 
capability of the Royal Navy with considerable haste. 
1 [169J 'German prisoners as hostages' 13 October 1915, digest cut lla, Adm 12/1539A 
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Counter -measures THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
Even before the Royal Navy had acquired its first submarines, Britain's 
naval authorities acknowledged that the weapon was more likely to be used 
against them than by them. The earliest boats were ordered to facilitate the 
development of anti-submarine tactics, and by 1912 at the latest the 
submarine was generally recognised as a serious threat. It was vital that 
counter-measures be found, for as HO Arnold-Forster remarked, "our 
moral objections to any particular weapon will not prevent a foreign power 
using it against us. Other forms of protection seem to me more reasonable, 
and more likely to prove effective. " [1] 
Yet Britain entered the Great War without effective anti-submarine 
weapons. Her enemies were, admittedly, equally helpless when confronted 
by the underwater weapon, but this was of little consequence. The Empire's 
dependence on seapower and on seaborne trade made it uniquely vulnerable 
to the submarine; the pre-war failure to develop anti-submarine weapons 
and tactics almost cost Britain the war. 
It is conceivable that the crisis of 1917 could have been avoided - 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) made rapid strides when the country was 
genuinely threatened, and although the problem could not be said to have 
been solved by 1918 it was clear that the battle against the U-boats was 
being won. Resources, money and talent both civilian and naval were flung 
at the problem in a way that only emphasised the lack of all three before 
1914. 
No fundamental breakthroughs in technology or tactics had still to be 
1 [1] Arnold-Forster memo 13 March 1901, Adm 1/7515 
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made; no anti-submarine weapon developed during the war could not have 
been invented earlier, and the most effective AS tactic of all - convoy - 
was centuries old. Only the pressing immediacy of the threat was new. In 
the pre-war period, slow recognition of the submarine's potential, the lack 
of a central authority charged with the development of anti-submarine 
17 
warfare, and the staggering difficulty of penetrating the underwater world of 
the submarine had induced what was practically a mental paralysis in many 
of those charged with tackling the problem; there were no useful 
precedents, and the task of developing effective methods of attack appeared 
so intractable that it was generally agreed that avoidance and flight were 
the only sure solutions. In 1914 they were suddenly no longer enough. 
The problem 
Anti-submarine warfare has two components: detection and destruction. 
Before the war many attempts were made to effect the destruction of 
submarine boats, several of them holding out fair promise of success, but 
the problem of detection remained unsolved. Gunfire, ramming, lasso nets, 
explosive creeps and sweeps and rudimentary depth charges were all useless 
if the target could not be located; even if by some good fortune a 
submarine was caught on the surface or her periscope was sighted, it was 
unlikely in the extreme that she would still be visible at the moment an 
attack was delivered. The boats' invisibility shielded them from attack as 
effectively as it concealed their own acts of aggression. 
The first attempts to detect submarines took three forms. Most 
obviously, a strict look-out could be kept from surface ships by the 'Mark 
I eyeballs' of men trained to recognise periscopes and conning towers. If 
successful this method did at least hold out the promise that patrol craft, 
scouts and destroyers could force the submarine to remain submerged where 
her speed and vision were seriously impaired, and harass her until a body 
of larger ships had passed out of range. The disadvantages were twofold: 
rapid exhaustion of the watching crew, and a high proportion of 
time-consuming false alarms caused by everything from shadows and sticks 
to whales and sea-serpents [2). A more promising method of surface 
I [2) See Dr Bernard Heuvelmans, In the wake of the sea-serpents (London 1968) pp. 397-400 for the May 1917 experience of the A. M. C. HMS Hilary. She opened fire ýº 
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observation was provided by the indicator net, a simple mesh designed to 
wrap itself around a submarine and carry away from its ' moorings, allowing 
patrol vessels to attack the intruder by following the movement of buoys. 
Indicator nets were laid abundantly during the war, most notably in the 
Dover barrage. 
The second method, echo-sounding and its related techniques, was not 
widely understood before 1914, although methods of underwater sound 
signalling were developed and active interest in underwater acoustics had 
existed since at least 1800 [3]. The third, observation from the air, was 
better regarded and numerous attempts were made to spot submerged 
submarines from balloons, airships and aeroplanes from the late 1890s -a 
use of one radical innovation to combat another that represents an 
intriguing triumph of imagination over naval conservatism. Early aircraft 
nevertheless laboured under the twin disadvantages of low endurance and 
designs that hindered the observer's downward field of vision. With the 
exception of airships they also lacked the abilly to carry the sort of bombs 
needed to disable a submarine boat. 
When - if -a submarine was detected, there were also three ways in 
which she could be actively attacked: collision (ramming), explosives either 
fired or dropped (guns, bombs, depth charges) and towed explosives (sweeps 
and trawls). Although apparently less likely to reap success, weapons of 
opportunity such as the gun or depth charge proved to be more effective 
than the sweeps that were favoured before 1914. This was because they 
narrowed the gap between detection and attempted destruction. Sweeps 
tended to be used after a sighting to hunt a whole area; - they were 
operated 'blind' and it is unsurprising that they accounted for only two 
German boats in the war. The passive obstructions used - nets and 
particularly mines - were effective precisely because they depended less on 
surface operators and could (in theory) be left in situ for long periods. 
Actually the fierce currents and adverse weather conditions of the Channel 
and North Sea reduced their effectiveness, but they were nevertheless vital 
in the anti-submarine war. 
The actual destruction of a submarine was not necessarily the main aim 
"/ on what was reported to be a sea serpent after mistaking its head for a periscope. It is 
possible, but unlikely, that the creature was actually a large basking shark. 
[3] See Willem Hackmann, Seek & strike: sonar, anti-submarine warfare and the Royal 
Navy, 1914-1954 (London 1984) pp. 7-10 
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of ASW. As well as preventing an attack by keeping the submarine under 
water and away from its main targets, the defending surface forces could 
score a victory simply by damaging the boat [4]. It was recognised that the 
submarine was highly vulnerable and anything other than minor leaks were 
very dangerous because seawater would either sink the craft by destroying 
her buoyancy or generate chlorine gas by coming into contact with battery 
acid. 
Even so, the difficulties encountered in anti-submarine warfare were 
evidently great. The usual solution to new problems in naval warfare - 
setting like against like - was far from obviously viable. The torpedo boat 
had been met by the destroyer, and one aircraft could fight another, but 
submarine v. submarine warfare was a desperate business in which the 
hunter could quickly become hunted and both combatants laboured under 
equal disadvantages. To be safe, a submarine boat on AS patrol had to be 
submerged, where her field of vision was restricted to what could be seen 
through a periscope raised a few inches above the surface, sometimes only 
for seconds at a time. Her target was small, manoeuvrable and acutely 
aware of the tactics and possibilities of submarine attack, and restrictions on 
underwater speed and endurance often made it impossible for a would-be 
assailant to get into an attacking position. In wartime the British found that 
only 8.1% of the torpedoes fired by one boat at another found their target, 
although the moral effect of such patrols in terms of forcing greater 
vigilance and caution from the enemy was great [see section 8] [5]. 
It was the weaknesses of the submarine rather than the strengths of her 
attackers that counted in World War I. Underwater craft were far slower 
than most of their prey and vulnerable on the surface, particularly in poor 
light when a boat was more likely to be caught unawares. Manoeuvres 
indicated, and experience proved, that it was difficult for a boat to hit a 
fast-moving hunter with torpedoes - but she could hardly remain on the 
surface to fight. If enough patrol craft were available, if the conditions 
were favourable and the waters restricted or shallow, and the target's 
position approximately known, it was even possible to keep a sub down 
until her batteries were exhausted and the air so foul that she had to 
I 
[4) As was recognised in HMS Vernon annual report 1901, Adm 189/21 p. 171 
[5) HMS Vernon annual report 1918, Adm 189/38 p. 152; Wemyss minute 12 September 
1918, Adm 137/2077 fol. 101 
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surface. But that was very rare. In general it proved far, far easier to 
neutralise a submarine than to destroy her. 
The participants 
The technical difficulties of ASW were great but they would not, perhaps, 
have proved insoluble if a determined effort had been made to confront 
them. None was. 
The central problem was an administrative one. Not until December 
1916 was there a full-time, properly funded department devoted to 
anti-submarine warfare. Before that, responsibility rested with a variety of 
individuals and groups, all of whom were also grappling with other 
problems. The gunnery school at HMS Excellent, which was the most 
important of the naval research stations, had no obvious interest in the 
submarine. HMS Vernon did some AS work but was officially responsible 
only for torpedoes, mining and diving. In addition, experimentation came a 
long way behind training in its list of priorities; most research was done by 
individuals in their very limited spare time. "From the 1900s onwards 
Vernon's duties became simply too many and too varied for the existing 
organisations to cope, " comments the historian of the torpedo service, Dr 
Cowpe [6]. 
The Vernon's wartime captain, RS Phipps Hornby, complained that he 
was "regarded as an expert in detail of all that pertains to most forms of 
underwater warfare, and from personal experience I know the post is so 
burdened with paper work and detail that it is impossible for him to devote 
the time and attention so necessary to the broader aspects of his work. " [7] 
In 1904 an addition was made to the staff when it was decided that ASW 
should become the joint responsibility of the Vernon's captain and the ICS, 
but no anti-submarine experiments were made by the Vernon in the 
periods 1905-06 and 1908-1912 [8]. A high turnover of personnel, 
[6] Alan Cowpe, Underwater weapons and the Royal Navy 1869-1918 (London University 
PhD 1980) p. 297. The whole section on the torpedo service (pp. 276-97) is of great 
interest 
[7) Phipps Hornby report 8 February 1916, Phipps Hornby papers, Phi 205 National 
Maritime Museum, quoted in ibid p. 291 
18) 'Attack and defence of submarines' 15 October 1904, digest cut lla, Adm 12/1402; 
HMS Vernon annual reports in Adm 189 series 
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under-financing and crowded facilities all contributed to the ship's inability 
to tackle the submarine problem effectively. 
Most of these problems also retarded the submarine service's AS 
research. As we saw in sections 3 and 4, the issues of technology and 
supply preoccupied the pre-war Inspecting Captains and Commodores, and 
although always willing to co-operate with attempts to develop 
anti-submarine warfare they seem never to have initiated such projects 
themselves. The officers of the submarine service itself were however 
intimately involved in the pre-war development of ASW. Of all RN 
personnel they were naturally best acquainted with the problem, and were 
hard-headed enough to tread the middle ground between panegyric and 
ridicule: "It seemed to me of the greatest importance, " Keyes recalled, "for 
the 'poacher to turn gamekeeper' and help the fleet to defeat enemy 
submarines. We knew our limitations and difficulties, but I found it as hard 
to make the converted enthusiast realize a submarine's limitations as to 
make an unconverted sceptic appreciate their powers. " [9] 
The active participation of serving submariners was the key to the 
successful development of AS tactics, for there was otherwise little 
continuity in the pre-war Navy's attempts to deal with the problem. 
Before 1904 AS work was theoretically the responsibility of the Captain 
(Destroyers), Home Fleet; from 1904 to 1911 it was, as we have seen, left 
to the ICS and the Vernon; and from 1911 the newly-created Admiral of 
Patrols also had a finger in the anti-submarine pie. None had much time 
to devote to the problem, and division of responsibility for ASW contrasts 
badly with the central control and absence of meddling which so contributed 
to the smooth and on the whole successful evolution of the submarine 
itself. Far from widening the scope of investigation, this division of labour 
effectively allowed the whole issue to be side-stepped for many years. 
Although all agreed - on a personal basis - of the vital necessity of 
improving the Navy's anti-submarine capability, each of the individuals 
concerned could argue, quite legitimately, that AS work interfered with the 
tasks with which they had been specially charged. 
The appointment in May 1909 of a 'Committee on submarine 
experiments and anti-submarine experiments' [10] was therefore a definite 
[9] Keyes NM 1,47 
[10] 'Committee on submarine experiments' 11 May 1909, digest cut Ila, Adm 1211464. 
The precise genesis of this committee is unclear. It probably came into being as a 
successor to Fisher's submarine committee of April 1909. 
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step in the right direction, and much useful work was done by this 
committee in the five years before the war. It was the first organisation 
specifically charged with developing AS techniques, taking over formal 
responsibility for ASW from the ICS. Even so the group was composed of 
part-time officers, numbering among its members Keyes and - as 
chairman - Cecil Burney, a squadron commander in the Home Fleet. 
More than 50 reports were made, but few were concerned directly with 
anti-submarine warfare because it was (quite properly) decided the 
capabilities of contemporary submarines had first to be ascertained, "and... 
many of the capabilities attributed to submarines need demonstration which 
can only be attained by systematic submarine exercises with the fleet. " [11) 
These included the ability to find warships at some distance from port 
without the assistance of surface ships (confirmed by the Dundee trial of 
August 1910 - see section 5.1), the endurance of personnel and 
navigational efficiency. Many similar experiments had been made 
independently by the submarine service, albeit on a smaller scale, and their 
systematic repetition further reduced the time which the RN had to find 
and develop antidotes to the submarine peril. The five 'lost years' 
between the Spithead trials of 1904 [see below] and the creation of the 
Submarine Committee in 1909 could have made a significant difference to 
the RN's preparedness in 1914. One is tempted to draw a parallel with the 
development of Wright flying machine, which the US military were offered 
in January 1905 and which they did not accept into service until late in 
1908. The European powers, too, delayed adopting the new weapon, often 
for the same reasons that the RN had continued to reject the submarine, 
and a Royal Flying Corps was not established until 1912. Given the 
tremendous strides made in aerial and anti-submarine warfare between 1914 
and 1918, it is thus at least interesting to speculate on the consequences 
had military aircraft - and ASW - been developed vigorously from a 
somewhat earlier date [12]. 
With no central body to co-ordinate matters, individuals found it hard 
[11] Report no. 1 of submarine committee 20 April 1910, in 'Anti-submarine development 
and experiments prior to 1916', The Technical History (TH), vol. 40 (1920) p. 9. Naval 
Library MOD. 
[12] Cf. IB Holley, Ideas and weapons: exploitation of the aerial weapon by the United 
States during World War I; a study in the relationship of technological advance, military 
doctrine, and the development of weapons (Hamden, Conn. 1971) pp. 26-8 
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to interest the naval authorities in their research. And although 
anti-submarine schemes were periodically sent to the Admiralty, naval 
officers were not unnaturally favoured when AS suggestions were considered. 
"Of the innumerable suggestions put forward, of which many of the more 
promising have been dealt with, " said an HMS Vernon report of 1915, "few 
have proved of any value, while all of those now in use or contemplated 
have been suggested and in the most part developed by British Naval 
Officers. " [13] The Admiralty does not seem to have recognised that its 
officers concerned themselves almost exclusively with attempts to improve 
primitive AS devices or adapt existing weapons developed for the surface 
fleet to attacking submarines. Nor did the Vernon's attitude take account of 
the specialised skills required in anti-submarine warfare; it was one thing 
to skim through the untutored suggestions of civilians and another to resist 
the arrival of professional scientific help, as the RN did during the early 
days of the war [14]. 
Few schemes, whether military or civilian in origin, were actively 
investigated in the last decade of peace, and there was, of course, good 
reason for the theoretical bias to ASW before 1914 - namely the difficulty 
of arranging realistic practice. Manoeuvre rules had had to be changed to 
protect submarines, the relevant portion stating clearly: "During exercises no 
attempt of any sort is to be made to attack submarines beyond the 
theoretical reading of their secret numbers. " [15] And as Lord Sydenham 
observed, "Much more could be learned in peace by scientific trials 
systematically carried out, but much will remain untried because the risks of 
trial are too great to be accepted. Only war can reveal the truth. " [16] 
To sceptics, the impossibility of organising realistic AS trials merely 
confirmed the submarine's weakness [17]. There was a general failure to 
recognise how few and far between real chances to sink underwater craft 
[13] HMS Vernon annual report 1915, Adm 189/35 p. 161 
[14] Hackmann op. cit. pp. 13-16 
[15] M-branch 'Memorandum on submarines' nd (Oct 1910) p. 11, RN Submarine Museum 
A1986/6. The secret numbers referred to were coded numerals painted on the side of 
conning towers and designed to be readable at certain ranges. Attacking vessels had to 
prove they had come into effective range by citing the secret number of the submarine 
they claimed to have sunk. 
[16] Sydenham to Fisher 28 June 1913, FP 705 
[17) Cf. EE Bradford, The life of Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson (London 1928) pp. 189-93 
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would be, particularly if submarines did not have to come to the surface 
forces that were hunting them, as they did in manoeuvres and, later, under 
the convoy system. Most dangerously, the promoters of early AS weapons 
often failed to appreciate just how accurately delivered an attack would 
have to be to damage a submarine. This, it transpired, was to prove the 
major stumbling-block to the development of anti-submarine warfare in 
the pre-war period. 
Despite the RN's stated policy of acquiring submarines to develop AS 
tactics, concentration on the technological evolution of the weapon and, in 
the strategic sphere, on its use for coastal defence was thus at the expense 
of developing counter-measures. Official papers that did consider the use 
of submarines against Great Britain almost invariably did so in passages that 
were short, ill-considered and unhelpfully vague. "It has been suggested, " 
noted Keyes in December 1914, "that the 'solution to the whole question 
lies in making the submarine strategically and tactically negligible'. This 
would seem almost as difficult a problem to solve as that of devising a 
means of destroying the submarine itself. The latter problem is very little 
nearer a solution than when the Anti-Submarine Committee was formed 
five years ago, although several distinguished Admirals, in collaboration with 
a number of younger officers, including almost the entire personnel of the 
submarine service, have very closely studied the question throughout this 
period. " [181 
Anti-submarine warfare 1901-1904 
After an initial flurry of interest caused by the decision to order 
submarines, attempts to develop anti-submarine devices were largely 
suspended until AK Wilson's December 1903 decision to hold fleet 
manoeuvres early the following year [19]; instead Bacon was permitted to 
spend six months working up the Holland craft and a further six practising 
them against their tender in secluded waters [20]. This was an entirely 
[18] Keyes report 26 December 1914, KP 4/28 
[19] TH 40 p. 2 
[20] Bacon report 'Remarks on the practices with submarine boats' 16 January 1904, Adm 
1/7719 
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sensible policy, and it ensured that when submarines did come up against 
major surface units the results would be as reliable as the manoeuvres 
could make them. 
The years 1901 -1904 were a period of optimism; most of those 
involved seemed confident that the submarine could be beaten. HO 
Arnold-Forster, for example, was bullish: "There are no doubt a great 
many ways of rendering the attack from submarine boats innocuous. Nets 
and blockade mines besides other means can be, when necessary, devised, 
the fatal effect of which, in addition to the inherent difficulties of 
submarine navigation, are so great that I am not apprehensive of submarine 
boats ever becoming formidable. " [21) 
The manouevres held off Spithead from 8-18 March 1904 were the 
first devised to test the primitive AS devices created by Wilson and the 
men of the Home Fleet. Every day for ten days, surface units steamed 
from Portland to the Nab with orders to simulate a close blockade of the 
naval base at Portsmouth. Opposing them were the five Holland class boats 
and Al, which were severely tested by spending eight days out of the ten 
of the manouevre period at sea. The submarines performed creditably, but to 
the uncritical observer the Spithead evolutions seemed quite promising; large 
numbers of boats were, in theory, put out of action while attacks on 
surface ships allowed by the umpires were few and far between. Wilson's 
destroyers 'sank' 14 submarines for no loss, but 87.5% of their claims were 
allowed and not a single submarine attack on the Home Fleet TBDs was 
adjudged successful [22]. The restraining influence exercised by the boats 
was harder to judge; capital ships were employed with unusual caution, but 
this fact was not readily evident to the uninformed observer - and nor 
were the unreal conditions imposed on Bacon's submarines. "These 
manoeuvres are the most misleading manoeuvres ever devised by man! " 
snorted Fisher. "There were the destroyers calmly laying over the 
submarines (so utterly out of the question in actual war), fishing for them 
as if they were trying to catch whiting! The whole thing was ridiculous and 
misleading in the extreme. " [23] 
The Spithead manoeuvres mark the end of the first phase of ASW 
[21] Arnold-Forster memo 28 January 1901, Adm 1/7515 
[22] Bacon report 23 March 1904, Adm 1/7795 
[23] Fisher, 'Submarines -a letter to the Controller of the Navy' 20 April 1904, FP 
4941 
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development. By the time they were over, most of the anti-submarine 
tactics used in the Great War had at least been mooted. During the next 
decade these ideas were tried out and in some cases developed, but few if 
any original suggestions were made between 1904 and 1914. 
Prevention - destroyer screens, aerial patrols, nets and mines 
The simplest method of preventing submarine attack was to harass them 
with destroyers. Anti-submarine operations seemed a natural extension of 
the TBD's old function of dealing with enemy torpedo craft - but there 
were important differences. The gun and the torpedo were not ideal AS 
weapons, and against a supremely elusive enemy the destroyer's superior 
size and speed were not the advantages they might have been. It seemed 
that her role was to be limited to prevention: "Destroyers may worry 
submarines by feinting attacks and then retiring and so try to wear them 
out, " noted Captains Bacon and Chariton in May 1904 [24]. The Controller, 
William May, agreed with this assessment: "There can be no doubt, " he 
remarked, "that when submarines are harassed by a well-organised 
combination of small boats or vessels their attention must be taken off the 
primary object of the submarine, viz - the battleships. " [25] A destroyer 
screen, constant high speed and zig-zagging by all units, deceptive fleet 
formations to take advantage of the submarine's difficulty in determining 
course and speed through a periscope, and preferably open order were 
suggested in an attempt to foil underwater attack. The value of such tactics 
was indicated by the manoeuvres of 1904 (which "established the value of 
destroyers as a guard to the fleet in waters suspected to be infested with 
submarines" [26]), 1912 and 1913 and confirmed by the test of war. It was 
rare indeed for a squadron to go anywhere without being accompanied by a 
[24] 'Proposed operations' - enclosure I of Bacon and Chariton to Fisher 6 May 1904, 
Adm 144/27 fol. 35 
(25) Controller's minute 30 June to Bacon and Charlton report 6 June 1904, Adm 1/7719. 
See also the similar sentiments expressed by SS Hall in 'Memorandum on submarines' 8 
April 1910, Adm 1/8119 
126) Wilson report 22 March 1904, Adm 1/7795 
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horde of chivvying mosquito craft [27], and the submarine failed to sink a 
single dreadnought in the four years of conflict. The fate of the 
pre-dreadnought battleship Formidable, sunk on New Year's Day 1915 by 
U24, only emphasised the dangers of sailing unescorted, moving slowly and 
steering a steady course. 
Nevertheless, the TBD was at first thought of as little more than a 
decoy and a distraction. Trials showed that a scouting force had little 
chance of spotting a submarine before being seen itself, and it was averred 
that a single destroyer would find the underwater craft "a veritable danger" 
[28]. To the suggestion that patrols should be kept up off enemy bases to 
force submarines to dive as soon as they left port, SS Hall replied that 
nothing would please a submariner more: "Officers would be falling over 
each other to go out and attack... it is a matter for consideration how long 
the supply of watches could be kept up if the submarines were successful, 
as it appears to me at present they must be. " [29] Destroyers needed a 
more potent weapon to become the hunters rather than the hunted; until 
one was produced, the scouts theselves had to be protected from the threat 
of attack. 
From this point of view aircraft - either airships or aeroplanes - were 
of obvious value. And they offered other advantages too: speed of approach 
was much faster, perhaps 60 or 70 miles per hour rather than 25, so the 
chances of catching a submarine unawares were that much greater. Aircraft 
could scout large areas quickly and push ahead of the fleet with relative 
impunity; the Germans used airships with great success in this role. And 
the advantage of height sometimes made it possible to spot submarines 
proceeding under water. 
The idea of using aircraft against submarines was a surprisingly old one. 
In 1899 the French flew a captive balloon in the Mediterranean and 
observed that although it was possible to spot submerged boats, "for every 
1,000 feet elevation of the balloon the horizontal distance from the vertical 
at which the boat could be seen was 174 feet, a distance of no practical 
[27] Cf De Robeck memo 6 August 1913, Adm 137/1926 fols. 414-18; Callaghan to de 
Robeck, same date, copy in KP 4/14; Keyes, NM 1,51; Jellicoe to Fisher 5 December 
1914, quoted in Marder, FG III, 87-8 
[28] Bacon and Charlton report 6 June 1904, Adm 144/27 fol. 58 
[29) Hall minute to submarine committee report no. 1 of 20 April 1910, quoted in TH 40 
p. 12 
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use except for watching the entrance to a narrow channel. " [30] In 1905 
the British made similar experiments with mines and noted, as had the 
French, that spotting was certainly possible to a depth of about 25 feet, so 
long as the target was not camouflaged. "As a method of defence against 
submarines it might be useful, " considered a team from HMS Indefatigable, 
"but where a constant watch is required a balloon fails. " [31] The 
problem of observer fatigue was a real one, and has already been noted in 
the case of naval look-outs; but equally important here was the clarity of 
the water. What was possible in the Mediterranean or the Adriatic (where 
in September 1916 Austrian seaplanes sank a French submarine that had 
been sighted proceeding submerged at a depth of 50' [32]) was not in the 
murky waters around Britain's coast. Conditions did vary - in July 1915 
the E18 found to her discomfort that a Zeppelin could still track her when 
she went to 70 feet, an experience that led to RN experiments with 
submarine camouflage - but in general British inshore waters were not 
happy hunting grounds for aircraft [33]. In 1918 the captain of HM Airship 
NS 6 expressed the opinion that aircraft only saw a German boat "when 
he is caught napping or has been careless, and that he can watch us with 
his periscope up cruising at slow speed with little fear of detection from 
even the most experienced crews - it therefore requiring extreme vigilance 
during an entire patrol... " [34]. The camouflagers concluded that water 
clarity must have been exceptional in July 1915, and advised that repainting 
all RN submarines would be a waste of time. 
If an aircraft did spot a submarine it would invariably be treated to the 
spectacle of a crash dive. It could however report the boat's position, 
relying on the craft's slow submerged speed to make it possible for surface 
units to avoid the danger zone, and it was in this role that flying machines 
[30] 'Submarine torpedo boats - extracts from the reports of Captain Jackson RN and 
others', in HMS Vernon annual report 1899, Adm 189/19 pp. 111-14 
[311 Lt. Kiddie report 'Visibility of mines &c. from a balloon' 8 April 1905, Adm 1/7825 
[321 See Alfred Price, Aircraft versus submarines: the evolution of anti-submarine 
aircraft, 1912-1980 (London 1980) pp. 3-4 
[33] Waistell report 17 July 1915, Adm 137/2068 fol. 426; Waistell to Hall 25 July 1915, 
ibid foI. 429; Hall report 30 August 1916, Adm 137/2077 fol. 56. Camouflage experiments 
are reported in papers dated between July and August 1915, Adm 137/1115 fols. 427-71. 
The French camouflaged their boats dark green in 1905 - see 'France: fleet, dockyards 
&c. ' in 'Reports on foreign naval affairs' NID No. 777, January 1906 p. 21, Adm 231/44 
[34] Woodcock report 'Submarine observations from airships' 5 April 1918, Adm 
1/8521/109 
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were most successful during the Great War [35]. If it was lucky an aircraft 
might be able to attack, either by strafing with machine guns or by 
dropping bombs and later depth charges. The submarine was after all 
uniquely vulnerable to small-arms fire; a few bullet holes could make 
diving impossible. Perhaps the most notorious proof of this was the case of 
the British submarine C25, attacked by five German seaplanes in July 1918 
and towed into port a bloody shambles, with five men dead and many 
more wounded [36]. 
Submarines certainly found aircraft disconcerting and an irritation, but 
for most of the war they were not that much of a threat. Aeroplanes that 
did catch boats on the surface usually found the puny bomblets which could 
be carried were not sufficient to finish them off. Airships had a better 
bomb load and good endurance but moved too slowly, so unless a 
submarine surfaced under them or could be tracked through the water they 
too had little prospect of success. The accuracy of all aerial bombing 
before 1918 was poor at best, and unless a direct hit was scored there was 
little chance of breaching an 11-16mm thick pressure hull, although it 
sometimes happened that a near miss jammed hydroplanes or disabled 
gauges [37]. 
Several British submariners nevertheless took an active interest in the 
development of aircraft and airborne ASW. Hugh Williamson, a B-class 
submarine captain who later transferred to the RNAS, wrote a paper on 
the subject in 1912, while in June 1914 Captain Hall went flying and 
reported on his return that he doubted whether contemporary aircraft were 
rugged enough for the job. It was an accurate enough assessment [38]. 
Back on the water attention was also turned to anti-submarine nets; 
indeed the first recorded AS proposal submitted to the Admiralty by a 
naval officer concerned this mode of warfare. Lieutenant Arthur Davison's 
January 1901 plan was rejected on the grounds that a well-equipped 
submarine could undoubtedly burst through most wire mesh and that 
[35] Keyes to de Robeck 21 August 1913, KP 4/14; Callaghan report 'Remarks on North 
Sea strategy' 28 August 1913, Adm 116/1214; de Robeck report 26 February 1916, Adm 
116/1429 
[36] Cobb report 7 July 1918 and subsequent correspondence, Adm 137/2074 fols. 215-228 
[37] Price op. cit. pp. 15-16 
[38] Williamson paper March 1912 quoted in ibid pp. 7-9; 'Presence of hostile S/M' 8 
April 1912, digest cut 11a, Adm 12/1500; TH 40 pp. 33-4; Hall to Fisher 14 June 1914, 
FP 809 
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anchored nets would be extremely difficult to maintain in a tideway [39]. 
These same arguments prevailed into the Great War, when it was found 
that with much expenditure of effort it was possible to maintain gigantic 
barrages across the Straits of Dover and Otranto. But nets were of little 
use by themselves; it was usually possible for a submarine to pass over or 
under them if not through them, and constant patrols were therefore 
needed to monitor a barrier. It also transpired that unless they were 
liberally seeded with mines, nets were unlikely to entrap and destroy a 
submerged boat. 'Lasso nets' to be dropped in the path of a submarine 
were tried in 1904 but were soon discarded as unrealistic. 
The advantage of netting was that it was a quick and convenient form 
of defence. The increased potential of underwater warfare caused a revival 
of interest in torpedo nets, and although they had been virtually ignored 
since 1890 those fitted to ships were once again regularly run out and the 
crews exercised in their use after 1905 [40]. They could be deployed in a 
few minutes. In an emergency it was expected that netting could be run up 
on board ship and readily laid, and the war caused immediate demands to 
made for huge quantities of indicator nets. In December 1914 an initial 
order for 60 miles' worth was made by the Admiralty, and these nets were 
the first of many tens of thousands delivered in the next four years [41]. 
But at the outbreak of war protection that available for individual ships had 
not been provided for fleets. 
The problem of tideways, together with a failure to appreciate that 
German submarines could cross the North Sea and operate off the Scottish 
coast [see section 4.1], meant that only the five great naval bases had 
boom defences and no British port had nets of any kind in August 1914. 
"I long for a submarine defence at Scapa, " wrote Jellicoe in the first few 
days of war, "it would give such a feeling of confidence. I can't sleep half 
so well when inside as when outside merely because I feel we are risking 
such a mass of valuable ships in a place where if a submarine did get in, 
she practically has the whole of the British dreadnought fleet at her 
mercy. " [42) The Grand Fleet was soon forced by a series of scares to 
[39] Wilson minute 13 June 1901 to Dawson plan 25 January 1901, Adm 1/7516; HMS 
Vernon annual report 1901, Adm 189/21 p. 172 
[40] Cowpe op. cit. pp. 82-92 
[41] HMS Vernon annual report 1902, Adm 189/22 p. 85; Admiralty to CinC Home Fleet 
27 December 1914, Adm 1/8409/15 
[42] Jellicoe to Churchill 30 August 1914, Add. Mss. 49012 fols. 17-19 
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retreat to Loch Ewe and then lough Swilly on the north coast of Ireland 
- several hundred miles from the expected field of the Battle of 
Armageddon. But improvements in harbour defences were rapidly put in 
hand, with the result that by November 1918,34 harbours were protected 
against underwater attack -a statistic that at once illustrates both the scale 
of the wartime submarine problem and the pre-war failure to appreciate 
its likely extent [43]. 
But it was the mine that proved to be the most potent AS weapon 
available in 1914. It caused practically half of British submarine losses [see 
appendix 8] and a rather smaller proportion of the German - an 
impressive statistic which becomes more so when it is remembered that 
mine warfare was badly neglected in the UK and that British mines were 
notoriously inefficient until copies of German models became available at 
the beginning of 1918. Combined with nets, mines made the task of forcing 
a passage through the Dover Straits or the Dardanelles much riskier; sown 
offshore or in the open sea they were unexpected and so even more 
deadly. Their use as 'blockade mines' had been suggested as early as 1901, 
but the independent use of the weapon in an AS role was otherwise 
entirely neglected until 1914 [44]. 
Yet the mine's success is easily explained. It was relatively cheap and 
could be laid in numbers. It required no supervision and could remain 
undetected and deadly for several months at least. It struck below the 
waterline and nearly always delivered a killer blow to the vulnerable 
pressure hull. It could lie in German home waters that could otherwise be 
blockaded only by risky patrols, and it was effective at any depth at which 
a submerged boat could operate. The most useful AS weapon was thus also 
the oldest, pre-dating the aircraft and the destroyer, the depth charge and 
the sweep [45]. 
[43] 'British naval effort 1914-1918' 24 December 1918, Adm 1/8547/336 fol. 26. See also 
Prendergast & Gibson, The German submarine war 1914-1918 (London 1931) pp. 4, 
14-16; Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford 1973) p. 338; Marder DSF 1,406 
[44] HMS Vernon annual report 1900, Adm 189/20 p. 24 
[45] See also SS Hall's assessment in untitled report of 30 August 1916, Adm 137/2077; 
fol. 55 
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The failure of detection 
Little can be written about attempts to evolve some form of submarine 
detection mechanism before the war, for the simple reason that little work 
was done. It was a task to which RN officers were peculiarly unsuited; 
acoustics, the subject in which the greatest strides were to be made, was 
not on the naval curriculum and can hardly have been foremost in the 
minds of men who had other professional duties to perform. The Admiralty 
nevertheless made no attempt to make good this deficiency by recruiting 
specialists from the scientific community, and naval officers appear to have 
subconsciously ignored the issue by concentrating on the apparently more 
immediate solution of developing weapons that could be deployed without a 
submarine being sighted, such as the sweep. 
An induction balance whose equilibrium would be disturbed by passing 
boats was tested by HMS Vernon in 1882. It was designed by Captain 
McEvoy, who in 1893 also built the Navy's primitive first hydrophone. 
Various models were tested in the 1890s, and towards the end of the 
period directional microphones were also tried without conspicious success. 
After a series of trials had been conducted off Portsmouth, experiments were 
finally abandoned in 1903 for a familiar reason: it was not anticipated that 
the machines could be constantly manned without exhausting the operator, 
and attempts to build in a 'call up' system had failed [46]. Underwater 
sound signalling was more active, with rival British and American systems in 
use by the Royal Navy for ship-to-ship communication by 1909, but 
although one such system proved able to detect the noisier German 
submarines there is no evidence that this was realised before the war [47]. 
The hydrophone experiments seem to have owed much to McEvoy's 
personal enthusiasm, and they were carried out in an ad hoc manner. 
There was no guiding force to push forward development and, in 1903, no 
sense of urgency. Despite 1911 trials with an electromagnetic towed device 
developed by Vickers, therefore, detection of enemy submarines depended in 
1914 on the sharp eyes of a look-out spotting a persicope feather or a 
[46) Michael Wignall, Scientists and the Admiralty: conflict and collaboration in 
anti-submarine warfare, 1914-1921 (London University Ph. D thesis 1987) pp. 25-6; 
'Detecting the presence of submarine boats' nd (1901), digest cut lla, Adm 12/1365 
[47) Hackmann op. cit. pp. 9-10 
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boat that was slow to dive. In other words, it relied largely on the 
carelessness of the submarine captain who in all normal situations had every 
chance of not being seen. Only during the last stages of an assault was it 
necessary for him to raise the periscope within sight of surface warships, 
and throughout the war the majority of submarine attacks were detected 
only by the sight of a torpedo wake heading for the target. Although 
crow's-nest seamen were generally reliable - indeed over-cautious - and 
aircraft showed great promise, detection had failed. A submarine might be 
sighted when she invaded the surface environment, but in 1914 it was 
impossible to follow her back to her own world. 
Cure - underwater explosions, gunfire and the ram 
AK Wilson's outrigger torpedoes were the earliest explosive devices to be 
tested in the anti-submarine war. First developed in 1900, they were 
modified at HMS Vernon and used in the 1904 manoeuvres, but results 
were poor and the weapon was immediately discarded. The reason is 
instructive: according to Fisher it was unlikely that a destroyer could bring 
its outrigger within the 50 foot 'striking distance' necessary to sink a 
submarine, "so that it does not seem worth while to lumber up destroyers 
with this apparatus. " [48] 
The consideration of proximity dictated the future course of AS 
explosives development. Before the war two main types of underwater towed 
charges - the single and the modified sweep - were evolved from Captain 
Ottley's 1901 invention, the 'Otter' [49]. It is interesting to note that this 
early device was expected to do no more than disable its victim, for similar 
doubts were later expressed by those involved in the development of 
sweeps. 
The single sweep consisted of a charge suspended at the end of a wire; 
a submarine coming into contact with the cable would in theory draw the 
explosive onto itself. The sweep could be towed at high speed and was 
usually regarded as an offensive weapon of some potential - "a formidable 
I 
[48] Fisher report 17 September 1903, Adm 138/180B section 26; 'Abolition of outrigger 
torpedo practice' 26 May 1904, digest cut 59-8, Adm 12/1405 
[49) HMS Vernon annual report 1901, Adm 189/21 p. 171 
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menace", the submarine committee termed it in July 1911 [50]. As the 
only offensive anti-submarine device available, the single sweep was 
popular in the 1913 manoeuvres, but even then its defects were recognised 
by the CinC, and in the Great War it proved of little service. Because it 
used only one wire, the area that could be searched by the sweep was 
small; success was unlikely without a recent clear view of the target, and 
by 1915 HMS Vernon had concluded that "such a sweep is now considered 
comparatively useless and incapable of further useful development. " [51] A 
modified version with multiple wires and charges went some way to 
overcoming the problem, but tended to encumber and slow the vessel using 
it-. The modified sweep was therefore reckoned more of a defensive 
weapon, and in this capacity was expected to be reasonably effective, if 
only as a deterrent - particularly if a number of vessels towed sweeps 
simultaneously. Keyes and his submariners thought it "not likely to prove of 
practical value in any other connection" [52]. But the modified sweep's 
great advantage was that alone among contemporary AS weapons it could 
be deployed without a target being sighted. 
The great problem was still to get within effective range of a submarine 
whilst hunting 'blind'. In 1903, the French exploded torpedo warheads 30, 
50 and 60 yards from a submerged submarine. On the last occasion there 
was a human crew on board; no harm came to them or to the boat [53]. 
1907 trials at HMS Vernon resulted in the sinking of the obsolete Holland 
No. 5, but indicated that a 1001b guncotton charge would have to be 
dropped "well within the submarine's length if any results are to be 
expected. " [54] 
Not until 1915 were the much larger charges needed to do serious 
damage tested. Trials showed that 2501bs of high explosive detonated within 
50 yards of a boat would "at the least cause the submarine extensive 
damage and force her to open up, and this supposes that the crew are not 
[50] Submarine committee report no. 15,17 July 1911, quoted in TH 40 pp. 16-17 
(511 Callaghan paper 'Remarks on North Sea strategy' 28 August 1913, Adm 116/1214; 
HMS Vernon annual report 1915, Adm 189/35 p. 162 
[52] Keyes to Chief of War Staff 16 October 1914, Adm 137/2067 fol. 654; see also de 
Robeck memo 6 August 1913, Adm 137/1926 fols. 414-18 
(53) 'Naval progress and estimates 1903' (France), NID No. 700, July 1903 p. 25. Adm 
231/38 
[54J HMS Vernon annual report 1907, Adm 189/27 p. 68; Wignall op. cit. pp. 34-5 
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overcome by the explosion, which is more than probable. " [55] This was 
an altogether more encouraging estimate, but it was made during the war 
and influenced only wartime AS development. 
Only the latter calculation made the depth charge seem a reasonable 
proposition. Before the war there had been experiments with 
delayed-action lyddite shells, but development of this supremely simple 
weapon had not been pressed because it seemed unlikely that a surface ship 
could get close enough to a submarine for an attack to be successful; even 
the 3001b depth charge used in the later stages of the conflict had to be 
detonated within 14 feet of the target to be sure of a kill [56]. The depth 
charge could however be used in multiples and had the advantage that - 
unlike the sweep - it could be kept instantly ready for action. 
Wartime experience proved what common sense had suggested: that 
simply damaging a submarine was often enough to thwart her. The war 
provided many graphic illustrations of the previously-untestable 
psychological effect of nearby explosions on a boat's crew. "The moral 
effect of a charge is very great, it is extremely upsetting, " reported Lt 
Heaton of HM Submarine HI after one attack. VM Cooper of the J2 was 
also badly shaken: "An experience of this nature is most trying as one can 
only wait and listen in silence and darkness without being able to strike 
back, " he wrote. "In my own case, I felt at the time I would much rather 
remain on the surface and engage the enemy, however large and at all 
costs, than endure the strain of a further similar experience. " [57] 
Before 1914, however, the one certain way of making contact with a 
submarine was by ramming it. The idea became popular once the loss of 
the Al had demonstrated the vulnerability of a submerged boat in a 
collision, and in fact the U15 - the first German submarine to be sunk in 
the Great War - went down after she was rammed by HMS Birmingham 
(August 1914). Jellicoe thought that there would be "many instances" in 
which ramming would be possible, and so it proved; but successful ramming 
was difficult if the intended victim could manoeuvre [58]. In the case of 
[55] HMS Vernon annual report 1915, Adm 189/35 p. 163. 
156) Wignall op. cit. pp. 353-7 
(571 Submarine committee report no. 24 22 September 1911, quoted in TH 40 p. 25; 
Heaton report 30 Spetember 1918, Adm 137/2075 fol. 579; Cooper report 1 September 
1917, ibid fol. 141 
[58] Jellicoe report 6 August 1913, Adm 116/3381; see Keyes memo 26 December 1914, POP- 
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the U15, for example, the British had the good fortune to come upon the 
submarine on the surface while most of the crew were below coping with 
an engine breakdown and an inadequate watch was being kept. In wartime, 
collisions were as often as not accidental, and the pre-war rules for 
manoeuvres recognised that. 
Gunfire seemed more likely to bring success, particularly with the 
spread of quick-firing guns and improving naval marksmanship. But the 
submarine proved a most elusive target; all that could be hoped for was a 
few seconds' glimpse of a disappearing conning tower or periscope. It was 
no surprise that the latter target proved just too small - in 1910 no hits 
were registered from 1,600 Maxim rounds fired at a periscope from 
1,000-1,200 yards [59] - but the naval authorities received a rude shock 
when in 1904 equally poor results were obtained with an immobile dummy 
conning tower 18 inches to three feet clear of the water. Only two of 271 
rounds from destroyers' 6- and 12-pdr quick-firers fctnnd their mark 
from ranges of just 200-800 yards. The target was then enlarged to 
represent a submarine running awash but still only four of 79 rounds struck 
home. The weather during these exercises was fine and the destroyers 
steamed slowly to minimise roll; their shooting was described by the 
Controller as "poor by any standard" and by the First Lord as 
"scandalously bad" [60], but in reality it was little different from what 
might be expected of gunners firing in the press of action. 
Capitulation 
The 1904 and 1910 gunfire experiments were the only anti-submarine trials 
carried out before 1914 from which precisely quantifiable statistics could be 
drawn - another consequence of the ad hoc, part-time nature of the 
investigation. Certainly the failure to set up a properly-recognised body to 
co-ordinate ASW had numerous serious consequences. One was a distinct 
4 KP 4/28 for similar sentiments. This was, of course, also the conclusion of the nineteenth 
century proponents of the battleship ram. 
(591 Submarine committee report no. 8,11 November 1910, quoted in TH 40 p. 14 
(601 May minute 30 June 1904 and Selborne minute 20 July 1904 to Bacon and Chariton 
report of 6 June 1904, Adm 1/7719 
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tendency to develop a limited range of existing ideas rather than search for 
new solutions. The destroyer screens, hand charges, towing charges, lasso 
and indicator nets used in 1904 were not much different from the AS 
devices suggested by Captains Ogilvy and Lees two years later; light 
indicator nets, the single sweep, high speed manoeuvres and advance screens 
were then under discussion [61]. In 1914 the Submarine Committee 
advocated a series of measures including aircraft, patrols and screens, 
sweeps, mine warfare and special formations of warships [62]. 
There was little sign of the AS weapons that were to prove decisive in 
two world wars. As late as 1915 HMS Vernon could make the remarkable 
statement that "it is the general opinion that all devices and methods of 
attack which have a reasonable chance of success are now in use or in 
process of development, and that it remains (December Ist, 1915) to 
develop accepted methods rather than to seek new ones... " [63] Sensible 
as this policy might have been in concentrating attention in the short term, 
it invited potential disaster in the long run and reflects the remarkable 
feeling of hopelessness that permeated the Royal Navy. 
Study of specific anti-submarine weapons can give a distorted picture 
of naval AS activity. Despite the early breezy optimism of many officers, 
trials soon convinced most that the problem was an intractable one. Almost 
from the first it was admitted - expected - that there was no complete 
solution to the submarine problem. In 1903 Admiral Fisher had written that 
"the whole pith and marrow of the matter lies in the fact that the 
submarine boat... is up to the present date quite unattackable" [64]; in 
1909 he reiterated the point, stating unequivocally that "no practical means 
at present exist or appear to be feasible for effecting the destruction of the 
latest type of submarine, or even of being warned of her approach. " [65] 
In 1908 Hall badgered Fisher into appointing a committee to investigate 
anti-submarine warfare; it sat only once, in April 1909, and the ICS 
remembered "Sir John telling the committee that there would shortly be 
[61] TH 40 pp. 3-4; Lees and Ogilvy 'Report on the attack and defence of submarines' 
NID No. 816.30 April 1906, Adm 231147 pp. 1-11 
[62] Submarine committee report no. 54,5 May 1914, KP 4/5 
[63] HMS Vernon annual report 1915, Adm 189/35 p. 161 
[64] Fisher paper 'Invasion and submarines' December 1903, FP 4940 
[65] Fisher paper 'The submarine question' nd 1909, FP 4238 
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large numbers of German submarines about and what were we to do about 
it etc etc. The committee said at present it seemed the only answer to 
submarine was submarine, " and promptly disbanded. Nothing - apart from 
a few experiments with gun armament for submarines - resulted from the 
apointment of this committee [66]. Keyes was no less pessimistic: "The only 
real safeguard at present is avoidance, and the object to be aimed at is to 
locate the submarines before they can dive, fix the danger area, and avoid 
it, " he admitted in 1912 [67]. And of a Submarine Committee report dated 
May 1914 the Commodore stated: "From the submarine officer's point of 
view, the main interest in this report lies in the statements it contains to 
the effect that... no effective means of direct attack on a submerged 
submarine has yet been produced... " [68] 
In his 1913 paper 'The oil engine and the submarine', Fisher noted 
"that at the present time no means exist of preventing hostile submarines 
emerging from their own ports and cruising more or less at will. " 
Furthermore, he believed, it was only "barely possible" that future 
developments would alter the situation [69]. When Lord Sydenham - who 
was not much of a believer in submarines - received an early draft of the 
paper he concurred with this opinion. "It must be admitted that this is 
rather" a desperate business, " he wrote; "no means can be suggested at 
present of meeting it [the submarine] except by reprisals. " [70] Early in 
1917, when the submarine peril was at its greatest, the Director of the 
Anti-Submarine Division admitted that "up to the present, no complete 
and practicable cure for the submarine menace has been, or is likely to be, 
discovered short of the destruction of the bases, which is obviously a 
military measure. " [71] This near-capitulation helps to explain the Royal 
Navy's inability to come to terms with the submarine -a failure that 
resulted in intellectual near-paralysis which was to cost the country dear. 
Admiral Custance realised the danger: "The navy, " he declared, "should not 
[66] Hall to Keyes 15 December 1912, KP 4/22 
[67] Keyes to de Robeck 3 October 1912, KP 4/18 
[68] Keyes minute 10 May 1914 to Submarine committee report no. 54. KP 4/5 
[69] Fisher paper 'The oil engine and the submarine' December 1913, FP 4293 p. 5 
[70] Sydenham to Fisher 24 June 1913, FP 704 
[71] 'Very secret: summary by DASD of anti-submarine measures', nd (c. February 1917), 
Adm 1/8480/36 
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be allowed to get into its head that nothing can be done against them"; it 
was a dangerously defeatist notion [72]. But he too had nothing specific to 
suggest. 
The state of anti-submarine warfare in 1914 
By August 1914, anti-submarine warfare was still imperfectly developed. 
The major offensive weapon was the single sweep carried by destroyers, 
which had to be detonated against a submarine's hull to be effective. There 
were no depth charges, and the British had no mines available for use 
against submarines. Nor were mines designed specially for use against 
underwater craft in production [73]. No method of detecting submarines 
underwater had been perfected, there were no submarine defences at any 
British port, and no nets other than torpedo nets were in service or 
reserve. RN submarine flotillas had developed no AS tactics and did not 
expect to be employed countering German U-boats. The vessels of the 
Grand Fleet relied for their protection on gunfire, torpedo nets, sharp 
look-outs, destroyer screens and their own improved underwater protection 
[741. 
Just how unsatisfactory anti-submarine warfare was in 1914 is 
immediately apparent to anyone examining the wartime statistics for 
submarine losses. In four years of war, the Allies sank 159 German 
submarines (19 more were lost to other causes); mines and depth charges 
accounted for 74 (46%) of these. Only 43 U-boats (27%) were destroyed 
by anti-submarine weapons (gunfire, ram, nets and sweeps) in use in 
August 1914. The yearly total of submarines lost by the Germans climbed 
from the five sunk in the last quarter of 1914, through 19 and 22 in the 
years 1915 and 1916 respectively, to a more respectable 63 (1917). 69 
U-boats went down in the period January-November 1918 [appendix 8]. 
[72] 'Notes by Sir Reginald Custance' August 1913, Adm 116/3381 
[731 Mines designed for use against surface ships had horns only on their upper surfaces, 
whereas those intended for use against submarines had a number of additional triggers on 
their undersides. 
[74] , The history of underwater protection by sub-division is given in Cowpe, op. cit. 
pp. 92 -110. 
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The one redeeming factor in this sorry picture was that other navies 
were equally incapacitated by the submarine. If mines (which accounted for 
70% of British submarines lost on active service) are excluded, no British 
boats were destroyed by underwater anti-submarine devices during the 
Great War. Even the Turks - who had the geographic advantages of the 
Dardanelles on their side - boasted a better record than the Germans with 
nets and gunfire [see appendix 7]. This failing was however but a small 
consolation to the United Kingdom. 
The submarine gained hugely in importance by the inadequate 
development of ASW. Her virtues were maximised, her failings minimised. 
Her comparatively low speed and endurance mattered little; in 1914 the 
submarine could risk attacks and try manoeuvres that later became suicidial. 
Because detection failed, destruction failed also. Because destruction 
failed, passive defence prevailed and avoidance seemed the best solution. 
The British inability to develop AS techniques before 1914 thus contributed 
materially to the direction taken by the war at sea. 
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Revelations 
m 
BRITISH SUBMARINES IN THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918 
At the moment Gavrilo Princip shot and fatally wounded Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Winston Churchill was conducting a party of visitors 
around overseas submarines of the Eighth Flotilla based at Portsmouth [1]. 
As First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill was in overall command of a 
volunteer force manning 72 boats. Flotillas of coastal submarines under the 
orders of the Admiral of Patrols were based at Portsmouth (11 boats), 
Plymouth (11 boats), and Chatham (24 boats) to guard the great naval 
bases. The Eighth Flotilla (17 boats), under the command of the CinC, 
Home Fleet, was to co-operate with the Grand Fleet and help to impose 
a blockade. Six B class submarines were stationed in the Mediterranean and 
there were still three C boats at Hong Kong [2]. 
By the time hostilities commenced on 4 August 1914, British and 
German submarines had already taken up positions dictated by war plans 
prepared in the last months of peace. Most of the 20 U-boats available to 
the Imperial Navy were assembled at Heligoland, where from 2 August they 
were escorted each morning to the patrol line from which they were to 
intercept the Grand Fleet as it made its expected rush into the Bight. They 
waited for a week, saw nothing and retired. A second patrol, by 10 
U-boats sweeping 300 miles into the North Sea, met with similar lack of 
success, and two submarines failed to return to base [3]. 
[1) Cecil Talbot diary 28 June 1914, Imperial War Museum department of manuscripts 
81/42/3 
(21 Navy List July 1914; Duff paper 21 February 1912, Adm 116/1122 
[3] William Jameson, The most formidable thing: the story of the submarine from the 
earliest days to the end of World War I (London 1965) pp. 120-1 
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The British preferred to begin a distant blockade, sending two E class 
boats, E6 and E8, to mount the first war patrol off the enemy coast and 
deploying the remainder of their submarines to protect the Expeditionary 
Force as it crossed the Channel. Keyes would have preferred not to station 
E boats off the enemy coast at all; because "their engines... [were]... still 
somewhat unreliable for long surface cruises", the two submarines were 
towed into the Bight by destroyers in an operation the Commodore 
described as "a hazardous experiment" [4]. But he was certain the Germans 
would come out - if not to offer battle to the Grand Fleet, then surely to 
dispute the passage of the BEF. "I cannot believe they will remain inactive 
when so much movement is in progress, " he wrote [5). Yet E6 and E8 saw 
nothing but enemy trawlers and a solitary U-boat. The High Sea Fleet 
remained stubbornly in port. 
It took only one week of war, then, to confound the expectations of a 
generation of naval officers. There was to be no 'Battle of Armageddon'. 
The war would not be 'over by Christmas' - and submarines, as much as 
battleships, would decide whether Britain or Germany won command of the 
sea. 
By 1914 the majority of British naval officers believed the submarine 
could be a relatively formidable weapon in certain circumstances [6]. The 
naval manoeuvres of 1912 and 1913 had demonstrated the dangers of trying 
to land troops on a coast defended by submarines, though it was easy to 
dismiss the limited successes of Keyes's flotillas as an aberration caused by 
loopholes in the rules of engagement [7]. It was obvious that the large 
overseas boats of the D and E classes could operate in open waters. But 
despite the efforts of AK Wilson and Keyes, the submarine branch had not 
been fully integrated into the fleet. 
Most officers had encountered submarines only once or twice in their 
careers, and comparatively few were familiar with the overseas types that 
had begun to come into service. Keyes admitted that "the Commanding 
Officers of vessels generally, and of destroyers of the Home Fleet flotillas 
[4] Keyes to Jellicoe 31 July 1914, Keyes papers KP 4/30, British Library; Michael 
Wilson, Destination Dardanelles: the story of HMS E7 (London 1988) pp. 32-3 
[5] Keyes to Jellicoe 2 August 1914, KP 4130; see also Keyes to Sturdee 23 August 1914, 
ibid 
[6] Cf. Keyes to de Robeck 10 August 1913, Adm 137/1926 fols. 420-4 
[7] Cf. de Robeck to Callaghan 20 August 1913, ibid fo1.425 
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particularly - with some notable exceptions - appear to be very vague as 
to the capabilities of submarines, their methods of attack and of evading 
attack", and a full year before the outbreak of war was arguing "that the 
time has arrived to face this question if we are to prepare ourselves to 
deal with the submarine as an enemy. " [8] But as late as December 1914 
Vice Admiral Bradford, in command of the third battle squadron, could 
write to Jellicoe to request that "the policy of secrecy which has hitherto 
been maintained with regard to the details of construction, armament and 
capabilities of submarines be discontinued. 
"I have recently been directed by the Admiralty to- furnish you with 
any suggestion I may have for attacking submarines actively, a subject 
that has been much in our thoughts for the last four months but the 
consideration of which is hampered on every side by the want of 
reliable information as to what a submarine can and cannot do... I 
submit that the provision of authoritative information on these points is 
of the first importance. " [9) 
The inexperience of ratings and junior officers in the Grand Fleet was 
exposed by the first major submarine scare of the war, which occured at 
Scapa Flow on 1 September. A 'periscope' was sighted as the fleet lay at 
anchor in the still-defenceless harbour, forcing Jellicoe to order all ships 
to raise steam. While they did so, torpedo nets were run out and small 
craft scurried about searching for the intruder, which was probably a seal. 
As a result of the 'First Battle of Scapa', the Grand Fleet put to sea for 
the first five days of September, then retreated to Loch Ewe on the west 
coast of Scotland for a further week for while defences for the Flow were 
improvised. A second scare, on 16 October, sent the British battlefleet to 
Lough Swilly, on the north coast of Ireland, for the best part of a month. 
For much of autumn, therefore, the Germans could have bombarded the 
east coast or played havoc with British lines of supply without fear of 
reprisal from the Grand Fleet [10). 
[8] Keyes to de Robeck 10 August 1913, ibid fols. 420-4 
[9] Bradford to Jellicoe 11 December 1914, ibid fols. 511 -12 
[10] Jellicoe to Admiralty 14 November 1914, Adm 137/965 fo1.166; Marder, DSF II, 
66-9. After the Grand Fleet did return to Scapa, it was lucky to escape a genuine attack 10. 
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Even the senior officers of the fleet had little experience of submarines. 
Beatty, who as naval secretary to the First Lord had written a pre-war 
paper on the threat to surface ships from underwater weapons, reported 
sighting a periscope at the Battle of Dogger Bank, and was so convinced 
German submarines were present that he ordered his battle-cruisers to 
alter course, putting them astern of the fleeing Germans at a vital moment. 
(Marder notes "Beatty's action was the first of its kind in the war. ") In 
fact no German submarine was within 60 miles of the battle; what Beatty 
had seen was probably a German torpedo surfacing at the end of its run 
[11]. Bayly, in command of a squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts, lost HMS 
'Formidable off the Isle of Wight early on New Year's Day 1915 because 
he had failed to take adequate precautions against U-boats, even though 
his flagship had been attacked four times by submarines during the 1913 
manoeuvres and the experience had taught him that "a battleship or 
battlefleet is incapable of defending itself from a determined destroyer 
attack, on a fairly dark night ... 
[or]... a submarine attack by day" [12]. 
Jellicoe, the British commander in chief, was one of the few senior 
officers with a real appreciation of the 'submarine peril' - although he, 
like many others, had under-estimated the danger before 1914. In 1909, as 
a gunnery specialist with no expert knowledge of underwater warfare, he 
wrote that "even if Germany spends a million a year on submarines, it will 
be eight years before the submarine menace in the North Sea is really bad, 
and I don't imagine we will wait eight years for war... It seems to be 
going rather too far to say that German submarine development must 
render the North Sea and all its ports uninhabitable by big ships... A time 
will come when the German submarines have been so reduced in 
numbers... that present conditions will be reproduced. " [13] 
Fisher had selected Jellicoe as a future CinC as early as 1910 as part 
of his drive "to push young men to the high commands who will think in 
submarines and 13.5 inch guns" [14]. Practically every letter he wrote to 
4 by U18, which penetrated the new defences on 23 November 1914 only to be rammed 
and sunk by a trawler. 
(11) Stephen Roskill, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, the last naval hero: an intimate 
biography (London 1980) pp. 54,56; Marder, DSF 11,160-1; Jameson op. cit. p. 147 
[12] Marder, DSF II, 98-9; Bayly to Callaghan 28 July 1913, Adm 137/1926 fols. 409-12 
[131 Jellicoe to Fisher 18 April 1909, Fisher papers FP 382, Churchill College Cambridge 
[141 Fisher to Balfour 23 October 1910, Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49712 fol. 63, British 
Library; see also Ruddock Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford 1973) pp. 425-6 
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the Admiral between 1911 and 1914 drove home the threat posed by 
underwater craft [15], and Fisher's protege was also one of the select group 
of officers to whom he sent a copy of the prophetic paper 'The oil engine 
and the submarine', which predicted attacks on British merchant shipping 
and warned of the damage 'submarine traps' could do to a battlefleet. 
Jellicoe was an early (1912) enthusiast for the fleet submarine concept, and 
his cautious handling of the Grand Fleet in waters within range of U-boats 
seems to have owed much to a study of Fisher's paper [16], but he 
remained guardedly optimistic that the menace could be defeated. 
"Unfortunately Germany has got a lead over us in overseas submarines and 
consequently the situation in this respect is not very easy, " the CinC wrote 
to Churchill at the end of August 1914. "It is suicidal to forgo our 
advantageous position in the big ships by risking them in waters infested by 
submarines ... 
[but]... the submarine has a very limited Sphere of Action. 
They can't hurt our overseas commerce nor can they help theirs get out. " 
[17] 
Only the grim experience of war at sea, and in particular the German 
experiments with unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915 and from February 
1917, convinced Jellicoe of the real threat posed by submarines. They were 
"the most serious menace with which the Empire has ever been faced, " he 
wrote in October 1916, after U-boats had sunk 180,000 tons of British 
shipping in two months [18]. It took almost 2,700 British vessels, including 
277 destroyers, 65 submarines and 2,054 motor launches, drifters and 
trawlers, to defeat the 111 U-boats in service when unrestricted submarine 
warfare was declared in 1917, the Admiral explained - figures that "show 
clearly the immense effect on Naval warfare, and Naval policy, of the 
introduction of a completely new offensive weapon. " [19] 
[15] Cf. Jellicoe papers, Add. Mss. 49006 (correspondence with Fisher), British Library 
[16] Fisher to Jellicoc 30 December 1913, ibid fol. 27; Fisher to Jellicoe 12 + 30 
November 1914, Add. Mss. 48990 Pols. 165-72; Jellicoe to Admiralty 30 October 1914, 
Add. Mss. 49012 fols. 23-5; Mackay op. cit. pp. 445,448-9,451-3; Marder, DSF II, 
75-6. On Jellicoe's interest in fleet submarines. see Keyes to Hall 19 October 1912, KP 
4/22 
[17] Jellicoe to Churchill 30 August 1914, Add. Mss. 49012 fols. 17-19 
[18] Jellicoe to Admiralty 29 October 1916, cited in Jellicoe, The submarine peril 
(London 1934) pp. 1 -5. See also Jellicoe's memo 'Naval policy in relation to merchant 
ship losses from submarines... ' 21 February 1917, Adm 1/8471/241 
[19) The submarine peril pp. 183-4; Jameson op. cit. p. 209. Jellicoe gives the number of 
U-boats in service at this time as 178. 
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The general failure of senior British naval officers to exploit the 
potential of their own submarines was no less obvious. Flotilla leaders 
commanding coastal boats complained of a lack of specific instructions from 
the Admiralty, which was quick to assume direct control over the 
deployment of overseas vessels [20]. There was no immediate attempt to 
move the maximum number of boats into the best offensive positions, and 
though a modest eight additional hulls were projected in the first wartime 
construction programme, Doveton Sturdee, the chief of the war staff, 
believed the score of overseas submarines available in September 1914 were 
"ample" for the war at sea [21]. He was wrong. The Royal Navy had 86 
patrol craft in service on 11 November 1918. 
Fisher's reappointment as First Sea Lord (30 October 1914) brought the 
Navy's most outspoken proponent of submarines back to the Admiralty. 
Within days a new Emergency War Programme had been drawn up, 
providing for the construction of extra vessels of every type. On 31 
October Churchill asked Fisher "to obtain 20 submarines... in the shortest 
possible time" [22]; he responded by ordering 53, including 20 H boats 
from the Bethlehem Steel Company to be completed within ten months and 
no fewer than 31 of the proven E class submarines recommended by Hall. 
When a further 58 submarines were sanctioned in November, Hall and 
Fisher saw to it that none - with the exception of a handful of G class 
hulls - were built to the controversial designs pioneered by Commodore 
Keyes. 
Keyes's termination of the Vickers monopoly did enable the Admiralty 
to order submarines from no fewer than 13 yards, and it was noteworthy 
that Scotts and Armstrongs completed their boats between 13 and 20 
months more quickly than novice companies such as Palmers, Thornycroft 
and Cammell Laird. But every yard made exceptional efforts, and in 1918 
the Director of Naval Construction observed that "the majority of the boats 
were completed in a time which, considering that the greater number of 
firms had no previous experience and were at the same time engaged in 
[20] Cf. Vernon Haggard memoirs August 1913-July 1915, undated typescript in the RN 
Submarine Museum, A1985/42 fols. 16-17. Haggard was in command of the depot ship 
HMS Vulcan, stationed with a flotilla of A boats at Dundee. 
[211 Sturdee minute 12 September 1914, Adm 137/999 fol. 191, Tudor paper 'Emergency 
war programme - new construction in destroyers and submarines for' 11 August 1914, 
Adm 1/8390/256 
[22) Quoted in Mackay op. cit. p. 464 
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other urgent work, compared extremely well with the building periods of 
other boats before the war. " [23] 
It took less than a month for submarines to prove they could have 
more than a 'moral effect' on the war at sea. On 3 September 1914, the 
British flotilla leader HMS Pathfinder was torpedoed and sunk (by U21) off 
St Abbs Head - the first warship to be sunk by submarine since the 
Housatonic. Worse was to follow. On 20 September, three elderly 
Bacchante class cruisers of what was only half-jokingly called the 'Live 
Bait Squadron' were surprised without an escort while patrolling off the 
Dutch coast. They had been on station for six weeks without sighting a 
submarine, and were taking none of the precautions suggested by the 
submarine branch after the Admiralty's pre-war A/S exercises. (In 
deference to experience, the 'Bacchantes had been detailed to operate with 
destroyers of the Harwich force, but these had returned to port during a 
spell of bad weather. ) In the space of less than an hour their attacker, U9 
(650/837 tons), sank all three 12,000 ton ships and drowned nearly 1,400 
sailors - "more men than lost by Lord Nelson in all his battles put 
together", as Fisher pointed out. Three weeks later the same submarine 
torpedoed and sank HMS Hawke, a somewhat more modern cruiser, off 
Aberdeen [24]. 
The loss of four cruisers in under four weeks had a great effect on 
British public opinion, and the Admiralty temporarily halted the movement 
of shipping in the Channel and placed restrictions on troop transports. But 
whatever its concern for the safety of naval auxiliaries, the RN was not yet 
convinced the submarine was a major threat to modern warships. The 
Bacchantes were obsolesecent and their loss did not affect the British war 
effort; moreover they had obviously been stationed in a highly exposed 
position and had been surprised while steaming at under 10 knots, while 
the Hawke had stopped to pick up mail. Reports of submarines at Scapa 
were infinitely more worrying, partly because they were infinitely less 
expected, but also because the Admiralty believed - correctly as it turned 
out - that warships in open waters, properly screened, and further from 
[23] DNC Department report 'Warship construction during the 1914-1918 war' 31 
December 1918, Adm 1/8547/340 pp. 210-12,225-6; 'Additional orders for submarine 
boats' 11 November 1914, Adm 1/8402/19; Fisher memo November 1914, FP 4305 
(24) Fisher to Churchill 26 December 1914, FG 111,111 -13; Jameson op. cit. pp. 126-8 
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the main German bases, would still make difficult targets. 
Nor should the significance of the Royal Navy's 'offensive culture' be 
under-estimated. British officers had been taught that losses were the 
inevitable price of aggression. From this point of view, the fact that the 
Bacchantes had not landed so much as a single hit on their attacker 
mattered less than the Admiralty's willingness to take the war to the 
Germans by stationing ships in hostile waters. 
British submarines had few chances to emulate the U-boats. Max 
Horton, in command of E9, was able to avenge the Pathfinder by sinking 
the old German cruiser Hela on 13 September, but the major submarine 
operation of 1914 - the Battle of the Heligoland Bight, as it became 
known - was hardly a glorious success. Combining the Eighth Flotilla with 
two light cruisers and two flotillas of destroyers from the Harwich Force, 
Commodores Keyes and Tyrwhitt set off at the end of August to attack 
enemy patrols in the Bight. The job of dealing with the German scouts 
was given to Tyrwhitt's TBDs, while Keyes's eight E boats were stationed 
in three lines off the main enemy bases in order to attack the High Sea 
Fleet when it made its hoped-for sortie. Five British battle-cruisers 
supported the raid, which was so poorly co-ordinated that Keyes remained 
unaware of the assistance being lent by the Grand Fleet. 
The British plan was for the outer line of submarines to make itself 
conspicuous in the hope of drawing enemy warships over the hidden inner 
cordon of E boats and into contact with Tyrwhitt's force. The scheme 
worked well, and on the morning of 28 August a German destroyer flotilla 
was sent out to hunt for an E boat that had attacked a patrol. The TBDs 
were soon spotted by Tyrwhitt, who gave chase in misty weather as the 
Germans fell back on Heligoland. Steaming at 25 knots, the Harwich Force 
blundered straight into the arms of a group of light cruisers from the High 
Sea Fleet. No sooner had Tyrwhitt disengaged than Keyes, in the 
destroyer Lurcner, came across a group of British light cruisers commanded 
by Commodore Goodenough, which were working in support of Beatty's 
battle-cruisers. Quite unaware that Goodenough was not berthed safely at 
Scapa, Keyes reported the newcomers as hostile, and Talbot in E6 made a 
(fortunately abortive) attack on the Commodore's flagship, HMS 
Southampton. 
Meanwhile the German CinC, von Ingenhol, had sent five more light 
cruisers into the Bight. These ships fell on Tyrwhitt's battered force and 
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were about to make short work of it when Beatty, steaming east at full 
speed, hurtled out of the mist with his five immense battle-cruisers and 
turned the tables on the German squadron. The cruiser Mainz was left 
ablaze from stem to stern, and Koln and Ariadne were both so badly 
damaged that they subsequently sank, the former with the loss of all but 
one of her men [25]. 
Beatty's intervention turned what could well have been a heavy British 
defeat into a triumph so rapturously received that its implications were 
never fully digested by the Admiralty. The original plan formulated by 
Tyrwhitt and Keyes called for light cruisers, destroyers and submarines from 
Harwich to go unsupported into the Bight, where it is clear that a number 
of British ships would have been lost. Keyes's submarines were unable to 
lend the Harwich Force useful support. They provided no intelligence of 
German movements to Tyrwhitt, and Keyes's own reports were of only 
limited use to Beatty. Nor was the overseas flotilla able to intercept 
German reinforcements as they left port. 
The Battle of the Heligoland Bight did nothing to suggest that 
submarines were well suited to operations that called for close cooperation 
with the surface fleet. The British battle-cruiser force, which entered the 
Bight knowing that Keyes was unaware of its presence, suspected it was as 
likely to be attacked by British submarines as by German boats, and when 
Lurcher fell in with Beatty's squadron, Keyes was forced to go "ahead of 
them at full speed... to try and warn the submarines". In his report, the 
Commodore (S) admitted that "the unexpected appearance of the light 
cruisers and the battle cruiser squadron must have been most embarrassing 
to them [the submarines], as it was to me. " [26] 
German losses - in what had been thought were 'safe' waters south of 
Heligoland - nevertheless angered the Kaiser and forced von Ingenohl to 
restrict operations in the North Sea. "Submarines have entirely altered the 
conditions in our operational bases in the German Bight; in this confined 
area we are exposed to continual danger and continual observation, which 
he have no means of avoiding, " wrote the German CinC [27J. 
[25] WS Chalmers, The life and letters of David, Earl Beatty, Admiral of the Fleet 
(London 1951) pp. 141 -55; Wilson op. cit. pp. 45-54 
[26) Keyes to Sturdee 29 August 1914, Halpern 1,11 -14; Keyes to Christian (CinC, 
Southern Force) 29 August 1914, ibid pp. 14-16; Keyes diary c. 29 August 1914, KP 216 
[27] Quoted in Jameson op. cit. p. 126; see also WS Chalmers, Max Horton and the 
Western Approaches (London 1954) pp. 9,13-19 
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Unable to use the Bight, von Ingenohl withdrew the majority of his 
ships to the Baltic through the Kiel canal. By the end of 1914, therefore, 
submarines and mines had forced both major naval powers to virtually 
abandon the main body of the North Sea for substantial periods, creating 
precisely the 'naval nomansland' so widely predicted before the outbreak of 
war [see section 6.1]. 
The presence of German surface units in the east, where they could be 
used against Britain's ally Russia, caused Keyes to press for submarines to 
be sent into the Baltic [28). Once there, he argued, they could be deployed 
against German supply lines, particularly the vital iron ore trade with 
Sweden. Although there was some concern that Danish neutrality might be 
compromised, the Admiralty detached three E boats to make the passage in 
October [29]. The operation was poorly planned and there was little 
co-ordination between the boats [30], but the two Es that completed the 
passage (which were later joined by a further three submarines of their 
own class and four C boats) scored numerous successes - without recourse 
to unrestricted submarine warfare [31). After the Russian collapse Admiral 
Hoppman, one of the German commanders in the Baltic, told Captain FN 
Cromie, the Senior British Officer, that the E boats were "a constant 
anxiety to them, in fact the only one. " [32) 
Similar but superficially even more dramatic successes were scored in 
the Sea of Marmara, where a handful of Allied submarines succeeded in 
disrupting Turkish seaborne communications with Gallipoli between 
December 1914 and January 1916 [33). By sinking two old battleships, 
several gunboats and numerous transports and dhows - and becoming the 
first enemy warships to penetrate the harbour at Constantinople in 500 
years -E boats forced the Turks to send some of their supplies more 
[28] Keyes diary 10 October 1914, KP 2/6 
[29) The arguments were set out by Keyes in a letter to Jellicoe, 10 October 1914, KP 
4/26 
[30] Halahan notes late September 1915, Adm 137/1247 fol. 29. Halahan aas captain of 
E18. 
[31] WF Nicholson minute 18 February 1916, ibid fol. 138 
[32] Quoted by Cromie in a letter to Hall, March 1918, cited by Michael Wilson, Baltic 
assignment: British submariners in Russia 1914-1919 (London 1985) p. 202 
[33] Cf. Reports of proceedings, Marmara 1915, Adm 137/382 
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than 100 miles overland from the railhead to the front and prompted the 
Allied commander, General Hamilton, to describe each boat as "worth an 
army corps" [34] 
The Baltic and Marmara campaigns were the most successful undertaken 
by RN boats in the Great War because they were the only ones that pitted 
British submarines against merchant shipping. Although the successes of the 
Marmara boats in particular have been exagerrated by British historians, the 
Trade proved it could operate with startling economy of force, and the 
speed with which the Swedish ore trade and Turkish military supply lines 
were disrupted by the torpedoes and guns of the Navy's overseas flotillas 
suggested that the their limited success in other theatres of war was due 
more to lack of opportunity than lack of skill. Certainly British submariners 
were no less skilful than their German counterparts [35). 
The submarine branch emerged from the two campaigns with a 
tremendous reputation in British naval circles. Its officers had proved, 
beyond doubt, their bravery and competence. Its boats had performed 
unexpectedly well in making the difficult passages into the Baltic and 
through the heavily-guarded Dardanelles, the latter submerged and against 
a 4.5 knot current [36]. A handful of E boats had seen more action in a 
few days than whole squadrons of Dreadnoughts, swinging at anchor in the 
Jade river and at Scapa, saw in a year. They had also reassured the public 
that the Navy was "doing something" [37]. 
Even more significantly, British submarines had taken the war to the 
enemy in waters where no other warship could live, proving they were at 
their most deadly when deployed along an enemy's lines of communication 
and supply. No Admiralty war plan had predicted their use in such a role. 
RN boats had been expected to act as coast defence craft, as the 
[34] Jameson op. cit. pp. 164-9; Peter Shankland and Anthony Hunter, Dardanelles patrol: 
the incredible story of the Ell (London 1971) 
[35) Beatty thought "Your submarine fellows are toppers... thank God their submarine 
officers are not in the same class as ours or we should have gone long ago. " Beatty to 
Keyes 18 September 1914, KP 4/34 
(361 Stoker report 9 January 1919, Adm 137/2077 fol. 418. Stoker was captain of the 
Australian submarine AE2, lost in the Marmara in April 1915. 
[37] One third of Britain's overseas submarines had been lost in action by August 1916 - 
a proportion "probably heavier than in any other of HM Forces, " noted Hall. During the 
first three years of the war, annual losses ran at about 10 per cent per year of boats in 
commission. Hall report 30 August 1916, Adm 137/2077 fol. 61; Hall report late August 
1917, ibid fol. 77 
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reconnaissance arm of the Grand Fleet, or in co-operation with British 
battle squadrons, because British naval strategy was largely one-dimensional. 
The Admiralty gave little thought to developing independent tactics for 
the submarine branch, concentrating its efforts on integrating boats into a 
grand strategy for the battlefleet. Naval warfare was expected to revolve 
around the blockade, the decisive battle and coastal defence against the 
possibility of invasion. British command of the sea was, if not taken for 
granted, at least taken as a starting point from which to develop plans, and 
this seems to have blinded the Royal Navy to the likelihood it would have 
to send warships into waters dominated by enemy craft. 
In the pre-war period coastal submarines had no sooner made a close 
blockade unthinkable than the overseas type made it possible again. In the 
Great War, confirmation that underwater warfare would severely restrict the 
role played by the surface fleet was immediately followed by the discovery 
that submarines could give the RN a presence in the most hostile of 
waters. The Admiralty - and particularly Keyes, as head of the submarine 
service - responded quickly to these unexpected circumstances, sending 
boats to the Baltic and the Dardanelles by the end of 1914. But at the 
same time the Navy failed to divert sufficient resources to let submarines 
make a decisive contribution to the war effort. There were never more 
than two boats operating at once in the Marmara, and it was their moral 
effect as much as their actual successes that forced the Turks to send 
supplies overland. During the crucial first winter of the war, when the 
Baltic was still relatively navigable, only El and E9 were available to help 
Russian naval forces protect their coast and strike at German shipping. 
More submarines might have had a decisive effect on the Gallipoli 
campaign and would certainly have hindered the Imperial Navy's attempts 
to use the Baltic as a training ground and turn it into a 'German ocean' 
on which trade could move freely and the High Sea Fleet operate without 
hindrance in support of armies on the Eastern Front. 
War plans drawn up in the last years of peace made it clear that both 
overseas and coastal submarines were to operate strictly in support of the 
Grand Fleet. According to the 1914 plans, boats under the orders of the 
CinC Home Fleet were to be stationed "as far as their numbers admit in 
offensive operations on the German coast, on the lookout for outgoing or 
incoming ships... with the ultimate object of establishing and maintaining a 
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close watch on all the enemy's ports" [38]. As a result, the majority of 
Britain's overseas boats spent the war on monotonous but hazardous surface 
(and, later, diving) patrols in the Heligoland Bight, or held in reserve at 
Harwich in the hope that they could be used en masse to intercept the 
German battlefleet [39]. 
The continuing failure of the RN to provide powerful W/T sets for its 
submarines [see section 6.3] made it difficult for overseas boats to perform 
a useful scouting function in the first two years of war. D and E class 
submarines still relied on destroyers acting as signal relay vessels to pass on 
sighting reports. Since the range of most submarine W/T sets fitted in 1914 
was no more than 20-60 miles, however, relay vessels were themselves 
forced into positions of considerable danger, and the majority of submarines 
therefore relied on traditional methods, such as carrier pigeons, to get their 
message through [40]. Results were unsatisfactory. One report, from an E 
boat near Terschelling, reached Harwich eleven and a half hours after it 
had been made - via a pigeon loft, the local post office and the 
Admiralty. This was reckoned to be good going [41]. 
Later in the war, however, long range W/T sets made a more subtle 
policy possible and patrolling boats were ordered to attack only if their 
targets were returning to port. If an overseas submarine spotted units of the 
High Sea Fleet heading into the North Sea, she was to surface in their 
wake and radio a position 'report, increasing the chances of a decisive 
surface action [42). 
Where British boats were able to get in shots at major surface units, 
the results were generally disappointing. Between 1914 and 1918 torpedoes 
struck four German Dreadnoughts and the battlecruiser Moltke (the latter 
[38J 'War plans - War with Germany 1914', Adm 116/3096 
[39] See Hall memo 24 April 1917, Adm 137/627 fol. 244 and 'Orders for Grand Fleet 
submarine patrols' 21 May 1917, ibid fol. 439 for discussion of the respective merits of 
surface and diving patrols. 
[40] Dumas (Assistant Director of Torpedoes) report on WIT sets 20 April 1915 in 
Historical Section summary of papers, Adm 137/1071 fol. 431. In 1915 the RN laid down a 
specification for sets capable of transmitting a minumum of 300 miles; see Admiralty to 
CinC Plymouth 13 June 1915, Adm 138/514 section 8, Draft Room, National Maritime 
Museum. For carrier pigeons, see Callaghan report 31 October 1914, Adm 137/965 fol. 115 
[41] Jameson op. cit. pp. 150-1. By 1916 signal intercepts decoded by the famous Room 40 
were providing the Admiralty with detailed information of German movements. 
[42] Hall report late August 1917, Adm 137/2077 fol. 76; 'Special patrol orders for 
submarines of the 10th and 11th flotillas' . 28 February 1918, Adm 137/871 fol. 526 
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three times) without sinking any of them [43]. On the other hand, the 
attacks did have a tactical impact. In April 1915 Lieutentant Commander 
Laurence, in El, sighted a powerful squadron operating in support of the 
German advance on Riga and hit the Molike with a single torpedo, 
prompting Admiral Hipper to order the whole squadron back to Danzig. 
Laurence was subsequently decorated by the Tsar, who told him: "You have 
saved our town of Riga. " [44] Fear of submarine attack also acted as a 
powerful disincentive for the Germans to brave the North Sea. For 
example, British boats intercepted the High Sea Fleet on each of the three 
occasions it left port in the 12 months following the battle of Jutland, 
torpedoing the battleships Grosser Kurfurst, Kronprinz Wilhelm (both hit 
by Laurence in 11) and Westfalen, plus the light cruiser Munchen [45]. As 
a result, the Grosser Kurfurst was unfit for service for three months, 
Kronprinz Wilhelm for one month and Westfalen for six -weeks [46]. 
Enforced inaction, particularly in the months after Jutland, eventually had a 
disastrous effect on morale in the German fleet and contributed substantially 
to the outbreak of mutiny in 1918 [47]. 
Britain's coastal submarines had a generally less exciting war. The local 
defence flotillas were split up, in accordance with the war plans, to provide 
protection to a total of around a dozen ports. By November there were 
boats at Lamlash, Dover, Dundee, Harwich, Blyth and Sunderland and on 
the Thames, Forth, Tyne and Humber rivers [48]. The pre-war scheme - 
which had grouped all local flotillas under the control of the Admiral of 
Patrols - proved unwieldy, as Keyes had predicted it would, and from 
October 1914 boats were placed under the orders of the 
commanders-in-chief of home ports and the Admirals commanding the 
Dover Patrol and the Coast of Scotland. The Commodore (S) remained 
[43] Hall report 15 January 1919, Adm 137/2077 fols. 109-16 
[44] WG Carr, By guess and by God: the story of the British submarines in the war 
(London nd [19301) p. 104 
[45] Hall report late August 1917, Adm 137/2077 fol. 76 
[46] Siegfried Breyer, Battleships and battlecruisers 1905-1970 (London 1973) pp. 263,276 
[47] Marder, DSF V, 172-5,333; Holger Herwig. 'Luxury Flee: ': the Imperial German 
Navy 1888-1918 (London 1980) pp. 138-9,250-1 
[48] Admiralty to Commodore (S) October 1914, Adm 137/1001 fol. 221; 'Orders in case of 
invasion' 16 November 1914, Palm 137/965 fols. 204,206-13 
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responsible for administration and personnel [49]. 
Callaghan, in a memorandum on the possibility of invasion written late 
in October 1914, predicted the use of coastals in their traditional role as a 
second line of defence - backed by a third line formed by troops on 
shore - to free squadrons of the Grand Fleet for offensive operations. But 
he displayed new confidence in the ability of torpedo flotillas to halt an 
invasion without assistance. "We have no right to risk the Grand Fleet in 
operations where there are two other lines of defence, " wrote the former 
CinC [50]. His successor seems to have concurred with this assessment. 
Coastal submarines, wrote Jellicoe, could be relied on to "free the Navy 
for its proper role - the destruction of the enemy's fleet - and will 
enable that concentration of force to be carried out which, in my opinion, 
is essential to secure the annihilation of the High Sea Fleet. " [51] 
The RN's confidence that its torpedo flotillas could prevent a full-scale 
landing led it to renew its blanket commitment to deal with any 'invasion 
fleet (August 1914) [52], but the Navy remained unconvinced that 
submarines could intercept a raiding force relying on speed and surprise to 
land troops or shell ports [53]. Coastal flotillas could not prevent the 
German attacks on Yarmouth (3 November 1914) and Scarborough, Whitley 
Bay and Hartlepool (16 December 1914), though the single C class 
submarine stationed at Hartlepool did play some part in driving off the 
German battlecruisers shelling the town [54]. By 1916, with the threat of 
invasion receding, C, F and V class submarines were widely used for 
training and practice work and their numbers were gradually reduced as 
more patrol boats came into service [55]. 
[49] Keyes to de Robeck, 30 July 1913, KP 4/13; Admiral of Patrols submission 13 
October and Keyes minute 20 October 1914, Adm 137/1001 fol. 216 
[50] Callaghan memo 31 October 1914, Adm 137/965 fol. 110. See also assessment by de 
Robeck, the Admiral of Patrols, in a letter to Callaghan 29 August 1913, Adm 137/1926 
fols. 437 -8 
(51] Jellicoe to Admiralty 14 November 1914, Adm 137/965 fol. 171 
[52] Marder, DSF 11,60-3. For a set of typical Admiralty orders to coastal submarines, 
see M-branch paper 'Action to be taken in the event of an attempted invasion', 25 
January 1916, Adm 137/835 fols. 44-S. 
[53] Cf. Jellicoe to Admiralty 14 November 1914. Adm 137/465 fols. 167-8; Beatty to 
Captains (S) Blyth and Tees 3 January 1917, Adm 137/1926 fols. 93-4 
[54) Marder, DSF II, 131,141-2,148; Jameson op. cit. p. 143 
[55] Hall report 30 August 1916, Adm 137/2077 fols. 53-4; Hall report late August 1917, 
ibid fol. 74. By November 1918 there were only 20 coastals in service - 22 fewer than in jo. 
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The surviving coastal boats were increasingly drafted into service as 
anti-submarine vessels from 1915 - at first in conjunction with surface 
'decoy' ships and later on diving patrols. This was a desperate measure on 
the part of the Admiralty, since British craft had been neither designed for 
nor trained in anti-submarine work [see section 7], carried no special 
anti-submarine weapons until the last months of 1918, when some J and 
K class boats were given depth charges, and depended on sharp eyesight 
and good luck to catch their prey. Keyes admitted in 1914 that "the odds 
against success are very large", particularly when the hunter was herself 
submerged [56) - and though 17 U boats fell victim to the torpedoes of 
their British counterparts during the war, Hall concluded in August 1918 
that "the large part that luck plays during this most difficult work has been 
most strikingly shown. " [57) 
The biggest difficulty faced by British coastal submarines was not 
sighting enemy boats but manoeuvring into position for an attack. U-boats 
generally steamed at 10-12 knots on the surface, leaving the typical C 
class submarine, with her 8 knot submerged speed, at a considerable 
disadvantage. Late in 1917, therefore, Hall developed the specification for a 
boat designed for maximum underwater speed and firepower. The final 
design for what became known as the R class provided for a submarine 
with 6x18" bow torpedo tubes, capable of 15 knots submerged and 8 knots 
on the surface. The submarines were also fitted with five hydrophone 
cabinets to help them detect submerged enemy craft [58). 
The R class boats - only ten of which were actually completed - 
were a technical triumph. They were surprisingly modern in appearance, 
and in post-war exercises regularly defeated the efforts of surface warships 
detailed to hunt them; furthermore, on the only occasion that one of the 
class actually encountered a U-boat she was able to manoeuvre into a 
perfect attacking position before being frustrated by a dud torpedo [59). 
August 1914.66 more patrol submarines were in service at the armistice than when war 
was declared. Hall report 15 January 1919, ibid fol. 113 
156) Keyes to Sturdee 11 September 1914, Adm 137/2067 fols. 625-6. See also Fremantle 
minute 12 May 1918, Adm 1371505 fol. 222 
[571 Hall report 28 August 1918, Adm 137/2077 fol. 103; see also Waistell report 8 June 
1917, Adm 137/2071 fol. 632 
[58) AN Harrison, Development of HM Submarines from Holland No. 1 (1900) to Porpoise 
(1930) (BR 3043,1979) sections 10.9-10.14; 'Submarine administration', Technical History 
vol 21 p. 16, Naval Library MOD 
[59] Lockhart report of proceedings 11 October 1918, Adm 13712077 fol. 125 
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What was particularly significant about the class, however, was its 
development to fulfil a specific strategic need. Most pre-war submarines 
were multi-purpose craft and comparatively little thought was given to the 
best ways in which they could be employed. The R class - and to a 
lesser extent the sub-class of E boats converted into submarine minelayers 
[60) - were desgined to carry out very specific tasks. Only one earlier 
type had been developed in this way. 
Fleet submarines 
The idea of building a submarine swift and seaworthy enough to operate 
with the fleet had long fascinated the Admiralty. A flotilla or two of 
submarines deployed ahead of the line of battle could play havoc with a 
fleet deploying for action, offering all the advantages of surprise and 
seriously inhibiting an enemy admiral. Much more importantly, however, a 
submarine serving at sea alongside Dreadnoughts and battlecruisers could 
claim to be a real part of the fleet, and therefore of the Royal Navy 
itself. 
The Admiralty's single-minded association of the Fleet with the Royal 
Navy, and of strategy with the Fleet, was the real force prompting 
development of the fleet submarine. There was an unspoken belief that no 
warship mattered if she could not serve on the high seas, and that all 
classes of warship would grow in size and power as they developed. The 
slow armourclad of the 1870s had become the Dreadnought. The frigate 
had evolved into the battlecruiser and the torpedo boat had been replaced 
by the destroyer. Now the Holland boat was to be succeeded by the K 
class submarine, belching steam and racing into battle at 24 knots to fulfil 
the long-standing and peculiarly British demand for seagoing torpedo 
vessels [see section 1.4]. "Without any doubt whatsoever, " wrote Fisher, "a 
fast battle fleet which can always be accompanied by submarines under all 
circumstances would possess an overwhelming fighting advantage. " [61] 
Fleet submarines were expected to give the advantage to a navy 
deploying them before or during a decisive battle by striking at enemy 
I 
[60] Hall report 28 August 1916, ibid fol. 204 
[61] Fisher to Hall 4 September 1913, FP 726 
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capital ships. The Admiralty planned to use their speed to station them 
ahead of the British battlefleet but behind an outlying screen of cruisers. 
From this position fleet boats (ideally working in groups of three) would 
not only be able to dive on a signal from the scouts, thus giving them the 
chance to attack the enemy as he deployed for action, but would also be 
unlikely to hamper the movements of their own battleships [62]. A 
pre-war study conducted by the War College suggested that submarines 
working ahead of the fleet could operate successfully even when the enemy 
was aware of their presence [63]. 
Fleet submarines also promised useful support for detached British 
squadrons, which could retire over their positions if confronted by a 
superior enemy force [64]. Beatty's 1918 war orders for the Grand Fleet 
outlined a third scheme by suggesting: "It must be the main tactical 
endeavour of K class submarines to place themselves between the enemy 
and his base, and in certain cases, to attack the enemy on the reverse side 
from that on which our battlefleet will attack. " [65]. 
There were two obstacles to the development of a technically efficient 
fleet submarine: speed and seaworthiness. The drive to substantially increase 
the displacement of British submarines began as early as 1904, when Bacon 
asked Vickers to draw up plans for a 1,000 ton boat with twin screws, oil 
engines and four times the battery power of the contemporary 190/205 ton 
A class. In 1911 Hall commented favourably on a design for another 1,000 
ton boat which he thought would make "a most interesting comparison with 
a destroyer" [66], and by 1912 Vickers had started work on the 1,270 ton 
Nautilus, then by far the largest submarine in the world. In February of 
the same year, Keyes's submarine committee recommended the Navy should 
concentrate on the construction of two types of submarine: coastals and 
double-hulled, high-buoyancy overseas boats "for service on the enemy's 
(621 'Record of a conference held in the First Lord's room on 9th December [19131'. KP 
4/10; Leir to Jellicoe 2 January 1917, Adm 137/1926 fols. 631-33 
[63] War College Tactical Investigation No. 11,27 April 1914, KP 4114 
[64] Keyes minute 18 August 1913, KP 4/11 
[65] Grand Fleet Battle Orders 1 January 1918 in Bryan Ranft, The Beatty Papers: 
selections from the private and official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl 
Beatty (London 1989) pp. 478-82 
[66] Vickers to Bacon 16 May 1904, Vickers Papers VP 739 bundle 2, Cambridge 
University Library; Hall to Briggs (Third Sea Lord) 7 December 1911, KP 4/1 
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coast and for blockade work. " [67] Early progress towards the production 
of a fleet submarine was so good that Rear Admiral Ballard, the DOD, 
thought "there is no great difficulty in the way of producing a sea-going 
submarine with a surface speed of 25 knots. " [68] In 1918 Admiral Fisher 
- by now retired - even backed a design for a submersible battlecruiser 
of 30,000 tons, with 18" or 20" guns, capable of 30 knots [69]. 
But even the largest submarines were no use if they were slow, as the 
Navy discovered when boats were deployed with the fleet in peacetime 
exercises. In 1908, at around the time the War Staff was first planning to 
use submarines to blockade the enemy coast, Hall stationed three flotillas of 
coastal boats parallel to the friendly battlefleet, protecting it with "a 
minefield 30 miles long moving at 10 knots" at the cost of severely limiting 
its speed [703. The development of efficient diesel engines made a 
considerable difference, and by 1911 Keyes was writing that "the D class 
can comfortably maintain a speed of 13-14 knots, and might well be 
employed in company with a battlefleet, particularly one expecting to fall in 
with a superior force. " [71] The Commodore's theory was tested when 
three D class submarines and one E boat joined the Home Fleet on 
manoeuvres in October 1913. They were deployed in pairs on the flanks of 
the battle squadrons, and claimed one light cruiser and an enemy battleship 
- greatly encouraging Keyes, who wrote that "submarines... might well 
inflict a severe loss on the enemy before a general action takes place. " [72] 
But even the D class was too slow to work offensively on the high seas, or 
with battle squadrons steaming at anything like the 21 knot top speed of 
the latest Dreadnoughts. There was no possibility the submarines could have 
worked ahead of the fleet to surprise an enemy squadron. 
Hall began to tackle the problem of low speed in his specification for 
[67] 'Record of a conference held in the First Lord's room on 9th December [1913]', 1(1' 
4/10 
[68] Ballard memo nd (? March 1912) KP 4/5 
[69] Jon Sumida, In defence of naval supremacy: finance, technology and British naval 
policy 1889-1914 (Boston 1989) p. 318 
(701 Hall memo 'A brief account of the performances of the sea-going flotillas of 
submarines during the recent strategical exercises in the North Sea' 4 August 1908, FP 
4253. By this date Hail expected future submarines to be used in fleet actions - see Hall 
to Controller 16 May 1908. Adm 116/1057 
[71] Keyes memo 3 June 1911, KP 4/13 
(721 Keyes to Madden (Rear Admiral, Third Cruiser Squadron) 8 October 1913, KP 4/14 
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the E class submarine, which was capable of 15 knots on the surface and 
expected to operate both off an enemy coast and with,. the British 
battlefleet. In Keyes's recollection, "it was considered that this type should 
be capable of accompanying a modern fleet to sea and should possess the 
highest possible speed for strategic reasons. " [73] Like its project to station 
B and C class submarines off the German coast, the Navy's attempts to 
force overseas submarines into a fleet role they could not discharge 
efficiently suggest that strategic thought was being allowed to run ahead of 
materiel; the next class of boat, the Gs of 1913, could manage no more 
than 14 knots on the surface and it became increasingly clear that 
contemporary diesel engines could not guarantee submarines the speed they 
would need to work with a fleet. The largest diesel boats produced during 
the war, the 121011610 ton J class, reached speeds of no more than 19 
knots and were never used in operations with surface units. 
Keyes's Nautilus and Swordfish were laid down to test diesels against 
the only possible alternative: steam engines. Vickers, the only British 
company with any experience of building diesel engines for submarines, 
wisely declined an Admiralty invitation to produce a boat capable of a 
surface speed of 20 knots, and in the end failed in its attempt to build a 
motor capable of driving the experimental Nautilus at 17 knots - three 
knots below the maximum speed of the Home Fleet at the time. The 
engines were "considerably overweight", Vickers admitted [74), and even in 
the machine shop they suffered from excessive vibration and over-heating 
[75]. 
Swordfish, built by Scotts to an Italian design, was always intended to 
be a prototype steam fleet submarine [76), and her design called for a 
surface speed of 18 knots. The tactical advantages anticipated from fleet 
submarines also prompted the DNC, ET d'Eyncourt, to produce designs for 
a much bigger boat in the spring of 1913. D'Eyncourt's steam powered 
submarine would have had a top speed of 24 knots and displaced 1,700 
tons, but by December the design had been rejected on the grounds that it 
represented too great an advance over existing types. A final decision on, 
[73) Keyes report 15 August 1913, Adm 138/246C section 49. See also Callaghan's 
'Remarks on North Sea Strategy' 28 August 1913, Adm 116/1214 
[74) Vickers paper 'HMS Nautilus' nd (? May 1918) VP 599 fol. 386 
[75] Vickers paper 'HMS Nautilus' 2 May 1918, VP 599 fol. 388 
[76] 'Swordfish type' 11 December 1913, digest cut lla, Adm 1211513 
8.1 BRITISH SUBMARINE POLICY 1914-1918 
I 
the boat was deferred for a year in the hope Nautilus might prove the 
viability of high speed diesel submarines; if the Vickers-designed boat was 
a failure, it was agreed to order one submarine to the DNC's design as 
part of the 1914-15 programme (77]. 
The Admiralty's misgivings were based largely -on a realistic appraisal of 
the shortcomings of steam submarines [see also section 3.2]. Steam boats 
took so long to close up and dive that the element of surprise needed for 
a successful attack on an enemy fleet could easily be lost [78). They were 
also vulnerable to weather damage, as the steam submarine Archimede 
demonstrated early in the war. The French boat was on patrol with British 
submarines off Heligoland when her collapsible funnel was struck by a 
wave, jamming the mechanism for lowering it into the hull and making it 
impossible for the boat to dive. Archimede shipped a considerable quantity 
of water through her damaged funnel and took two days to stagger out of 
the Bight in constant danger of attack by German patrols [79]. Hall pointed 
out a number of other disadvantages: steam engines were difficult to 
maintain [80], d'Eyncourt's submarine was probably too big to operate 
successfully in the shallow waters of the North Sea, and her size made her 
difficult to manoeuvre into an attacking position and an easy target for a 
counter attack [81]. 
Both Hall and Keyes were also reluctant to order submarines to work 
with large surface units. Hall accepted that "the argument that they should 
be able to gain the right ahead position on the surface is a sound one", 
but pointed out submarines were "horrible things to have around from [a) 
big ship point of view". Keyes, who saw his overseas boats in action with 
the fleet in 1913, "had some very bad moments watching heavy ships, 
[77] 'Record of a conference held in the First Lord's room on 9th December [1913]'. 
KP 4/10; ET d'Eyncourt, A shipbuilder's yarn: the record of a naval constructor (London 
nd [1949]) p. 88; 'Warship construction during the 1914-1918 war' 31 December 1918, 
Adm 1/8547/340 pp. 216-18 
[78] Fisher paper 'The oil engine and the submarine' December 1913 and Esher 
marginalia, FP 4293 
[79] Jameson op. cit. p. 144; Kenneth Edwards, We dive at dawn (London nd 1939) 
pp. 90-2 
[80] Hall to Fisher 14 July 1913, FP 708 
[81] Hall to Tudor 16 May 1915, cited in 'Submarine administration', Technical History 21 
pp. 14-15, Naval Library. "Only the necessity of accompanying the battlefleet justified in 
my opinion the size of the K class, " Hall concluded. See also Don Everitt, The K boats: 
a dramatic first report on the Navy's most. calamftous submarines (London 1963) p. 31. 
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cruisers and destroyers manoeuvering in all directions over the submarines" 
[82], and the risk of misidentification and accident was such that in 
October 1914 the Admiralty issued orders for boats to keep clear of the 
fleet and notify surface units of their movements [83]. 
The real impetus for the development of large submarines therefore 
came from the Admiralty and senior surface officers. The naval authorities 
suspected the Germans had stolen a decisive lead in the development of 
fleet types in the immediate pre-war period; there were reports that the 
Imperial Navy had built boats with surface speeds of 19 or even 22 knots, 
and the Admiralty was further alarmed by news that a half flotilla of 
U-boats had been attached to the High Sea Fleet during the 1913 
manoeuvres [84]. By the end of 1915 Jellicoe thought the High Sea Fleet 
was "quite certain" to be accompanied by underwater craft [85]. He did not 
learn until after the war that Germany had never given credence to the 
fleet submarine theory [86]. 
Both Jellicoe and Beatty were keen to have submarines under their 
command. In 1915 Jellicoe argued that German deployment of U-boats 
with the fleet would put him at a disadvantage "if our own submarines are 
not in a position to take offensive action against the German battlefleet", 
and when Beatty took over the Grand Fleet he requested the transfer of a 
minimum of 40 boats to his control [87]. The senior officers of the surface 
fleet were supported by Keyes - who had been ordered to integrate the 
submarine service into the fleet and was less concerned than his 
predecessors by non-specialist 'interference' in the branch - and from 
1913 by Fisher, who had anticipated the problems of operating fleet 
[82] Hall to Keyes 7 October 1911, KP 4/22; Keyes to de Robeck 10 August 1913, Adm 
137/1926. Keyes nevertheless believed the submarines had performed creditably; see Keyes 
to Madden 8 October 1913, KP 4/14 
[83] 'Keeping clear of fleets' 16 October 1914, digest cut Ila, Adm 12/1525 
[84] Report on High Sea Fleet manoeuvres dated 16 July 1913, Adm 137/3867. See also 
Jellicoe to Admiralty 30 October 1914, Add. Mss. 49012 fols. 23-5; Tudor memo 
'Submarines - proposals in regard to further programmes' 22 July 1915, Adm 1/8428/209; 
Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat: the evolution and technical history of German submarines 
(London 1975) p. 32 
[85] Jellicoe to Admiralty 8 November 1915. Adm 137/1926 
[86] Reinhard Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War (London 1920) p. 104 
[87] Jellicoe to Admiralty 8 November 1915, Adm 137/1926 fols. 48-9; Beatty to Captains 
(S) 3 January 1917, ibid fols. 93-4 
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submarines as early as 1904 [88] but who refused to let the Germans 
develop a lead in any sort of warship. Even Hall, encouraged by Fisher, 
gave his guarded blessing to steam power shortly before the outbreak of 
war [89]. 
The fleet submarine concept thus had the approval of a broad spectrum 
of naval officers by 1914. Despite Keyes's drive to develop workable 
designs, however, the Admiralty began to realise its overseas submarine 
programme was of greater short-term significance to British policy. 
Procurement of E class boats had been cut back to fund experimental 
designs, leaving the RN without enough patrol submarines to mount a full 
scale blockade [see section 6.3]. Early in 1914 the Admiralty therefore 
called a temporary halt to the fleet programme in order to concentrate its 
resources on building overseas craft; the construction of coastal and patrol 
submarines was more important than a long-term fleet programme, Keyes 
conceded [90]. 
Only the twin spurs of war and rumours of German activity prompted 
the Admiralty to revive the programme in 1915. D'Eyncourt's 1913 design 
was dusted off and compared with a specification for a steam submarine 
drawn up by Vickers. In April 1915 the best elements of the two plans 
were combined to produce what was to become the K class submarine. 
Each boat displaced 1,880/2,560 tons on a 340 foot hull and could reach 
speeds of 24/9 knots - enough to let them operate ahead of the fleet, if 
not enough to guarantee success under water. The boilers could be closed 
down for diving in five minutes; the fastest dive ever recorded by aK boat 
was completed in a- perilously slow -3 minutes 30 seconds [91]. 
Orders for 14 fleet submarines were placed in June 1915. A total of 18 
Ks were eventually completed, and two flotillas of seven boats each served 
with the Grand Fleet in 1917 and 1918 [92], replacing E class boats 
stationed at Blyth as stop-gap fleet submarines [93]. The Ks were a 
[88] Cf. Fisher paper 'Submarine boats' nd (c. April 1904), Adm 116/3093 
[89] Hall to Keyes 25 September 1913, KP 4/22 
[90] Keyes to Churchill nd (late December 1913 or early January 1918) KP 4/11; Keyes 
report 16 February 1914, KP 4/10 
[91] Everitt op. cit. pp. 28,98-9 
[92] David Henry, British submarine development and policy 1918-1939 (unpublished 
London University PhD thesis, 1976) p. 36 
[93] Jellicoe to Admiralty 24 July 1915, Adm 137/1926 fols. 40-4; Jellicoe to Admiralty 3 
November 1915, ibid fol. 88 
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considerable advance on anything that had been tried before, and soon 
earned a reputation for unreliability. The boats performed poorly in heavy 
seas, forcing the Admiralty to add distinctive swan bows to lend extra 
buoyancy. The weight of water on the long, low superstructure sometimes 
pushed them under, and it was discovered the hydroplanes were too small 
to control the delicately-balanced submarines in neutral buoyancy. The 
boats also had a tendency, shared with French steam submarines, to ship 
water through funnels and ventilators, and some of the numerous hull 
openings were occasionally jammed in a partially open position by driftwood 
[94]. Handling such large and unwieldy submarines called for great skill, 
and from 1916 many of the most experienced British submarine 
commanders were transferred to the K flotillas, seriously compromising the 
efficiency of the far busier overseas submarines on the blockade line. 
Not all officers were convinced that such boats could work effectively 
with the fleet. Hall, who had never been keen on the K class, sounded a 
warning note in 1916 by reporting: "the underwater disadvantages attending 
the Vessel[s]... are great, and steam is not recommended for reproduction 
in any class of submarine unless it can clearly be shown that she will be 
of no use without it. " [95] Ernest Leir, the senior submarine officer 
afloat, thought "the only good thing about K boats was that they never 
engaged the enemy" [96]. But few went as far as AT Leveson, the Director 
of the Operations Division, who in May 1914 questioned the whole concept 
of the fleet submarine. "As regards the employment of submarines, " he 
wrote, 
"I far prefer that they should be sent on detached service to important 
positions in the theatre of operations... I always seem to see too great 
a desire on the part of a good many theoretical strategists and 
tacticians to bring the latest and newest of every type of vessel and 
arm, into the Grand Fleet of Battle. 
"This has its advantages, but I think gets a bit overdone, especially 
when it comes to types originated and designed for something else. " 
[97] 
[94] Everitt op. cit. pp. 95-7 
[95] Hall to Admiralty 6 November 1916, Adm 137/1926 fols. 626-9 
[96] Everitt op. cit. p. 109 
[97] Leveson note 12 May 1914, KP 4/14 
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In retrospect, however, Leveson's caution seems justified. The K's 24 knot 
maximum speed was only Just sufficient for fleet work, and they found it 
difficult to move into the prescribed positions ahead of the line of battle. 
Once there, their near five minute diving time made it likely they would 
be spotted before they could submerge, and their nine knot underwater 
speed meant they could not respond to evasive action by the enemy. In 
addition, they lacked both the manoeuvrability (surface and submerged) and 
the control facilities to work with fleet without risking collision. The real 
danger of wartime operations was conclusively demonstrated when a pair of 
K class flotillas exercising with the Grand Fleet off May Island at the end 
of January 1918 lost two submarines, one of them with all hands, and had 
three damaged, in a terrible series of collisions caused by a jammed helm 
in K22 [98]. There were a number of lesser accidents, and K13 and KS 
were both lost during diving trials (the latter not until 1921). "At the end 
of the war, " wrote Vernon Haggard, "it was recognised fully... that the use 
of steam in submarines was not a sound policy. " [99] 
It was perhaps unfortunate for the Royal Navy that though steam power 
was universally condemned, the fleet submarine concept itself was not 
discredited. The K class boats never had the chance to prove themselves in 
action. They joined the fleet after Jutland, and as it became obvious the 
HSF would stay in port the Ks were detached to' operate against enemy 
submarines, either on patrol or as "interceptors" based at Scapa [100]. The 
K boats' great size made them poor anti-submarine submarines, but the 
Admiralty continued to believe they would prove relatively valuable in a 
fleet role, and thought the submarines were proof Britain "could confidently 
produce a successful boat of any size or specification asked for and that we 
have long passed the stage of experimental construction" [101]. One 
modified K class boat was completed in 1923, and three more fleet 
submarines, of the River class, were built between 1929 and 1932. The 
fleet submarine concept was not finally abandoned until the mid-1930s. 
[98] Everitt op. cit. pp. 109-152 
[99] Haggard to Admiralty 22 October 1925, Adm 1/8678/24, quoted in Henry op. cit. p. 94 
[100] On K class anti-submarine orders, see Beatty Operations Order AA 4 June 1917, 
Adm 137/1925 fol. 21 and Madden order Operation Z9 June 1917, ibid fol. 24 
[101] 'Submarine administration' October 1921, Technical History 21 p. 6 
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On 19 November 1918 Germany began the surrender of its 176 surviving 
U-boats. The submarines were interned at Harwich under Article XXII of 
the Armistice, and 125 boats building were broken up on the stocks. 40 
German submarines were allocated to the Allied powers for use for 
propaganda purposes, but the main effect of the surrender was to give the 
Royal Navy, with its 133 boats, an unassailable advantage in numbers and 
an estimated five year lead in submarine design and development over all 
other powers [102]. 
Yet British submarine policy in the immediate post-war period was 
almost as uncertain as it had been in 1914. Two committees - the Post 
War Questions Committee and the CID 'Sub-committee to take evidence 
on the question of capital ship construction in the Royal Navy' (Bonar Law 
committee) - set up to analyse the lessons of the war and set out future 
naval policy revealed there was disagreement as to which of the six main 
types of submarine in service in 1918 should be retained, and some 
uncertainty over the future of capital ships confronted by the dual threat of 
submarines and aircraft. And - since Britain's finances were in such 
disarray the RN would have to be drastically slimmed, and U-boats had 
proven themselves thoroughly efficient commerce destroyers - the issues 
were further clouded by the Admiralty's initial determination to have the 
submarine abolished. 
In January 1919 the Board decided to press the naval powers for "a 
universal prohibition against the building of submarines in future", hoping at 
the very least to obtain an undertaking not to use boats in an illegal 
commerce war. It was prepared to order the scrapping of Britain's 
submarine force to achieve this aim [103]. 
The Admiralty had the support of the US Navy, which was strongly in 
favour of strengthening international law as it applied to war at sea, but 
the British and Americans eventually decided not to press the issue in the 
face of the combined opposition of the other allies, who argued the 
[102) Marder, DSF V. 258-9; Henry op. cit. p. 56. The first British post-war scheme 
called for 94 submarines of the E, G, H21, J, K, L, M and R classes to remain in front 
line service, while 14 more would be placed in reserve. 'Post-war fleet' 24 January 1919, 
Adm 1/8549/18 fol. 20. 
[103) Marder, DSF V. 257; David Henry, 'British submarine policy 1918-1939' in Bryan 
Ranft, ed., Technical change and British naval policy 1860-1939 (London 1977) p. 80 
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submarine was a legitimate weapon of war that happened to have been 
used illegally and pointed out the abolition of such a cheap but potent 
weapon would unfairly favour the major naval powers. Even the British 
naval staff argued that the war had shown the RN needed submarines for 
reconnaissance and to guard its bases, particularly those in the Far East, as 
well as to provide training for the anti-submarine forces needed in case an 
enemy ever began to build up its submarine strength again. At the 1921 
Washington Naval Conference, therefore, Britain asked only that the powers 
agree to keep construction of underwater craft within specific limits. Fierce 
opposition from the French delegates prevented an agreement, although 
under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles the Germans were denied the 
right to build any more U-boats [104]. 
The great lesson of the submarine war, so far as the Admiralty was 
concerned, was that the submarine was indeed the 'weapon of the weaker 
power', of less use to the RN than it was to its enemies and a far greater 
threat to commerce than it was to the surface fleet. Not a single 
Dreadnought had been sunk by submarines during the Great War, and 
though the development of underwater warfare had severely limited 
deployment of the Grand Fleet, it had never been driven from the seas 
and had continued to operate offensively until November 1918. Moreover 
the substantial increase in the number of U-boats sunk in 1917 and 1918 
- 132, compared to the 46 destroyed in the first two and a half years of 
the war - suggested that the submarine might now be tamed, if not 
defeated. 
Beatty, who commanded the Grand Fleet for the last two years of the 
war before going to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord, believed developments 
in anti-submarine warfare - and in particular the promising ASDIC echo 
location system - meant "the submarine menace should be kept within 
measurable limits in any future war. " Furthermore, he reminded his 
colleagues, the Germans had turned to submarine warfare only in 
desperation: 
"It cannot too clearly be realised that the Germans were forced to 
undertake the laborious task of attacking our vessels with the 
submarine on account of their inability to employ surface vessels which 
[104) Ranft, op. cit. pp. 81-4,92,103; Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of British naval 
mastery (London 1983) pp. 268-75 
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would have accomplished the same amount of work in a far shorter 
time... it is the Admiralty view that the surface ship still retains an 
incomparable advantage over the submarine. If, therefore, the 
command of the sea which has been the outstanding principle of our 
Naval Policy for the past 300 years is to be maintained, it will be 
necessary to continue to rely upon surface vessels. It follows, then, 
that the Capital Ship, which represents the most powerful expression of 
tactical effect, is also necessary. " [105) 
Beatty's opinions were echoed in the general conclusions of the Bonar 
Law committee, which met on a number of occasions in 1920 to take 
evidence on the question of capital ship construction, and ruled that "there 
is little to support the contention that the capital ship has been rendered 
obsolescent by developments in the use of submarines and aircraft, but that 
no limit can be put on the possibilities of achievement in this direction in 
the near future. " [106] Every serving officer questioned by the committee 
was adamant that capital ship construction should continue, and most 
thought new vessels should be laid down immediately. The evidence of a 
minority of retired officers - including Hall and Rear Admiral Charles de 
Bartolome, the Controller at the time of the Armistice - who thought the 
submarine and the aircraft had rendered capital ships obsolescent, was 
disregarded. Churchill described the minority group as "officers who have 
left the service without attaining high command... and who are in some 
cases embittered and in all cases without responsibility. " [107] 
Hall's argument - that aircraft and submarines could do the job of a 
capital ship, but more cheaply - was essentially that advanced by 
proponents of the submarine among second ranking naval powers since at 
least the time of Robert Fulton. It recognised, as many British officers 
were unwilling to, that the Royal Navy could no longer hope to maintain 
any sort of two-power standard and would henceforth have to fight to 
retain naval parity with the USN, and underlined the former Commodore's 
faith in the wartime achievements of the submarine branch. 
[105] Beatty paper 'The retention of the capital ship' 14 December 1920, Adm 116/3610 
[106] Report of the CID 'Sub-committee on the question of the capital ship in the Royal 
Navy' 29 December 1920, ibid 
[107] Churchill note 13 February 1921, ibid 
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In his evidence to the Post War Questions Committee, Hall agreed that 
all six major classes of submarine - the patrol, coastal, fleet, monitor, 
minelaying and cruiser types - would find a place in the ideal navy, but 
argued that the general purpose patrol boat was most important to the RN 
as it could also work as a coastal or minelaying submarine. The fleet type, 
though a success, was highly specialised and no more than one flotilla need 
be retained. The former Commodore (S) recommended the scrapping of 
other specialised boats, such as the R class, with the proviso that one or 
two of each type be retained for experimental work, and was enthusiastic 
about the performance of the H, L and M class boats - the first two 
'perfect' patrol types and the last a monitor submarine developed from the 
K class but fitted with diesels and a single 12" gun [108]. "The monitor 
type is the most valuable and most successful submarine we have ever had; 
it has a very large radius of action and is extraordinarily good under 
water, " he concluded [109). 
Hall's evidence reflected the ambiguous results obtained by British boats 
in the Great War. Patrol submarines had been an obvious success, 
contributing to what the Admiralty described as 'the most effective blockade 
in history' and helping to restrict the movements of the German surface 
fleet, while the limited range and endurance of older types, plus their 
inability to intercept raiding forces, made it seem unwise to persist with 
purely coastal designs. But British torpedoes - designed for optimum short 
range performance rather than efficiency at the longer ranges more usual in 
wartime [110] - had failed on numerous occasions and had never delivered 
a knock-out blow to a modern capital ship. Wartime submarines had been 
given the maximum possible bow torpedo armament in an attempt to 
compensate, but the 12" gun of an M class submarine offered more range 
than a torpedo and could be used from a semi-submerged position to 
attack enemy merchant vessels and small warships. The shell could not be 
spotted or avoided as a torpedo could be. Hall even anticipated its use 
against enemy battlecruisers, though he admitted that "a single 12 inch shell 
will not stop them. " [111] 
[108) See Henry, British submarine development and policy 1918-1939 (unpublished 
London University PhD thesis, 1976) pp-42-8; Jameson op. cit. pp. 159-60 
[109] Hall evidence to the Post War Questions Committee nd (1920), Adm 11612060 
fols. 726-38 
[1101 Hall evidence, ibid fol. 730. On the British blockade, see Admiralty paper 'The 
British naval effort 1914-1918' 24 December 1918, Adm 1/8547/336 pp. 6,9 
1111) Hall evidence, ibid fol. 737; HMS Vernon annual report 1917, Adm 187/37 pp. 24-5. 
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The principal drawbacks of the M class design - the difficulty of 
guaranteeing a hit from a single shell, the fact that a hit above the 
waterline could not match the devastation caused by a torpedo, and the 
semi-submerged submarine's vulnerability to a counter attack - were never 
exposed in action. Nor were the faulty tactics of the fleet submarine, at its 
most vulnerable operating in close formation in support of a fleet and 
unlikely, with its five minute diving time, ever to get into position early 
enough to attack an enemy formation from beneath the surface. 
Even the benefit of hindsight does not appear to have helped naval 
officers to appreciate the difficulties submarines created when operating with 
the surface fleet. Both the Battle of the Heligoland Bight and the 
so-called Battle of May Island demonstrated not only that underwater craft 
risked being accidentally rammed by surface units manouvring at high speed, 
but also that they actively disrupted operations because they were frequently 
impossible to distinguish from enemy U-boats [112]. Equally importantly, 
high speed surface actions gave submarines little chance to make the sort of 
deliberate attacks most likely to bring success. Four years of war proved 
nothing more decisively than that underwater craft were weapons of 
opportunity whose low submerged speed gave them little chance of making 
a second attack if their first was unsuccessful. 
Although submarines might - in theory at least - make some small 
contribution to the success of a fleet action, their tactical value was 
altogether less significant than their influence on the strategy of the naval 
war. British patrol flotillas were largely responsible for keeping the High 
Sea Fleet in port and maintaining a blockade that not only guaranteed 
Allied supply lines against enemy surface forces but also had a devastating 
long-term effect on the economies of the Central Powers. In addition, 
British and German submarines exercised a 'moral effect' so potent, so 
restrictive, that the Great War at sea was absolutely distinct from any naval 
war that had preceded it. 
Although Hall's flotillas had little chance of equalling the impact made 
by German U-boats, the achievements of British submarines should not be 
under-estimated. They exercised considerable influence not just on the 
main campaign in the North Sea, but also in the Baltic and the 
I 
[112] Ranft op. cit. p. 91; Richard Compton Hall, Submarine warfare: monsters and midgets 
(Poole 1985) pp. 31-43 
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Mediterranean. They helped to prolong the Gallipoli campaign and offered 
considerable assistance to the Russians. Without wishing to denigrate the 
efforts of the Russian Baltic Fleet, which is rarely treated fairly by Western 
historians, it is not too much to suggest that the nine boats of the British 
Baltic flotilla had more effect on the naval war than any similarly-sized 
group of Allied, and perhaps also German, warships. 
In the absence of more effective anti-submarine weapons, British boats 
also made an impressive contribution to the desperate war against the 
U-boats. Despite the handicap of inadequate detection apparatus and poor 
quality torpedoes, they sank 17 enemy craft for the loss of only five of 
their own number. Perhaps more significantly, the moral effect of the 
Trade's anti-submarine patrols contributed something to the mental strain 
on U-boat crews, particularly in 1917 and 1918. 
The submarine branch's contribution to the war effort was nevertheless 
secondary to that of the surface fleet. Both the Admiralty and the public 
gave the Grand Fleet credit for the British victory at sea in World War 1, 
and despite the rapid development of the aircraft carrier the battleship 
remained the principal instrument of naval policy in the 1920s. The 
submarine was peripheral to RN strategy, and according to David Henry, 
"the Submarine Service was faced with the obstacle of a far greater 
restraint on resources for construction and development than any other 
category of warship" in the inter-war period [113]. 
Restrictions were inevitable because the Royal Navy failed to integrate 
the submarine fully into its strategic thought either during or after World 
War I. Some lessons had been learned. The Admiralty was forcibly 
convinced of the true radius of action of the modern boat - one German 
coastal craft of the tiny 127/142 tonne UB class reached the Azores in the 
course of a 33-day cruise, and overseas submarines operated successfully 
off the east coast of the United States [114] - and confidence in the 
seakeeping and endurance of the latest types fuelled RN willingness to 
depend on submarines to defend its Far Eastern interests from the 1920s. 
The importance of personnel, as well as materiel, also emerged clearly 
from the war, as Hall had always insisted it would. Although 150 British 
boats served in the Great War, sixteen captains accounted for all the 
I 
(1131 Henry op. cit. p. 80 
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warships sunk by Royal Navy submarines, while 22 of the 400 U-boat 
commanders accounted for over 60 per cent of Allied losses of merchant 
vessels [115]. 
The qualities of the British diesel engined overseas type were 
recognised, and from 1918 there were no more experiments with foreign 
boats. The overseas submarine was the only type of underwater craft to be 
consistently developed by the RN between the wars, and the S, T and U 
class boats that formed the backbone of the submarine branch in World 
War II - though double-hulled and incorporating the best features of 
continental designs - were recognisably the descendants of the E and L 
class craft of the Great War [116]. The wartime success of Britain's 
extemporised E class minelaying submarines also encouraged the 
development of specially designed Porpoise class minelayers [117]. 
During the inter-war period considerable effort was nevertheless devoted 
to the piecemeal development of specialised submarines - including the 
monitor and fleet types - incorporating the more desirable features of 
surface warships. None of these submarines added substantially to the 
Navy's strength in the long term and all had been abandoned by 1939. 
They were built because the RN rarely thought of the submarine as a 
distinct type of warship. The original Holland craft were 'submarine torpedo 
boats'. The Ks were 'diving destroyers', the M class 'submarine gunboats'. 
They were expected to adopt the tactics of the torpedo boat, the destroyer, 
the monitor - and this made it all too easy for the Navy to forget that 
underwater craft had unique potential of their own. In 1918 and 1939, as 
much as in 1900 or 1853, the submarine posed more questions for British 
policy than it answered. 
British submarine policy 1901-1918 
The British submarine branch developed extremely rapidly between 1901 and 
1918. It began the period with six Hollands, a hundred men and a minor 
(1151 Hall report 30 August 1916, Adm 137/2077 fol. 68; Hall introduction to WG Carr, 
By guess and by God: the story of the British submarines in the war (London nd (1930)) 
p. ix 
[116] Henry op. cit. p. 106 
[1171 Ibid pp. 155-6,179-80 
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place in Royal Navy's scheme of coastal defence. It ended it as the world's 
largest submarine service, with 133 boats, 6,000 men and a considerable 
lead in design and development over all other powers. The latest types 
were more than three times faster and no less than seventeen times the 
size of HM Submarine Torpedo Boat No. 1. 
British submarine policy did not evolve as quickly as the British 
submarine. Underwater craft seemed to have no place in the traditional 
offensive strategy of the Royal Navy, which called for mobility and the 
maximum offensive potential, and they had originally been developed as a 
means of attacking the dominant naval power * and not to bolster the 
position of a navy dependent on a large surface fleet. Although enthusiasts, 
such as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, HO Arnold-Forster, 
argued that "the submarine cannot correctly be called the 'weapon of the 
weaker power', because the Power that possesses it, necessarily becomes the 
stronger power" [118), the majority of naval officers did not understand 
underwater craft and showed little enthusiasm for them at the turn of the 
century. Some doubted that the RN needed submarines, and most thought 
of them as defensive weapons of limited range. 
The Navy had very little time to come to grips with the modern 
submarine. It had to fight a war only twelve years after its first boat was 
commissioned. The Germans did not take delivery of U1 until 1906, and 
put their first long-range offensive types into service as late as 1912. 
Neither the French navy, with its chaotic, ever-changing submarine policy, 
nor the pioneering Russian and American fleets, seemed to have much to 
teach the Royal Navy about underwater warfare, and the Admiralty had to 
rely upon its own - flawed - manoeuvres and exercises to assess the 
submarine. 
It was difficult to exercise boats with the fleet. Rigid safety rules were 
introduced after the Al was sunk during the 1904 Spithead trials, and 
submarines did not participate in the manoeuvres of 1905,1906,1907 and 
1909. When they did exercise with surface ships, they were accompanied by 
tenders flying a red flag, and had to display two feet of periscope at all 
time. If a submarine came within 1,000 yards of a surface ship, she had to 
surface. The naval manoeuvres, which were the only occasions on which 
I 
(118] Arnold-Forster to Selborne 8 August 1901, Arnold-Forster papers Add. Mss. 50294 
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the majority of officers encountered submarines, thus gave a very distorted 
impression of their capabilities. 
A number of additional factors combined to complicate assessment. The 
submarine branch was a closed service, commanded for its first ten years 
by individualists who gladly took the opportunity to develop a 
semi-autonomous force with little contact with the surface fleet. The 
Admiralty - which had to deal the emergence of a new enemy, Germany, 
and the creation of entirely new classes of battleship and cruiser - rarely 
interfered with the development of submarine design and tactics, and Keyes, 
instructed in 1910 to "bring the submarine service into close touch and 
co-operation with the fleet" found himself in command of "a highly 
selected body of officers and men, credited in the Navy generally with an 
inclination to regard themselves as almost a seperate service. " [119] By 
entrusting the development of materiel and tactics to the technical 
specialists of the Trade, the Royal Navy effectively ensured that its 
submarine service would be technology-driven rather than strategy-driven 
for the first ten years of its existence. 
Most of the British submarines available in 1914 betrayed their origins 
as coast defence boats developed by a branch more concerned with 
technical problems than strategic planning. The size of the C, D and E 
classes was limited because they were expected to operate in shallow coastal 
waters, and performance - particularly diving time - reflected the 
expectation that submarines would work in friendly rather than enemy 
waters. The results of highly artificial torpedo firing-trials suggested that a 
substantial proportion of hits could be expected, and British boats therefore 
mounted only a limited number of torpedo tubes. The Vickers diesel - 
probably the single most important technological advance made before the 
war - was adopted because it was safer and more efficient than the old 
petrol engines, and not because it also offered substantially improved 
endurance. Each of main classes of submarine, from the Hollands to the E 
class was, in short, was a multi-purpose type designed to take advantage 
of the latest developments in technology rather than to fill a specific 
strategic role. 
Not until Roger Keyes took command of the submarine branch in 1910 
did the service switch from being technology-led to being strategy-led. 
1 [1191 Keyes NM I pp. 23-5 
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Keyes's determination to experiment with foreign designs, and in particular 
his attempts to produce a workable fleet submarine with the surface speed 
to operate ahead of British battle squadrons, helped to integrate the 
submarine branch with the fleet. It also pushed design to its limits and 
diverted attention from the overseas type, which was criticially important in 
maintaining a blockade of German ports and fulfilling vital patrol and 
reconnaissance roles in enemy-controlled waters. Although Keyes developed 
his own patrol type, the G class submarine, he cut back sharply on the 
proven E boats in favour of placing orders for what his predecessor, Hall, 
termed "freaks and coastals" [120]. 
With the exception of the G class itself, none of the submarines 
ordered by Keyes proved of much use to the Navy in World War 1, and 
the K class fleet submarine - developed with the encouragement of an 
Admiralty obsessed with the idea of operating underwater craft in 
conjunction with the surface fleet - never came into action. Because Keyes 
and the naval staff down-played the dangers of working submarines close 
to large surface units, and because the Ks were both too large and too 
slow when submerged to be truly effective, the fleet submarine concept was 
pursued for years with little chance of real success, and at the expense of 
the overseas submarine programme. 
Keyes was able to impose his own strategic ideas on the submarine 
service both because he had the full backing of most of the branch's junior 
officers and the support of key figures at the Admiralty, and because 
formulation of policy depended, particularly in the early years of the 
service, chiefly on the assessments made by submarine officers themselves. 
Bacon's reports of 31 May 1903 and 16 January 1904, which concluded 
that the submarine should operate as a coast defence weapon, formed the 
basis of the Admiralty's submarine strategy until 1908-11, when the 
development of the D and E class 'overseas' submarines suggested other 
uses for underwater craft. The Admiralty war staff's 1914 decision to use 
submarines to maintain a blockade of the enemy coast - giving the 
Germans one of the major strategical surprises of the war - did not 
altogether find favour with the officers of the submarine branch, who 
understood the limitations of their existing boats and still harboured doubts. 
about their reliability. 
The British submarine blockade - though neither 'close', continuous nor 
1 (120] Hall to Fisher 26 April 1914, FP 803 
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complete - did exercise a decisive 'moral effect' on the activities of the 
German fleet. The submarine's elusiveness gave it a psychological value that 
far outweighed its actual effectiveness, particularly in the early years of the 
century. Bacon noted that "if no boat is sighted, the terible danger exists 
of being attacked by an unseen enemy. If one boat is sighted it is merely 
an assurance that others are near. No ship will, in Naval wars of the 
future, be at sea without some definite purpose in view. " [121] 
Nevertheless, the tendency of non-specialists to think of submarines as 
defensive weapons helped to blind them to the substantial endurance of the 
more modern classes. Germany's UI had a theoretical radius of action of 
750 miles, and the latest type available in 1914 - the U27 class - one of 
10,000 miles [122]. British experience suggested, however, that crew 
endurance of the uncomfortable conditions on board was restricted to three 
to four days in a coastal submarine and no more than a week in the larger 
overseas types. The Admiralty therefore doubted that U-boats would be 
able to operate effectively off the British east coast, and certainly did not 
expect to encounter them off northern Scotland or in the Atlantic. This, 
together with the financial constraints imposed by a government forced to 
pay for the dramatic expansion of the Grand Fleet, caused the RN to take 
few precautions against submarine attacks on British bases. A similar 
tendency to judge the submarine on what it was, rather than on what it 
might become, contributed to the Admiralty's failure to develop effective 
anti-submarine weapons and tactics before 1914. 
Neither the British nor their enemies expected submarines to be used in 
a war against commerce. They were too small to carry a prize crew, and 
too slow and vulnerable to risk a counter attack by their intended victims. 
International law forbade them to attack without warning. Only desperation, 
and disgust at Britain's own flouting of the law of 'stop and search', 
prompted the Imperial German Navy to launch its unrestricted submarine 
war on commerce in 1915. 
Britain's first real fleet submarine, laid down in the same year, met the 
RN's long standing demand for a seagoing torpedo vessel. Strategically, the 
K class boats were what the Navy had always thought submarines should 
be: large, fast, seaworthy (after a fashion), and capable of participating in 
a decisive battle. Tactically, though, they were a nonsense, combining the 
I 
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worst defects of the submarine as a type. Though fast, they were not fast 
enough to work far ahead of the fleet. Though well-armed, they took so 
long to dive they sacrificed the advantage of surprise. With their limited 
bridge and control room facilities, they were almost as likely to torpedo 
friendly vessels as the enemy. Worst of all they were slow and unwieldy 
when submerged, and could not work with a fleet without running a serious 
risk of collision. In 1915, the Navy finally produced the submarine it had 
always wanted - and found it wanted something else. 
The submarine did, however, exert a decisive influence on other areas 
of naval strategy. It influenced the development of a new class of fast 
capital ship, the battlecruiser, which Fisher believed was the only major 
surface unit capable of evading _a submarine torpedo attack. Its performance 
in the manoeuvres of 1912 and 1913 prompted the Admiralty to develop 
tactics for screening the battlefleet with destroyers, fundamentally altering 
the TBD's strategic role and limiting the Grand Fleet's radius of action to 
that of its escorts. Most significantly of all, fear of falling into a 
'submarine trap' forced the commanders of both the Grand Fleet and the 
High Sea Fleet to manoeuvre with extreme caution. The southern half of 
the North Sea became a naval nomansland, festooned with mines and 
infested with torpedo craft, and the war at sea developed into a stalemate 
to the benefit of Great Britain but to the detriment of morale in the 
Grand Fleet. "There can, " wrote the First Sea Lord, Rosslyn Wemyss, "be 
no naval officer who does not see the end of this war with a feeling of 
incompleteness. " [123] 
Scott Russell's submarine, built in 1855, was little more than a death 
trap: oar powered, open-bottomed, practically unarmed. The latest 
submarines available to the Royal Navy in 1918 - those of the L50 class 
- were formidable boats by any standards, displacing 890/1070 tons, 
capable of 17.5/10.5 knots and armed with six 21" torpedo tubes. They had 
been created in the space of only 16 years by a Navy with no real 
practical experience of submarine boats, but by one that had had a 
submarine policy since the mid 1850s. Only the continuity of naval policy, 
and the quality of RN personnel, can explain the remarkable development 
of the British submarine service after 1900. 




Robert Fulton`s British submarine designs, 1804-06 
The introductory section to section 1 dealt very briefly with Robert Fulton 
and his negotiations with the French and British navies early in the 
nineteenth century. Fulton's exploits, and the details of his advanced 
submarine designs, have been well documented by a number of historians 
- but despite the Admiralty's apparently categorical rejection of the 
inventor's plans, at least one historian has suggested it is possible that the 
British did build a boat to his design, at Lymington late in the summer of 
1804 [1]. 
Since Fulton's most recent biographer asserts that the RN finally 
discarded his proposed submarine some time in June of that year [2], 
evidence for the existence of a British submarine at this date remains 
confined to passing references to 'plungers' (tentatively equated with 
'plunging boats') in the correspondence of Admiral Lord Keith. In one 
passage the distinguished naval officer Sir Home Popham writes from 
Lymington Creek, whence he had been sent to supervise preparations for a 
raid on the French invasion fleet: "My Lord, you are so well aware of the 
difficulties which generally arise in proposing any new mechanical operation, 
particularly in our dockyards, that you will not be surprised to learn that I 
could not get a plunger made until Saturday morning" [3]. In another, he 
[1] Christopher Lloyd, The Keith papers, III (London 1955) p. 7 
[2] Wallace Hutcbeon, Robert Fulton: pioneer of undersea warfare (Annapolis 1981) p. 71 
(3) Home Popham to Keith 12 August 1804, cited in Lloyd op. cit. p. 85 
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states that he "found it much better to row the plungers with two pairs of 
sculls" [4]. 
It is, thus, apparent that while Home Popham's 'plungers' were boats of 
some kind, it is unlikely in the extreme they were submarine boats. The 
speed of construction suggested by the first passage (notwithstanding 
complaints about dockyard delays) is against it, as is the clear reference to 
oars. (All four submarines designed by Fulton in the period 1797-1813 
used screw propulsion. ) From the context of Home Popham's first letter, it 
appears more likely that 'plungers' were the cutters used to deliver Fulton's 
'New Curiosities' (mines) during the so-called Catamaran Expedition to 
Boulogne on 2-3 October 1804, and which the inventor later specifically 
described as "rowboat[s]... clinker-built" [5]. 
The most recent research into Fulton's stay in Britain has nevertheless 
uncovered the inventor's plans for two successors to the Nautilus. The first 
of these boats, a tiny one-man submarine to be called the Messenger, was 
designed during the inventor's first months in Britain. She would have 
carried only one man, and in Fulton's sketches bears some resemblance to 
the Holland I of 1878. A much more sophisticated second boat was never 
named but was designed to sustain a crew of six for up to 20 days at sea. 
At 35x10x8' she would have been rather larger than the Nautilus, and 
Fulton's sketches show her carrying two sails. She was evidently designed 
for optimum sea-keeping on the surface, and in side view looks something 
like one of Simon Lake's much later submarines [6]. Indeed the inventor's 
plans suggest that his 1806 craft was probably more sophisticated than any 
submarine designed in Britain before the mid-1850s. 
1 
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'On His Majesty's Secret Service': Tom Johnson and the first British 
submarine, c. 1812-1828 
There is a story that one of Robert Fulton's British collaborators was the 
privateer captain and Channel pilot Thomas Johnson [1]. Johnson 
(1772-1839), a Hampshire man familiarly known as 'the Famous Smuggler' 
in his day, now inhabits the shadowland between folklore and verifiable 
history. His association with Fulton is folklore, though there may well be 
truth in it; his interest in submarines, however, must be regarded as 
established fact. 
A contemporary source [2] suggests that 'Captain' Johnson first 
approached the British authorities with the plans for a submarine in 1812, 
demonstrating a clockwork model of the proposed boat to them. Something 
of the sort must have occurred, for by October 1813 the smuggler had 
armed himself with letters of security from the Admiralty, the Army and 
the Home Office, and was formally employed "on His Majesty's Secret 
Service on submarine, and other useful experiments by Order. " [3] 
Captain Johnson's real authority came not from the Admiralty but from 
Horseguards Parade. In the autumn of 1813 he obtained an interview with 
the Commander-in-Chief, Frederick Duke of York, receiving his verbal 
sanction to go ahead with the project. Johnson had less success with the 
ever-sceptical Royal Navy; his meeting with Lord Henry Paulet ended on a 
[1] Tom Pocock, 'The Chelsea submarine', Chelsea Society report 1984 pp. 40-5 
[2] John Brown, Historical gallery of criminal portraiture (2 voll, Manchester 1823), II, 
495 
[3] Security from Lord Sidmouth 15 October 1813, enclosed in Johnson to Admiralty, nd 
(? July 1815), PRO J letter no. 206, Adm 1/4783 
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dispiriting note with the information "that their Lordships could not agree 
with his proposal, and that they would not give Mr Johnson any further 
trouble upon the business. " [4] In 1815 the projector was reminded by 
letter that he had "no authority from their Lordships for carrying out... 
experiments... or for incurring any expense thereon. " [5) 
The Famous Smuggler decided to press ahead nevertheless. Securing the 
help of an engineer on High Holborn, he designed a submarine "in shape 
much like a porpoise. " She was 27 feet long, with a beam of 5 feet, and 
was 5 feet deep towards each pointed end; wrought iron armour covered 
the hull, protecting a six foot square inner chamber, lined with cork and 
wood, which housed the 2-man crew. 
Like Fulton's submarine, the new vessel was propelled by a collapsible 
sail while on the surface; dived, however, she was to be driven along by 
oars. Mention of air-pipes and of armour "proof against 12-pounders at 
point-blank range" suggests that her submersible qualities were rather 
limited. Captain Johnson armed her with a gunpowder mine which he 
probably intended to drive against his target's bottom with the auger 
favoured by Bushnell and Fulton, but which may at times have been 
mounted on a spar. The boat's submerged endurance was estimated at 12 
hours [6]; the inventor had had her fitted with cylinders of compressed air 
[7]. 
The submarine was built on the Thames near Wallingford. She was well 
advanced in 1814 and nearly complete a year later. In July 1815 the owner 
"reported being ready with it for experiment", and took the opportunity to 
request an advance payment of C2,000[8]. 
It was, in fact, the lure of money that prompted the whole project. 
Captain Johnson seems to have got wind of the fabulous payments and 
assurances made to Robert Fulton, and hoped to secure a similar fortune 
for himself. Johnson's patron the Duke of York had been in close touch 
with the American submariner, and was probably aware both of the 
[4] Johnson to Admiralty nd (? July 1815); and minute by Paulet nd (? July 1815). ibid 
[5] Admiralty to Johnson 8 July 1815, Adm 2/919 
[6] This and the above details from the Naval Chronicle (1814) p. 287; Brown op. cit.; 
Pocock op. cit. 
[7] Arthur Morris, 'A boom in submarines', Nautical Magazine 71 (Sept-Oct 1902) p. 563 
[8] Johnson to Admiralty nd (? July 1815), Adm 1/4783 
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Admiralty's agreement to pay him a salary of £200 a month, plus £40,000 
for the first ship destroyed by his system and half the supposed value of 
each subsequent vessel sent to the bottom [9], and of Fulton's own demand 
to Pitt and Castlereagh (9 August 1805) for £100,000 to secure his future 
silence [10]. Tom Johnson's own plan was therefore to build and test 
another submarine: "the effects being proved a report to be made thereon, 
so as to ground an application to Parliament for a remuneration of 
£100,000, or such sum as may be judged adequate in proportion to its 
importance. " [11] 
That the submarine was ever built is, in retrospect, rather astonishing; 
that the authorities eventually paid for her is little short of remarkable. 
Johnson raised the necessary money by mortgaging his property, hoping to 
be handsomely rewarded for his trouble. He had, however, misread the 
situation, and the outcome of the business was for a long time 
problematical. 
Johnson was ultimately able to take advantage of the sort of 
communications failure not uncommon in wartime. What probably happened 
was this: in 1813 Britain and America were at war. Fulton had returned to 
the United States and was devoting his energies to well-publicised 
experiments in torpedo warfare. Knowing this, and possessing few details of 
a system reputed to be highly effective, the Duke of York gave his general 
approval to the smuggler's suggestion that he develop some sort of 
counter-measure or counterpart. (If Johnson could prove he had himself 
worked with Fulton, his task would have been easier, of course. ) Armed 
with the Duke's security, Johnson next visited the Admiralty and the Home 
Office, where production of Frederick's note was sufficient to provide him 
with similar documents from those departments. (The latter two securities 
are dated 15 October to the Duke's authority of the 14th. ) 
It is quite possible that none of the signatories intended to pay for the 
Famous Smuggler's experiments - perhaps all assumed that he would meet 
the costs himself, perhaps each believed that another department had taken 
responsibility. But whatever the truth, the project was undoubtedly a 
[9] Fulton's agreement with the Admiralty 20 July 1804, Adm 1/5121/22 
(10] Wallace Hutcheon, Robert Fulton: pioneer of undersea warfare (Annapolis 1981) 
Pp. 90-1 
[11] Johnson to Admiralty nd (? July 1815), Adm 1/4783 
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maritime one and the Admiralty's letter denying liability (based as it was 
on a verbal warning to Johnson) had no legal force when set against the 
inventor's written proof that he was employed "by His Majesty's 
Government". 
Faced with this awkward situation, the Navy had no option but to settle 
the matter as quickly and as cheaply as possible. In January 1820, Sir 
George Cockburn joined a committee appointed to examine the submarine 
and state its "opinion of the actual cost of the said vessel. " [12] (Johnson 
had, presumably, submitted an obviously-inflated bill. ) The Sea Lord 
assessed the boat's value at £4,538, and this sum was paid to the inventor 
-a portion of the total being retained until the smuggler returned some 
government stores. There is absolutely no evidence that the Admiralty 
seriously considered the submarine as a warship; the Navy's real opinion of 
the whole project is best suggested by the close scrutiny given to a 
subsequent invoice for the floating cradle used to transport the boat down 
the Thames to London; this bill was shaved from £216 7s. 6d to £197 11s. 
6d. before it too was quietly settled [13]. Johnson's total remuneration 
therefore amounted to £. 4,735 11s. 6d. -a far cry from the £100,000 he 
had hoped for, but a very respectable sum for the time. 
The Famous Smuggler had no real cause for complaint; there is no 
record that the Admiralty paid any other projector more than his incidental 
expenses in the whole period under review (1793-1900). To Johnson too 
belongs the signal honour of being the first Briton to construct a submarine 
[14]. For this alone he deserves to be remembered. 
The evidence suggests that Tom Johnson retained an interest in the 
possibilities of submarine warfare (military and commercial) after his 
account was settled in April 1820. Eight years later we find the 56 
1121 'Report from Sir George Cockburn ... ' 10 January 1820, digest cut 59-8, Adm 
12/198. The original report has, sadly, disappeared. 
1131 Johnson to Admiralty 28 March 1820 and enclosures, PRO J letter no. 48, Adm 
1/4787; Croker minute 3 May 1820, ibid 
[14] Before assessing other contenders for the honour, it is necessary to define the term 
'submarine'. This I take to mean a vessel capable of submergence and of independent 
movement when submerged. By these criteria the vessels of Nathaniel Symons (1747) and 
John Day (1774) were not submarines, since they were capable of no more than 
submerging and (sometimes) of then returning to the surface. Cornelius Drebbel, who is 
traditionally said to have built a sumbersible rowing boat in London c. 1620, was a 
Dutchman. For further details of these and other projects see (eg) William Jameson, The 
most formidable thing: the story of the submarine from its earliest days to the end of 
World War I (London 1965) pp. 20-6. On Drebbel, see Alex Roland, Submarine warfare 
in the age of sail (Bloomington. Indiana 1976) pp. 18-31; typescript paper in RN 
Submarine Museum A1985/26. On Day, see RN Submarine Museum pamphlet A1774/1. 
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year-old smuggler renewing his approaches to the Admiralty, to be 
rebuffed in short order [15]. And (if the secondary sources are to be 
believed), the British government was not the only one to which he offered 
his unusual services. 
There are several other accounts - invariably brief - of Johnson's 
submarine. I will summarise them here for the sake of completeness, to 
suggest the kind of material found in the popular histories, and because 
these early works are broadly accurate, although unreferenced. I have been 
unable to verify the details, but a thorough search of contemporary 
newspapers might well yield further information. There is no mention of 
Johnson or his submarine in The Annual Register, the Gentleman's 
Magazine or Palmer's Index to The Times (1812-21), although The 
Annual Register printed his obituary in 1839. 
The noted naval historian William Laird Clowes says that-the Admiralty 
did experiment with the submarine. "On one occasion, " he writes, "the 
boat, a small one, got foul, while submerged, of a ship's cable, and stuck 
fast. Johnson calmly pulled out his watch and said to his assistant: 'We 
have but two minutes and a half to live, unless we can get clear of that 
cable. I" They did get clear, "owing to Johnson's coolness and presence of 
mind. " [16] There is, unhappily, no suggestion in the Admiralty records 
that any such official trial took place. 
Clowes and others assert that French Bonapartists then became 
interested in Johnson's scheme. According to Clowes, the smuggler was 
offered £40,000 for his boat, and a further huge sum if he would use her 
to rescue Napoleon from St Helena. Colonel Cyril Field [17], who has the 
same story, describes the submarine intended for the business as a vessel 
100 feet long powered by two collapsible sails. She was intended to make 
the passage south on the surface, submerging for the last few miles to 
make a secret rendezvous on the shore. It was, allegedly, only the 
Emperor's death (5 May 1821) that put a stop to the plot [18]. 
[15] 'Mr Thomas Johnston' 19 April 1828, digest cut 59-8. Adm 12/255 
[16] William Laird Clowes, 'Submarine boats', United Services Journal II (1888-89) 
pp. 286-7 
[17] Cyril Field, The story of the submarine (London 1908) pp. 76-8 
[18] It would be interesting to know what Sir George Cockburn thought of this story. As 
Admiral commanding the Northumberland, he had been the man responsible for putting 
Napoleon on St Helena in the first place. 
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The only account we have of the fate of Johnson's craft does suggest 
that she was latterly intended for illicit purposes. According to the memoirs 
of the Chelsea artist Walter Greaves, his father remembered how "one dark 
night in November" [? 1820] the Famous Smuggler was . 
intercepted as he 
attempted to run the boat down the Thames for his French masters: 
"Anyhow she managed to get below London Bridge, the officers boarding 
her, Capt. Johnson in the meantime threatening to shoot them. But they 
payed no attention to his threats, seized her and, taking her to Blackwall, 
burned her. " [19] 
Not easily deterred, Tom Johnson continued his researches in the 1820s. 
Clowes and Field have him exhibiting another submarine - perhaps a 
model? - on the Thames in 1823. She was intended for the relief of 
Cadiz, then besieged by the French. Geoffrey Moreley, author of a work 
on smuggling in the Hampshire region [20], suggests that Johnson took a 
submarine built for Spain down the Thames to Blackwall in the spring of 
1822. The boat was lost during a diving trial after she had run into some 
submerged cables. (This seems to be a variation on the stories told by 
Greaves and Clowes, but it is impossible to say which version is more 
accurate. ) Pocock mentions other projects: a submarine for the King of 
Denmark, a boat for salvage work off the Texel or for wrecking in the 
Caribbean. These are, perhaps, no more than the sort of stories one would 
expect to spring up around as glamorous a figure as Captain Johnson, and 
it would be unwise to take them at face value. Given his difficulties with 
the Admiralty, however, it is always possible that Johnson spread the 
rumours deliberately, in the hope that the authorities would buy him off 
[21]. The Blackwall burning may have been the Admiralty's response to 
blackmail. 
[19] Pocock op. cit. 
[20] Geoffrey Morely, Smuggling in Hampshire and Dorset 1700-1850 (Newbury nd) 
pp. 33 - 41 
[21] Certainly Johnson used precisely this method in 1828, informing the Admiralty that 
two other Powers had shown strong interest in his invention, and that his poverty would 
compel him to negotiate with them if the British authorities continued to ignore him. 
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Vickers and the submarine export market, 1900-1913 
Demand for submarines increased sharply in the early years of the 
twentieth century. By 1914 underwater craft were in service with the navies 
of 18 nations, from Austria-Hungary to Turkey, half of which did not 
have the facilities to build their own boats. British companies soon 
attempted to tap the export market for submarines. 
Vickers' 1900 agreement with the Electric Boat Co. gave it the right to 
exploit Holland's patents in Europe. There was considerable initial interest 
in the design [1]; even French shipbuilders approached Vickers for details 
of the Holland type [2]. In 1901 Admiral Verhaskoi, head of the Russian 
Department of Shipbuilding, offered to send a naval officer to inspect a 
submarine built by Vickers or the EBC in exchange for a 5% 'commission' 
on boats ordered [3]. Officials from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Norway and 
Sweden all made enquiries [4]. 
From 1901 Vickers publicly rejected all approaches from foreign powers 
on the grounds that its contract with the Admiralty forbade the export of 
[1] Coded telegram, Vickers to ? EBC, 22 January 1901, Vickers papers VP 1003 fol. 7, 
Cambridge University Library 
[2] Loewe to Societe Anon. des Forges et Chantiers, Toulon, 10 January 1901 and 26 
March 1901, ibid fols. 2-3,52. The French company had built the submarine Gymnote 
in the 1880s. 
[3] Albert Vickers to Basil Zaharoff 19 April 1901, ibid fo1.77; Messrs Vickers to Rice 20 
April 1901, ibid fol. 80 
[4] Hall to Fisher 15 June 1910, Fisher papers FP 489, Churchill College Cambridge; 
Messrs Vickers to Rice 17 September 1901, VP 1003 fol. 111; see also ibid fols. 113-14, 
118,138-9 
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submarine technology while the monopoly agreement remained in force. But 
the company made several attempts to find the loophole that would enable 
it to exploit a demand that would otherwise be satisfied by German or 
French arms firms. The Admiralty was persuaded to authorise the export of 
two Holland boats and three more sets of engines to Britain's ally Japan, 
but the IJN soon began to build its own submarines. More significantly, 
Vickers' 1906 acquisition, jointly with Armstrongs, of the Whitehead torpedo 
works at Fiume gave it access to a suitable foreign yard over which the 
Admiralty had no control. In 1907 Vickers told the Norwegian navy that 
Whitehead could build it Holland submarines [5], and four years later 
Armstrongs came close to persuading the Brazilians to order boats from the 
Adriatic yard [6]. 
Unfortunately for Vickers, foreign governments found the Whitehead 
works less attractive than British shipyards. Although three prefabricated 
Holland boats shipped over from the United States were put together there 
in 1908, and later sold to the KuK Kriegsmarine, Fiume was less 
experienced and less efficient than Barrow, and even the Austro-Hungarian 
navy preferred to order extra submarines from the equally inexperienced 
Krupps [7]. The Whitehead submarine operation was wound up in August 
1913 - ostensibly because more space was needed for the manufacture of 
torpedoes, more probably because there was no likelihood of ever building 
submarines profitably there. After the war Captain Paul Koster of the 
Electric Boat Co. observed that the Austrian firm had "balled up the work 
in a horrible way" [8]. 
[5] Cf. Messrs Vickers to AE Jones of the Whitehead Company, Weymouth, 10 May 
1907, Vickers microfilm 306, Cambridge Univeristy Library 
[6) Messrs Armstrongs to Messrs Vickers 20 June 1911, VP 1007 fol. 96 
[7] Messrs Vickers to AE Jones 10 May 1907, Vickers microfilm 306; Erwin Sieche, 
'Austro-Hungarian Submarines', Warship V pp. 21-3 
18] Koster to EBC 2 August 1919, quoted in Hearings before the Special Committee 





Drafting regulations for submarines (1909) 
[Source: 'Regulations for the drafting, entry and advancement of men at the 
Home Ports', chapter III sections 97-101,7 March 1909, Adm 1/8034. ] 
[The regulations state that no men in the second class for conduct are to 
be drafted to service in yachts, cadets' training establishments, boys'. 
training establishments, submarines or torpedo craft. ] "... Special rosters for 
submarine crews are to be kept at each of the three Home Ports, and each- 
port, is to train its own men for the submarines attached to it, a complete 
crew being provided for each submarine, and in addition one spare crew 
for every three boats. 
All applications by Volunteers are to be forwarded direct to the 
Inspecting Captain of Submarines, HMS Mercury, Portsmouth, accompanied 
by the Service Certificate, Medical History Sheet, and a statement by 
Medical Officer as to the candidate's fitness... 
Submarine service is to be regarded as a closed service and is to be 
voluntary. The maximum period of submarine service at one spell, including 
training, is not to exceed five years without Admiralty approval. 
Volunteers are to be entered in the first instance for a nominal period 
of five years, but they may be allowed to revert to the general service 
before the end of such a period for purposes of advancement or other 
legitimate reasons. 
Ratings who have served five years, unless specially exempted by the 
Admiralty, must revert to the general service for at least two years or for 
a commission, after which they must return to the submarine service. 
APPENDIX 5 
The total period of service in submarines is not to exceed eight years. 
Service in submarines and in spare crews appropriated to submarines is 
to count as submarine service. Service in submarine depots and bases at 
home or abroad is not to count as submarine service. 
All advancements in the submarine service are to be made only to fill 





Distribution of British submarines January 1906 
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British submarines: performance in World War I 
(Source: Hall report 15 January 1919, Adm 137/2077 fols. 109-16) 
i) Submarines in commission 
Type On 4 August 1914 On 11 November 1918 Difference 
Coastal 42 20 -22 Overseas (patrol) 20 86 +66 




TOTALS 62 133 +71 
ii) Officers and ratings in the submarine service 
Officers 168 612 +444 
Ratings 1,250 5,446 +4,196 
TOTALS 1,418 6,058 +4,640 
(NB: This represents a percentage increase of 427% in the number of 
submariners in the service. The respective figures for officers and 
ratings are: Officers 364%; ratings 436%). 
iii) Officers and ratings killed 
1914-1918: Officers 126 
Ratings 1,048 
TOTAL 1,174 
(NB: These casualties are equivalent to 83% of the men serving in submarines in 
August 1914, or 19.4% of the men serving in November 1918. As one would expect 
the proportion of officers and ratings killed was fairly similar; the casualty 
figures represent 20.5% of the officers serving at the armistice, and 17.3% of 
the men. ) 
APPENDIX 7 




Armoured cruiser 1 
Light cruiser 2 
Destroyer 8 
Gun vessels 4 
Submarines 20 
Armed auxiliaries 7 
Transports & unarmed 
auxiliaries 18 
Merchant steamers 50 
Sailing ships 207 
TOTALS 319 
m 
Hit Captured Total 
4 - 6 
2 - 2 
- - 1 
2 - 4 
2 - 10 
1 - 5 
1 - 21 
3 2 12 
4 - 22 
4 3 57 
7 7 207 
23 5 347 
(NB: These are the figures calculated by Hall. I believe they are quite 
accurate, but have not checked them thoroughly. We now know (see appendix 
8) that only 17 U-boats were sunk by British submarines. However, since it 
is so difficult to tell whether a submarine has dived or gone down after 
being hit, the discrepancy does not necessarily indicate that other figures 
are inaccurate. Hall gave no figures for sailing ships hit or captured, 




British submarine losses during the Great War 
(Source: Beneath the Waves: a history of British submarine losses 
1904-1971 by AS Evans, London 1986) 
Enemy action 
Gunfire (German) 1 
(Turkish) 2 
Nets (Turkish) 1 
Mines 5 
Probable mine and 'unknown' 18 
Submarines (German) 5 
Aircraft (Austrian) 1 
Total 33 
Other causes 
Aircraft (French)* 1 
Ships (British)* 6 
Submarines (British)** 4 
Accident 3 
Stranding 4 
Scuttled during Russian Revolution 7 
Blown up at Zeebrugge I 
Total 26 
GRAND TOTAL 26 
* Mistaken identity 
** Collisions, mostly during practice attacks and exercises 
APPENDIX 8 
German submarine losses during the Great War 




Nets and mine-nets 2 
Sweeps 2 
Depth charge 27 
Mine 47 
Probable mine and 'unknown' 23 
Submarines (British) 17 
Submarines (French) 1 
Aircraft (British) 1 
Total 159 
Other causes 
German mines 10 




GRAND TOTAL 179 
w 
[Note: I have not broken down losses in exactly the same way as Grant, 
and in some cases have used my discretion in deciding from his evidence 
what caused a submarine's loss. In case of sinkings caused by multiple 
attacks, I have selected the weapon which seems to have delivered the coup 
de grace. ] 
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home defence in the period to 1906). The records of the relevant home 
ports and stations, and of the Controller's Office (not always preserved) are 
also useful. Several significant reports, including some from the ICS, can be 
found under 'Captains A-Z'. 
There are six or so boxes per year in the Adm 1 series in the early 
1850s, building up to sixty or more for the early years of the twentieth 
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The 'Foreign Office' papers, which are of great importance for the 
Victorian period, seem hardly to have been touched. 
Boxes for the period 1800-1919 were examined. Before 1898 and for 
the 1914-1918 period, PRO indexes and/or the Admiralty digests were used 
as a guide to likely locations. For 1898-1913 all boxes in the 
above-mentioned categories were checked as a precaution. 
Adm 2- Admiralty Out letters, 1665-1810 
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Adm 3- Admiralty rough minutes, 1793-1839 
Adm 12 - Digests and indexes. (Some researchers refer to this class with 
the now-extinct IND prefix. ) All papers which found their way through 
S -branch were digested and precised in these massive volumes, but letters 
and submissions addressed to other departments (such as the Surveyor's 
office) were not, unless the departmental head then made a submission to 
the Board. 
The digests and indexes make up a unique and impressive collection and 
are an under-exploited resource. They can do far more than simply 
indicate gaps in the secretariat papers where the weeders have been at 
work; with patience it is possible to reconstruct entire episodes in naval 
history from them, and many otherwise lost policy decisions are detailed in 
their pages. 
For the present thesis the digests only were used. The indexes deal with 
personnel (by name) and would be useful to biographers, but they mostly 
detail mundane requests for leave and so on. 
Submarines were digested under cuts Ila (boats) and 59-8 ('Projects 
for annoying the enemy', which eventually came to deal with torpedo 
warfare); the cut 52 (foreign countries) was checked for records of 
intelligence reports. Volumes for the period 1793-1920 were searched. 
Adrn 91 and 92 - Surveyor's department records. These large and 
crumbling volumes, most with their own indexes, record the activities of the 
Surveyor's department from the Napoleonic Wars to 1860. ' Adm 91 volumes 
are letter-books of 'Out' correspondence. The more valuable Adm 92 
series contains the Surveyor's 'Recommendation & submission letter books', 
which include copies of submissions to the Board dealing with the reasons 
for rejecting particular submarine projects, together with occasional reports 
by departmental officers on submitted inventions. Volumes for the period 
1812-1860 were examined. 
Aden 116 - Secretariat papers bound up according to subject. A basic 
PRO index exists. Large numbers of Adm 116 cases referred to in the 
digests, including several interesting-looking files on submarines, have been 
destroyed. 
Adm 137 - Papers concerning the Great War which passed through the 
Historical Section were bound up in the 600-odd page vol umes of the 
Adm 137 series. The Adm 137 papers are mostly routine 'reports of 
proceedings', but there are a few gems worth searching for. There is a 
good PRO index and most volumes have their own contents lists. The 
series includes a ten-volume collection of the wartime records of the 
Commodore (S). Many duplicates can be found in the volumes detailing the 
activities of submarines in the Baltic, detached boats based at Blyth-Tees, 
Harwich and Aberdeen, and vessels under the command of the Admiral of 
Patrols. These volumes contain docket covers bearing minutes that are not 
present in the Commodore's records. The 'North Sea' papers of 
Commodores (S) and (T) also include useful material. 
Adm 144 - Station records, Channel Fleet. Used for the manoeuvres of 
1904. Partly duplicated in the Adm 1 series. 
Adm 189 - Bound printed annual reports of HMS Vernon, 1881 -on. The 
series includes an index volume, and each report has its own index. 
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Adm 231 - Foreign Intelligence Committee and Naval Intelligence 
Department papers, 1880-1908, with some isolated reports from 1910. This 
series was recently transferred from the Naval Library, Ministry of Defence, 
and reports for the period 1908-1914 now seem to be lost. 
The Adm 231 series includes intelligence reports on foreign navies, 
'Reports on naval affairs', and summaries and analyses of several British 
manoeuvres. 
Cabinet papers 
There is a good PRO index to the papers of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. The papers themselves (available on microfilm) broadly concern 
grand strategy and are written in an extremely concise and to-the-point. 
style. 
Cab 2- Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence (1902-1914) 
Cab 3- Memoranda on home defence (1901 -1914) 
Cab 4 -- Miscellaneous memoranda (1903-1914) 
Foreign office papers 
Helpfully bound up in stout volumes, making the weeders' job particulary 
difficult, and of special importance for the pre-1900 period. Before 1906 
there is a rough PRO index by country and consulate. Each consulate 
submitted reports in the categories 'Political' (after 1872), 'Commercial' and 
'Consular'. Submarine papers are invariably included in the 'Political' series; 
before 1873 this was a sub-section of 'Commerical'. 
The FO papers were searched with the aid of the Admiralty digest. 
Sadly, naval attaches' reports were submitted direct to the Admiralty and 
do not feature at all before 1906, and only sporadically thereafter; the 
fortuitous exception that proves the rule is a volume of 1880-2 attache's 
reports from the United States in the FO 115 series. Particularly useful 
series include FO 5 (USA) and FO 65 (Russia). 
From 1906 all relevant FO papers were catalogued in the FO 371 
series. There is a PRO card index to reports. 
War office papers 
Some documents relevant to the mining and coastal defence debate were 
found in the 'printed papers' categories, WO 32 and WO 33. 
b) Department of Manuscripts, British Library 
Halifax papers (Add. Mss. 49531-49593) The papers of Sir Charles Wood, 
later Lord Halifax, the First Lord of the Admiralty during the Crimean 
War. Most important are his letter books for the Admiralty period, to 
which there is a one-volume MS index by name of correspondent. 
Arnold-Forster papers (Add. Mss. 50275-50357) The papers of HO 
Arnold-Forster, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty and later 
Secretary of State for War during the coast defence debate. They are a 
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real joy to use; all military and naval documents are meticulously indexed 
and cross-referenced and almost all the papers - including 
Arnold-Forster's important diaries - are in typescript. 
Balfour papers (Add. Mss. 49683-49962) Most significant for 
correspondence with Fisher. 
Jellicoe papers (Add. Mss. 48989-49057) Rather thin on the ground before 
1914, but there are a number of interesting Fisher letters and a few NID 
reports not to be found in the PRO. 
Keyes papers The Keyes papers have not been placed in the 'additional 
manuscripts' series; they retain the classification system devised at Churchill 
College, where they were kept until recently. There is a good index, but 
no substitute for checking the individual files. 
The most significant category in KP 4, which deals with Keyes's time 
with the submarine service and contains an imposing quantity of private and 
official papers that go far to make up for the paucity of PRO records in 
the period 1910-1914. Of particular interest is KP 4/22, the Commodore's 
correspondence with SS Hall. 
KP 2, Keyes's correspondence with his wife, begins with their enforced 
separation in 1914 and continues with a wonderfully candid commentary on 
events. 
Paul Halpern's printed selection of 'Keyes papers' has little submarine 
material, but is fairly comprehensive for Keyes's career from 1914 onwards. 
c) National Maritime Museum, Greenwich 
A wealth of material, both official and personal. 
The Adm 138 series deals with the construction history of British 
warships and is kept in the Draught Room. Each class of submarine from 
the D class on has a volume or two, while four together cover the earlier 
boats of the Holland-C classes. A few volumes, such as that for the R 
class, have gone missing. The papers cover aspects of submarine design and 
construction (mostly of a purely technical nature), occasionally straying into 
the realms of policy. 
Special permission is needed to consult draught room papers and plans, 
which include a mass of uncatalogued Thornycroft material. 
Private papers consulted in the main library include: 
Bridge papers Papers of Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge. 
D'Eyncourt papers Papers of Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt, the 
one-time DNC and chief designer at Armstrongs. Includes correspondence 
with Simon Lake and some stray strategy material from d'Eyncourt's 
Admiralty years. 
May papers Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir William May. The papers 
include reports and analyses of the 1912 and 1913 manoeuvres, which May 
umpired. 
Noel papers Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Gerard Noel. 
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Phipps Hornby papers The papers of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey 
Phipps Hornby are a valuable source for the early history of the torpedo. 
Walker papers Photostat copies of the papers of Admiral Sir Baldwin 
Wake Walker, Surveyor of the Navy in the 1850s. 
d) Churchill College archives centre, Cambridge 
Appointments are preferred at this important centre for 20th century 
political and naval history. Notable collections include: 
Fisher papers 6,000-odd items indexed by author but not by subject. The 
papers rank among the most important private sources for the history of 
the submarine. Fisher's archive contains invaluable correspondence with SS 
Hall as well as his own idiosyncratic papers on the subject. 
McKenna papers Papers of Reginald McKenna, First Lord 1908-1911. 
Tomldnson papers A four-volume war diary and forty or so letters from 
Keyes preserved by the Commodore's close friend and long-time lieutenant. 
e) Department of manuscripts, Cambridge University Library 
Graham papers Papers of Sir James Graham, First Lord 1830-34 and 
1852-55 (on microfilm). 
Vickers papers Transferred from Vickers House in 1984. Of great interest, 
but apparently weeded since being used by Scott and Trebilcock, the 
Vickers historians, whose references no longer correspond to the 
arrangement of the papers. Some material is on microfilm or bound up 
with the extensive collection of material made available to the Bankes 
Commission. There is an index volume and a few of the letter books are 
indexed by addressee. 
f) Tyne and Wear archives centre 
Armstrong papers Papers of the great Armstrong arms combine. Special 
permission is needed to consult them. 
g) Southampton University Library 
Palmerston papers The thoroughly-indexed Broadlands Mss., recently 
transferred from the National Registry of Archives, contain correspondence 
from Sir Charles Wood, the Prince Consort and John Scott Russell. 
Includes the exceptionally interesting 'Journal of the submarine vessel, 
1855'. Is this the world's oldest surviving submarine log? 
h) Naval Library, Ministry of Defence 
Located in the Empress State Building, Earl's Court. Two boxes of 
Tweedmouth papers (indexed), a collection of printed Selborne papers, a 
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volume of pre-war naval attache's reports from Berlin, the 
multiple-volume Admiralty 'Technical history' of the Great War, and 
numerous unique typescripts (including a partial translation of the German. 
official history of the war) are among the more important documents. The 
library also holds an unrivalled collection of books, pamphlets and offprints 
dealing with all aspects of naval history. Appointment necessary in the first 
instance. 
A less important collection than it once was, thanks to the transfer of 
many original papers to the PRO. 
i) Imperial War Museum 
Talbot papers The extensive diaries of Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Talbot, one 
of the pioneer submariners, provide details of his service in the submarine 
branch from 1905 to 1918. 
The Imperial War Museum library also boasts an imposing collection of 
military books and journals. An appointment is necessary. 
j) Submarine museum archives, HMS Dolphin, Gosport 
A wide variety of papers (original material and photostats, including a few 
Addison papers), press clippings and sound archives are held by the 
submarine museum, and researchers can also tap the invaluable knowledge 
of its curators. The emphasis is more on operations than on policy. 
At the time of writing, HM Submarine Holland No. 1 is on display at 
the museum, and preparations are being made for the salvage of the 
conning tower of the wartime boat E17. 
An appointment is necessary to visit the archives centre, which is 
located inside a naval base, although the museum itself is open to the 
public. 
k) New York Public Library 
The rare books room holds primary material concerning the Confederate 
submarine service, while the reading room offers a mass of American 
secondary sources - many of them not available in the UK. 
2) PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES - OFFICIAL 
Parliamentary papers: 
Naval estimates for the period 1901-1914: - 1901 x1i; 1902 lix; 1903 xxxix; 
1904 Iii; 1905 xlvii; 1906 lxix; 1907 1; 1908 1xv; 1909 liii; 1910 lxi; 
1911 xlviii; 1912-13 Iii; 1913 xliii; 1914 liii 
Command papers: 
Report of the committee on shipbuilding arrears, 1902, Cd. 1055 
Royal Commission on the private manufacture of and trading in armaments 




Hearings before the special committee investigating the munitions industry 
(Nye committee), 74th Congress, September 1934, vol. 1. Copy in VP 
145/1 
Various authors - Official records of the Union and Confederate navies 
in the War of the Rebellion. Washington 1902 
3) PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES - PRIVATE 
Brett, Maurice - Journals and letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher 
London, 4 vols, 1934-38 
Gwynn, S- The anvil of war: letters between FS Oliver and his brother 
1914-1918 London 1936 
Halpern, Paul - The Keyes papers: selections from the private and 
official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Baron Keyes of 
Zeebrugge London: Navy Records Society, 3 vols, 1972-81 
Lloyd, Christopher - The Keith papers Volume III: 1803-1815 London: 
NRS 1955 
Marder, Arthur - Fear God and dread nought: the correspondence of 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone London, 3 voll, 
1952-59 
Patterson, A. Temple - The Jellicoe papers: selections from the private 
and official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of 
Scapa London: NRS, 2 vols, 1966-8 
Ranft, Bryan - The Beatty papers: selections from the private and 
official correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty London: 
NRS 1989 
4) UNPUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES 
Cowpe, Alan - Underwater warfare and the Royal Navy, 1869-1918 
London University Ph. D. thesis, 1979-80 
Harrison, AN - Development of HM Submarines from Holland No. 1 
(1900) to Porpoise (1930) BR 3043,1979. Copies in National Maritime 
Museum and RN Submarine Museum archives. 
Henry, David - British submarine development and policy, 1919-1939 
London University Ph. D. thesis, 2 vols, 1976 
Hutcheon, Wallace - Robert Fulton and naval warfare George Washington 
University Ph. D. thesis, 1975 
Lambert, Andrew - Great Britain, the Baltic and the Russian war, 
1854-1856 London University Ph. D. thesis, 1983 
Moon, Howard - The invasion of the United Kingdom: Public controversy 
and official planning, 1888-1918 London University Ph. D. thesis, 2 
vols, 1968 
Ranft, Bryan - The naval defence of British sea-borne trade, 1860-1905 
Oxford University D. Phil. thesis, 1967 
Ropp, Theodore - The development of a modern navy: France 1871-1904 
Harvard University Ph. D. thesis, 1937 
Towle, Philip - The influence of the Russo-Japanese war on British 
military and naval thought London University Ph. D. thesis, 1973 
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Walser, John - France's search for a battleflee:: French naval policy 
1898-1914 University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) Ph. D. thesis, 
1976 
Wignall, Michael - Scientists and the 
collaboration in anti-submarine warfare, 
Ph. D. thesis, 1987 
Williams, Eustace - The Confederate 
Unpublished typescript (Van Nuys, Calif 
Public Library 
S) PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES 
Admiralty: conflict and 
1914-1921 London University 
submarine Hunley papers 
1958) in the New York 
[Note: this bibliography has been restricted to works cited in the footnotes. 
No effort has been made to compile a comprehensive listing; the reader is 
referred to the Annotated bibliography of submarine technical literature, 
1557-1953 by the Committee on Underwater Warfare, publication 307 of 
the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council, which is held 
in the library of the Imperial War Museum and elsewhere. 
Key sources are asterisked [*]. 
Anon - 'A new submarine boat', Scientific American 66 (1892) 
---- 'A submarine boat', Naval chronicle 1814 
--- 'The influence of the submarine on naval policy, parts I-III', Naval 
Review (1913,1914) 
---- 'The present condition of submarine boats', RUSI Journal LIII 
(1909) 
Armstrong, David - Bullets and bureaucrats: the machine gun and the 
United States army, 1861-1916, Westport, Connecticut 1982 
Arnold-Forster, Forster D. - The ways of the Navy, London 1931 
Bacon, Reginald - 'Notes on the causes of accidents to submarines and 
their salvage', Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects 
XLIX (1907) 
----------- The life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, London (2 
vols) 1929 
*---------- From 1900 onward, London 1940 
Bade, Roderigo Fuenzalida - La armada de Chile desde la liberacion de 
Chiloe (1826) hasta el fin de la Guerra Espana (1866), np, Chile 
1978 
Bartlett, Christopher - Great Britain and sea-power 1815-1853, Oxford 
1963 
Baxter, James - The introduction of the 
Mass., 1933 
Bennett, Geoffrey - Charlie B.: the life 
Beresford, London 1968 
Beresford, Charles - The memoirs of Lord 
vols) 1914 
ironclad warship, Cambridge, 
of Admiral Lord Charles 
Charles Beresford, London (2 
Bethge, Hans-Georg - Der Brandtaucher: ein tauchboot - von der Idee 
sur wirklichkeit, Rostock 1968 
Bolander, Louis - 'The Alligator - first Federal submarine of the Civil 
War', USNI Proceedings 64 (1938) 
Bonnett, Stanley - The price of Admiralty: an indictment of the Royal 
Navy 1805-1966, London 1968 
Bradford, Ernest - Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet 
Wilson, London 1923 
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Breyer, Siegfried - Battleships and battlecrusiers, 1905-1970, London 1973 
Brodie, Charles - Forlorn hope 1915: the submarine passage of the 
Dardanelles London, 1956 
--------- 'Some early submariners, parts I-III', Naval Review 
(1962,1963) 
Brown, John - Historical gallery of criminal portraiture, Manchester (2 
vols) 1823 
Browning, Robert - Two if by sea: the development of American coastal 
defense policy, Westport, Connecticut 1983 
Buhl, Lance - 'Mariners and machines: resistance to technological change 
in the American navy, 1865-1869', Journal of American History 
(1974) 
Cable, Frank - The birth and development of the American submarine, 
New York 1924 
Carr, William - By guess and by God: the story of the British 
submarines in the war, London nd (1931) 
de Chair, Dudley - The sea is strong, London 1961 
Chalmers, WS - The life and letters of David, Earl Beatty, Admiral of 
the Fleet, London 1951 
-------- Max Horton and the western approaches, London 1954 
Churchill, Randolph, and Martin Gilbert - Winston Spencer Churchill, 
London 1967-86 
Clarke, George (Lord Sydenham of Combe) - "'The weapon of the 
weak"', Naval Review (1933) 
Clowes, William Laird - 'Submarine boats', United Services Journal 2 
(1888-1889) 
Colomb, Philip - Memoirs of Admiral the Right Honourable Sir Astley 
Cooper Key, London 1898 
*Compton-Hall, Richard - Submarine boats: the beginnings of underwater 
warfare, London 1983 
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Poole 1985 
Cooling, Benjamin (ed) - War, business and world military-industrial 
complexes, Port Washington (NY) 1981 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Forest, F., and H. Noalhat - Les bateaux sous-marins, Paris (2 vols) 
1900 
Fyfe, Herbert - Submarine warfare, London 1907 
Gemzell, Carl-Axel - Organization, conflict, innovation: a study of 
German naval strategic planning, 1888-1940, Lund 1973 
Grant, Robert - U-boat intelligence 1914-1918, London 1969 
Hackmann, Willem - Seek and strike: sonar, anti-submarine warfare and 
the Royal Navy, 1914-1954, London 1984 
Hagan, Kenneth (ed) - In peace and war: interpretations of American 
naval history 1775-1984, Westport, Connecticut, 1984 
Hartcup, Guy - The war of innovation: scientific developments, 
1914-1918, London 1988 
Herwig, Holger - The German naval officer corps, a social and political 
study, 1890-1918, London 1983 
--------- 'Luxury' fleet: the Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918, 
London 1980 
Hessen, Robert - Steel titan: the life of Charles M Schwab, New York 
1975 
Hezlet, Arthur - The submarine and sea-power, London 1967 
Hilton, CH - 'Isaac Peral and his submarine', USNI Proceedings 82 (1956) 
Holland, John - 'Submarine navigation', Cassier's magazine, marine 
number 1897 
Holley, IB - Ideas and weapons: exploitation of the aerial weapon in the 
United States during World War I; a study in the relationship of 
technological advance, military doctrine, and the development of 
weapons, Hamden, Connecticut 1971 
Hovgaard, William - Submarine boats, London 1887 
---------- 'Proposed designs for surface boats and diving boats', 
Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects XXIX (1888) 
Hutcheon, Wallace - Robert Fulton: pioneer of undersea warfare, Annap- 
olis 1981 
*Jameson, William - The most formidable thing: the story of the 
submarine from its earliest days to the end of World War I, London 
1965 
---------- The fleet that Jack built: nine men who built a 
modern navy, London 1962 
Jellicoe, John - The submarine peril: the Admiralty policy in 1917, 
London 1934 
Jordan, Gerald (ed) - Naval warfare in the twentieth century, 1900-1945: 
essays in honour of Arthur Marder, London 1977 
Kemp, Peter - HM Submarines, London 1952 
Kennedy, Paul - The rise and fall of British naval mastery, London 1983 
------- (ed) - The war plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, 
Boston 1985 
Kennett, Lee - 'Military inventions and popular involvement, 1914-1918', 
War and Society 3 (1985) 
Kerr, Charles - All in the day's work, London 1939 
*Keyes, Roger - The naval memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger 
Keyes, London 2 voll, 1934-35 
Kipp, Jacob - 'Undersea warfare in Russian and Soviet naval art: 
historical background, 1853-1941', unpublished paper presented at 
Undersea Warfare Conference, Dalhousie University, Halifax 21-24 
June 1989, and available from Professor Kipp at the Soviet Army 
Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Lake, Simon - Submarine: the autobiography of Simon Lake, New York 
1938 
Lambert, Andrew - Battleships in transition: the creation of the steam 
battlefleet 1815-1853, London 1984 
Le Masson, Henri - Les sous-marins Francais, des nos origenes (1800) a 
nos jours, Brest 1980 
MacDougall, Phillip - The Royal dockyards, Newton Abbott nd (1982) 
*Mackay, Ruddock - Fisher of Kilverstone, Oxford 1973 
Manning, Frederick - The life of Sir William White, London 1923 
Marder, Arthur - The anatomy of British sea-power: a history of British 
naval policy in the pre-Dreadnought era, 1880-1905, London 1940 
*-------- From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy 
in the Fisher era 1904-1919, Oxford 5 vols, 1961-1970 
--------- Portrait of an Admiral: the life and papers of Sir 
Herbert Richmond, London 1952 
Mitchell, Donald -A history of Russian and Soviet sea-power, London 
1974 
Morely, Geoffrey - Smuggling in Hampshire and Dorset, 1700-1850, 
Newbury nd 
Morris, Anthony - The scaremongers: the advocacy of war and 
rearmament, 1896-1914, London 1984 
Morris, Arthur - 'A boom in submarines', Nautical magazine 71 (1902) 
Morris, Richard - John P. Holland, Annapolis 1966 
Murphy, William - Father of the submarine: the life of the Reverend 
George Garrett Pasha (London 1987) 
Nordenfelt, Thorsten - 'On submarine boats', RUSI Journal XXX (1886) 
Osborn, GA - 'Paddlewheel fighting ships of the Royal Navy', Mariners' 
Mirror 68 (1982) 
Padfield, Peter - Aim straight: a biography of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, 
London 1968 
Parks, E. Taylor - 'Robert Fulton and submarine warfare', Military affairs 
21 (1962) 
Penn, Geoffrey - 'Up funnel, down screw! ': the story of the naval 
engineer, London 1955 
Perry, Milton - Infernal machines: the story of Confederate submarine 
and mine warfare, Baton Rouge 1965 
Prendergast, Maurice, and RH Gibson - The German submarine war 
1914-1918, London 1931 
Price, Alfred - Aircraft versus submarine: the evolution of 
anti-submarine aircraft, 1912-1980, London 1973 
Ranft, Bryan (ed) - Technical change and British naval policy 1860-1939, 
London 1977 
Reppington, Charles a Court - 'New wars for old', Blackwood's Magazine 
June 1910 
Rhodes-James, Robert - Albert, Prince Consort, London 1963 
Richmond, Herbert - "'The weapon of the weak"', RUSI Journal (1932) 
Rodger, Nicholas - 'The dark ages of the Admiralty, parts I-III', 
Mariners' Mirror 61 and 62 (1975,1976) 
Roland, Alex - Underwater warfare in the age of sail, Bloomington, 
Indiana 1976 
Roskill, Stephen - Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, the last naval hero: 
an intimate biography, London 1980 
Rossler, Eberhard - The U-boat: the evolution and technical history of 
German submarines, London 1975 
Sandler, Stanley - The emergence of the modern capital ship, Newark 
1979 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Saul, Norman - Sailors in revolt: the Russian Baltic fleet in 1917, 
Lawrence, Kansas 1978 
Scheer, Reinhard - Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War, London 
1920 
Scott, John - Vickers, a history, London 1960 
Scotts Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd. - 250 years of shipbuilding by 
Scotts at Greenock, Glasgow 1961 
Semmel, Bernard - Liberalism and naval strategy: ideology, interest, and 
sea power during the Pax Britannica, Boston 1986 
Shelford, WO - Subsunk: the story of submarine escape, London 1960 
Sieche, Erwin 'Austro-Hungarian submarines', Warship V (1982) 
Sleeman, CW - 'The Lay and other locomotive torpedoes', RUSI Journal 
XXVII (1883) 
Smith, Gaddis - Britain's clandestine submarines, 1914-1915, New Haven 
1964 
Steinburg, Jonathan - Yesterday's deterrent: Tirpitz and the birth of the 
German battle fleet, London 1965 
Sueter, Murray - The evolution of the submarine boat, mine and torpedo, 
Portsmouth 1907 
Sulivan, Henry - Life and letters of the late Admiral Bartholomew James 
Sulivan, London 1896 
Sumida, Jon - In defence of naval supremacy: finance, technology and 
British naval policy 1889-1914, Boston 1989 
Symonds, Craig (ed) - New aspects of naval history: selected papers 
presented at the 4th annual naval history symposium, US Naval 
Academy, 25-26 October 1976, Annapolis 1981 
Till, Geoffrey - Air power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945, London 1979 
Till, Geoffrey, et al - Maritime strategy and the nuclear age, London 
1982 
Tirpitz, Alfred von - My memoirs, London 1919 
Travers, Timothy - The killing ground: the British Army, the Western 
Front and the emergence of modern warfare 1900-1918, London 1987 
*Trebilcock, Clive - The Vickers brothers: armaments and enterprise 
1854-1914, London 1977 
---------- 'A special relationship: government, rearmament and 
the cordite firms', Economic History Review (1966) 
Vetch, RH (ed) - The life of Lieutenant-General Sir Andrew Clarke, 
London 1905 
Weir, Gary - 'Tirpitz, technology and building U-boats, 1897-1916', 
International History Review (1984) 
Wilson, Michael - 'The British B class submarine', Warship V (1982) 
--------- Baltic assignment: British submariners in Russia, 
1914-1919, London 1985 




A class 98,106,122,124,153-4, 
242 








Addison, Percy 129,131,169-70 
Aigrette 200,209 
Aircraft, military development of 
180-1,271,276-8 
Akula 193 
Alabama Claims 67 
Albert, Prince Consort 37,42-6 
Alexandrofsky, IF 30,32.69 
Allerby, Reginald 208 
Alstitt (US inventor) 24 
Amiral Bourgois 202,206 
Anson 137 
Ariadne 298 
Archibald, Edmund 67 
Archimede 206,310 
Armstrong Whitworth & Co. 99, 111, 
113-15,121,130,131,135, 295, 
338-9 
Arnold-Forster, Forster 105 
Arnold-Forster, Hugh 51,88, 236, 
258,265,322 
Arthur, William 46,67,73 
Asquith, Herbert 241 
Aube, Theophile 80-2,261 
Austro-Hungary -- submarine p olicy 
74n, 339 
B class 122,123,124,148,242, 253, 
290,309 
B2 153 
Bacon, Reginald 31,100,105, 106, 
111,118,122,125,126, 129n, 
134,137,144,148,149,152, 154, 
161,168,174&n, 186,215, 217, 
225,234,238,244-6, 255, 
273 -4,275,307,324,325 
-- character of 125,156-60,164 
Bacchantes 213,296 
Baker, George 30 
Balfour, Arthur 136,216,262-3 
Ballard, George 254,308 
Barnaby, Nathaniel 51,72,74-5 
Bartolome, Charles de 317 
Battenburg, Louis 234,261 
Bauer, Wilhelm 36-40 
Bayly, Lewis 113,243 
Beatty, David 166,168,293, 298, 
300n, 311,316-17 
Beresford. Charles 27,78-9,159, 
173-4,176,179,192,250 
Birley, Hugh 96 
Birmingham 284 
Bonite 155 
Bourgois, Simon 23,39n, 70 
Bouvet 89 
Boyle, EC 177 
Bradford, Edward 188,292 
Der Brandraucher 36-7,40 
Brandt, Frank 161,178 
Brennan, Louis 27n, 75 
Bridge, Cyprian 33 
Brodie, CG 145n, 165,169n 
John Brown & Co. 99,114 
Brumaire 200,202 
Brun, Charles 23 
Buckley, G 21 
Burney, Cecil 271 
Bushnell, David 17-18,20,21,22, 
23,25 
Busley, Professor 207 






Caillard, Vincent 119 
Callaghan, George 166,179, 219,237, 
241,251,304 
Cammell Laird & Co. 111.1 14,295 
Capelle, Eduard 212 
Captain 55-6 
Carnarvon Commission 227 
Carp class 198 
de Chair, Dudley 113-14 
Champness, HR 79 
Charles Brun 206 
Charles Martel 89 
Childers, Hugh 56-7 
Churchill, Winstgn 112,167, 222,241, 
263,290,295,317 
Clarke, George 75-8,218, 261,262, 
272,287 
Clarke, Andrew 75-7,236 
Clorinde 205 
Cockburn, George 332 
Coles, Cowper 55 
Colville, Stanley 166 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) 
229,232,234,239,260 
Confederate Navy 24,58,62 
Corbett, Julian 261 
de Courcy, Michael 16-17 
Cowan, Walter 165,166 
Craven, Charles 101 
Cridland, Frederick 63,64n 
363 
Cromie, Francis 145,299 
Cronstadt 40,42 
Custance, Reginald 172,173,176,179, 
189,192.287-8 




Dawson, Arthur 278 
Dawson, Trevor 101,112 
Day, John 332n 
Declaration of Paris 259 
Delamater, Cornelius 67 
Delaney, William 96 
Delfin 190,191 
Del jino 70 
Denny & Co. 111 
Devastation 56 
Diable Marin 38,40 
Diana 161 
Disraeli, Benjamin 41 
Domville, William 26 
Dreadnought type 157,173.188n, 214, 
224 
Drebbel, Cornelius 332n 
Drzewiccki, Stefan 25,69,71 -2, 
190-1 
-- drop collar 29,190 
Durstan, Albert 96 










Eardley-Wilmot, Sydney 79n 
Edward VII 233 
Electric Boat Company (EBC) 95-8, 
101,103,106,107 -08,121, 135 
Emeraude 202,205 
Engines, early 23-5 
-- steam 24,65,133-4,306-14 
-- petrol 123,124 
-- diesel 124,130-323 
-- electric 130 
-- paraffin 212 
-- delays 116&n 
Engineers 143,182-3 
d'Equevilley-Montjustin, RL 209 
Ericsson, John 55 
Excellent 269 
d'Eyncourt, Eustace 242,309-10,312 
F class 122, . 131,304 
Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. 
114 
Fanshawe, EG 63 
Faraday, Michael 36 
Fenian Brotherhood 66-8 
Fenian Ram 30,67-8,73 
FIAT type 114,115,129,130 






Flach, Karl 15-17,21 
Fleet Air Arm 180-1 
Fontes, Pereira de Mello 29,69 
Foreign Office and submarines 67-8 
Forelle 209 
Forfait, Pierre 19 
Formidable 276,293 
Fournier, Francois-Ernest 204 
Fox, Charles 40 
France -- submarine policy 27, 
80-4,86,127,190,199-206, 
232,261 -2,273-4,283,335-7 
-- naval policy 52,59-60,80-4 
-- manoeuvres 59-60,86,89-90, 
204,243 
-- personnel 145 
Frederick, Duke of York 329,330, 
331 
Fulton 210 
Fulton, Robert 19-20,22,23,25,26, 
32,176,327-8.329,330,331 
G class 122,132,295,315n, 324 
G class (US) 197 
Galster, Karl 262 
Gamble, Douglas 90 
Garrett, George 24,65-6,77,96 
Germaniawerft 209,210 
Germany -- submarine policy 127, 
152-3,155,190,206-13,261-2, 
290-1,299,315-16,335-7 
-- personnel 145-6,182n, 320 
Gloire 50,80,228 
Goodenough, William 297 
Goschen, George 85,86,96 
Goubet,. Claude 80,83-4 
Gorgone class 205 
Graham, James 37,56 
Greaves, Walter 334 
Grierson, James 234 
Grigorovich, IK 193 
Grosser Kurfurst 303 
Grubb, Howard 130 
Guepe 201 
Guepratte, Emile-Paul-Amible 206 
Gustave Zede (1893) 27,29-30, 
81-29 86,89-90,200 
3 64 
Gustave Zedc (1914) 206 
Gymnote 25,28,81 
H class 196,295,315n, 318 
Hl 284 
Haggard, Vernon 138,314 
Halstead, John 25,69 
Hall, Sydney 100,122,128, 129n, 




278,286-7,295,300n, 305, 307, 
308-09,310&n, 312, 313, 
317-18,324 
-- and importance of personnel 
141-2.162-3,187,320 
-- character of 160-4 
Hall, William 181 -2,246 
Hamilton, Ian 167,300 
Hankey, Maurice 158 
Hawke 296 
Hazard 137,186 
Heaton, Lt. 284 
Hela 297 
Higgins, Pearce 261 
Hilary 266n 
Hill, Cumberland 21 
Hipper, Franz 303 
HL Hunley 23,26,32,63,65 
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, Chlodwig von 
228 
Holbrook, Norman 177 
Holland type 97,114,122,123, 128, 
135,191,197,211,242,245, 321 
Holland No.! 98,105,109,123 
Holland No. 2 109,210 
Holland No. 5 283 
Holland VI (US) 94-5,195 
Holland, John 17,23,25,30, 32, 
66-8,85,93,94-8,106 
Hood, Arthur 32 
Hope, James 42-3 
Hopkins, John . 
68 
Hoppmann, Albert 299 
Hopwood, Francis 112 
Hornby, Geoffrey Phipps 246 
Hornby, RS Phipps 269 
Horton, Max 145n, 177,297 
Housatonic 26,62 
Hovgaard, William 112-13 
Howaldt Yard 209 
Hunley, Horace 22,62 
L'Hydrostat 40 
Imperial Maritime League 173 
Indefatigable 277 
Ingenohl, Friedrich von 298-9 
Intelligent Whale 69 
J class 122,309,315n 
l! 302 
Jackson, Henry 84,86,150,221, 
254 -5 
Jackson, Thomas 75 
Japan -- submarine policy 127, 
192-3 
-- naval policy 198 
-- personnel 146 
Jaques, WH 79 
Jellicoe, John 166,168,179,220, 
241,261,279,284,292,293-4, 
304,311 
Jeune Ecole 59,80,82-3 
Johnson, Tom 329-34 
Jones, Josiah 39 
Jupiter 137 





Karp class 210,211 
Kerr, Walter 89,94,234-5,237-8 
Key, Astley Cooper 31,42,51,75 
Keys, John 167 
Keyes, Adrian 164 








-- and double hull type 128-9, 
132-4 
-- character of 164-71 
Koln 298 
Koster, Paul 339 
Krab 193 
Kronprinz Wilhelm 303 
Krupp 191,209 
(see also Germaniawerft) 
L class 315n, 318 
L class (US) 197 
L 50 class 326 
Lake, Simon 21,29,108,113-14, 
114,191,197 
Lans, Wilhelm von 211 
Laubeuf, Maxime 115,200,202,209 
Laurence, Noel 303 
Lee, Ezra 18 
Lees, Edgar 100,111,122,128,129n, 
134,160,179,183,225,239,286 
-- character of 161 -2 
Leir, Ernest 145,313 
Leveson, AJ 313-14 
365 
Little, Charles 145n, 178n 
Loewe, Sigmund 101 
Lome, Dupuy de 50,80 
Long, Samuel 78,79,80 
Lurcher 297,298 
M class 315n, 318-19,321 
McClintock, James 22,23,24, 
39n, 62-5 
McDuff, Chief Diver 42-3 
McEvoy, Captain 281 
McKechnie, James 119 
Macpherson, Henry 70 
Machine gun, development of 53, 
178n, 186n, 224,225-6.285 
Madden, Charles 181 
Magenta 86 
Mahan, Alfred 289 
Mainz 298 
Makarov, Stefan 191 
Mariotte 206 
May, William 179,188,189, 
285&n 
Merchant shipping -- losses in Vb 
War 17 
-- unrestricted submarine warfare 
257 -64 
Milne, Alexander 51 
Mines 191-2,233-7,249 















Le Napoleon 50,80 
Napoleon I 323 
Narval 81-2,200 
Nautilus (Fulton) 19-20,29,32,328 
Nautilus (Campbell & Ash) 78-9 
Afautilus (Vickers) 121,122,132,134, 
309,310 
Naval Defence Act 51,228 
Navarin 192 
Navy League 223 
Nicholson, William 63,72 
Noel, Gerald 166,175,179 
Nordenfelt I 27,28,76 
Norden felt 11 76,101 
Nordenfeli IV 76-7,79,101 
Nordenfelt, Thorsten 24,29,75-9,94 
Octopus class 197,198 
Oliver, Frederick 164,169 
Opale 202 
Ottley, Charles 95,218,282 
Oxygen consumption in submarines 
30-1 
Palmers Shipbuilding & Iron Co.. 295 
Palmerston, HJ Temple. Viscount 
41-2.44-5,228 
Pa pin 206 
Pathfinder 296,297 
Paulet. Henry 329 
Payerne, Dr 40 
Pelleton, Camille 201,204 
Peral, Isaac 25,70-1 
Phillips, Lodner 21,34,96 
Pioneer 62 
Pleveille-le-Pelley, Georges 176 
Le Plongeur 23,26,29,69,70,80, 
155 
Plunger 94,195 
Pluvoise class 202,205,206 
Pollen, Arthur 159 
Porpoise class 321 
Pound, Dudley 181 
Princip, Gavrilo 290 
Pyotr Koschka 190 
R class 305-06,315n, 318 
Reed, Edmund 50 
Repington, Charles a Court 216 
Resurgam 24,65 
Rice, Isaac 95,101,107-08,130,197 
Richards, Frederick 247 
Richmond, Herbert 260 
Riou, Oliver 24 
de Robeck, John 166,219 
Robinson, Admiral 246 
Robinson, Robert Spencer 50 
Roosevelt, Theodore 197 
Rossa, Jeremiah O'Donovan 66 
Rothschild, Nathan 96-8,101 -02 
Royal Dockyards 99,102,109-10, 
118,119,121 
Royal Engineers 75-7,92,231 -5 
Royal Navy -- and intelligence 8, 
73,83,90n, 152,213,220 
-- and conseryatism 8,49,54,56. 
87-8,91 -2,176-84 
-- and nineteenth century submarine 
records 20,34&n, 35 
-- and Crimean War 39-46,49-50 
-- early submarine policy of 44-6 
-- and innovation 46-57,71,90-3, 
214-226 
-- in 1860s and 1870s 50-1 
-- and economy 53,89,97,335-7 
-- Controller's Department of the 
55,73-4,128,129-30 
-- and torpedoes 60-1.185-8 
(see also torpedo boats) 
-- assessment of submarines 
(1856-1886) 69-75 
-- capacity for planning in nineteenth 
century 73-5,92-3 
-- and submarine design 73-4,122, 
126,129&n, 134,242 
-- submarine and naval strategy 
74-5,125,214-64,300-02,306, 
326 
-- and double-hull submarines 
81 -2,128-36 
-- orders first submarines 85, 
86-90,94-8 
-- individuals' influence on policy 
97,156-71,172-6 
-- and anti-submarine warfare 98, 
132,265-89,305-06,314,316 
-- relationships with shipbuilders 
102,103,108-21 
-- and submarine secrecy 105-06 
-- understanding of first Holland 
boats 122 
-- and coastal submarines 122-6, 
131,135,150-1,227-44, 
303-05,323 
-- and overseas submarines 122, 
125-7,132,133,150,216-18, 
220-24,244-64,297-303,324 
-- and continuity in design 127-8 
-- and fleet submarines 128, 
306-14,319,325-6 
-- and submarine commitee (Keyes) 
128-9,135,283,307-08 
-- unwillingness of to accept foreign 
designs 130-1 
-- and development of 'strategy led' 
submarine branch 135 
-- and recruitment of submariners 
137-45,181-2,340-1 
-- creates closed service in submarine 
branch 146-53,320 
-- and submarine committee (Burney) 
150,270-1,273,286 
-- and submarine safety 153-6 




-- and temperance among submariners 
155n 
-- and Battle of the Heligoland Bight 
165,297-9,319 
-- 'Blue Water School' of 173-4, 
228-9,240-4 
-- submarine branch compared to 
Fleet Air Arm 180-1 
-- submarine branch compared to 
engineering branch 182-3 
-- and understanding of submarines in 
fleet 183-9 
-- and moral effect of submarines 
214,244-6,319-20 
-- blockade strategy of 214, 
215-16,244-56,301 -03,324 
m 
-- submarine and destroyers 
219- 20,245,256,326 
-- and War Staff 220,221,222, 
237,254-5 
-- on ships vs. forts 230 
-- dislike of mines 233-5 
-- and commerce warfare 257-64 
-- and Great War 290-314,320 
-- submarines lost in Great War 
300n, 346,348 
-- and Battle of May Island 314, 
319 
-- and post-war submarine policy 
315-21 
Royal Naval Air Service 180n, 181, 
278 
Rubis 202 
Rundell, Lt. Cdr. 181 
Rurik 257 
Russia -- submarine policy 71 -2, 
79,190-5 
-- personnel 58,146 
Russo-Japanese War 187,188n, 
190-3,231 
S class 122,130 
Schri ider-Laubeuf 115,131 
Scott, Percy 179,222-4,262 
Scotts Shipbuilding Co. 111,114,115, 
121&n, 130,135,295,309 
Scott Russell, John 22,25,32,37-8, 
40-5,326 
Selbourne, 2nd Earl of 235,262, 
285&n 
Shove, Herbert 177 
Simon Lake X 197 
Skipjack 196 
Som 191 
Steward, Hardinge 75.77 
Stokers 140,143,182 
Sturdee, Doveton 165,295 
Sulivan, Batholomew 42 
Suvoroff 192 
Swan Hunter 111 
Swordfish 122,133,134,309 
Symons, Nathaniel 332n 
Talbot, Cecil 177,297 
Thames 137 
Thomson, Gaston 127,201,203,205 
Torpedoes -- spar 26,58 
-- Whitehead 26-91 185-8,318 
-- dangerous to submarines 27 
-- Lay 28 
-- Nordenfelt 28 
-- Brennan 75 
-- hit ratios 186-8.243 
Torpedo boats 24,58-61,75,151, 
246-7 
Torpedo personnel 142-3 
t 
3&" 
Torpedo tubes -- submerged 28-9, 
127,132,242-3 
-- Drzewiecki 29,190 
-- beam 243-4 
Tryon, George 246-7 
Tuck, Josiah 66 
Tudor, Henry 83 
Turret ships 55-6 
Turtle 17-18 











U27 class 325 
UB class 320 
United States -- submarine policy 
33,92,94,190,195-99,232 
-- Navy 52-3,107. 
-- personnel 146,182-3 
V class 121,122,131 -2,304 




\'_kers, Sons & Maxim 98,99-121, 
123,124,127,128,131,134-6, 
281,307,309-10,312,338-9 
Vickers, Albert 100-01,107 
Vickers, Tom 100 
de Villeroi, Brutus 22,23 
Viper class 198 
Virginia 22 
Vyvyan, Arthur 251 -2 
W class 122 
Waistell, Arthur 169 
War Office 228,241 
(see, also Royal Engineers) 
Warrender, George 166 
Warrior 50 
Watts, Philip 115 
Weddingen, Otto 213 
Wemyss, Rosslyn 162n, 326 
Westfalen 353 
White, William 52,73-4,76-80,97 
Whitehead, Robert 26,27&n 
Williams, HG 129 
Williamson, Hugh 129 






Wintz, Lewis 83 
Wireless Telegraphy 144,255-6, 
302&n 




Zede, Gustave 80-1 
Zeebrugge Raid 160n, 165 
Zeye, Admiral 209,211 
